Chairman of the KGB 1991. Chairman of the State Security Committee of the USSR

  • 29.07.2019

WHO HAS IGNORANCE AND WHO HAS IMMORTALITY
“Father! let them go, they don’t know what they are doing..."
From the memoirs of Lieutenant General of the KGB of the USSR Nikolai Sergeevich Leonov about the events of August 1991 in Moscow:
- Nikolai Sergeevich, reflecting on the role of the individual in history, you once told one episode when you were sitting in the KGB building on Lubyanka in August 1991, around which an angry crowd was raging, and you were waiting for it to break in, and That’s when the will of one person manifested itself...
- Such moments happen in the life of any person. And they, as the famous song says, “distribute shame to some, disgrace to others, and immortality to others.” I, of course, remember well this terrible day on August 21, when it became clear that members of the State Emergency Committee were arrested, and at the board of the State Security Committee we learned that Kryuchkov was arrested upon his return from Foros, and the now deceased Shebarshin was appointed temporary chairman of the KGB. At the same time, we saw from the windows that a huge mass of people was gathering on Dzerzhinsky Square. We were talking about 10-15 thousand people, extremely excited. The situation was very dangerous. By the way, from the windows of the upper floors you could see people standing in all the alleys, pouring vodka and alcohol from canisters into paper cups and offering them to everyone who came up.
The committee buildings were barricaded, and the guards kept asking what we would do if the building was stormed? And many speakers openly called for this. Through amplifiers they called: “Let’s go storm the committee, let’s take all the documents.” And now the question was what to do for the State Security Committee. Shebarshin called Yeltsin on the phone. I think it was Burbulis who answered the phone. Shebarshin reported that there is a threat of storming the KGB building, we have several thousand officers in the State Security Committee, bloodshed could occur... And then the head of the border troops, Colonel General Yakov Kalinichenko, stood up and said: “I am responsible for the main directorate of the border troops. Our border guard officers will not allow themselves, like sheep, to have their throats cut in their offices. We will protect the documentation and archives of the border troops by force of arms. We have 200 machines that will now go into operation if needed.” Like this! These words were transmitted, including directly to Yeltsin’s reception. And he immediately arrived, 15 minutes later, spoke in the square and began calling for everything to stop, because he understood what this could escalate into...
- What then happened to the fate of General Kalinichenko?
- He was fired, of course. But he normally remained on his pension, which he was not deprived of. Of the entire KGB leadership, General Plekhanov, who was the head of the 9th Security Directorate, suffered the most. He was punished personally by Gorbachev upon returning from Foros; deprived him of his title, his pension, everything. He was rehabilitated only a week before his death. And Kalinichenko lived like an ordinary pensioner. He did not dirty himself in any way - a real military leader and a worthy person (but by a strange coincidence, he died, again on August 28, 1997, at the age of only 66 years - A.V.).
After the failure of the State Emergency Committee, on August 23, 1991, at the insistence of Yeltsin, USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev and the presidents union republics During a meeting in the Kremlin, without agreement with the board of the KGB of the USSR, they offered the former first secretary of the Kemerovo regional committee of the CPSU Vadim Bakatin, a foreman by education like Yeltsin, to head the KGB of the USSR for its reorganization and reform. Later, in his memoirs, the alcoholic and pathological sadist Yeltsin explained the purpose of this appointment: “He was faced with the task of destroying this terrible system of suppression, which had been preserved since Stalin’s times.”
In 1988, having entered the office of the Secretary General as an instructor, Vadim Bakatin emerged as the Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR, and then he suffered... Having settled comfortably in the ministerial chair, enjoying the full support of Gorbachev and Politburo member Ligachev, Bakatin first of all requested the affairs of paid agents of influence, which was used in development crime bosses and thieves in law of the Soviet Union. And what? 90% of the secret assistants of the operational staff of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, who ruined their health in cells and in zones, risking their lives, were fired without severance pay and without a pension! Even his work books did not include years of secret work for the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Bakatin called the operation to eliminate police agents of influence “Clean Field.” The generals of the Ministry of Internal Affairs remained silent - perestroika!
Becoming last chairman KGB of the USSR, Bakatin held this position until January 15, 1992. The removal of individual structures from the KGB of the USSR, their reassignment to other departments or giving them independent status began already in August 1991. In his book “Getting Rid of the KGB,” Bakatin defined his own role in the committee as follows: “I was forced not just to start slaughtering livestock, but to exterminate it...”
Bakatin reveled in the role of a temporary worker unique in world history, who headed the most important state institute in order to destroy it. Apparently, the former foreman enjoyed the role of a liquidator of all-Union significance and swaggered around carrying out anti-state, criminal clean-ups. Objective facts testify: Bakatin, with his “reforms,” sharply weakened the activities of the most important law enforcement institutions precisely at the moment when they needed to be strengthened in every possible way. Professional crime immediately took advantage of this, quickly developing into organized crime. Police and intelligence services Western countries consider working with agents to be one of their main directions, as evidenced by dozens of Western TV series that have filled the Russian screen. But Bakatin destroyed this institution of informants with one stroke of his pen. The number of agents was reduced thousands of times, and their files had to be destroyed by order of the would-be minister. It seems that criminals and foreign intelligence agents are obliged to erect a monument to Bakatin in gold, sprinkled with diamonds...
Unexpected and, most importantly, timely assistance to Bakatin in his savage deeds was provided by the CIA, which developed Operation “Slander” to discredit KGB officers with the help of a stream of anonymous letters. But at first, “white doves” with accusations against the security officers ended up in the letters department of the CPSU Central Committee, because they were addressed to General Secretary Gorbachev. Hasty checks ended in party courts, which passed sweeping verdicts. A massive outflow of professionals from the KGB of the USSR began.
