If not for the Bolsheviks?
Let's give the floor to Vladimir Ilyich
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The Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks viewed the Soviet as temporary bodies of the revolution. While controlling the actions of tens of thousands of armed people through the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies in the February days, they did not take advantage of such an advantage to declare this body a state body and seize power. On the contrary, the Socialist-Revolutionary-Menshevik leaders unconditionally supported the Provisional Government, formed from representatives of the Kadet and Octobrist parties, which occupied dominant positions in the State Duma. This course was intended to ensure continuity and legitimacy (legitimacy) of power. Of course, the Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks used their influence in the Soviets to fight for power with government parties, but within the framework stipulated by law.
The political line of the Bolsheviks in the first days of the revolution did not differ from the course of other socialist parties. However, in April, on the second day after arriving in Petrograd from emigration, V.I. Lenin pronounced the “April Theses” - a document that radically changed the tactics and strategy of his party. He noted that it was time to move from the first stage of the revolution, which gave power to the bourgeoisie as a result of the insufficient consciousness and organization of the proletariat, to its second stage, which would transfer power into the hands of the proletariat and the poorest strata of the peasantry. The Bolshevik Party pledged to renounce support for the Provisional Government, oust the Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who were considered “petty-bourgeois” parties, from the Soviets, and seize control over them. The transition of the Soviets under the control of the Bolsheviks introduced, according to Lenin, consciousness and organization into the revolutionary masses.
The theses put forward the slogan “All power to the Soviets!” By implementing it, the Bolsheviks inevitably impeded the democratic direction of the revolutionary process. After all, the proletarian, that is, purely class organization, was opposed to representative state institutions, before the Constituent Assembly, which began to take shape in the country after February Revolution. “Not a parliamentary republic - a return to it from the R.R.D- (Councils of Workers' Deputies - author) would be a step backwards - but a republic of Soviets of workers', farm laborers' and peasants' deputies throughout the country, from bottom to top" - this is how Lenin defined the immediate goals of his party.
The Bolsheviks themselves did not immediately agree with the April Theses. In particular, the Kiev party committee declared them unacceptable. Only after an intense struggle did the majority of members of the city organization of the RSDLP (b) identify with this document.
The unity of the Bolsheviks around the course outlined by Lenin was helped by the very situation in the country raging by revolution. The Octobrist-Cadet Temporary Government did not dare to make fundamental changes and did not take into account the demands of the masses, tired of poverty and war. In response to a note from the Minister of Foreign Affairs P. N. Milyukov, who declared the government’s readiness to wage war to a victorious end 21 In April, a protest demonstration of one hundred thousand people took place in Petrograd. Miliukov and Minister of War A. I. Guchkov were forced to leave their posts. The government was replenished with six ministers from parties represented in the Petrograd Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, who decided to take responsibility for further events. remained in the opposition. During the April crisis, they held a conference that supported Lenin’s theses. The confrontation between the conservative forces and the Bolsheviks also deepened. socialist parties, which Lenin accused of conciliation. With this alignment of political forces, the possibilities for the democratic development of the revolutionary process have become extremely limited.
V.I. Lenin characterized the political situation in the country after the February Revolution as an intertwining of two powers - bourgeois (Provisional Government) and revolutionary-democratic (Council). The term “dual power” he put forward logically followed from the point of view of the Council as a power. The leader of the Bolsheviks headed for replacing the Socialist-Revolutionary-Menshevik majority in the Soviets with the majority of his party in order to proclaim Soviet power in the country. Instead of civil peace war was proposed to society. The then press of various political trends constantly accused the Bolsheviks of wanting to start a civil war.
The indecisive actions of the government parties, in which the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries joined after the April crisis, contributed to the country's further slide into the abyss. economic crisis and political anarchy. Against the background of the organizational impotence of the government, the slogans of the Bolsheviks seemed especially attractive: peace to the peoples, land to the peasants, factories to the workers, power to the Soviets! More and more Soviet deputies declared themselves Bolsheviks or who sympathized with this party. After the May by-elections, the Bolshevik faction of the Kyiv Council of Workers' Deputies already had about a third of the deputy seats (in March - less than 15%).
Even while in the minority in the Soviets, the Bolsheviks began to organize armed forces for future battles - workers' squads, workers' militia, Red Guard detachments. Menshevik resistance in the Soviets and opposition local authorities The Provisional Government slowed down this work, but Red Guard detachments were nevertheless created in Kyiv, Kharkov, Yekaterinoslav and Odessa.
The revolution is coming. Shot at in the July days and “buried” at the Moscow conference, it again raises its head, breaking old barriers, creating a new power. The first line of counter-revolutionary trenches has been taken. Following Kornilov, Kaledin retreats. In the fire of struggle, the Soviets who were dead come to life. They are again at the helm, leading the revolutionary masses.
All power to the Soviets!- this is the slogan of the new movement.
The Kerensky government comes out to fight the new movement. Already in the first days of the Kornilov uprising, it threatened to dissolve the revolutionary Committees, dismissing the fight against the Kornilov rebellion as “arbitrariness.” Since then, the fight against the Committees has intensified, recently turning into open war.
The Simferopol Soviet arrests an accomplice of the Kornilov conspiracy, the notorious Ryabushinsky. And the Kerensky government, in response to this, issues an order to “take measures to release Ryabushinsky and to bring to justice those who subjected him to his illegal arrest” (“Speech”).
In Tashkent, all power passes into the hands of the Council, and the old authorities are removed. And the Kerensky government, in response to this, “is taking a number of measures that are kept secret for now, but which should have a most sobering effect on the presumptuous leaders of the Tashkent Council of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies” (“Russian Vedomosti”).
The Soviets demand a strict and comprehensive investigation into the case of Kornilov and his associates. And the Kerensky government, in response to this, “narrows the investigation to a small circle of people, without using some very important sources that would make it possible to qualify Kornilov’s crime as treason, and not just as rebellion” (Shubnikov’s report, “Novaya Zhizn”) .
The Soviets demand a break with the bourgeoisie and, first of all, with the Cadets. And the Kerensky government, in response to this, is negotiating with the Kishkins and Konovalovs, inviting them to the government, proclaiming the “independence” of the government from the Soviets.
All power of the imperialist bourgeoisie!- this is the slogan of the Kerensky government.
There is no room for doubt. Before us are two powers: the power of Kerensky and his government, and the power of the Soviets and Committees.
The struggle between these two authorities is a characteristic feature of the current moment.
Or the power of the Kerensky government - and then the rule of landowners and capitalists, war and devastation.
Or the power of the Soviets - and then the rule of workers and peasants, peace and the elimination of devastation.
This is how and only this way life itself poses the question.
With every crisis of power, this question was raised by the revolution. Each time the Messrs. prevaricated. the compromisers refused a direct answer and, by prevarication, gave power to their enemies. By convening a meeting, instead of a Congress of Soviets, the compromisers wanted to evade once again, ceding power to the bourgeoisie. But they made a mistake in their calculations. The time has come when we can no longer prevaricate.
A direct question posed by life requires a clear and definite answer.
For the Soviets or against them!
Let the Messrs. choose. Compromisers.
Frontline
About the revolutionary front
The Socialist Revolutionaries from Dyelo Naroda are dissatisfied with the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks are scolded, the Bolsheviks are vilified, the Bolsheviks are finally threatened. For what? For “unrestrained demagogy”, for “factional sectarianism”, for “schismaticism”, for the lack of “revolutionary discipline”. In short: because the Bolsheviks are against unity with the Socialist Revolutionaries from Dyelo Naroda.
Unity with the Socialist Revolutionaries from Dyelo Naroda... But judge for yourself whether such unity is possible now.
While the Democratic Conference in St. Petersburg expires in word disputes, and the initiators of the conference hastily develop formulas for the “salvation” of the revolution, while the Kerensky government, encouraged by Buchanan and Milyukov, continues to follow “its” path, a decisive process of the growth of a new revolution is taking place in Russia. power, truly popular, truly revolutionary, waging a desperate struggle for existence. On the one hand, there are the Soviets, standing at the head of the revolution, at the head of the fight against the counter-revolution, which has not yet been defeated, which has only retreated, prudently hiding behind the back of the government. On the other hand, there is the Kerensky government, which covers up the counter-revolutionaries, which conspires with the Kornilovites (the Cadets!), which declared war on the Soviets, trying to defeat them, so as not to be defeated itself.
Who will win this fight is the whole point now.
Either the power of the Soviets and then – the victory of the revolution and a just world.
Either the power of the Kerensky government and then – the victory of the counter-revolution and “war until the complete” ... exhaustion of Russia.
The meeting, without resolving the issue, only reflects this struggle and, of course, reflects it very late.
Therefore, the main thing now is not to develop a general formula for “saving” the revolution, but to directly support the Soviets in their fight against the Kerensky government.
Do you want a united revolutionary front? Support the Soviets, break with the Kerensky government, and unity will come by itself. The unity of the front is formed not as a result of debate, but in the course of the struggle.
The Soviets demand the removal of the cadet commissars. And the Kerensky government imposes unwanted commissars on them, threatening them with force...
Who do you stand for, citizens from Dyelo Naroda, the Soviets or the Kerensky commissars?
In Tashkent, the Council, consisting mostly of Socialist Revolutionaries, took power into its own hands, removing the old officials. And the Kerensky government sends a punitive expedition there, demanding the restoration of the old government, “punishment” of the Council, etc....
Who do you stand for, citizens from Dyelo Naroda, for the Tashkent Council or for the punitive expedition of Kerensky?
- No answer. For we do not know of a single protest, not a single act of struggle on the part of the followers of Dyelo Naroda against these counter-revolutionary exercises of Mr. Kerensky.
