Carrying out the line of the 18th Party Congress, the Soviet government, in the difficult and dangerous situation of a possible imperialist conspiracy, made every effort to thwart the plans of international reaction, prevent a military conflagration and create a barrier to fascist aggression. To this end, it persistently sought negotiations with the governments of England and France and the conclusion of an agreement on mutual assistance against aggression.
The international situation and the domestic political situation of the Western powers created certain preconditions for the success of such negotiations. The Munich policy did not bring England and France the desired results: it became increasingly clear that fascist aggression could first fall on them, and not on the USSR.
The Anglo-French public persistently advocated negotiations with the Soviet Union. In the spring of 1939, similar sentiments gripped a significant part of the members of the English Parliament. An alliance with the USSR was advocated not only by Labor members and liberals, but also by many conservatives who hated the USSR and at the same time feared for the fate of the British Empire. “We will find ourselves in mortal danger,” Churchill said in the House of Commons, “if we cannot create a great alliance against aggression. It would be the greatest stupidity if we rejected natural cooperation with Soviet Russia" (516). Liberal leader Lloyd George warned Chamberlain: “If we act without Russian help, we will fall into a trap.”
The Communist Party and the Soviet government understood the essence of the predatory policy of German imperialism and realistically assessed its danger both for the USSR and for other states. The decision to negotiate with the Western powers was a continuation of a consistent foreign policy course Soviet state to create a system of collective security, suppress fascist expansion and prevent war.
The true goals of the governments of England and France were different. One of the policy memorandums developed by the British government in the summer of 1939 stated: “It is desirable to conclude some kind of agreement with the USSR that Soviet Union will come to our aid if we are attacked from the East, not only in order to force Germany to fight on two fronts, but also, probably, because - and this is the most important thing - ... that if war breaks out, we should try drag the Soviet Union into it..." (517)
The “appeasers” also hoped that the fear of an alliance between England and France and the USSR would force Germany to come to an agreement with the Western powers and return its policy to the framework of the Munich agreement.
On March 21, the British Ambassador to the USSR Seeds presented the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs with the following draft declaration of England, the USSR, France and Poland: “We, the undersigned, duly authorized to do so, hereby declare that, since peace and security in Europe are a matter of common interests and concerns and since European peace and security may be affected by any action constituting a threat to the political independence of any European State, our respective Governments hereby undertake to confer forthwith upon such steps as should be taken for general resistance to such action" (518).
The limitations of this draft declaration, which replaced specific decisive action against the aggressors, the obligation to “confer immediately” was obvious. Nevertheless, believing that even such a declaration could play a positive role, the Soviet government agreed with it. The USSR People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs told Seeds: “We identify with the position of the British government and accept the wording of its draft declaration. Representatives of the Soviet government will immediately sign the declaration as soon as both France and Poland accept the British proposal and promise their signatures. To make the act especially solemn and binding, we propose that the prime ministers and foreign ministers of all four states sign it” (519). In order to achieve greater effectiveness of the English project, the Soviet government expressed the wish that, along with the Balkan countries, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, as well as the Scandinavian countries (520) join the declaration.
Despite this, the British government abandoned its own proposal of March 21, 1939. Moreover, it continued to connive with the aggressor. “When I occupied Memel,” Hitler later testified, “Chamberlain informed me through third parties that he very well understood the need for such a step, although he could not publicly approve such a step” (521).
In mid-April, England and France sent new proposals to the Soviet Union. French Foreign Minister Bonnet announced his readiness to exchange letters with the USSR obliging the parties to mutual support if one of them was drawn into a war with Germany as a result of providing assistance to Poland or Romania. The essence of the English proposal was that the USSR should take on unilateral obligations to help “its European neighbors” in the event of aggression committed against them. The French proposal, despite its limitations, contained an element of reciprocity that was not in the English one, according to which the Soviet Union was to immediately enter the war with Germany on the side of “its European neighbors” without any specific reciprocal obligations from the British government.
Despite the clearly two-faced position of Great Britain, the Soviet government tried in every possible way to solve the problem of repelling German aggression in a businesslike manner, together with France and England. On April 17, it tabled proposals that marked the beginning of actual negotiations. These proposals were:
"1. England, France, and the USSR conclude an agreement with each other for a period of 5-10 years on a mutual obligation to immediately provide each other with all kinds of assistance, including military assistance, in the event of aggression in Europe against any of the contracting states.
2. England, France, and the USSR undertake to provide all kinds of assistance, including military assistance, to the Eastern European states located between the Baltic and Black Seas and bordering the USSR, in the event of aggression against these states.
3. England, France and the USSR undertake to discuss and establish as soon as possible the amounts and forms of military assistance provided by each of these states in pursuance of § 1 and 2.
4. The British government explains that the assistance it promised to Poland refers to aggression exclusively on the part of Germany.
5. The existing alliance treaty between Poland and Romania is declared valid in the event of any aggression against Poland and Romania, or is completely canceled as directed against the USSR.
6. England, France and the USSR undertake, after the opening of hostilities, not to enter into any negotiations and not to conclude peace with the aggressors separately from each other and without the general consent of all three powers.
7. The corresponding agreement is signed simultaneously with the convention that is to be developed by virtue of § 3.
8. Recognize it necessary for England, France and the USSR to jointly enter into negotiations with Turkey on a special agreement on mutual assistance” (522).
This was the solid foundation of a tripartite treaty of mutual assistance, based on equality of obligations and the necessary effectiveness of measures to suppress aggression in any part of Europe.
But the reciprocity of obligations did not suit England and France. They only counted on an agreement that would allow the USSR to be drawn into a war with Germany and at the same time avoid providing assistance to it. This was confirmed by the response proposals of France (April 25, 1939) and especially England (May 8, 1939).
At first glance, the French side declared the reciprocity of obligations: “In the event that France and Great Britain found themselves in a state of war with Germany as a result of the fulfillment of obligations that they would have accepted in order to prevent any violent changes in the situation existing in Central or Eastern Europe, the USSR would provide they receive immediate help and support. If, as a result of the assistance provided by the USSR to France and Great Britain under the conditions provided for in the previous paragraph, the USSR would in turn find itself in a state of war with Germany, France and Great Britain would immediately provide it with assistance and support” (523).