With the sanction of the country's leadership - by decision of Gorbachev - Bakakin, as a sign of “good will”, on December 5, 1991, handed over to the US Ambassador to the USSR Robert Strauss technical documentation related to the installation and use of top-secret listening devices in the new building of the US Embassy in Moscow. The then head of the Federal Security Agency of the RSFSR, Major General Viktor Valentinovich Ivanenko, formerly deputy. Head of the USSR KGB Directorate for Tyumen region And good friend my father, recalled this: “He passed the system without consulting with professionals. I only found out about this on the radio. Bakatin later said that he agreed on this step with both presidents (apparently, the USSR and the RSFSR), he had a letter with their visas. But is this the competence of presidents? I think they didn't understand what this could lead to. And for the KGB officers it was a blow. Hand over the holy of holies - the technique of eavesdropping in the embassy, ​​if not of the enemy, then of a competitor! Bakatin made excuses: they say, the Americans knew about it anyway. Nothing like this! There it was applied completely new technology. Elements of the sound-conducting system were walled up in bricks. We received them from foreign suppliers. It was know-how. They were built by foreign contractors whom the Americans trusted. The KGB recruited contractors."
Strictly speaking, Bakakin and scum like him are not traitors. They are the real enemies, they zealously served the authorities who appointed them and scrupulously carried out all his instructions. It turns out that the enemies were sitting at the very top...
It became known from the American media that until 1995, Bakakin and his family lived in Alabama, on the first floor of the two-story cottage of defector intelligence officer Oleg Kalugin. This character is there under the protection of the American Federal Act "On the Protection of Helpers Promoting the Prosperity of the United States of America." In 1996, on the eve of Boris Yeltsin's re-election as president Russian Federation, the CIA leadership, realizing the complete failure of Bakakin as their consultant on countering Russian intelligence services, decided to “finish the marathon” and invited him to leave the United States.
According to unconfirmed reports, Bakakin, having returned to Moscow, with the help of the already ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs Kozyrev, got an appointment with Yeltsin. Having fallen at the feet of “Tsar Boris,” he begged for indulgence and a 5-room apartment in the “general’s houses” on Frunzenskaya Embankment.
Later he worked as an adviser to the Alfa Cement company.
“U T V E R J D A Y”
Chairman of the KGB of the USSR
lieutenant general
V.V. Bakatin
“____“ September 1991
CONCLUSION
based on materials from the investigation into the role and participation of KGB officials of the USSR
in the events of August 19-21, 1991.
Pursuant to the order of the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR No. 140 dated September 1, 1991 special commission The KGB of the USSR conducted an official investigation into the actions of officials of the KGB of the USSR, state security agencies and troops of the KGB of the USSR on the eve of and during the anti-constitutional coup in August of this year.
From the investigation materials it is clear that back in December 1990 Kryuchkov V.A. instructed the former deputy head of the PGU KGB of the USSR V.I. Zhizhin. and assistant former first Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the USSR V.F. Grushko Egorov A.G. carry out the study of possible initial measures to stabilize the situation in the country in the event of a state of emergency. These materials were prepared, but, according to the performers, they were not used until the beginning of August 1991.
With a high degree of certainty it can be assumed that from the end of 1990 to the beginning of August 1991, taking into account the current situation in the country, V.A. Kryuchkov. together with other future members of the State Emergency Committee, they took possible political and other measures to introduce a state of emergency in the USSR by constitutional means. However, without receiving the support of the President of the USSR and Supreme Council USSR, these persons, from the beginning of August 1991, began to implement specific measures to prepare for the introduction state of emergency illegally.
From August 7 to 15 Kryuchkov V.A. He repeatedly held meetings with some members of the future State Emergency Committee at the secret facility of the PGU KGB of the USSR, codenamed “ABC”. During the same period of time, Zhizhin V.I. and Egorov A.G. At the direction of Kryuchkov, we corrected the December documents on the problems of introducing a state of emergency in the country. They also with the participation of the then commander of the airborne troops, Lieutenant General P.S. Grachev. prepared for V.A. Kryuchkov data about possible reaction population of the country for introduction to constitutional form state of emergency. The content of these documents was later reflected in official decrees, appeals and orders of the State Emergency Committee. August 17 Zhizhin V.I. participated in the preparation of the abstracts of V.A. Kryuchkov’s speech. on television in case of a state of emergency.
The materials obtained during the investigation indicate that the participants in the conspiracy at various stages of its implementation assigned the KGB of the USSR a decisive role in carrying out the following tasks:
removing the President of the USSR from power by isolating him;
blocking possible attempts by the President of the RSFSR to resist the activities of the State Emergency Committee;
establishing constant control over the whereabouts of the heads of government bodies of the RSFSR, Moscow, people's deputies of the USSR, RSFSR and Moscow City Council, known for their democratic views, and major public figures with a view to their subsequent detention;
implementation together with parts Soviet army and units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs stormed the building of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR with the subsequent internment of persons captured there, including the Russian leadership.
For these tasks, the former chairman of the KGB of the USSR V.A. Kryuchkov, using his official position, attracted individual, including special forces and funds of units of the central apparatus and troops of the KGB of the USSR.
As a result, during the period from August 17 to 19, some special forces of the KGB of the USSR and special forces of the PGU KGB of the USSR were put on heightened combat readiness and redeployed to pre-designated places to participate, together with units of the SA and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in measures to ensure the state of emergency.
Through specially created groups, on August 18, USSR President M.S. Gorbachev was isolated in a vacation spot in Foros, and behind the President of the RSFSR B.N. Yeltsin. and other persons opposed to the conspirators established external surveillance.
With the participation of forces and means of the KGB of the USSR, other measures were also carried out aimed at creating conditions for the implementation of the conspiracy.