Unbelievable but true. The St. Petersburg Socialist-Revolutionary Kerensky, sitting in the directorate, armed with “machine guns,” is campaigning against the Socialist-Revolutionaries sitting in the Tashkent Council, and the central body of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party “Delo Naroda” is thoughtfully silent, as if this does not concern him! Socialist-Revolutionary Kerensky is going to fight with the Socialist-Revolutionaries from Tashkent, and Dyelo Naroda, publishing Kerensky’s pogrom “order,” finds it possible to pass it by in silence, obviously observing “neutrality”!
But what kind of party is this, whose members reach the point of mutual massacre with the obvious connivance of its central body?
We are told about the unity of the revolutionary front. But unity with whom?
With the Socialist Revolutionary Party, which has no opinion because it is silent?
With the Kerensky group, which is going to smash the Soviets?
Or with a group of Tashkent Socialist Revolutionaries who are creating a new government in the name of the revolution and its conquests?
We are ready to support the Tashkent Council, we will fight in the same ranks with the revolutionary Socialist Revolutionaries, with them we will have a united front.
But will the citizens of Dyelo Naroda ever understand that it is impossible to support both the Tashkent people and Kerensky at the same time, because whoever supports the Tashkent people breaks with Kerensky?
Will they ever understand that by not breaking with the Kerensky government and observing “neutrality,” they are thereby betraying the cause of their Tashkent comrades?
Will they ever understand that before demanding front unity with the Bolsheviks, they must first establish this unity at home, in their own party, definitely breaking or with Kerensky, or with the Left Social Revolutionaries?
Do you want front unity with the Bolsheviks? Break with the Kerensky government, support the Soviets in their struggle for power - and there will be unity.
Why did unity emerge so easily and simply during the days of the Kornilov uprising?
Because it arose then not as a result of endless debates, but in the course of a direct struggle against counter-revolution.
The counter-revolution has not yet been defeated. She only retreated, hiding behind the back of the Kerensky government. The revolution must take this second line of counter-revolutionary trenches if it wants to win. The successful struggle of the Soviets for power is precisely the completion of this victory. Whoever does not want to end up “on the other side of the barricade,” whoever does not want to come under Soviet fire, whoever wants the victory of the revolution, must break with the Kerensky government, must support the struggle of the Soviets.
Do you want the unity of the revolutionary front?
Support the Soviets against the directory, support the fight against the counter-revolution resolutely and to the end - and then unity will develop by itself, simply and naturally, as it did in the days of the Kornilov uprising.
With or against the Soviets?– choose, citizens of “Dyelo Naroda”!
In the last, critical days of August, Lenin remained in an illegal position in the capital of Finland, Helsingfors. In Finland, which had been part of the Russian Empire since 1809, the Finnish desire to gain national independence complicated and greatly intensified the ferment that followed the collapse of the tsarist regime. In addition, Helsingfors was the main base of the Baltic Fleet, where the Bolsheviks fought active work and enjoyed especially great influence among the Baltic sailors. At the end of the summer and beginning of the autumn of 1917 in Finland, as elsewhere in the former Russian Empire, socio-political antagonism sharply worsened, and the popularity of far-left political programs among the masses increased. At the Third Regional Congress of the Soviets of the Army, Navy and Workers of Finland, held from September 9 to 12 in Helsingfors, a permanent executive committee was elected, which included almost exclusively Bolsheviks and Left Socialist Revolutionaries. Bolshevik Ivar Smilga, who held extreme left-wing views, became chairman of the Regional Executive Committee of the Army, Navy and Workers of Finland, which proclaimed itself the highest body political power in Finland.
While hiding in Helsingfors, Lenin met with some leaders of Finnish Social Democracy. Probably, the strong positions of the left and the increasingly tense, explosive political situation in Finland contributed to the formation of Lenin’s views on general issues of the further development of the revolution. However, he was primarily concerned with the development revolutionary events in Petrograd. Lenin moved from Razliv to Finland on August 9, and very soon he managed to establish a fairly reliable connection with the Central Committee. Petrograd newspapers were delivered to Lenin, as a rule, in the evening next day after leaving. The time that remained after voraciously reading newspapers and pondering the news, he apparently devoted entirely to working on the book “State and Revolution,” which was nearing completion, and to writing political articles for the Bolshevik press.
Lenin first learned that General Kornilov was threatening Petrograd on August 28, but the newspapers for that day with the first more or less detailed reports were delivered only late in the evening of August 29. Among these newspapers, however, there was no Bolshevik Rabochiy, so he remained almost completely unaware of the actions of the party in the current critical situation. Nevertheless, on the morning of August 30, eagerly awaiting news from Petrograd, Lenin wrote a letter in which he gave tactical recommendations to the Central Committee, indicating a temporary but significant shift in his views on the development of the revolution. Lenin pointed out that the threat of establishing a right-wing dictatorship had dramatically changed the political situation and, accordingly, the party must reconsider its tactics. If during the days of the Moscow meeting Lenin dismissed rumors of a counter-revolutionary conspiracy as “a well-thought-out trick of the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries,” now he insisted on uniting the Bolsheviks in the fight against Kornilov. Without speaking out on such an important issue as the permissible limits of cooperation between the Bolsheviks and other socialists, Lenin simply warned that the Bolsheviks should neither provide direct support to the Kerensky government nor, at the moment, strive to overthrow it. The task of the fight against Kerensky was reduced to exposing by all possible means his weakness and vacillations, as well as to putting pressure on the government to force it to fulfill such “partial demands” as the arrest of Milyukov, the arming of the workers, the summoning of naval units to Petrograd, the dissolution of State Duma, legalizing the transfer of landowners' lands to peasants and introducing workers' control.
Recognition of the need to coordinate the actions of the Bolsheviks and other political groups against Kornilov and to intensify agitation for the fulfillment of “partial demands” indicated Lenin’s departure from his previous categorical objections to any rapprochement with the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries and assertions that the main task of the Bolshevik Party was how the direct seizure of power by the proletariat can be achieved as quickly as possible. As noted above, in the last days of August, the majority of Petrograd Bolshevik leaders took exactly this position. Obviously, what was unexpected for them was the approval of their course of action, which Lenin expressed in a postscript to a letter to the Central Committee, written late in the evening of August 30, when he finally read the latest newspapers, including Rabochiy. “Having read, after writing this, six issues of Rabochiy,” Lenin added in a postscript, “I must say that we have a complete coincidence.”
Even more obvious evidence of a change in Lenin’s views with the beginning of the Kornilov rebellion was the article “On Compromises,” written by him on September 1 and delivered to Petrograd two days later. In fact, it is difficult to regard this article as anything other than a deviation from the main provisions on which Lenin’s instructions to the VI Congress of the RSDLP(b) were based, namely: The Soviets are no longer revolutionary institutions, the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries are completely bankrupt, the violent seizure of power is absolutely necessary . Now, in view of the obvious weakness of Kerensky, who found himself in isolation, and being impressed by the strength of the Soviets, which they demonstrated in the fight against the Kornilov rebellion, and also taking into account the obvious increase in the hostile sentiments of the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries towards the very idea of further developing cooperation with the Cadets, Lenin actually confirmed the possibility a return to the “peaceful” pre-July tactical program, which the more moderate Bolsheviks insisted on. Specifically, the compromise proposed by Lenin was as follows: the Bolsheviks temporarily lifted the demand for the transfer of power to a government formed by representatives of the proletariat and the poor peasantry, and officially returned to the slogan “All power to the Soviets!” The Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries take power into their own hands and form a government responsible to the Soviets. Political power throughout Russia passes to local Soviets; the Bolsheviks are not included in the government, but receive guarantees of complete freedom of action in accordance with their program. In essence, the article “On Compromises” was an expression of readiness to abandon armed struggle and fight for dominance in the Soviets by political means, provided that the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries broke with the bourgeoisie. According to Lenin, such a government at this moment could be created and strengthened completely peacefully and “ensure, with enormous probability, the peaceful movement forward of the entire Russian revolution and extremely great chances big steps forward worldwide movement to peace and to the victory of socialism."
Lenin learned about the creation of the Directory, the stubborn reluctance of the majority of moderate socialists to agree to the formation of an exclusively socialist government and their desire to form a new coalition cabinet from representatives of the bourgeoisie, albeit without the participation of the Cadets, on September 3, when he was about to send the article “On Compromises” to Petrograd. This news prompted him to add a short postscript to the article, in which he pessimistically noted: “...And after reading Saturday and today’s Sunday newspapers, I say to myself: perhaps the offer of a compromise is already too late. Perhaps those few days during which peaceful development was still possible have also passed. Yes, it’s obvious that they have already passed.”
However, Lenin did not completely abandon the idea of the peaceful development of the revolution. During the first week and a half of September he was still thinking about the possibility of a compromise. To a certain extent, the basis for such hopes was the continuous and widely publicized disputes among the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries on the question of the future government, as well as the worsening antagonism between Kerensky and the Socialist Revolutionary-Menshevik leaders of the Soviets, which was evidenced, for example, by the stubborn resistance of the Committee of the People's Struggle against Counter-Revolution attempts by the government to dissolve the revolutionary committees created during the Kornilov revolt. In any case, Lenin returned to the question of the possibility of a compromise with the Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks and the peaceful development of the revolution in the articles of this period “Tasks of the Revolution”, “The Russian Revolution and the Civil War” and “One of the Fundamental Questions of the Revolution”.