However, this project essentially rejected very important parts of the Soviet proposals. His “reciprocity” was very relative. If the USSR was under obligations to help France and England in any case of their war with Germany (even if they themselves started it), then support for the Soviet Union was provided only after it provided assistance to England and France. When the Soviet plenipotentiary in France drew Bonnet's attention to this, the latter, feigning embarrassment, said that due to his excessive busyness, he had entrusted the editorship of the project to the Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Leger (524).
After a long silence, the British government rejected the French proposals and introduced its own, with which it again tried to impose on the Soviet state the obligation of unilateral and gratuitous assistance to the Western powers.
The Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Soviet government revealed the provocative meaning of Anglo-French policy. In a memorandum dated 14 May 1939, the Soviet government informed Great Britain that English sentences cannot serve as a basis for organizing a front of resistance of peace-loving states to the further deployment of aggression in Europe, since they “do not contain the principle of reciprocity in relation to the USSR and put it in an unequal position...” (525).
In an effort to reach an agreement with the Western powers, the Soviet government set out the following conditions for ensuring collective security, consistent with the principle of reciprocity:
"1. Conclusion between England, France and the USSR of an effective mutual assistance pact against aggression;
2. Guarantee by these three great powers of the Central and of Eastern Europe under the threat of aggression, including Latvia, Estonia, Finland;
3. The conclusion of a specific agreement between England, France and the USSR on the forms and amounts of assistance provided to each other and to the guaranteed states, without which (without such an agreement) mutual assistance pacts risk hanging in the air, as the experience with Czechoslovakia showed” (526).
The position of the USSR was impeccably frank and consistent. It was aimed at curbing the fascist aggressor and ensuring collective security. But Anglo-French diplomacy in negotiations with the Soviet Union showed stubborn slowness, which naturally caused concern among the international community.
In mid-May, pressure on the Chamberlain government increased from more far-sighted members of the English Parliament. In response to persistent demands to speed up negotiations in Moscow, Chamberlain said: “I must be careful not to allow anything to complicate the situation... We have to turn not only to the Russian government. We must also keep in mind the governments of other countries.” This statement indicated that the British policy of connivance with the aggressor remained unchanged.
Meanwhile, the political situation in Europe became increasingly tense. Under pressure from public opinion, the Anglo-French side was forced to slightly change its position at the end of May. In the proposals of May 27, the Western powers already recognized the need for mutual assistance between England, France and the USSR in the event of a direct attack by Germany. But reservations nullified this principle of mutual assistance. Instead of immediate measures against the aggressor, preliminary consultations and resolution of the issue in the League of Nations were proposed, which could be used as a ruse to refuse immediate assistance to the victim of aggression.
The Soviet Union did not at all take the position of “overthrowing” the initiative of the Western powers, as some bourgeois historians are now trying to present. Taking all measures to speed up the progress of negotiations and conclude an effective and equal treaty with England and France against aggression in Europe, the Soviet government on June 2, 1939 handed over to the relevant governments a draft mutual assistance treaty, which contained the following obligations of the parties:
France, England and the USSR undertake to provide each other with immediate, comprehensive, effective assistance if one of these states is drawn into hostilities with a European power as a result of either
1) aggression on the part of that power against any of these three states, or
2) aggression on the part of this power against Belgium, Greece, Turkey, Romania, Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Finland, regarding which it was agreed between England, France and the USSR that they undertake to defend these countries against aggression, or
3) as a result of assistance provided by one of these three states to another European state, which requested this assistance in order to counteract a violation of its neutrality.
The three states will agree as soon as possible on the methods, forms and amounts of assistance that should be provided by them on the basis of Art. 1.
In the event that circumstances arise that, in the opinion of one of the contracting parties, create a threat of aggression from any European power, the three states will immediately begin consultations in order to study the situation and, if necessary, jointly determine the moment for the immediate activation of the mechanism of mutual assistance and the procedure for its application regardless of any procedure for passing questions in the League of Nations.
The three states communicate to each other the texts of all their obligations in the spirit of the obligations provided for in Art. 1, regarding European countries. If one of them envisages the possibility of accepting new obligations of the same nature in the future, it will first consult with the other two states and inform them of the content (text) of the adopted agreement.
The three states undertake, in the event of the opening of joint actions against aggression on the basis of Art. 1, conclude a truce and peace only by joint agreement” (527).
This project was based on proposals previously put forward by the Soviet government and fully met the interests of the fight against aggression.
Chamberlain and Daladier, although they did not formally reject the Soviet project, nevertheless continued their policy of delay. It was a demonstrative act of disrespect towards the USSR that the negotiations on the British side were conducted by an employee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, W. Strang. Even bourgeois historians qualify his arrival in Moscow as “a triple insult inflicted on the Soviet Union, for Strang was a person of low diplomatic rank, acted as a defender of a group of English engineers convicted of espionage in Soviet Russia, and was part of a group of employees who accompanied Chamberlain to Munich " (528) .
On June 8, Halifax expressed a desire to negotiate not through an exchange of letters, but at a round table and authorized Seeds to do this, giving him Strang as his assistant. On this occasion, in a speech on July 23, Lloyd George said: “Lord Halifax visited Hitler and Goering. Chamberlain went into the arms of the Fuhrer three times in a row... Why was only a Foreign Office official sent to represent us in a much more powerful country that is offering us its help? There is only one answer to this. Mr. Neville Chamberlain, Lord Halifax and Sir Simon do not want an alliance with Russia" (529).
At this stage, the Western powers chose the discussion they organized about security guarantees for the Baltic states as the main method of diplomatic sabotage of negotiations with the USSR.
The firm determination of the Country of Soviets to defend the Baltic republics from aggression was of no small importance. In connection with the seizure of the Klaipeda region from Lithuania by the Nazis, the USSR government addressed the governments of Estonia and Latvia with statements. Well aware of the ways and methods used by Germany to implement its aggressive plans, and also taking into account the anti-Soviet position of the governments of the Baltic countries, the Soviet government warned the latter against concluding such agreements that could, to one degree or another, infringe on their independence, allow political and economic domination of a third state. It emphasized the danger of such agreements for the Baltic states and their incompatibility with the agreements of Estonia and Latvia with the Soviet Union, which in this case could not remain an indifferent spectator (530).