Thus, after the announcement on August 19 of the formation of the State Emergency Committee and the introduction of a state of emergency, the leadership of the Committee took measures aimed at increasing the combat readiness of the KGB bodies and troops and ensuring their participation in the implementation of the decisions and instructions of the State Emergency Committee. Using the forces of the KGB of the USSR, control over the activities of funds was organized mass media, the reaction of the population in the USSR and foreign circles to events in the USSR was studied.
On August 20, preparations were made for the previously unplanned seizure of the building of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR by groups special purpose The KGB of the USSR using units of the SA, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and special forces of the KGB of the USSR in this operation. At the same time, due to the impossibility of carrying it out without significant casualties on the part of the civilian population, the assault was canceled.
Carrying out general management of the ongoing events, Kryuchkov V.A. For these purposes, he actively used people close to him from among the leadership of the KGB of the USSR, who, according to his instructions, organized the deployment of individual forces and means of units of the Central Apparatus and troops of the KGB of the USSR in specific areas and directions
In particular:
First Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the USSR, Colonel General F.V. Grushko
He was a direct participant in the conspiracy, repeatedly together with V.A. Kryuchkov. attended his meetings with members of the State Emergency Committee. Systematically took part in the work of the so-called. working group Baklanova O.D. Along with Kryuchkov V.A. gave the most important orders to use the capabilities of the USSR State Security Committee to implement the plans of the conspirators. He directly ordered the preparation of measures to isolate the President of the RSFSR, the involvement of special forces of the PGU KGB of the USSR, and the strengthening of security measures at the USSR State Television and Radio.
First Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the USSR, Colonel General Ageev G.E.
Directly led the measures to isolate the President of the USSR by turning off communications at the Zarya facility in Foros and reassigning the 79th border detachment and the 5th separate brigade border patrol ships to the head of the Security Service of the KGB of the USSR, Yu.S. Plekhanov. and his deputy Generalov V.V. On his direct orders, preparations were made for the detention and isolation of the President of the RSFSR and the leadership of the Russian Federation, the blocking of the building of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR in contact with units of the Soviet Army and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR, its subsequent assault, the disarmament of the persons in it and their internment. He gave orders to form and send groups of operational officers to Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia to ensure a state of emergency. On August 15, he personally briefed the head of the 12th department of the KGB of the USSR, Major General E.I. Kalgin, who was called back from vacation. and the head of the KGB of the USSR, Lieutenant General Bedu A.G. on the organization of auditory control in relation to a number of leaders of the USSR and the RSFSR, served by top secret, secret and city telephone communications at their places of work and residence. From August 18, he provided general guidance on the use of the forces and means of the units of the Central Apparatus and the KGB troops of the USSR involved in the implementation of the conspiracy. As a representative of the KGB of the USSR, he took part in a meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers of the USSR on August 19 of this year, supervised the preparation of individual documents on the activities of the bodies and troops of the KGB of the USSR in a state of emergency, sent to the localities.
Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the USSR, Major General V.F. Lebedev
On August 18 he gave instructions to organize external surveillance of a number of leaders of the USSR and the RSFSR, people's deputies of the USSR and the RSFSR, prominent public figures, and the administrative detention of some of them. In particular, on his direct orders, the forces of Directorate “Z” and Directorate 7 of the KGB of the USSR were used to detain Urazhtsev, Gdlyan, Proselkov, Kamchatov. Created an information support group for the state of emergency, supervised the preparation and distribution of documents of the State Emergency Committee, as well as those related to the activities of the media, including in relation to the Ekho Moskvy radio station.
Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the USSR, Lieutenant General Petrovas I.K.
He gave the order to bring special forces into combat readiness and sent specific instructions to the bodies and troops of the KGB of the USSR, regulating their actions in conditions of increased combat readiness. He provided leadership and coordination of actions with the USSR Ministry of Defense to advance troops towards Moscow, including in preparation for the assault on the building of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. On his command, 300 personnel of the 103rd Airborne Division were sent to the Baltic states.
Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the USSR, Head of the Directorate of the KGB of the USSR for Moscow and the Moscow Region, Lieutenant General V.M. Prilukov.
On August 17, V.A. Kryuchkov was introduced to him. with the main idea of ​​the conspiracy and, starting from August 18, took practical measures to participate in its implementation using the forces and means of the KGB. He took personal part in all meetings with the leadership of the KGB of the USSR and the USSR Ministry of Defense, where specific measures were developed for the use of troops, special forces and operational personnel in Moscow, and gave instructions for their implementation to his deputies.
The data obtained by the commission regarding the above-mentioned persons gives reason to believe that even a few days before August 19, they were, to one degree or another, aware of the plans of the conspirators and consciously acted in their interests.
At the same time, from the investigation materials it is clear that a number of heads of units of the Central Apparatus and troops of the KGB of the USSR actively participated in the implementation of their instructions. Moreover, some of them, even before the events began, had information about the direction and goals of the activities they were carrying out, however, before signs of failure of the conspiracy of specific steps appeared no efforts were made to counteract it. During the work of the commission, some of them showed insincerity and tried to diminish their share of responsibility.
In particular:
Head of Directorate “Z” of the KGB of the USSR, Major General V.P. Vorotnikov.