In the article “Tasks of the Revolution,” written around September 6 but published only at the end of the month, Lenin outlined in more detail the political plan first proposed in the article “On Compromises.” “Having taken all power,” Lenin insisted, “the Soviets could now - and this is probably their last chance - ensure the peaceful development of the revolution, peaceful elections by the people of their deputies, and the peaceful struggle of parties within the Soviets.”
A day or two later, Lenin wrote an article “One of the Fundamental Questions of the Revolution,” which was published only on September 14. In this article, he noted the importance of the issue of state power for the development of any revolution. Lenin explained why he attached so much importance to the immediate transfer of all power to the Soviets:
“It is impossible to bypass or push aside the question of power, for this is precisely the main question that determines everything in the development of the revolution...
The whole question now is whether petty-bourgeois democracy has learned anything during these great six months, unusually rich in content, or not. If not, then the revolution is lost, and only a victorious uprising of the proletariat can save it. If yes, then we need to start with the immediate creation of stable, unwavering power...
Only Soviet power could be stable, only it could not be overthrown even in the most turbulent moments of the most turbulent revolution, only such power could ensure the constant, broad development of the revolution, the peaceful struggle of parties within the Soviets...”
Lenin also explained what meaning he put into the slogan “All power to the Soviets!”, calling for a return to it in the article “On Compromises”:
“But the slogan: “power to the Soviets” is very often, if not in most cases, completely misunderstood in the sense of: “a ministry from the parties of the Soviet majority”...
“Power to the Soviets” means a radical reworking of the entire old state apparatus, this bureaucratic apparatus that inhibits everything democratic, the elimination of this apparatus and its replacement with a new, popular one, i.e. a truly democratic apparatus of the Soviets, i.e. an organized and armed majority of the people, workers, soldiers, peasants, giving initiative and independence to the majority of the people not only in choosing deputies, but also in governing the state, in implementing reforms and transformations.”
Only Soviet power, Lenin argues, is capable of showing sufficient courage and determination to introduce a grain monopoly and effective control over production and distribution, limit the issue of paper money, ensure the correct exchange of grain for industrial goods, etc., that is, go to all those lengths measures required by “the unprecedented severity and disasters of war, the unheard-of and most formidable danger of devastation and famine.” Such a power, in Lenin’s opinion, would be nothing more than the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poorest peasants, the need for which he spoke about in the April Theses. In the article “One of the Fundamental Questions of the Revolution,” Lenin argues that such a dictatorship would break the resistance of the Kornilovites and complete the democratization of the army, that “ninety-nine hundredths of the army would be enthusiastic supporters of such a dictatorship two days after its establishment,” that it “would give land to the peasants and omnipotence to the local peasant committees,” that the peasants would undoubtedly support such a dictatorship. Lenin further writes:
“Only the dictatorship of the proletarians and the poorest peasants is capable of breaking the resistance of the capitalists, showing the truly majestic courage and determination of the authorities, and securing for itself the enthusiastic, selfless, truly heroic” support of the masses both in the army and in the peasantry.
Power to the Soviets is the only thing that could make further development gradual, peaceful, calm..."
In the article “The Russian Revolution and the Civil War,” the last of this series, probably completed on September 9 and published on September 16, Lenin wrote about the unfoundedness of the fears of moderate socialists, who were afraid of a bloody civil war, supposedly inevitable in the event of a break with the bourgeoisie. On the contrary, Lenin argued, further delay in the creation of the Soviet government would cause growing indignation among the masses, and then an armed uprising of the workers and civil war would become truly inevitable. The uprising and war will be bloody, but in any case the proletariat will win a triumphant victory. According to Lenin, “solely an alliance of the Bolsheviks with the Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, exclusively the immediate transfer of all power to the Soviets, would make a civil war in Russia impossible. For against such an alliance, against the Soviets of Workers’, Soldiers’ and Peasants’ Deputies, no civil war started by the bourgeoisie is unthinkable; such a “war” would not even reach a single battle...” In support of his words, Lenin pointed to the helplessness of the bourgeoisie during the Kornilov rebellion, when such an alliance ensured “a complete victory over the counter-revolution, achieved with an ease unprecedented in any revolution...”.
The atmosphere of freedom of discussion characteristic of the Bolshevik Party in 1917 is evidenced, in particular, by the fact that even Lenin’s proposal for a more tolerant attitude towards the Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks was not accepted without objections. By the time the Bolshevik leaders in Petrograd received the article “On Compromises,” the Central Executive Committee had already officially rejected the resolution “On Power” proposed by the Bolsheviks on August 31. To the publishers of Rabochiy Put, a compromise of the kind proposed by Lenin seemed impracticable. A member of the editorial board, Grigory Sokolnikov, later recalled that initially they did not want to publish the article, and only at the insistence of Lenin the decision was revised and the article was published on September 6.
The Leninist point of view expressed in the article “On Compromises” was also objected to by some members of the Moscow Regional Bureau, which always advocated the most decisive actions, and by the leaders of the St. Petersburg Committee, who held the most left-wing views, who had just a little more than four weeks earlier, at the VI Congress of the RSDLP (b) ), supported Lenin on the issue of a complete break with the moderate socialists and preparations for an armed seizure of power and were now clearly stunned by the sharp change in his views. The negative attitude of a number of Petrograd Bolshevik leaders towards the bloc with the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries became obvious during the discussion current moment at a meeting of the St. Petersburg Committee on September 7, the very next day after the publication of the article “On Compromises”.
The debate was opened by the representative of the Executive Commission A. Slutsky. Agreeing with Lenin that Kornilov’s speech caused the “left” of the masses and moderate socialists and even, to some extent, the Soviets, he objected to rapprochement with the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries, arguing that the main task of the party was to keep the masses from premature active actions and prepare to use the Soviets as combat centers through which it will be possible to come to power. G. Kolomin, distinguished by his independent judgment and even in the July days, showed himself to be a supporter of the most decisive actions, argued that Kornilov’s speech did not at all lead to any significant change in the positions of the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries and, accordingly, the Soviets. He argued that their shift to the left “does not yet make it possible to think that the Council will take a revolutionary path... Our position must remain unchanged. Our goal is not to go hand in hand with the leaders of these Soviets, but to try to tear away the more revolutionary elements from them or to lead them with us... Both in the factories and among the peasant poor, we are seeing a retreat to the left. Now it’s funny for us to think about compromises. No compromises!.. Our revolution is not the same as in the West. Our revolution is proletarian. Our task is to strengthen our position and, of course, prepare for a combat battle.” It should be noted that the statements of the representative Central Committee Bubnov were more likely to correspond to the sentiments of Slutsky and Kolomin than to the point of view of Lenin, expressed by him in the article “On Compromises”.
It is difficult to judge to what extent such sentiments prevailed at that time among the members of the St. Petersburg Committee, since the discussion of the current situation at the meeting on September 7 ended without the adoption of any resolution. In any case, at the moment, as in the period preceding the July events, in the short term the peaceful course corresponded both to the programmatic guidelines of the right-wing Bolsheviks, such as Kamenev, who argued that Russia was not yet ready for a socialist revolution, and spoke out at that time only for the creation of a socialist coalition government with the participation of the Bolsheviks, the proclamation of a democratic republic and the convening Constituent Assembly, as well as the views of such Bolsheviks as Lenin, Trotsky and the leaders of Petrograd party organizations, who considered the transfer of power to the Soviets and the creation of the Socialist-Revolutionary-Menshevik government as an intermediate stage in the development of the socialist revolution on the path to the speedy establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasantry. Undoubtedly, the course proposed by Lenin touched a sensitive chord among the majority of members of the Central Committee. In the first weeks of September, the Petrograd Bolsheviks, under the leadership of the Central Committee, concentrated their efforts not so much on further deepening the gap between them and the moderate socialists and preparing the masses for an armed seizure of power in the spirit of Lenin’s instructions to the VI Congress of the RSDLP (b), but on solving problems to ensure the possibility of peaceful development revolution. In particular, with new energy the Bolsheviks waged a struggle to induce wavering elements in the Socialist-Revolutionary-Menshevik camp to accept and support the principle of a complete break with the bourgeoisie, and intensified the struggle for further expansion and strengthening of the party’s influence in mass organizations (most importantly, in the Petrograd Soviet). The Bolsheviks' efforts were also aimed at sending as many of their delegates as possible to the Democratic Conference, scheduled for mid-September and considered by the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries as a forum at which the question of the coalition and the nature of the future government should be finally resolved.
A particularly important task of the Bolsheviks was the struggle for influence in the Petrograd Soviet. At the meeting on August 31, when the majority voted for the Bolshevik political program, less than half of the deputies eligible to vote were present. A significant part of the absent deputies were then soldiers holding the defense outside the capital, on whom the Socialist Revolutionaries had a significant influence. It is not surprising, therefore, that moderate socialists disputed the significance of the Bolshevik success on August 31 and counted on their defeat in the near future.
To test the strength and relative influence of the parties in the Petrograd Soviet, the Socialist-Revolutionary-Menshevik strategists chose the question of the future composition of the presidium. From the moment of its formation, that is, from March 1917, the Presidium of the Petrograd Soviet consisted exclusively of Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries. Among them were the most famous and authoritative politicians, like Chkheidze, Tsereteli, Chernov, Dan, Skobelev, Gots and Anisimov. Now they have all announced their intention to resign if the results of the August 31 vote are not invalidated and the previous leadership does not receive a vote of confidence. This step by the Socialist-Revolutionary-Menshevik leaders posed a considerable threat to the Bolsheviks, since the latter could hardly hope to collect enough votes to defeat such prominent politicians. An annulment of the results of the August 31 vote and a vote of confidence in the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries could go a long way toward negating the Bolsheviks' recent successes in the struggle for broader mass support.