Consultations were held with representatives of the Baltic states. The Estonian envoy in Moscow stated that his country only formally treats both groups equally, but in essence counts on the help of non-aggressive countries, and primarily the USSR (531). However, such evasive statements were contradicted by a clearly expressed anti-Soviet policy. At the height of the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations, Estonia and Latvia concluded “friendly” non-aggression treaties with Germany. The Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, Halder, and the Chief of Hitler's military intelligence, Admiral Canaris, who secretly visited these countries, discussed the issue of the occupation of the Baltic states by Nazi troops.
Somewhat earlier, the German envoy to Estonia, Frowein, reporting to Berlin about a conversation with the chief of staff of the Estonian army, Rek, wrote that it was very important for this country to know whether Germany would exercise control over the Baltic Sea in the event of war. “General Rack admitted this,” he continued, “and stated that Estonia could also assist in this matter. For example, the Gulf of Finland is very easy to mine against Soviet warships without attracting any attention. There are other possibilities" (532). Finland also took a pro-German position.
On June 15, Seeds conveyed the next proposals of his government to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, which were not much different from the previous ones. New project Article 1 read:
“The United Kingdom, France and the USSR undertake to provide each other immediately with all possible support and assistance if one of the countries is drawn into a military conflict with any European power as a result of either
1) aggression on the part of that power against one of these three countries, or
2) aggression on the part of that Power against another European State to which the contracting country concerned has undertaken, in accordance with the wishes of that State, to assist against such aggression, or
3) actions on the part of that power which the three contracting governments, as a result of the mutual consultation provided for in Article III, would recognize as threatening the independence or neutrality of another European state in such a way as to constitute a threat to the security of the contracting country concerned" (533).
This project indicated that the British government continued to slow down the resolution of the issue of providing the Baltic states with effective guarantees from the three powers - the USSR, France and England. This was a real trap set for the Soviet Union by the governments of England and France.
If the Soviet Union was supposed to immediately, automatically come to the aid of England and France in the event of a German attack on Belgium, Greece, Poland, Romania and Turkey, then in the event of a German attack on the Baltic countries no immediate assistance was provided from England and France. They pledged to come to the rescue only if, “as a result of mutual consultation,” Germany’s actions were recognized as threatening the independence and neutrality of the Baltic states, and also if this constituted a threat to the security of the USSR.
Well, what if France and England, for some reason, do not recognize Germany’s actions as falling under these conditions? What if they delay consultations or lead them to a dead end, while Hitler’s troops are already going on the offensive? It is enough just to raise these questions to make sure that the proposed project did not impose any real obligations on England and France to provide assistance to the Baltic states (534).
Criticizing the position of the governments of the Western powers, A. A. Zhdanov, a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, pointed out on the pages of the newspaper Pravda that the British and French governments were piling up artificial difficulties in the negotiations on issues that, with their good will and sincere intentions, could be resolved without delay or interference.
The negotiations had already lasted 75 days, of which 59 were spent on delays on the Anglo-French side. The British and French, Zhdanov wrote, “do not want a treaty with the USSR that is based on the principle of equality and reciprocity, although they take oaths every day that they are for “equality,” but a treaty in which the USSR would act as a farm laborer bearing responsibility for bear the full weight of obligations on their shoulders. But no self-respecting country will agree to such an agreement if it does not want to be a toy in the hands of people who love to rake in the heat with the hands of others. Moreover, the USSR cannot agree to such a treaty, the strength, power and dignity of which are known to the whole world” (535).
Despite the consistently constructive initiative of the Soviet government, subsequent actions of the Anglo-French side created more and more new obstacles to the negotiations. One of them was the question of guarantees against indirect aggression, that is, a seizure covered by any screen, as happened with Czechoslovakia.
At the beginning of June, the question of the need for guarantees against indirect aggression was raised to Daladier. This reflected France's desire to secure its borders in the east. Daladier proposed extending the mutual obligations of England, France and the USSR to the case of not only direct, but also indirect aggression (536). The Soviet government was sympathetic to the opinion of the French Prime Minister. It considered guarantees against indirect aggression as an important and integral condition of the trilateral treaty, providing it with the necessary reliability. Such guarantees were of particular importance for the Soviet Union. On the basis of a mutual agreement between England, France and the USSR, it was necessary to exclude the possibility of using the territory of the Baltic countries under the guise of “voluntary consent” of their governments as a springboard for a German attack on the Soviet Union.
However, during further negotiations, it became clear that England and France were trying to push through a definition of indirect aggression, which not only did not guarantee joint actions by the three powers, but also opened a direct path to the repeated repetition of the “Czechoslovak option.” Thus, the invader was shown the ways and means of advancing to the east, and the neutrality of England and France was ensured.
“...The expression “indirect aggression,” emphasized in the proposals of the Soviet government of July 9, 1939, “refers to an action to which any of the above states agrees under the threat of force from another power or without such a threat and which entails the use of the territory and forces of a given state for aggression against it or against one of the contracting parties, - therefore, entails the loss of that state’s independence or a violation of its neutrality” (537).
The Anglo-French side stubbornly refused to accept a clear and precise definition of indirect aggression. A number of other fundamental issues remained unresolved, including the question of the timing of the entry into force of the military agreement.
The Soviet side proposed that agreements on political and military issues come into effect simultaneously. England and France promised that following the conclusion of a mutual assistance treaty, negotiations on a military convention would begin. The Soviet government had every reason to express distrust: a convincing warning was the fate of the Franco-Soviet mutual assistance treaty, which was not supported by a military agreement and for this reason alone did not have the proper effectiveness.
Halifax instructed Seeds that the British government did not want to accept Soviet proposals to define indirect aggression and simultaneously bring into force political and military agreements. Reporting “the intention of His Majesty’s government” if the USSR defended its proposals, “to reconsider the position as a whole” (538), that is, to disrupt the negotiations, the minister, in essence, advised the ambassador to resort to threats and blackmail against the Soviet Union. However, the French government did not support Halifax's intentions (539).
Meanwhile, the Moscow negotiations directly or indirectly drew the entire world diplomacy into their orbit. It was clear that this was the last frontier that could block the path to a new world war. “Now there was only one possibility to avoid war,” admits B. Liddell Hart, “and that was to enlist the help of Russia...” (540). But there were no constructive solutions. On one side of the line, the Soviet Union waged a diplomatic struggle, supported by the world progressive community and those Western politicians who soberly assessed the global threat of fascist expansion, on the other - the forces of international imperialist reaction, seeking to resolve their contradictions at the expense of others.