According to the deputy head of Department “Z” Moroz A.V. Vorotnikov informed him that at 18:00 on August 18, a state of emergency would be declared in the country. On the same day, by 16:00, he ensured that Department employees were called and sent together with representatives of the Third Main Directorate on a special flight to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. At the same time, on his instructions, a group of 11 employees of Directorate “3” and 7 employees of the Directorate for State Security in Moscow and the Moscow Region was formed to carry out administrative detentions. (During the briefing, each group member was given blank forms for orders for administrative detention, the implementation of which was envisaged in cooperation with the “NN” brigades).
On August 19, I received from V.F. Lebedev. a list of persons subject to secret surveillance and detention, and handed it over to G.V. Dobrovolsky.
Deputy beginning Directorate “3” of the KGB of the USSR, Major General Dobrovolsky G.V.
As the leader of the above group, he directly supervised the efforts to detain Urazhtsev, Gdlyan, Komchatov and Proselkov.
Head of the Border Troops of the KGB of the USSR, Colonel General Kalinichenko I.Ya.
On August 18, he set tasks for the Simferopol border detachment and the Balakovo brigade of border patrol ships to increase attention to protecting the area of ​​the recreation area of ​​the President of the USSR and to subordinate the commanders of these units only to the head of the security service, Lieutenant General Yu.S. Plekhanov. and his deputy, Major General V.V. Generalov. Having learned on August 19 about the introduction of a state of emergency in the country, he gave an order to strengthen the security of the state border, and at a meeting of the leaders of the Main Directorate, he announced an order to transfer troops to a state of high combat readiness. Signed and sent to the troops prepared by the head of the Military-Political Directorate of Border Troops, Lieutenant General N.V. Britvin. an instruction in which it was proposed to widely promote the documents of the State Emergency Committee among all categories of military personnel and to take part in the work of the CHR created locally in the interests of fulfilling official tasks. These documents, also signed by the secretary of the party committee of the border troops, Major General V.G. Antsupov, recommended that measures to implement the decisions of the State Emergency Committee be discussed at party meetings.
Head of the 3rd Main Directorate, Vice Admiral A.V. Zhardetsky
I knew about the existence of the State Emergency Committee and its plans since August 18. He personally took part in meetings with the leadership of the KGB and the USSR Ministry of Defense, where issues of forming forces and means to block the building of the RSFSR Armed Forces and storm it were resolved, and gave instructions to his deputies on their implementation. On his instructions, operational groups were formed at the Main Directorate: for operations at the building of the RSFSR Armed Forces, headed by the Deputy Head of the USSR KGB Office for the Internal Troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, Major General Yu.A. Gushchei; to fly to the Baltics under the leadership of his deputy, Major General N.I. Ryzhak; to analyze the operational situation, as well as the reserve group.
Deputy Head of the Third Main Directorate of the KGB of the USSR, Major General Bulygin Yu.E.
He supervised the bodies subordinate to the Main Directorate, gave instructions to the heads of the Special Departments of the KGB of the USSR in the Military Districts that, due to the aggravation of the situation in a number of regions on the eve of the signing of the Union Treaty, authorized representatives of the USSR Ministry of Defense were sent there, with whom they should come into contact and receive appropriate explanations for further actions.
Deputy Head of the Third Main Directorate of the KGB of the USSR, Major General Ryzhak N.I.
He exercised general leadership of the operational groups that flew to the Baltic States on August 18, led by him. On August 19-20, on personal initiative, he sent from special department KGB according to Prib. Three encrypted telegrams were sent to the military counterintelligence of the Baltic zone and the KGB of the USSR, which expressed actual support for the actions of the State Emergency Committee, and proposals were made to introduce a state of emergency in the Baltic states.
Deputy Head of the USSR KGB for Moscow and the Moscow Region, Colonel Karabanov E.P.
He personally took part in a meeting with the leadership of the KGB of the USSR and in the USSR Ministry of Defense when discussing issues of the storming of the building of the RSFSR Armed Forces, the administrative detention of a number of people there, directly supervised the development of a plan to ensure the state of emergency in Moscow, and personally gave orders for the planning and preparation of measures on the participation of the KGB in the assault.
Deputy Head of the KGB for Moscow and Moscow Region, Major General Kucherov V.K.
From August 19, he headed the operational headquarters created at the KGB. On his instructions, a coded telegram was sent to the city district authorities on August 19 “to clarify the availability of a printed base, cable television and taking control of their work.” Sent groups of employees of the “Z” service of the KGB to deliver notifications to publishing houses about the closure of publication of some central, Moscow city and regional publications. Gave instructions to the head of the department of Service “Z” Ryazanov A.I. take part in a discussion with the Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the USSR V.F. Lebedev. the issue of localizing the activities of the radio station “Echo of Moscow”, assigning several employees of the KGB for this purpose. On the morning of August 19, he sent 7 people to the disposal of the deputy head of Directorate “Z” of the KGB of the USSR G.V. Dobrovolsky. to participate in the administrative detention of some people's deputies.
Deputy Head of the KGB for Moscow and Moscow Region, Major General Korsak A.B.
As deputy director operational headquarters, coordinated actions with airborne troops to block the Moscow City Council, the Ostankino television center, the State Bank and the Gokhran of the USSR.
He gave instructions to issue service weapons to 7 employees of the KGB. He personally took part in meetings with the leadership of the KGB of the USSR and the USSR Ministry of Defense, at which issues of military operations in the area of ​​the building of the RSFSR Armed Forces were discussed. He gave the necessary orders for the preparation of KGB officers to participate in the storming of the building of the RSFSR Armed Forces. Despite the decisive refusal of the heads of the operational units of the KGB to participate in this action, he gave instructions to continue the necessary preparations for the assault. Generals Alferov, Korsak, Kucherov did not communicate to the department employees the documents received through liaison officers, accepted by the Russian and Moscow leadership, and until the evening of August 20, they did not try to give a fundamental assessment of the actions of the State Emergency Committee.