In order to insure themselves to some extent against such a defeat, the Bolsheviks attempted to highlight procedural issues and thereby obscure the political significance of the vote on the composition of the presidium. In particular, they argued that it would be unfair if the presidium, as before, included only representatives of the majority. In contrast to the moderates who proposed comparing political programs different parties, make a choice and allow representatives of the prevailing parties to form a presidium, the Bolsheviks insisted that the only democratic approach was to reorganize the presidium according to the principle of proportional representation and introduce into the presidium an appropriate number of members from parties and political groupings that were not previously represented in it. This plan seemed quite reasonable to many deputies who leaned to the left, but did not want to join the Bolsheviks at the cost of breaking with their leaders. Defending the idea of proportional representation in the Presidium of the Petrograd Soviet, Kamenev convinced such wavering deputies that if the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries “recognized a coalition with the bourgeoisie, then they would agree to a coalition with the Bolsheviks in the presidium.”
The question of reorganizing the presidium was put to a vote at the beginning of the meeting of the Petrograd Soviet on September 9. The Bolshevik proposal was accepted by a slight majority. Lenin subsequently criticized the leaders of the Bolshevik faction of the Petrograd Soviet for their adherence to the idea of proportional representation, considering their behavior in the elections to the presidium to be just another example of the unjustifiably close cooperation of their comrades with other socialist parties to the detriment of their own goals. However, the justification of this tactical step and the expediency of proportional representation were confirmed at the same meeting, when another proposal of the Bolsheviks was discussed - to change the order of representation of soldiers in the Council - and it turned out that they did not yet have a reliable majority in the Petrograd Council. The Bolsheviks' proposal did not find the support of the majority of deputies, and in order to avoid inevitable defeat they had to at the last moment abandon their intention to put their resolution to a vote.
The Bolshevik maneuvers in the Petrograd Soviet were ultimately successful. When the results of the vote at the meeting on September 9 on the issue of proportional representation were announced, the majority of members of the former presidium defiantly left the hall, expressing extreme irritation and indignation. By September 25, the leadership of the Petrograd Soviet was completely reorganized. The new presidium included two Socialist Revolutionaries, one Menshevik and four Bolsheviks (Trotsky, Kamenev, Rykov and Fedorov). Trotsky replaced Chkheidze as chairman.
At the same time, the Bolshevik leaders paid great attention to the Democratic Conference. On September 4, the Central Committee sent a telegram to 37 local party organizations in different regions of the country, and the next day a letter in which it was reported that the Central Committee had decided “to make every effort to create the most significant and cohesive group possible from the participants of the meeting, members of our party.” . The Bolsheviks on the ground were asked to “having become acquainted with the exact composition of the meeting, conduct their comrades wherever possible” and send them directly to Smolny “for more accurate and detailed information about our tasks at the meeting.”
When the composition of the Democratic Conference was announced, it became clear that hopes that the conference would reject the idea of a coalition and take steps to create a new homogeneous socialist government were unlikely to come true. Representatives of the Councils of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, city dumas, army organizations, trade unions and a number of other organizations received 1,198 mandates. However, the number of seats for representatives of urban Soviets of workers and soldiers, as well as trade unions, that is, organizations where the Bolsheviks had the strongest positions, was small in comparison with the representation of rural Soviets, zemstvos and cooperatives, in which moderate socialists predominated.
The Bolsheviks, however, did not completely abandon the idea that the Democratic Conference could create a socialist government. At a meeting on September 13, the Central Committee elected a commission consisting of Trotsky, Kamenev, Stalin, Milyutin and Rykov, which was tasked with preparing a declaration and resolution for the Democratic Conference. Partly based on letters and articles written by Lenin in early September, the Bolshevik revolutionary program, formulated in the commission's declaration, assumed that the peaceful development of the revolution was still possible and that the Democratic Conference could and should create a revolutionary government. Like Lenin’s article “On Compromises,” the Bolshevik declaration was essentially an expression of recognition of the Soviets as a body of revolutionary power and a call for former supporters of the coalition to decisively break with the bourgeoisie. It was categorically stated that the Bolsheviks did not try, are not trying and will not try to take power against the will of the majority of the working masses, that the struggle for dominance in the Soviets will continue in conditions of complete freedom of agitation and constant renewal of their composition due to the influx of new deputies from the ranks. At the same time, in contrast to the article “On Compromises,” the possibility of Bolshevik participation in the Soviet government was not excluded; in all likelihood, this was influenced by Kamenev.
Just before the opening of the Democratic Conference, it became clear that the fears of party members with the most left-wing views regarding the likely composition of the delegates were completely justified. Among those delegates who arrived at the meeting who indicated their party affiliation, there were 532 Socialist-Revolutionaries (including 71 Left Socialist-Revolutionaries), 172 Mensheviks (of which 56 were internationalists), 55 people’s socialists, 133 called themselves non-party. There were only 134 Bolshevik delegates.
However, during the preliminary meetings of the factions, it became clear that among moderate socialists there was by no means a unity of opinion on the issue of a coalition with non-socialist parties - the disagreements on this issue that arose in the days after Kornilov’s speech not only did not disappear, but even deepened. The current attitude towards the coalition of many leaders of the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries, who previously supported the Provisional Government, was expressed on the first day of the Democratic Conference by the Menshevik Bogdanov: “In the difficult moment we are experiencing... we must establish beyond doubt that we have no power. We had a government leapfrog, which was no different from the leapfrog that was under the tsarist autocracy. This governmental leapfrog is weakening the country, the continuous change of cabinets has led to complete sterility, and we, the revolutionary democracy that created this government, are to blame for this... I am a supporter of the coalition government, and I must admit with pain that the main reason for the inaction of the government was the coalition composition of its from representatives of democracy and the bourgeoisie."
So, before the opening of the Democratic Conference and in the first days of its work, the Bolsheviks could still hope that the majority of delegates would vote for a break with Kerensky and the creation of a homogeneous socialist government. This hope was expressed by Zinoviev in an article on the front page of the Rabochy Put newspaper of September 13, which was undoubtedly distributed among the arriving delegates. The article, entitled “Our Victory and Our Tasks,” stated:
«... Main question The question that now faces every revolutionary is whether there are still any chances for the peaceful development of the revolution and what needs to be done to strengthen these chances? And here we must say to ourselves: if they exist, then only if a certain compromise, a certain agreement takes place between the working class, which has finally followed our party, and the mass of petty-bourgeois democracy, which is following the Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. with petty-bourgeois democracy, yes, this is both desirable and, under certain conditions, possible! ...And the All-Russian Democratic Conference, opening in a few days, could still open the way for such a peaceful outcome.”
The democratic meeting opened on the evening of September 14 at the Alexandria Theater (now the Leningrad State Academic Drama Theater named after A.S. Pushkin). Delegates who arrived from all over Russia took their seats in the famous old auditorium - in the boxes, stalls and on the balcony. The delegates were strikingly different from the audience that filled this hall in tsarist times, and the hall itself now looked completely different. The red plush upholstery of the seats and boxes merged with the sea of red revolutionary banners. The raised curtain revealed a stage and decoration depicting Big hall with several doors flanked by artificial palm trees and juniper bushes. The members of the presidium sat at a long narrow table that crossed the entire stage; in front of the table stood a pulpit draped in red, to which was attached a “No Smoking” sign.
In Kamenev's speech at the first meeting of the conference, as well as in Trotsky's speech to the Bolshevik delegation the next day, hopes were unambiguously voiced that the Democratic Conference would decide to create a new government. Kamenev gave a rather long speech, declaring that six months of work by various compositions of the Provisional Government forced the Bolsheviks to refuse confidence in the policy “which is now headed by Minister Kerensky.” “The situation is so tragic,” Kamenev argued, “that we no longer have a single day for experiments.” He stated that the government’s inability to repel counter-revolutionary forces in the army, failures in the field of agriculture and food supply for the country, as well as in the foreign policy sphere, are not the result of mistakes made by one or another socialist minister, they are due to the political influence of the bourgeoisie as a class: “ Yes, comrades, there has not yet been a single revolution in which the implementation of the ideals of the working people did not cause mortal horror to the counter-revolutionary forces... If democracy does not want to take power into their own hands now, they must openly say to themselves: “We do not believe in our own strength , and therefore, Buryshkins and Kishkins, come and rule us, we ourselves do not know how.” You can write any program that will satisfy labor democracy, but it will be pure utopia to think that such a program will be carried out sincerely and honestly by the bourgeoisie.”
Kamenev further said that the only possible way out is the transfer of state power to democracy, but not to the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, but to the democracy that is sufficiently represented at the meeting. A new government and body to which it must be accountable must be created.
Trotsky, addressing the Bolshevik delegates, said that, whenever possible, one should first of all strive to convince the meeting participants of the need to break with the bourgeoisie and take upon themselves the task of creating a new government. If successful, this would be the first step towards transferring all power to the Soviets.
It should be noted that unlike Kamenev, who advocated the creation of a democratic coalition government on a broad basis, that is, with the participation of representatives of various political groups who sent delegates to the meeting, Trotsky insisted on transferring all power to the Soviets. This very significant circumstance reflected a fundamental difference in views on the development of the Russian revolution, which was soon destined to become the source of one of the most acute and significant internal contradictions in the history of Bolshevism. Within the framework of the topic under consideration, however, the main thing is that both Kamenev and Trotsky, and with them the majority of the Petrograd Bolsheviks, positively assessed the work of the Democratic Conference and the prospects for the peaceful development of the revolution.