The leadership of Nazi Germany was extremely alarmed by the possibility of concluding an Anglo-French-Soviet treaty. In the summer of 1939, Hitler, among his circle of associates, said that if the negotiations ended successfully, he would be forced to convene Nazi rally in Nuremberg to revise policies and call it a “peace congress” (541). However, information coming through diplomatic channels from London convinced the Fuhrer that fears were premature. Comprehensive information about the true intentions of the Western powers flocked to Berlin. In this regard, an excerpt from a telegram from the German ambassador in London dated April 26, 1939 is characteristic: “... this evening or tomorrow morning British government through his ambassador in Moscow, will give the Soviet government a response to the counterproposals of Soviet Russia. The answer is tantamount to a refusal, although it is expressed in the form of comments. In its main part, the note contains a rejection of the tripartite pact for mutual assistance proposed by Soviet Russia... Accordingly, military agreements in addition to this pact also disappear” (542).
A negative position regarding the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations, and above all assistance to the USSR, was taken partly under the influence of England and France by the Polish and Romanian governments, which in foreign policy, even in the face of an immediate threat from Germany, did not change their anti-Soviet course. “The Polish government,” Halifax wrote in a memorandum dated May 22, 1939, “does not want to bind itself in this way (by an Anglo-French-Soviet treaty - Ed.) with the Soviet government. We found that the Romanian government shares a similar point of view” (543).
The position of the Polish government was constantly a stumbling block in the negotiations. The USSR’s agreement to provide assistance to Poland and the negative attitude of its government towards cooperation with the Soviet Union in defense against aggression were clearly evident during the visit to Warsaw of the Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR Potemkin in May 1939. In a conversation with the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Beck, he emphasized that “ The USSR would not refuse assistance to Poland if it so desired” (544).
But the next day the Polish ambassador in Moscow made a statement to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs that Poland did not want this moment bind themselves to any agreement with the USSR (545). Wek cabled the Polish ambassador in London on June 9, 1939, that a treaty with the Soviet Union would violate “stabilization and security in Eastern Europe” (546). Colonel Vek, according to the French bourgeois historian M. Muren, “because of his Russophobia and fear of communism,” did not want rapprochement with Soviet Russia and believed that with the Hitler regime it was possible to find a solution to issues in the interests of Poland (547).
Recklessly rejecting Soviet aid In the fight against aggression, the rulers of bourgeois-landowner Poland actually put the country in a difficult position and, in the event of war, they obviously doomed it to disaster. Just in those days when Vek was sending telegrams to his ambassadors about Poland’s refusal to accept USSR help, plans for a “new Munich” - at the expense of Poland - were being developed and refined in the highest spheres of London, Paris and Washington. The American charge d'affaires in France reported to the State Department on June 24: "The prevailing opinion in influential circles is that after all, France should abandon the whole of Central and Eastern Europe to Germany in the hope that Germany will eventually come into conflict with the Soviet Union" ( 548)
The policy of the government of the United States of America was of no small importance for the course of the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations. The version of bourgeois historians that all US statesmen acted with the goal of preventing aggression is far from the truth. The negative point of view of the United States was invariably scrupulously brought to the attention of the British cabinet and used by it to strengthen the positions of opponents of the treaty. American foreign policymakers, aware of the moods of each member of the British government, skillfully capitalized on their anti-Sovietism, in every possible way inflating the false version that the treaty was beneficial only to the USSR. At one of the cabinet meetings in June 1939, Halifax emphasized that, in Bullitt’s opinion, “the Russians need an agreement with us, and we should not enter into one” (549). The negative attitude of American diplomacy towards the Anglo-French-Soviet treaty on mutual assistance was also explained by the fear that such a treaty would strengthen the international positions of England and France, and therefore complicate the US struggle for world hegemony (550).
Despite the opposition to the negotiations on the part of the governments and reactionary forces of a number of countries, the center of decisive resistance to the Anglo-French-Soviet agreement was in England. Even English bourgeois historiography does not deny this fact. “The British,” writes R. Parkinson, “made every effort to isolate Russia” (551). It was the Cliveden clique, which expressed the interests of English monopoly capital, and its proteges in the person of Chamberlain and Halifax, who held in their hands the key positions on which the success or failure of the negotiations depended.
In this regard, it is necessary to refute the speculations of some bourgeois historians about “Chamberlain’s instability”, “Halifax’s inconsistency” and other versions, which have the goal of removing responsibility for the delays in the negotiations from the English ruling circles at any cost. Empowered by monopoly capital, Chamberlain, Halifax, Wilson, Hoare and their inner circle very consistently pursued a policy of using negotiations for imperialist purposes, skillfully disorienting the British people and world public opinion.
During March - July 1939, the British cabinet repeatedly discussed the progress of the Moscow negotiations, but neither Chamberlain nor Halifax said a word in support of the tripartite treaty. Essentially, the cabinet members were playing a game of negotiation. Under the guise of discussing differences, various ways were sought to delay and then disrupt negotiations in such a way as to blame it on the USSR. When considering a possible version of a treaty with the Soviet Union, British leaders unambiguously stated their intention, in the event of a German attack on the USSR, to refuse to implement the treaty, that is, to leave the Soviet state alone with the fascist coalition. Orienting cabinet members to this, Halifax said on June 21: “If the Russian government decides to force our country to fight for fantastic goals, common sense will manifest itself” (552).
At one of the cabinet meetings, Chamberlain stated, as recorded in the minutes, that “he views everything relating to an alliance with Russia with great foreboding of trouble,” and has absolutely no faith in “the strength of Russia and doubts its ability to provide assistance in the event of war” (553 ) . He called the agreement with the USSR “a stone around the neck”, which “could hang for many years and lead to the fact that even sons will have to fight for Russian interests” (554). The obedient ministers echoed him. Lord Chatfield, Minister for Defense Coordination, "expressed the hope that his colleagues would understand with what disgust he was forced to consider the possibility of an alliance with the Soviets" (555).