Head of the 7th Directorate of the KGB of the USSR, Lieutenant General Raschepov E.M.
During the period of preparation and introduction of a state of emergency, he was directly involved in organizing activities for secret surveillance of the heads of government bodies of the RSFSR, Moscow, people's deputies USSR, RSFSR and Mossovet, gave instructions to subordinates for their participation in the administrative detention of four of them. On August 18 at 2 p.m., he personally handed over lists of Soviet citizens to a group of heads of external intelligence units and gave instructions to urgently place them under surveillance. There were 63 people on the lists, including Rutskoy, Khasbulatov, Burbulis, Popov, Luzhkov, Yakovlev, Shevardnadze, Shakhrai, Stankevich.
On August 17, before the return of the President of the RSFSR from Almaty, together with the head of group “A” of the 7th Directorate of the KGB of the USSR, Major General V.F. Karpukhin. studied the conditions for carrying out measures for the possible detention of B.N. Yeltsin. at the Chkalovsky airport. For these purposes, I personally went to the site, set the task of preparing 25-30 employees of group “A” for this and coordinating actions with the USSR Ministry of Defense. The next day, similar events were carried out at the Sosenki-4 and Arkhangelskoye-2 complexes. On the special instructions of Raschepov E.M. On August 18, external surveillance forces recorded the arrival of B.N. Yeltsin. to Vnukovo airport and his arrival at the dacha in the Arkhangelskoye-2 village.
In addition, Raschepov E.M. instructions were given to prepare the necessary forces to organize external surveillance of V.V. Bakatin, but work on it should not begin until further notice.
Commander of Group “A” of the 7th Directorate of the KGB of the USSR, Major General Karpukhin V.F.
By orders of V.A. Kryuchkov and Grushko V.F., Ageev and Raschepov, on August 17 and 18, brought the group’s personnel into combat readiness, prepared special measures against the President of the RSFSR, carried out reconnaissance at the Chkalovsky airport, in the Sosenki and Arkhangelskoye dacha complexes. On his command, group “A” of 60 people moved on August 19 to the Arkhangelskoye area. At the direction of Ageev, he prepared the assault by group “A” together with units of the Soviet Army and the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs of the building of the RSFSR Armed Forces. Taking into account the current situation around the building of the RSFSR Armed Forces, the negative attitude of the group’s personnel and attached units, I reported to Ageev that the operation was inappropriate.
Head of the 12th Department of the KGB of the USSR, Major General Kalgin E.I.
On the personal instructions of V.A. Kryuchkov, having received instructions from G.E. Ageev. in violation of the laws of the USSR and current regulations, he gave orders to the first deputy head of the 12th department, Major General G.V. Guskov. on the organization of technical execution of control in relation to the leaders of the USSR and Russia. Auditory control was carried out from August 18 to 21, the incoming information was orally reported to Kalgin, and, according to his instructions, partially stated in writing without appropriate accounting. Kalgin introduced Kryuchkov to the materials received, and in his absence Ageev. Kalgin and his deputies, Generals Guskov, Smirnova, Colonels Kutny, Abakumov, Fetisov, behaved insincerely during the official investigation; they reported truthful information only upon presentation of facts incriminating them of illegal actions.
Head of Department government communications KGB of the USSR, Lieutenant General Beda A.G.
On the personal instructions of Kryuchkov, on August 15-17, he organized the supply of government communication lines to the 12th department of the KGB of the USSR for subscribers - the leaders of the USSR and Russia. On August 15, at the direction of Ageev, he sent, as part of the operational group of the USSR KGB Security Service that flew to Crimea, UPS officers headed by his deputy, Major General A.S. Glushchenko, subordinating him to the head of the USSR KGB Security Service. At the direction of Plekhanov Yu.S. August 18 at 16.30 Glushchenko A.S. gave the order to the head of the 21st department of the Department of the Criminal Investigation Department of the KGB of the USSR S.V. Parusnikov. turn off all types of communication at the dacha of the President of the USSR in Foros (Object “Zarya”). At the same time, from 18.00 on August 18 to 9.00 on August 22, the Security Service of the KGB of the USSR cut off communications with the border troops units guarding the external perimeter of the dacha of the President of the USSR. On August 19, by order of V.A. Kryuchkov. gave instructions to turn off the government long-distance communication devices of Yeltsin B.N., Silaev I.S., Burbulis G.E.
Head of the Legal Department with Arbitration of the KGB of the USSR, Major General of Justice Alekseev V.I.
Together with the senior consultant of the Group of Consultants under the Chairmen of the KGB of the USSR Sidorenko A.G. and the head of the secretariat of the KGB of the USSR Sidak V.A. On August 20, we prepared a draft of Yanaev’s Decree “On Decrees of the President of the RSFSR Nos. 59,61 and 63 of August 19, 1991.” He was involved by the leadership of the KGB in the legal assessment and consultations of some other regulatory documents.
Regarding the role of other officials of the Central Apparatus and KGB troops in the preparation and participation in the events of August 19-21, it should be noted that they learned about their beginning from media reports or upon arrival at the USSR KGB on the morning of August 19. Subsequently, they acted in strict accordance and within the framework of their functional responsibilities. The work of the divisions they headed was carried out in normal mode, with the exception of the introduction of increased duty of personnel and the implementation of individual instructions from the leadership of the KGB of the USSR.
BALLAD ABOUT THE MONUMENT
I
The following story is told in the mountains:
War has come to North Caucasus,
And a statue with an outstretched hand
The enemy saw it over the foamy river.
- Put away! - said German general
And he ordered the bronze to be melted down.
And then the statue lay on the ground.
And in the evening, when the darkness thickened,
German machine gunners convoy
She was taken away in a truck.
II
That night a storm raged on the slopes,
In the gorges of the mountains hiding partisans.
And where there was a turn in the road,
The machine gun spoke in Russian.
And the echo echoed him in the mountains
In all guttural mountain languages.
And the heights lit up with shots:
In the gorges of the mountains they fought for Lenin.
And Lenin himself - from a truck -
I watched this partisan battle.
III
People in the town woke up in the morning,
And the children were the first to go to the river.
They went to look at the pedestal
Where Lenin stood for so many years and winters.
And they see: Lenin is safe and sound
And he also extends his hand to them.
As before, he extends his hand to them
And he says: “Friends, we will win!”
He speaks - or the river roars,
Running here from afar...