Considering that at that moment relatively moderate views prevailed among the Bolsheviks, and Lenin himself had been in favor of compromise tactics since the beginning of September, it is not difficult to imagine how stunned the Bolshevik leaders were when they received on September 15 two letters from Lenin, written between September 12 and 14 , in which he completely abandoned the moderate position set out in the article “On Compromises” and insisted that the Bolsheviks must immediately begin preparations for an armed uprising.
This seemingly sharp and unexpected turn was due to a number of complementary factors. On the one hand, factors such as the strong positions of the extreme left elements in Finland, the majority support that the Bolshevik program received in the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets, as well as in a number of local Soviets, widespread and steadily growing unrest among landless peasants, and the further disintegration of the army at the front. and the increasingly insistent demands of the soldiers for immediate peace, and finally, signs of growing revolutionary sentiment in the German fleet, obviously aroused Lenin's hope that at the moment, if the Bolsheviks took power, they would be provided with powerful support in the cities, widespread and stubborn opposition in the village will not be at the front, and the formation of a truly revolutionary government in Russia will serve as an impetus for mass uprisings in other European countries. And of course, when Lenin realized the opportunity to quickly achieve the adoption of a resolution on the creation of an extreme left government, he lost interest in compromises with moderate socialist parties. On the other hand, Lenin apparently feared that the Provisional Government would be able to “let off revolutionary steam” in one way or another - by entering into negotiations for a separate peace, surrendering Petrograd to the Germans, holding elections to the Constituent Assembly, or provoking and suppressing a spontaneous uprising unorganized masses. Apparently, Lenin also feared that if the Bolshevik Party showed slowness, it would begin to lose influence and authority among the masses and would be unable to prevent complete anarchy in the country.
In the first of two letters addressed to the Central, St. Petersburg and Moscow committees of the RSDLP (b), Lenin wrote: “Having received a majority in both capital Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, the Bolsheviks can and must take state power into their own hands.
They can, because the active majority of the revolutionary elements of the people of both capitals is enough to captivate the masses, defeat the enemy’s resistance, defeat it, win power and retain it...” “The democratic conference,” Lenin pointed out, “does not represent the majority of the revolutionary people, but only conciliatory petty-bourgeois elites... Why should the Bolsheviks take power now?
Because Peter’s upcoming return will make our chances a hundred times worse.” Lenin noted that we are not talking about the “day” of the uprising, not about its “moment” in the narrow sense - the choice of the moment should be entrusted to the local Bolshevik leaders. Now, Lenin pointed out, the party must take advantage of the fact that at the Democratic Conference it actually has its own congress, the task of which is to put on the order of the day “an armed uprising in St. Petersburg and in Moscow (with the region), the conquest of power, the overthrow of the government.” In conclusion, Lenin asserts that, having taken power in Petrograd and Moscow at once (it does not matter in which city the Bolsheviks appear first), “we will win unconditionally and beyond doubt.”
In the second letter, entitled “Marxism and the Uprising” and addressed only to the Central Committee, Lenin refutes the opportunist lie that the preparation of an uprising, in general the attitude towards an uprising as an art, is “Blanquism”. According to Lenin, an uprising, in order to be successful, must rely not on a conspiracy or on a party, but on the proletariat, it must rely on the revolutionary upsurge of the people. Finally, the victory of an uprising is possible only if it occurs at a moment when “the activity of the advanced ranks of the people is greatest, when the fluctuations in the ranks of the enemies and in the ranks of the weak, half-hearted, indecisive friends of the revolution are greatest.” Emphasizing that “since these conditions are present, then to abandon the attitude to the uprising as an art means to change Marxism and change the revolution,” Lenin in his letter explained why an immediate armed uprising was “the order of the day.” He compared the current situation with the situation in the days of the July events, noting that then the Bolsheviks did not yet have sufficient support from the proletariat, but now, after the “retribution” against the Bolsheviks and the Kornilov revolt, the Bolsheviks have a majority in both Soviets - Moscow and Petrograd. In July there was no nationwide revolutionary upsurge; now, after the Kornilov revolution, there was one. Finally, then there were no serious hesitations among the enemies of the Bolsheviks, now the hesitations are “giant.” “Politically, we would not have retained power on July 3-4,” Lenin wrote in conclusion, “for the army and the provinces, before the Kornilov revolution, could and would have marched on St. Petersburg. Now the picture is completely different. ... We have before us all the objective prerequisites for a successful uprising.” Lenin demanded that the Central Committee rally the Bolshevik faction at the Democratic Conference, without fear of leaving the wavering in the camp of the wavering,” indicated that it was necessary to draw up a short declaration, “the shorter, the sharper the declaration, the better,” “emphasizing in the sharpest way the inappropriateness of long speeches, the inappropriateness of “speeches” in general, the need for immediate action to save the revolution, the absolute necessity of a complete break with the bourgeoisie, the complete removal of the entire present government... the need for the immediate transfer of all power into the hands of revolutionary democracy, led by the revolutionary proletariat.” The Bolsheviks, “having read this declaration, calling to decide, not to talk, to act, and not write resolutions,” must “move our entire faction to factories and barracks...”. At the same time, Lenin pointed out, in order to treat the uprising in a Marxist way, that is, as an art, it is necessary, without wasting a minute, “to organize the headquarters of the rebel detachments, distribute forces, move loyal regiments to the most important points, surround Alexandrinka, occupy Petropavlovka, arrest General base and the government... mobilize the armed workers, call them to a desperate last battle, immediately take over the telegraph and telephone, place our uprising headquarters at the central telephone exchange, contact all factories, all regiments, all points of armed struggle with it by telephone, etc. ." .
It is not surprising that the first reaction of the Petrograd Bolshevik leaders to these letters was approximately the same as their reaction to Lenin’s Letters from Afar. “We all gasped, no one knew what to do. Everyone was perplexed at first,” Bukharin recalled several years later. On the evening of September 15, members of the Central Committee hurriedly left the Alexandria Theater for an emergency meeting to discuss Lenin's letters. Present were not only the members of the Central Committee who were constantly in Petrograd and who carried out the day-to-day leadership of the party (that is, Bubnov, Dzerzhinsky, Joffe, Milyutin, Sverdlov, Sokolnikov, Stalin and Uritsky), but also Kamenev, Kollontai and Trotsky (for Trotsky this meeting of the Central Committee was second after his release from prison), representatives of the Moscow Bolshevik organization Bukharin, Lomov, Nogin, Rykov and the representative of the Central Committee in the Caucasus Stepan Shaumyan. Most of those present were given copies of Lenin's letters so that they could think about them in advance. The published minutes of the debate are extremely sketchy. The Central Committee decided to schedule a meeting in the near future specifically dedicated to discussing tactical issues. Stalin's proposal to send Lenin's letters to the most important organizations for discussion was rejected, despite the fact that Lenin addressed his first Letter not only to the Central Committee, but also to the St. Petersburg and Moscow Committees. Moreover, the majority of those present were in favor of quietly destroying Lenin’s letters. Bukharin subsequently claimed that the Central Committee considered the question of destroying the letters and unanimously decided to burn them. As noted in the official minutes, the members of the Central Committee voted to retain only one copy of each letter and to take appropriate measures to prevent mass action.
Lomov later recalled the fears of the Central Committee: “...we were afraid that this letter would get to the St. Petersburg workers, to the district committees. Petersburg and Moscow committees, because this would immediately introduce enormous discord into our ranks... we were afraid: if his words leaked out to the workers, then many would begin to doubt the correctness of the line of the entire Central Committee.” As an additional precaution, at the meeting of the Central Committee on September 15, it was decided to make the representatives of the Central Committee in the Military Organization and the St. Petersburg Committee (Sverdlov and Bubnov, respectively) personally responsible for ensuring that calls for immediate action in the spirit of Lenin’s demands were not heard in the barracks and factories.
So, for a time, Lenin's calls for the overthrow of the Provisional Government were unceremoniously ignored. In fact, the behavior of the Bolshevik delegation at the Democratic Conference changed after receiving Lenin's letters only in the sense that Trotsky stopped talking about the possibility of forming a government by the conference as the first step towards transferring power to the Soviets - he now categorically insisted on the direct transfer of all political power to the Soviets. This seemingly insignificant, but in fact very significant change led to a heated argument between Trotsky and Martov at a meeting of the faction of delegates from the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies on September 18. Martov advocated the creation by the Democratic Conference of a broad-based socialist government, including representatives of all the main groups invited to the meeting. Objecting to Martov, Trotsky argued that the composition of the Democratic Conference is such that giving it full state power and entrusting it with resolving the issue of government would be a rash step. On the contrary, Trotsky insisted, it was absolutely necessary to transfer power to the Soviets, which had shown themselves to be a powerful creative force. political force.
The Bolsheviks did not stop their efforts to influence the conference delegates, to convince them to break with the bourgeoisie and take the first steps towards creating a revolutionary government. The Bolshevik Declaration on the Question of Power, a program approved by the Central Committee on September 13 and, as noted above, based largely on the provisions of Lenin's article “On Compromises,” was read at the meeting of the Democratic Conference on September 18. That evening, responding to the calls of the Bolsheviks, 150 delegates from Petrograd factory workers and military units organized a demonstration near the Alexandria Theater in support of the creation of a government formed only of socialists. So, instead of leaving the Democratic Conference and going to the masses to call for an armed uprising, as Lenin insisted, the Bolshevik Party worked to mobilize workers and soldiers to put pressure on the Democratic Conference to take a more radical course.
Lenin took the announcement of the declaration at the Democratic Conference as undoubted evidence that the party leadership rejected his instructions contained in the letters of September 12-14. Undoubtedly, the appearance on September 16 in the Rabochiy Put newspaper of the article “Russian Revolution and Civil War” he wrote at the beginning of the month, with the author indicated, should have had an even greater effect on him. The Central Committee, therefore, not only took measures to prevent Lenin’s calls for an armed uprising from reaching the masses of rank-and-file party members, it took care to convey to the masses more moderate views Lenin, expressed by him a week earlier, thereby creating the impression that this was Lenin’s point of view at the present moment.