In mid-July, due to the fault of the Anglo-French side, the negotiations reached a dead end. The British representatives in Moscow, in a report to Halifax, replete with anti-Soviet fabrications, were nevertheless forced to admit that the USSR’s proposals were “imbued with sincerity,” and the “magnificent” arguments with which you supply us make almost no impression,” because the USSR sees “differences in positions of the parties,” so the negotiations as a whole “turned into a humiliating exercise.” “From time to time,” said this secret report, “we take a new position and then abandon it... Piling one difficulty on top of another creates the impression that our plans are not serious.” Emphasizing that public opinion “demands the speediest conclusion of a treaty,” the British representatives hinted that the decision on whether to continue delaying tactics or completely disrupt the negotiations “belongs to the sphere of higher politics", that is, within the competence of the government (556).
The public in England, France and a number of other capitalist countries in Europe increasingly advocated for taking effective measures to suppress the growing fascist aggression. This was largely facilitated by the clear and precise position of the Soviet Union at the Moscow negotiations. It is characteristic that if in the fall of 1938, according to foreign sources, public opinion in France approved the Munich agreement (53 percent of the votes against 37, the rest abstained), then in the summer of 1939, 76 percent of those surveyed were in favor of the use of force in the event of German aggression against Poland, and only 17 percent (557) are against. The leader of the British communists, G. Pollitt, emphasized in July 1939: “87 percent of the population of England wants to conclude a pact with the Soviet Union. Why? Yes, because they first of all want to prevent war and understand that this can most effectively be achieved by joining forces with the forces of a great and powerful country, which over the past troubled years has repeatedly shown that it has no warlike intentions and that it is sincerely ready come to the aid of her allies, who have concluded a collective security agreement with her, if they are attacked by mad fascist dogs" (558).
Under these conditions, on July 25, the Anglo-French side was forced, in response to Soviet proposals, to announce their agreement to begin military negotiations. In Moscow from August 12 to 21, 1939, negotiations were held between military delegations (military missions) of the USSR, England and France, which, as the Soviet government hoped, should have led to the conclusion of a trilateral agreement.
On August 2, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, having discussed the issue of military negotiations, determined the composition of the Soviet delegation (559). It included people's commissar defense Marshal of the Soviet Union K. E. Voroshilov (head of the delegation), Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, commander 1st rank B. M. Shaposhnikov, People's Commissar of the Navy, flagship of the fleet 2nd rank N. G. Kuznetsov, chief of the Air Force of the Red Army commander 2nd rank A.D. Loktionov and Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army corps commander I.V. Smorodinov.
The next day, the NKID of the USSR informed the British and French embassies about the composition of the USSR delegation. The authority of the head and members of the delegation served as an important indicator of the attitude of the Soviet government not only to the upcoming negotiations, but also to the countries taking part in them. The French military attaché to the USSR reported to Paris on August 7: “The fact that this mission includes the People’s Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the People’s Commissar of the Navy, the Chief of Staff and his Deputy and the Commander of Soviet Aviation shows the importance of the Soviet the government attaches importance to these negotiations" (560).
The governments of England and France reacted differently to the selection of the composition of the delegations. Admiral R. Drake, close to the royal court, was appointed head of the English delegation. A like-minded person of Chamberlain, he gained fame through public calls for war against the USSR. The delegation, in addition, included uninfluential figures of the British army, Air Marshal C. Vernet, Major General T. Heywood, as well as a number of even less significant persons. Characterizing the members of the British delegation, the American bourgeois historian W. Shirer writes that “Drake... according to his data, was absolutely incapable of conducting high-level negotiations with the Russians, whom he considered aliens from another planet... Wernet understood nothing in any of the issues grand strategy, nor in diplomacy..." (561).
The composition of the British delegation testified to Britain's demonstrative disrespect for the Soviet Union and its obvious disinterest in the effectiveness of the negotiations. Far from sympathizing with the Soviet Union, W. Strang was forced to emphasize in a letter to Halifax that it was necessary to send an authoritative person to Moscow for negotiations between military delegations. “Russians expect to be treated the same way as the French, and certainly not worse than the Poles.” Given that Ironside's visit to Warsaw was reported in the press, "the Soviet government would consider it an insult if we sent a representative of lesser rank" (562).
The French military delegation included a member of the Supreme Military Council, General J. Doumenc, General M. Valen, a teacher at the naval school, Captain 1st Rank Vuillaume, Captain A. Beaufre and others. The Soviet plenipotentiary representative in France reported to Moscow regarding the composition of the mission that “the selection of mainly narrow specialists also indicates the inspection purposes of the delegation - the intention, first of all, to become familiar with the state of our army” (563).
The policies of the Western powers and the role assigned to military negotiations in them are shed light on by the directives and instructions developed by the governments of England and France and their military headquarters. On July 26, 1939, the minutes of a meeting of the British Cabinet, when considering the main tasks of the military delegation, said: “Everyone agreed that our representatives should be instructed to negotiate very slowly...” (564). The position of the British government was reflected in the directive of the military delegation: “The British government does not want to accept any specific obligations that could tie our hands under any circumstances. Therefore, one should strive to limit the military agreement to the most general formulations possible. Something like an agreed statement of policy would be in keeping with this.” The directive further revealed the position of the Western Allies regarding Poland, Romania and the Baltic countries: “If the Russians propose to the British and French governments to approach Poland, Romania or the Baltic states with proposals that would entail cooperation with the Soviet government or the General Staff, the delegation should not accept undertake any obligations... and discuss the issue of the defense of the Baltic states, since neither Great Britain nor France gave them any guarantees” (565).
The French delegation was similarly oriented. The Minister of Colonies J. Mandel had information that “the mission is leaving for Moscow without a developed plan.” “This is alarming and undermines confidence in the integrity of the negotiations,” the USSR plenipotentiary representative in France telegraphed to Moscow on August 3. “... The reasons for all this lie in the fact that here (in Paris - Ed.) and in London the hope of reaching an agreement with Berlin has not yet been abandoned” (566).