The Federal Security Service (FSB) of Russia celebrates its 20th anniversary. April 3, 1995 Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed the law “On the Federal Security Service Bodies in the Russian Federation.” In accordance with the document, the Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK) was transformed into the Federal Security Service.

In 2014, terrorist crimes were committed 2.6 times less than in 2013. Last year, the Service stopped the activities of 52 career employees and 290 agents foreign intelligence services, during the same period, it was possible to prevent damage to the state from corruption in the amount of about 142 billion rubles

AiF.ru talks about the FSB and its predecessors, who guarded the state interests of the USSR.

Cheka (1917-1922)

The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission (VChK) was created on December 7, 1917 as an organ of the “dictatorship of the proletariat.” The main task The commission was fighting counter-revolution and sabotage. The agency also performed the functions of intelligence, counterintelligence and political investigation. Since 1921, the tasks of the Cheka included the elimination of homelessness and neglect among children.

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR Vladimir Lenin called the Cheka “a devastating weapon against countless conspiracies, countless attempts on Soviet power from people who were infinitely stronger than us.”

The people called the commission “the emergency”, and its employees - “chekists”. Headed the first Soviet state security agency Felix Dzerzhinsky. Under new structure The building of the former mayor of Petrograd, located at Gorokhovaya, 2, was allocated.

In February 1918, Cheka employees received the right to shoot criminals on the spot without trial or investigation in accordance with the decree “The Fatherland is in Danger!”

Capital punishment was allowed to be applied against “enemy agents, speculators, thugs, hooligans, counter-revolutionary agitators, German spies,” and later “all persons involved in White Guard organizations, conspiracies and rebellions.”