It was now that Lenin decided to immediately return to Petrograd, contrary to the ban of the Central Committee (allegedly for security reasons). Without the knowledge of the Central Committee on September 17 (or one of the next few days after September 17) Lenin arrived from Helsingfors to Vyborg and from here notified Krupskaya and Sverdlov - but not the Central Committee - of his adamant decision to return to Petrograd.
Meanwhile, the delegates of the Democratic Conference for four days (September 14-18) held endless meetings of groups and party factions and general sessions, at which all sorts of issues concerning the nature of the future government and government were discussed. After lengthy debates on September 19, a vote took place on the issue of power, however, in essence, the issue was not resolved, and all interested parties suffered a complete fiasco. According to the order pre-established by the presidium, the delegates had to first express their attitude towards the idea of a coalition in principle. Further, the delegates were asked to vote for or against each of two proposed amendments: 1) on the exclusion of elements of the Kadet Party and other groups involved in the Kornilov rebellion from participation in the coalition and 2) on the unconditional rejection of the coalition with the Cadets in general. Finally, the resolution as a whole was put to a vote with appropriate amendments.
By a roll call vote that lasted five hours, the Democratic Conference approved the principle of coalition with the bourgeoisie (766 votes for, 688 against and 38 abstentions). The results of the vote confirmed the validity of the Bolsheviks' fears regarding the composition of the meeting: representatives of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and trade unions overwhelmingly voted against an alliance with the bourgeoisie, but still outweighed the votes of the much more numerous delegates from the Soviets of Peasants' Deputies, military committees, zemstvos and cooperatives who spoke for the coalition. The two proposed amendments were then put to a vote. Speaking before the vote on behalf of the Bolsheviks, Trotsky spoke in favor of accepting both amendments. The same opinion was expressed by the representative of the Menshevik-Internationalists Martov and the representative of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries Kamkov. Both amendments passed, to the displeasure of many, although obviously not all, delegates who favored a coalition in principle. The resolution as a whole adopted amendments(that is, approval of the principle of coalition, but refusal of an alliance with the Cadets and other groups that had stained themselves by supporting Kornilov) satisfied practically no one. The Bolsheviks, of course, voted against the resolution, joined by numerous coalition supporters who simply could not imagine a viable coalition government without the Cadets. The amended resolution received only 183 votes, 813 delegates voted against it, and 80 abstained from voting.
Four days of bitter debate revealed sharp differences between the "democratic groups" but absolutely nothing was decided about the composition of the future government. The attitude of socialists to power and government turned out to be, perhaps, even more contradictory and confusing than before the vote on September 19. It was absolutely clear to the Presidium of the Democratic Conference that this situation could not continue, therefore, at its insistence, even before the close of the meeting on September 19, the delegates decided to continue the Democratic Conference until it was possible to somehow reach a mutually acceptable agreement on the program of the future government and the conditions its formation and functioning.
The next day, a debate appointed by the presidium took place to find a way out of the impasse. Fierce disputes, in which members of the presidium and representatives of various parties and groupings from among the delegates of the meeting participated, began in the morning and ended only in the evening. Referring to the enormous differences that had emerged within the ranks of the democrats on the issue of power and government, Tsereteli argued that a government consisting only of representatives of democratic parties could not be viable. He was echoed by Gots and Avksentyev, who again reiterated the need to maintain a political union with the bourgeoisie in one form or another. The main Bolshevik speaker was Kamenev, who not particularly convincingly referred to the fact that just yesterday the idea of creating a coalition government had been decisively rejected, and insisted on the need to create a homogeneous democratic government. To reassure moderate socialists about what the Bolsheviks' attitude to such a government would be, Kamenev categorically asserted that the Bolsheviks would not overthrow such a government; on the contrary, they would support it as long as it followed a democratic course and led the country to the convening of the Constituent Assembly. Having talked until they were hoarse, the delegates began voting on the issue of a coalition - 60 delegates voted against, 50 votes were cast for the coalition.
Due to the fact that opinions and votes were divided almost equally, Tsereteli proposed taking a slightly different path. He proposed to try to achieve unity of opinion on the issue of the political program of the future government, leaving the problem of the specific composition of the government to be decided by a permanent representative body, which should be elected at the Democratic Conference and to which the government would be responsible until the convening of the Constituent Assembly. This proposal was subsequently accepted. As for the line that the new government was supposed to pursue, the majority of the delegates were in favor of the August 14 Programme, only the Bolsheviks objected. However, the Bolsheviks, like other participants in this meeting, supported the idea of creating a permanent representative body.
Kamenev hoped that this body would be “homogeneous”, that most of its members would be representatives of the Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies and, therefore, it would not be as deaf to calls to break with the bourgeoisie as the democratic conference. However, almost immediately it became clear that such hopes had no basis. Once again, only the Bolsheviks expressed disagreement when the meeting participants decided that the permanent body (originally called the Democratic Council, but more often called the Pre-Parliament) should include both representatives of the parties and groups represented at the democratic meeting, as well as representatives of the propertied circles. Something exactly the opposite of what happened in the voting the day before happened. At the meeting on September 19, the delegates began by agreeing to the idea of a coalition in principle, and then, by voting against the participation of the Cadets, they effectively ruled out any real possibility of creating a coalition government. Now, on September 20, a special meeting of delegates rejected the coalition principle and then adopted a resolution indirectly allowing for the possibility of political cooperation with representatives of the bourgeoisie, not excluding the Cadets.
Supporters of the coalition government did not fail to immediately take advantage of the opportunity. That same evening, September 20, at the plenary session, a resolution introduced by Tsereteli was adopted, according to which the task of final resolution of the issue of power was entrusted to the Pre-Parliament. The resolution provided, among other things, that the government would pursue a line aimed at implementing the August 14 Program, that in the field of foreign policy it would strive to conclude peace between all warring states, that it would be accountable and responsible to a permanent representative body, which, until the convocation The Constituent Assembly will be considered a body expressing the will of the entire people. The resolution noted that this representative body, that is, the Pre-Parliament, should consist of delegates from the Democratic Conference. The possibility of participation of representatives of the bourgeoisie in the Pre-Parliament or the government was not specifically stipulated, but in a camouflaged form the resolution allowed for the possibility of the formation of a new coalition, because it contained a vague indication that if the government included bourgeois elements, then the composition of the permanent representative body should be expanded through inclusion of representatives of the bourgeoisie into it. The resolution, however, made a reservation that in this case the predominance of democratic elements should be ensured. Finally, the resolution provided for the selection of five people from among the delegates (later this figure was doubled) who should begin negotiations in order to facilitate the formation of a government” in accordance with the provisions of this resolution. These delegates were charged with informing the Democratic Council of the results of their efforts, and the council had to approve their reports. So, the long-awaited Democratic Conference ended, in essence, without result - several yet unnamed delegates were entrusted with the task of finding an acceptable way out of the government crisis, which turned out to be beyond the power of more than a thousand delegates of the Democratic Conference.
Partly due to the fact that opponents of further cooperation with the bourgeoisie did not want to participate in formal negotiations with Kerensky, the group of delegates appointed for the negotiations of the Democratic Conference was dominated by prominent supporters of the coalition in the Council, such as Tsereteli, Avksentiev, Gots and Chkheidze, as well as representatives cooperatives and zemstvos, who believed that Russia under no circumstances could do without the participation of representatives of the big bourgeoisie in the government. On September 22-24, the delegation conducted negotiations, often more like bickering, with Kerensky, other ministers, representatives of the Central Committee of the Kadet Party and representatives of Petrograd and Moscow industrialists. As one might expect, representatives of the bourgeoisie did not agree to accept the August 14 Program as the basis of government policy. Without completely rejecting the idea of the Pre-Parliament, they insisted that only the Provisional Government had the legal right to create such a body and that under no circumstances could the new government be responsible to the Pre-Parliament; in other words, the latter was assigned the role of just an advisory body, nothing more. At the same time, Kerensky categorically insisted on the need to form a new coalition cabinet of ministers.
Members of the delegation of the Democratic Conference had to choose whether to abandon the most controversial provisions of the August 14 Program and tacitly recognize the independence of the government from the Pre-Parliament, or break with Kerensky and abandon the idea of introducing representatives of the bourgeoisie into the government. As expected, they chose the first path. The tactics of the delegation led by Tsereteli at the political negotiations on September 22-24 were, in a certain sense, the opposite of the tactics that Tsereteli followed at the Democratic Conference. At the meeting, he managed to achieve an agreement that ensured the possibility of a coalition, leaving aside the question of who exactly should enter the cabinet, and focusing general attention on the line that the new government would have to pursue, whatever its composition; now, faced with a stubborn reluctance to accept the August 14 Program as the basis of government policy and disagreement with the government’s responsibility to the Pre-Parliament, Tsereteli was forced not to attach much importance to these circumstances and to emphasize the decisive importance of the alliance between democracy and the bourgeoisie as the only possible basis for ridding Russia of all her troubles.
At the last stage of negotiations, the August 14 Program was revised and “softened” so much that it became acceptable to the cadets. This time it was decided that the government would quickly prepare and issue a decree legitimizing the Pre-Parliament, and that this body, renamed the Council of the Republic (it was, however, still most often called the Pre-Parliament), would include the already elected 367 members from among the delegates of the Democratic meetings and up to 150 more representatives of the propertied classes. It was also understood that from a legal point of view it would be a purely advisory body and. most importantly, the government will remain outside its jurisdiction.