The instructions developed by the French General Staff resembled a prospectus for academic discussion (567). “Cooperation with the Russians,” Beaufre, a member of the French delegation, subsequently wrote, “was viewed as an auxiliary factor that should be used in the interests of problems closer to our diplomacy and strategy...” (568)
The main task of the military missions sent by the governments of England and France remained unchanged. “It is not in our interests,” the note from the French General Staff frankly said, “to leave it (the USSR. - Ed.) out of the conflict” (569). Military negotiations also pursued other goals. They are evidenced by a special questionnaire handed to members of the military missions of the Western powers. The British and French general staffs gave their delegations, which were asked to act in unity, the task of finding out in detail the size and condition of the USSR Armed Forces, establishing possible dates for their mobilization and concentration, and familiarizing themselves with the strategic considerations of the Soviet command regarding plans for waging war. Here are some of the questions:
What is the main idea of the USSR's policy in matters of warfare?
What are the views of the Soviet General Staff on German and Italian strategy at the beginning of the war and in its subsequent stages?
If Germany attacks in the East, what defensive operations can the USSR undertake: a) in Poland, b) in Romania? To what extent and on what frontiers is the Soviet Union ready to use its army or air force outside the Polish-Russian and Romanian-Russian borders?
Will Soviet bombers be able to operate against Germany directly from USSR territory or will they have to be based in Poland and Romania?
How much refined oil could the USSR supply during the war? Will it have enough tankers to transport it?
What naval policy does the Soviet Union intend to adhere to in the Baltic and White Seas? How will he be able to operate against the German merchant fleet or the transport of German troops by sea in these zones?
What are the specifications of aviation gasoline in the USSR? (570)
The German ambassador in London, Dirksen, aware of the mood of British government circles, reported to Berlin that “the military mission is more likely to establish the combat capability of the Soviet Army than to conclude operational agreements” (571).
Trying to explore as fully as possible the state of the military potential of the Soviet Union, the Anglo-French delegation had no intention of revealing its true intentions. The strictly secret instructions received by the English and French missions from Chamberlain and Daladier directly instructed: “Negotiations should be carried out very slowly. The mission must exercise the greatest restraint where these considerations (stated above - Ed.) reveal Franco-British intentions" (572).
The reluctance of England and France to achieve cooperation with the USSR in the fight against aggression was also evidenced by the unprecedented delay in the arrival of military missions in the Soviet Union, which lasted for seventeen days. And this at a time when Europe was already in a state of pre-war crisis, when war could start at any moment!
The following conversation took place between the Soviet plenipotentiary in England Maisky and Admiral Drax:
“Tell me, Admiral, when are you leaving for Moscow?
This has not yet been finally decided, but in the coming days.
Of course, you are flying... the atmosphere in Europe is tense...
Oh, no!.. It’s inconvenient to fly on an airplane!
Maybe you will go to the Soviet Union on one of your fast cruisers?.. That would be very stylish and impressive...
No, and a cruiser is no good..." (573).
Finally, on August 5, the slow-moving packet boat City of Exeter (its speed did not exceed 13 knots), which carried the delegations, left the pier and headed for Leningrad.
The work of the meeting of military delegations began with the presentation of powers approved by the governments. Voroshilov, who chaired the meeting, read out the text of the authority issued by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, which stated that the delegation “is authorized to negotiate with the British and French military missions and sign a military convention on the organization of the military defense of England, France and the USSR against aggression in Europe” (574) .
The powers of the French delegation stated that General Doumenc was authorized to conduct negotiations with the main command of the Soviet Armed Forces “on all issues related to entering into cooperation between the armed forces of both countries” (575). It followed from this that the French delegation had the authority to negotiate. The British delegation had no written authority.
On this occasion, the following dialogue took place between the heads of the Soviet and British delegations:
“Marshal K. E. Voroshilov....But authority, in my opinion, is necessary in writing so that it is mutually clear to what extent you are authorized to negotiate, what issues you can touch upon, to what extent you can discuss these issues and how these negotiations may end . Our powers, as you have seen, are comprehensive... Your powers, stated in words, are not entirely clear to me. In any case, it seems to me that this question is not an idle one - at the very beginning it determines the order and form of our negotiations...
... Admiral Drake declares that if it were convenient to transfer the negotiations to London, he would have full authority...
Marshal K. E. Voroshilov to the general laughter he remarks that it is easier to bring papers from London to Moscow than for such a large company to go to London” (576).
So, already on the first day of the meetings, the declared intentions of the British and French governments to conclude a military convention, and therefore the tripartite treaty as a whole, were again called into question by their representatives.
The Soviet delegation proposed a specific military plan, the implementation of which would guarantee the suppression of German aggression. Chief of the General Staff Shaposhnikov outlined the plan for the deployment of the Soviet Armed Forces to western borders THE USSR. In accordance with this plan, in the event of aggression in Europe, the Soviet Army was ready to field 120 infantry and 16 cavalry divisions, 5 thousand heavy guns, 9 - 10 thousand tanks, from 5 to 5.5 thousand combat aircraft (577). Fortified areas along the entire western border of the USSR were put on combat readiness within four to six hours, and the concentration of the army was carried out within eight to twenty days.
The military plan of the General Staff of the Red Army provided for the following options for joint actions of the armed forces of England, France and the USSR.
The first option is when a bloc of aggressors attacks England and France. In this case, the USSR will field 70 percent of those armed forces that will be directly directed by England and France against the main aggressor - Germany. If these two countries will field 90 infantry divisions against the Nazi troops, then the Soviet Union will field 63 infantry and 6 cavalry divisions with a corresponding amount of artillery, tanks and aircraft for a total of about 2 million people.
In this option, the participation of Poland is considered obligatory by virtue of the agreement with England and France with all its forces, while it must concentrate from 40 to 45 infantry divisions for the main attack on its western borders and against East Prussia. In addition, the British and French governments must obtain consent from Poland for the passage and operation of the USSR armed forces - ground and air - through the Vilna corridor and, if possible, through Lithuania - to the borders of East Prussia, and if the situation requires, then through Galicia.
The combined Anglo-French fleet was entrusted with: closing the English Channel and breaking through a strong squadron into the Baltic Sea for operations against the German fleet, with the consent of the Baltic countries, temporarily occupying the Moonsund archipelago, the Aland Islands, the ports of Gange, Pernov, Gapsal, Gainash and Libau for the purpose of protection neutrality and independence of the Baltic countries from attack from Germany, cessation of the supply of ore and other raw materials to Germany from Sweden, blockade of the Reich coast in the North Sea, dominance in the Mediterranean Sea, closure Suez Canal and Dardanelles.