Ending civil war and the decline of the wave peasant uprisings made the further existence of the expanded repressive apparatus, whose activities had practically no legal restrictions, meaningless. Therefore, by 1921, the party was faced with the question of reforming the organization.

OGPU (1923-1934)

On February 6, 1922, the Cheka was finally abolished, and its powers were transferred to the State political management, which later received the name United (OGPU). As Lenin emphasized: “... the abolition of the Cheka and the creation of the GPU does not simply mean changing the name of the bodies, but consists of changing the nature of the entire activity of the body during the period of peaceful construction of the state in a new situation...”.

The chairman of the department until July 20, 1926 was Felix Dzerzhinsky; after his death, this post was taken by the former People's Commissar of Finance Vyacheslav Menzhinsky.

The main task of the new body was the same fight against counter-revolution in all its manifestations. Subordinate to the OGPU were special units of troops necessary to suppress public unrest and combat banditry.

In addition, the department was entrusted with the following functions:

  • protection of railway and waterways;
  • fight against smuggling and border crossing by Soviet citizens);
  • carrying out special assignments of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars.

On May 9, 1924, the powers of the OGPU were significantly expanded. The police and criminal investigation authorities began to report to the department. Thus began the process of merging state security agencies with internal affairs agencies.

NKVD (1934-1943)

On July 10, 1934, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR (NKVD) was formed. The People's Commissariat was an all-Union one, and the OGPU was included in it in the form of a structural unit called the Main Directorate of State Security (GUGB). The fundamental innovation was that the judicial board of the OGPU was abolished: the new department should not have judicial functions. The new People's Commissariat headed Genrikh Yagoda.

The area of ​​responsibility of the NKVD included political investigation and the right to pass sentences out of court, the penal system, foreign intelligence, border troops, and counterintelligence in the army. In 1935, the functions of the NKVD included regulation traffic(GAI), and in 1937 NKVD departments were created for transport, including sea and river ports.

On March 28, 1937, Yagoda was arrested by the NKVD; during a search of his home, according to the protocol, pornographic photographs, Trotskyist literature and a rubber dildo were found. Due to “anti-state” activities, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks expelled Yagoda from the party. Was appointed the new head of the NKVD Nikolai Yezhov.

In 1937, the NKVD “troikas” appeared. Their commission three people handed down thousands of sentences in absentia to “enemies of the people”, based on materials from the authorities, and sometimes simply on lists. A feature of this process was the absence of protocols and the minimum number of documents on the basis of which a decision was made on the guilt of the defendant. The troika's verdict was not subject to appeal.

During the year of work by the troikas, 767,397 people were convicted, of which 386,798 people were sentenced to death. The victims most often were kulaks - wealthy peasants who did not want to voluntarily give up their property to the collective farm.

On April 10, 1939, Yezhov was arrested in his office Georgy Malenkov. Subsequently former head NKVD confessed to homosexual orientation and preparation coup d'etat. Third people's commissar internal affairs became Lavrenty Beria.

NKGB - MGB (1943-1954)

On February 3, 1941, the NKVD was divided into two people's commissariats - the People's Commissariat state security(NKGB) and the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD).

This was done with the aim of improving the intelligence and operational work of state security agencies and distributing the increased volume of work of the NKVD of the USSR.

The NKGB was assigned the following tasks:

  • conducting intelligence work abroad;
  • the fight against subversive, espionage, and terrorist activities of foreign intelligence services within the USSR;
  • prompt development and elimination of the remnants of anti-Soviet parties and counter-revolutionary formations among different layers population of the USSR, in the system of industry, transport, communications, Agriculture;
  • protection of party and government leaders.

The NKVD was entrusted with the tasks of ensuring state security. Military and prison units, police, and fire protection remained under the jurisdiction of this department.

On July 4, 1941, in connection with the outbreak of war, it was decided to merge the NKGB and NKVD into one department in order to reduce bureaucracy.

The re-creation of the NKGB of the USSR took place in April 1943. The main task of the committee was reconnaissance and sabotage activities in the rear German troops. As we moved west, the importance of working in countries increased of Eastern Europe, where the NKGB was engaged in the “liquidation of anti-Soviet elements.”

In 1946, all people's commissariats were renamed into ministries, and accordingly, the NKGB became the USSR Ministry of State Security. At the same time he became Minister of State Security Victor Abakumov. With his arrival, the transition of the functions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the jurisdiction of the MGB began. In 1947-1952, the department was transferred internal troops, police, border troops and other units (the Ministry of Internal Affairs retained camp and construction departments, fire protection, escort troops, and courier communications).

After death Stalin in 1953 Nikita Khrushchev displaced Beria and organized a campaign against illegal repression NKVD. Subsequently, several thousand of those unjustly convicted were rehabilitated.

KGB (1954-1991)

On March 13, 1954, the State Security Committee (KGB) was created by separating departments, services and departments related to state security issues from the MGB. Compared to its predecessors, new organ had a lower status: it was not a ministry within the government, but a committee under the government. The KGB Chairman was a member of the CPSU Central Committee, but in supreme body authorities - the Politburo - he was not a member. This was explained by the fact that the party elite wanted to protect themselves from the emergence of a new Beria - a man capable of removing her from power in order to implement his own political projects.