Late in the evening of September 23, a meeting of the Pre-Parliament was held (in the composition elected before the closure of the Democratic Conference), at which the Bolshevik resolution introduced by Trotsky was rejected, which called the negotiations of the delegation led by Tsereteli a betrayal of the aspirations of the masses and demanded to ensure “truly revolutionary power" However, by a slight majority of votes, the resolution introduced by Dan was adopted, which was, in fact, a tacit approval of the results of the negotiations. Now the delegates could only wait for the Provisional Government to introduce new members to the Pre-Parliament - representatives of the bourgeoisie. Kerensky was given the opportunity to officially name the members of the new coalition cabinet, which he did on September 25. The cabinet included four cadets - Konovalov, Kishkin, Smirnov and Kartashev. Although the Socialists received most of the portfolios, the most important portfolio of Minister of Foreign Affairs remained with Tereshchenko; Konovalov became Minister of Industry and Deputy Prime Minister, while Kerensky remained head of government and Supreme Commander.
The next day (September 21) after the Democratic Conference adopted Tsereteli's resolution authorizing negotiations with Kerensky on the formation of a new government (but before the results of the negotiations became known), members of the Central Committee met to discuss the party line at the moment and for the near future. Regarding this meeting, what is perhaps most surprising is that even now, when the Democratic Conference clearly demonstrated its reluctance to abandon the policy aimed at creating a coalition power, Lenin’s calls to raise the masses in an armed uprising were not even considered. In all likelihood, this is explained, in particular, by the influence of right-wing Bolsheviks such as Kamenev, Rykov and Nogin. However, even party members who fully shared Lenin’s views regarding the possibility and necessity of revolution in Russia doubted the possibility of immediately mobilizing the armed masses. Thanks to constant communication with workers and soldiers, such prominent Bolsheviks as Trotsky, Bubnov, Sokolnikov and Sverdlov were able to realistically assess the limits of the party’s influence and authority among the masses, as well as the degree of the latter’s commitment to the Soviets as a legitimate stronghold of democracy, providing all truly revolutionary groups with the opportunity joint activities for the benefit of the revolution. In addition, after the Kornilov revolt, they were much less concerned than Lenin with Kerensky and his ability to damage the left forces. They were now inclined to link the seizure of power and the formation of a new government with the convening in the near future All-Russian Congress Soviets, meaning to take advantage of the legitimacy of the Soviets in the eyes of the masses.
It should also be noted that immediately after the Democratic Conference, the right-wing Bolsheviks also advocated the early convening of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets and proclaimed the slogan “All power to the Soviets!” The essential difference between "Leninists in spirit" like Trotsky and right-wing Bolsheviks like Kamenev was that while the former believed that the Congress of Soviets should transfer power to a government of extreme left elements ready to immediately make peace and implement a broad program of radical domestic reforms, the latter saw the Congress of Soviets as a means of securing a broader and stronger alliance of “democratic groups” capable, at most, of forming an exclusively socialist coalition government until the convening of the Constituent Assembly.
So, the main issue on which the opinions of the leaders of the Petrograd leadership of the Bolshevik Party differed, when the work of the Democratic Conference was approaching completion, was by no means the question of the immediate preparation of the masses for an armed uprising, which, informed about Lenin’s calls for an uprising, the narrow circle of Bolshevik leaders unanimously rejected, or about the immediate convening of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which everyone considered necessary. There was no unanimity of opinion on the question of whether the Bolsheviks should leave the Democratic Conference, and whether they should join the Pre-Parliament, which was counting down the last hours of its work, the first meeting of which was scheduled for September 23. For the Bolsheviks, who shared Kamenev’s views, the opportunity to take advantage of the conclusion of the Democratic Conference and take part in the work of the Pre-Parliament, using its platform to discredit supporters of the coalition and maintain connections with wavering elements in the Socialist-Revolutionary-Menshevik camp, seemed extremely valuable and important. They believed that this would contribute to the maximum strengthening of the broad socialist bloc at the All-Russian Congress of Soviets. As for Trotsky's supporters in the Bolshevik leadership, they considered the demonstrative withdrawal of the Bolsheviks from the Democratic Conference and the boycott of the Pre-Parliament as a necessary precondition that would allow, at the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, to achieve a decisive break with the compromisers and the transfer of power to the Soviets and to follow a new revolutionary path forward with all truly revolutionary groups.
At the morning meeting of September 21, the Central Committee adopted a compromise decision on the issue of future relations with the Democratic Conference. It was decided not to recall the entire Bolshevik delegation from the meeting, but to protest against the actions of coalition supporters by recalling the Bolsheviks from the presidium. Then, by nine votes to eight, they voted against the participation of the Bolsheviks in the Pre-Parliament. Since the votes were divided almost equally, the members of the Central Committee agreed that the final decision on the issue of boycotting the Pre-Parliament would be made at a joint meeting of the Central Committee and the Bolshevik participants in the Democratic Conference, which would take place as soon as all the delegates had gathered.
A joint meeting of members of the Central Committee and Bolsheviks - participants in the Democratic Conference took place on the same day. Trotsky spoke on behalf of the supporters of the boycott of the Pre-Parliament, and Rykov expressed the opposite point of view. Many, including Stalin, joined Trotsky. Kamenev, Nogin and Ryazanov supported Rykov. Subsequently, Trotsky recalled that the debate was lengthy and extremely stormy. When it came to voting, the left was defeated. United party representatives from all over Russia voted 77 to 50 for the participation of the Bolsheviks in the pre-parliament. The decision was immediately approved by the Central Committee.
Two days later, on September 23, at to a certain extent Thanks to the efforts of the Bolsheviks, a meeting of members of the Central Executive Committee with delegates of the Democratic Conference from the regional Soviets took place, at which it was decided to hold the All-Russian Congress of Soviets in Petrograd and set the date for its opening - October 20. Then, at a joint meeting of the Central Committee, representatives of the St. Petersburg Committee and the newly formed pre-parliamentary delegation of the Bolsheviks held on September 24, a resolution was adopted that the activities of the Bolsheviks in the Pre-Parliament should serve the purposes of the campaign to ensure the transfer of All power to the Soviets at the approaching congress. The resolution noted that in the current situation, the main task of the party is to mobilize the broad masses to support the transfer of power to the Soviets, expand the influence of the Soviets and strengthen their political authority to such an extent that they can successfully compete in this regard with the government. In this regard, the Bolsheviks should concentrate efforts on strengthening ties between local Soviets, strengthen ties with other revolutionary organizations of workers, soldiers and peasants, and seek re-election executive bodies central and local councils, still controlled by the compromisers, to hold regional congresses of Soviets and, of course, take all measures to unconditionally ensure the holding of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets on the appointed date. The resolution emphasized that the activities of the Bolsheviks in the Pre-Parliament should be only auxiliary in nature, being entirely subordinated to the tasks of mass struggle.
The situation that had developed by that time in the Petrograd Soviet clearly demonstrated the strengthening of the positions of the extreme left elements in connection with the formation of the third coalition cabinet of ministers and the worsening economic situation of the country. On September 25 he began his duties new line-up presidium, which was dominated by the Bolsheviks. At the plenary meeting of the Petrograd Soviet, with stormy applause, the new presidium took its seats, and Trotsky addressed the meeting:
“Let me remind you of a moment from 1905 when I had to open a meeting of the Petrograd Soviet instead of the arrested Khrustalev. Then the Petrograd Soviet experienced a turning point, which ended in our defeat... We feel much stronger now than then. But the new list of ministers published in the evening papers, which poses a challenge to democracy, indicates that the revolution has arrived at a serious moment. We are confident that the new presidium will have to work with a new upsurge of the revolution. We are all party people, and we will carry on our work, and more than once we will have to cross arms. But we will direct the work of the Petrograd Soviet in the spirit of law and complete freedom of all factions, and the hand of the presidium will never be the hand of suppressing the minority."
Soon after Trotsky assured the assembly of his determination to direct the work of the Petrograd Soviet in a spirit of democracy, the Bolsheviks presented to the deputies a resolution he had prepared, which stated the reluctance of the Petrograd workers and soldiers to support the new coalition government. The resolution, immediately adopted by an overwhelming majority of votes, expressed confidence that “the news of the new government will meet with one answer from all revolutionary democracy: “resign.” And relying on this unanimous voice of true democracy, the All-Russian Congress of S.R. and S.D. will create a truly revolutionary government."
The focus on the formation of a new government and a new government at the All-Russian Congress of Soviets determined all the activities of the Bolsheviks in the second half of September. So, starting from September 27, each issue of “Workers' Way” was published with a call printed large on the first page: “Comrade workers, soldiers and peasants! Get ready for the All-Russian Congress of Soviets on October 20! Immediately convene regional congresses of Soviets!” On the first page of the September 26 issue was an article by Zinoviev, in which he wrote about the imminent collapse of the new coalition government, the so-called September bloc: “... We consider the Congress of Soviets convened on October 20 to be the sovereign owner of the Russian land. If this congress is allowed to take place, then by that time the experiment with the “new” coalition, we are convinced, will completely fail and a number of intermediate elements will finally join our slogan “All power to the Soviets!” Every day our strength will increase, every step of the September bloc will prove the correctness of our point of view.”