The USSR Navy, together with the Anglo-French squadron, should conduct cruising operations in the North off the coast of Finland and Norway (outside their territorial waters) against the submarine and surface fleet of the aggressor, and be based in the Baltic together with the combined fleet of England and France on the Ganges, Aland Islands and the Moonsund Archipelago, as well as to Gapsal, Pernov, Gainash and Libavu to protect the independent Baltic countries. The USSR Baltic Fleet will also develop its cruising operations, submarine operations, install mines off the coast of East Prussia and Pomerania, and prevent the transport of industrial raw materials from Sweden to Germany.
The second option is when aggression is directed at Poland and Romania. These two states must put all their armed forces to the front. France and England immediately declare war on Germany and oppose it. The participation of the USSR in the war can only be carried out if England and France reach an agreement on the passage of Soviet troops through the Vilna corridor, Galicia and Romania. In this case, the Soviet Union is fielding the same number of divisions against Germany as England and France. Before English, French and Soviet naval fleets The tasks are the same as in the first option. The USSR Black Sea Fleet closes the mouth of the Danube and the Bosphorus from penetration of enemy surface and submarine forces into the Black Sea.
The third option is when Germany, using the territory of Finland, Estonia and Latvia, directs aggression against the USSR. In this case, France and England must immediately go to war with Germany or with the bloc of aggressors, deploy 70 percent of the forces and means deployed by the Soviet Union and immediately begin active actions against the main aggressor. Poland necessarily opposes Germany, allocating at least 45 infantry divisions, reinforced with artillery, tanks and aircraft, and lets Soviet troops through the Vilna corridor and Galicia. If Romania is drawn into a war, it must participate in it with all its might and let Soviet troops pass through its territory (578).
These were the general strategic considerations of the Soviet military delegation about the joint actions of the armed forces of England, France and the USSR in the fight against the German aggressor, which stemmed from the real military-political situation.
The British and French delegations continued to conduct abstract discussions and had no intention of agreeing on the issues of organizing a joint rebuff to the aggressor. Drake set out common truths, such as those that it is necessary to “cut off all communication routes for the enemy”, “instinct to defeat the enemy fleet” and others. The British and French military missions did not even have a preliminary plan for joint operations against common enemy. This further strengthened the Soviet government's doubts about the true goals of the British and French delegations.
Reviews of the state of their armed forces, which were delivered by British and French representatives, were general character and, as it later turned out, sometimes contained false information. Thus, Dumenk said that if the Nazis sent their main forces to the eastern front, they would have to leave at least 40 divisions against France. In this case, General Gamelin will attack the Germans with all his forces (579). Meanwhile, Doumenc, as a member of the Supreme Military Council, was well aware that the military doctrine of France and its strategic plans for waging war on western front were of a passive defensive nature. In May 1939, at a Paris meeting of Anglo-French military representatives, when discussing issues related to fulfilling obligations to assist Poland in the event of German aggression, France unequivocally stated that it was not going to take active action on the Western Front (580). The same spirit of passivity permeated Gamelin's directive on the operation between the Rhine and Moselle, sent on May 31, 1939 to General Georges. “At the first stage,” it said, “in the event of occupation, it is necessary to oust the enemy from national territory, then come into contact with his defensive zone, while simultaneously covering the main part of our territory in depth... At the second stage, starting from the moment of entry into contact with the enemy’s defensive position, it is necessary to identify the location of German units, which, taking into account our available resources, will subsequently need to be attacked” (581). As can be seen, the strike against the enemy was postponed until the indefinite future, and there was no orientation towards an offensive “with all our might.” England followed a similar strategy. The directives to the military missions indicated that “the actions of the British and French armed forces in the West will fetter (only “fetter”! - Ed.) German forces on this front. As soon as the allied forces have the necessary resources, they will launch an offensive, most likely against Italy" (582).
The British and French delegations deliberately disoriented the Soviet representatives. They knew that the strategic plans of their governments did not provide for active actions against Germany on the western front, and at the same time they demanded that the USSR declare war on Germany in the event of an attack on Poland, but did not take decisive measures until the Wehrmacht troops reached the Soviet borders. In other words, the Reich had an unhindered path to aggression against Poland, Romania and further against the USSR.
The missions of the Western powers acted in strict accordance with the instructions they received, which stated that, having an enemy in the person of the USSR, Germany would find itself in much more difficult conditions in the East. At the same time, the depth of the front will increase to infinity, and the Reich will not be able to hope that it can easily get away with the occupation of Romania and a large part of Poland. The further German troops penetrate into enemy territory, the closer they will be to the Soviet Union (583).
The desire of the Western powers to expose the USSR to attack became obvious when discussing the cardinal issue of allowing Soviet troops through the territory of Poland and Romania in the event of German aggression. This question was not new. It was already on the agenda in 1938.
Nevertheless, when on August 14 Voroshilov invited Drax and Dumenk to explain their point of view on this issue, the British and French delegations promised to seek the opinion of their governments. But even without this it was absolutely clear that by sending delegations to negotiations without a preliminary decision the most important issue, which determines the strategic interaction of the parties to the treaty in the fight against a common enemy, the ruling circles of England and France did not strive for genuine cooperation with the USSR.
On July 25, 1939, the British government gave the Soviet side consent to begin negotiations on concluding a military agreement between the USSR, England and France. However, the governments of Chamberlain and Daladier did not actually intend to negotiate with the Soviet Union. This was evidenced by both the composition of the delegations of the Western powers at the negotiations and the content of the directives they received.
The military missions of England and France were composed of minor persons. Secret directives to the military missions of England and France came from the attitude of Chamberlain and his entourage to conduct fruitless negotiations and the possibility of interrupting them at any time if an Anglo-German agreement was achieved. The directives of the British military mission set the task of reducing “the military agreement to the most general formulations.” This was motivated by the fact that “the British government does not wish to accept any specific obligations” that could tie its hands “in certain circumstances.” Consequently, the directives did not provide for the conclusion of a military convention of the three powers. This indicated that Chamberlain did not want to conclude either a mutual assistance treaty or a military convention with the Soviet Union.