The area of ​​responsibility of the new body included: foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, operational investigative activities, security state border USSR, protection of the leaders of the CPSU and the government, organization and provision of government communications, as well as the fight against nationalism, dissent, crime and anti-Soviet activities.

Almost immediately after its formation, the KGB carried out a large-scale staff reduction in connection with the beginning of the process of de-Stalinization of society and the state. From 1953 to 1955, state security agencies were reduced by 52%.

In the 1970s, the KGB intensified its fight against dissent and the dissident movement. However, the department's actions have become more subtle and disguised. Such means were actively used psychological pressure as surveillance, public shaming, disruption professional career, preventive conversations, forced travel abroad, forced confinement in psychiatric clinics, political trials, slander, lies and compromising evidence, various provocations and intimidation. At the same time, there were also lists of “those not allowed to travel abroad”—those who were denied permission to travel abroad.

A new “invention” of the special services was the so-called “exile beyond the 101st kilometer”: politically unreliable citizens were evicted outside of Moscow and St. Petersburg. Under the close attention of the KGB during this period were primarily representatives of the creative intelligentsia - figures of literature, art and science - who, due to their social status and international authority, could cause the most widespread damage to their reputation Soviet state and the Communist Party.

In the 90s, changes in society and the system government controlled USSR, caused by the processes of perestroika and glasnost, led to the need to revise the foundations and principles of the activities of state security agencies.

From 1954 to 1958, the leadership of the KGB was carried out by I. A. Serov.

From 1958 to 1961 - A. N. Shelepin.

From 1961 to 1967 - V. E. Semichastny.

From 1967 to 1982 - Yu. V. Andropov.

From May to December 1982 - V. V. Fedorchuk.

From 1982 to 1988 - V. M. Chebrikov.

From August to November 1991 - V. V. Bakatin.

December 3, 1991 President of the USSR Mikhail Gorbachev signed the law “On the reorganization of state security bodies.” Based on the document, the KGB of the USSR was abolished and transition period on its basis, the Inter-Republican Security Service and the Central Intelligence Service of the USSR (currently the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation) were created.

FSB

After the abolition of the KGB, the process of creating new state security bodies took about three years. During this time, the departments of the disbanded committee moved from one department to another.

December 21, 1993 Boris Yeltsin signed a decree on the creation Federal service counterintelligence of the Russian Federation (FSK). The director of the new body from December 1993 to March 1994 was Nikolay Golushko, and from March 1994 to June 1995 this post was held by Sergey Stepashin.

Currently, the FSB cooperates with 142 intelligence agencies, law enforcement agencies and border structures of 86 states. Offices of official representatives of the Service bodies operate in 45 countries.

In general, the activities of the FSB bodies are carried out in the following main areas:

  • counterintelligence activities;
  • fight against terrorism;
  • protection of the constitutional order;
  • combating particularly dangerous forms of crime;
  • intelligence activities;
  • border activities;
  • security information security; fight against corruption.

The FSB was headed by:

in 1995-1996 M. I. Barsukov;

in 1996-1998 N. D. Kovalev;

in 1998-1999 V.V. Putin;

in 1999-2008 N. P. Patrushev;

since May 2008 - A. V. Bortnikov.

Structure of the FSB of Russia:

Lieutenant General Vakulchik Valery Pavlovich

In 1985 he graduated from the Kharkov Guards Higher Tank Command School. In 1992 - Higher courses of military counterintelligence of the KGB of the USSR. In 2011 - Academy of Management under the President of the Republic of Belarus.

From 1985 to 1991 took place military service in the Armed Forces. From 1991 to 2008 he served in state security agencies. Since May 2008 - Head of the Operational and Analytical Center under the President of the Republic of Belarus.

Since October 2011 - Chairman of the Investigative Committee of the Republic of Belarus.

Appointed Chairman of the State Security Committee of the Republic of Belarus on November 16, 2012 by Decree of the President of the Republic of Belarus No. 511.

Awarded the Order of the Fatherland, III degree, and 11 medals.

Deputy Chairmen of the KGB

First
Major General Sergeenko Igor Petrovich

Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the Republic of Belarus
Major General Kalach Vladimir Viktorovich

Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the Republic of Belarus
Major General Tertel Ivan Stanislavovich

Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the Republic of Belarus
Major General Chernyshev Oleg Anatolyevich

Heads of regional departments and Department of Internal Affairs of the KGB

Head of the KGB department for Minsk and the Minsk region
Colonel Reutsky Dmitry Vasilievich

Head of the KGB department for the Brest region
Colonel Gladyshev Sergey Sergeevich

Head of the KGB department for the Vitebsk region
Colonel Stolyarchuk Oleg Valerievich

Head of the KGB department for the Gomel region
Major General Terebov Sergey Evgenievich

Head of the KGB department for the Grodno region
Major General Alexander Viktorovich Neverovsky

Head of the KGB department for the Mogilev region
Major General Terekhov Alexander Alexandrovich

Head of the KGB military counterintelligence department
Colonel Kuchinsky Konstantin Anatolyevich

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