In a very laconic and polished language, the new tactics of the Bolsheviks were outlined in an appeal to workers and soldiers, published in the newspaper “Rabochy Put” on September 30 (the authorship of the appeal clearly also belongs to Zinoviev; obviously, the text was discussed and approved by the Central Committee). The appeal, entitled “Before the Congress of Soviets,” stated that the counter-revolution would stop at nothing to prevent the convening of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets and the Constituent Assembly. Under these conditions, the appeal said, workers and soldiers must be vigilant and take all measures to ensure that delegates opposed to the coalition are elected to the congress:
“...Be on your guard, comrades! Don't rely on anyone but yourself. Without wasting a single hour, prepare for the Congress of Soviets, convene regional congresses, ensure that opponents of conciliation are sent to the congress... No partial speeches!.. We will concentrate all our efforts on preparing the Congress of Soviets for October 20 - a congress that is alone will ensure the convening and revolutionary work of the Constituent Assembly... The Central Committee of the R.S.-D.R.P.”
Exactly G.S. How Lenin hid with the Helsingfors “police chief.” In the book: Lenin in 1917. Memories. Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the CPSU Central Committee. M. 1967, p. 148-156; Startsev V.I. IN AND. Lenin in August 1917, p. 121-130; Startsev V.I. About some works of V.I. Lenin in the first half of September 1917 - In the book; IN AND. Lenin in October and in the first years of Soviet power. Ed. F r i m a n A.L.L., 1970, p. 30-31; Astrakhan H.M. and others, Lenin and the revolution of 1917, L., 1970, p. 277-284; Norman E. Saul Lenin's Decision to Seize Power: The Influence of Events in Finland, Soviet Studies, April 1973, pp. 491 -505; Koronin M.M. V.I. Lenin and Finnish revolutionaries , - "Questions of History", 1967, No. 10, pp. 11-17.
Lenin V.I. Poly. collection cit., vol. 34, p. 119-121.
There, p. 133-139.
Western historians pay almost no attention to these articles. In the works of Soviet historians, who tried to trace the development of Lenin's views almost minute by minute, contradictory, sometimes directly opposite, assessments are expressed. This is partly explained by the fact that Lenin’s views on the possibility and desirability of the peaceful development of the revolution in September 1917 and the coincidence or disagreement of his point of view with the opinions of the leaders of the Petrograd Bolshevik organization for a long time remained a taboo topic, partly due to the gap between the dates of writing and publication of Lenin's articles - only recently have serious attempts been made to establish the exact dates of their writing. Different opinions and assessments are expressed in such works as: S o v o k i n A.M. On the possibility of the peaceful development of the revolution after the defeat of the Kornilov regime. - "Questions of the history of the CPSU", 1960, No. 3, p. 50-64; S a n d i n B.I. Lenin on the relationship between peaceful and armed ways of developing the revolution after the defeat of the Kornilov revolt. -Scientific notes of the Leningrad State Pedagogical Institute, vol. 19, no. 2, 1958, p. 213-232; Frumkin S.N. IN AND. Lenin on the possibility of the peaceful development of the revolution. - Scientific notes of the Ryazan State Pedagogical Institute, vol. 19, 1958, p. 29-51; Startsev V.I. About some works of V.I. Lenin in the first half of September 1917, p. 28-38; Ivanov N.Ya. Some issues of the crisis of the “ruling elite” and the tactics of the Bolsheviks on the eve of the October armed uprising. -On Sat. Mints I.I. Lenin and the October armed uprising in Petrograd. Materials of the All-Union Scientific Session, held on November 13-16, 1962 in Leningrad, M., 1964, p. 202-214. In all collected works of V.I. Lenin, except latest edition selected works, these articles are arranged in order of their publication dates, that is, September 14-27. Studies of some classified materials carried out by V.I. Startsev, allow us to conclude that they were written much earlier than previously thought (that is, between September 6 and 9).
519 votes were cast for the Bolshevik proposal, and 414 votes for the resolution of the “moderate” socialists, with 67 abstentions.
Each military unit The Petrograd garrison, regardless of its size, could have at least one representative in the Petrograd Soviet, while the norm for the representation of factory workers was one deputy per 1000 workers. This circumstance led to a very large inequality in the representation of soldiers, among whom the influence of the Socialist Revolutionaries was relatively large, and workers, who were greatly influenced by the Bolsheviks. Beginning in August, the Bolsheviks unsuccessfully sought to equalize the representation of soldiers and workers, demanding that soldiers also elect one representative per 1,000 people.
Vladimirova V. Revolution of 1917, vol. 4, p. 269.
Those. platform, which involved a combination of reforms with firm power, developed by the All-Russian Executive Committee and presented for consideration at the State Meeting in Moscow on August 14.
Minutes of the Central Committee, p. 68; Vladimirova V. Revolution of 1917, vol. 5, p. 263-264, 275.
Minutes of the Central Committee, p. 65. In 1920 Stalin, in one of his speeches, stated that after October Lenin recognized the correctness of the leaders of the Petrograd Bolshevik organization, who at that time rejected the tactical course he proposed. See: Trotsky L., The Stalin School of Falsification, translated by John G. Wright, New York, 1962, pp. 200-201.
Minutes of the Central Committee, p. 65, 261 -262; Trotsky L. Soch., vol. 3, part 1, p. 301 -302, 359, 441 - 442; Komissarenko L.A. Activities of the Bolshevik Party, p. 332-333.
. "Working Path", September 29. Revolutionary movement in Russia in September. National crisis, p. 74-75.
Ibid., see also: Trotsky. cit., vol. 3, part 1, p. 317-318.
. "Working Path", September 30. On September 23, the position of the right wing of the Bolsheviks in the Central Committee strengthened, as they were joined by Zinoviev, who began to regularly take part in meetings. At the same time, Trotsky, a representative of the left wing of the party, did not take part in the work of the Central Committee and the Petrograd Soviet for almost a week (starting from September 28) due to illness. Minutes of the Central Committee, p. 67-75; Reiman M. Russian Revolution, vol. 2, p. 287.
"ALL POWER TO THE SOVIETS!"
chief politician slogan of the Bolshevik Party during the preparation and implementation of the Great October Socialist Revolution. revolution. Put forward in the April Theses of V.I. Lenin and enshrined in the decisions of the All-Russian April Conference of the RSDLP (b). Based on the teachings of Marxism-Leninism about revolution and the state and, in particular, on Lenin’s position on the Soviets as a new state. power like the Paris Commune, designed to replace the bourgeoisie that is subject to destruction. state car. The content of the slogan during the period of peaceful development of the revolution (April-June 1917): the elimination of dual power by transferring all power to the Soviets, the creation of Soviets. government from the Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks (since they constituted the majority in the Soviets), the demolition of the old state. apparatus and replacement of its owls. state org. The Bolsheviks were supposed to, without entering the government, act as opposition party and, campaigning among the broad masses, criticizing the inconsistency and hesitation of the petty bourgeoisie. parties, their compromise with the bourgeoisie and their inability to satisfy the revolutionaries. demands of the people, change, using the right to recall deputies, the party composition of the Soviets and, ultimately, create a Bolshevik Soviet. production At the same time, the overthrow of the Time. production of weapons an uprising was excluded, because with the support of the government of the Soviets, it would have been perceived by the masses as an uprising against the Soviets. Elimination of bourgeois it was thought that the Soviets would decree the transfer of power to them. The Provisional Government, which had no real power at its disposal and was kept in power by an agreement with the Soviets, would not have been able to provide any serious resistance.
During the development of the revolution, the masses were convinced from their own experience that the Time. The government and the Socialist-Revolutionary-Menshevik leadership of the Soviets that support it do not fulfill their demands. The process of elimination has begun, they agree. illusions. A clear indicator of this were the mass demonstrations in Petrograd (April, June and July) and other cities. In the July days of 1917, the autocracy of the bourgeoisie was established. The Socialist-Revolutionary-Menshevik Soviets turned into powerless appendages of the bourgeoisie. pr-va. Under these conditions, V.I. Lenin justified the need to temporarily remove the slogan about the transfer of power to the Soviets. This, however, did not mean that the provision on the Soviets as state bodies needed revision. form of dictatorship of the proletariat. Lenin had in mind only the Soviets led by the Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. The VI Congress of the RSDLP (b) completely agreed with Lenin. During the Kornilov revolution, in the context of a broad popular movement against the counter-revolution, in which a number of Socialist-Revolutionary-Menshevik Soviets were drawn in, the possibility of transferring power to the Soviets arose for a short period of time. Lenin considered in these days it was quite possible “... a return to the pre-July demand: all power to the Soviets, a government of Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks responsible to the Soviets” (Works, vol. 25, p. 283). However, the Socialist-Revolutionary-Menshevik bloc, with its support of the Temporary. the manufacturer ruined this opportunity.
After the liquidation of the Kornilov rebellion, in the conditions of the rapid Bolshevisation of the Soviets, which reflected the revolution. the rise of the masses, the Bolshevik Party again put up the slogan “V. V. S.!”, but its content was modified: now it called for a struggle to transform the Soviets into organs of uprising against the bourgeoisie. pr-va, for the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The slogan "V.V.S." was implemented on Oct 25. (November 7), when the 2nd All-Russian. Congress of Soviets, relying on the victorious weapons. uprising in Petrograd, decreed the overthrow of the Time. pr-va and the establishment of the Soviet Union. authorities.
Lit.: Lenin V.I., Soch., 4th ed., vol. 24, p. 1-9, 13-14, 19-51, 116-22, 125, 181-82, 198-216, 262-64, 281-84; vol. 25, p. 157-59, 164-70, 282-87, 340-47, 385-428; vol. 26, p. 38-46, 215-16; CPSU in resolutions and decisions of congresses, conferences and plenums of the Central Committee, part 1, 7th ed., M., 1954, p. 332-53; Sixth Congress of the RSDLP (Bolsheviks). Protocols, M., 1958.
Yu. S. Tokarev. Leningrad.
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