The position of the Soviet government, which sincerely sought to conclude an agreement with England and France in order to prevent aggression, was completely different. On August 2, 1939, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks reviewed and approved the tasks of the Soviet delegation at the negotiations. A representative delegation was appointed to conduct military negotiations, headed by the People's Commissar of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union K. E. Voroshilov. The powers of the head of the Soviet delegation were tasked with “signing a military convention on organizing the military defense of England, France and the USSR against aggression in Europe.”
Due to the deliberate delay by England and France of the arrival of military missions in the USSR, negotiations began only on August 12, 1939. From the very beginning of the negotiations, the following main questions were raised by the Soviet side:
1) determine specific commitments regarding the extent and forms of mutual assistance and plans for military cooperation;
2) agree on the passage of Soviet troops through the territory of Poland and Romania to provide assistance in the event of aggression.
When considering the first issue, the Soviet delegation declared its readiness to field 136 divisions, 5 thousand medium and heavy guns, up to 10 thousand tanks, and over 5 thousand aircraft against the aggressor. Specific plans for joint action against the aggressor were proposed. Assessing the Soviet proposals, English ambassador Seeds reported to London on August 13 that “all signs clearly indicate that the Soviet military mission is quite serious about pursuing the matter.” However, the British and French representatives refused to develop specific plans for military cooperation, since, as P. Cote wrote, they “did not have these plans” in the directives. Instead, they proposed agreeing on common goals and principles for mutual assistance. Comparing the positions of the Soviet Union and the Western powers, a member of the French mission noted in his memoirs that the Soviet proposals were “clear and specific.” The contrast between the program of the Soviet delegation and “the vague abstractions of the French-English platform,” he wrote, “is striking and shows the gulf that separated the concepts. The Soviet arguments were weighty... Our position remained false.”
When considering the second cardinal issue raised by the Soviet delegation, it turned out that it was also not included in the directives of the military missions of England and France. Therefore, the British and French representatives were not ready to answer it and made corresponding requests to their governments. Only after this, on August 16, Chamberlain's government instructed the deputy chiefs of military staff to give their opinion on this issue. They submitted a report which stated: "We consider it so important to give satisfaction to the Russians on this point that the strongest pressure should, if necessary, be brought to bear on Poland and Romania to persuade them to take a positive stand." An agreement on this issue was necessary, since the USSR, not having a common border with Germany, could provide assistance to England, France and Poland in the event of fascist aggression. Germany only on the condition that Soviet troops pass through Polish territory. The validity of the Soviet proposal, including from the point of view of security interests Western countries, recognized the French delegation and the French embassy in Moscow. Their report dated August 16 said that the Soviet proposal leads to “the very essence of the issue” of Soviet assistance, without which the negotiations “would be pointless.”
However, the governments of England and France did not use the opportunities at their disposal to induce the Polish government to accept the Soviet proposals. True, they established contacts with the Polish government on the issue of Soviet-Polish cooperation. However, at the same time, such “dosed” contacts were carried out in order, on the one hand, to create the appearance of “influence” on Poland, and on the other, not to bring the matter to the point of obtaining consent from it for military cooperation with the Soviet Union. As for Soviet-Romanian military cooperation, the governments of England and France did not even contact the Romanian government on this issue.
The Soviet Union negotiated with England and France in the context of a military conflict with Japan in the area of the river. Khalkhin Gol. The Japanese ruling circles assured the Nazis that “if Germany and Italy start a war with the USSR, Japan will join them at any time, without setting any conditions.” The prospect of a war on two fronts - in the West and in the East - worried the Soviet government. At the same time, given that the aggression of the fascist powers also poses a real threat to England and France, the Soviet government counted on the prudence of the ruling circles of these countries. In this regard, it did not react to Germany’s proposal to conclude a non-aggression pact made in early August, still hoping to receive a positive answer to the questions raised from the governments of England and France. However, the course of the negotiations in Moscow finally convinced the Soviet government of the reluctance of Western countries to cooperate with the Soviet Union in organizing collective security. At the same time, by this time the threat of an anti-Soviet conspiracy between England and Germany had become quite real. If there was no response from the Soviet side to the proposal to conclude a non-aggression pact, the German government was ready to conclude an anti-Soviet alliance with England.
On August 20, Hitler addressed a personal message to J.V. Stalin, inviting him to receive the German Foreign Minister on August 22 to sign a non-aggression pact. On the same day, Hitler sent a secret message to Chamberlain, in which he expressed his readiness, in response to British proposals, to communicate his thoughts regarding the conclusion of an “Anglo-German alliance.” From Hitler's answer it followed that Chamberlain proposed to negotiate an alliance with Germany. On August 21, it was reported from Berlin that Goering was ready to meet with Chamberlain. On August 22, Chamberlain sent a message to Hitler expressing agreement to “discuss broader problems.” In this regard, Halifax wrote in his diary that "the necessary preparations are being made for the arrival of Goering on Wednesday the 23rd." During Goering’s stay in England, it was intended to discuss English plans, “confirmation of which,” Halifax noted, “we expect from Berlin.”
In the current situation, the Soviet Union had no choice but to take the path of ensuring its security in individually and sign the Soviet-German non-aggression pact on August 23, 1939. The conclusion of this agreement was not part of the foreign policy plans of the Soviet Union. “It was not because military negotiations with England and France were interrupted,” the Soviet People’s Commissar of Defense rightly stated in a press interview, “that the USSR concluded a non-aggression pact with Germany, but on the contrary, the USSR concluded a non-aggression pact with Germany as a result, among other things, of that circumstance "that military negotiations with France and England have reached a dead end due to insurmountable differences."
The correctness and validity of this decision of the Soviet Union was recognized by many Western statesmen and historians far from Marxist views. Former French Minister of Aviation P. Cote wrote that as a result of the policy of England and France to disrupt the negotiations in Moscow, “the Soviet government had no choice but to choose between signing the Soviet-German pact or attacking its country under unfavorable conditions.”
Just as in 1918, due to the hostile policy of the Western powers, Soviet Russia was forced to conclude the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty, and in August 1939, the Soviet Union was forced to conclude the Soviet-German Pact due to the same hostile policy of England and France, although the Soviet Union did everything possible, to have a collective security pact with England and France.
The signing of the Soviet-German Pact disrupted the formation of an anti-Soviet alliance in Europe, which Chamberlain and his supporters sought. On the day of the conclusion of the Soviet-German treaty, Goering's trip to England to determine the terms of the Anglo-German alliance was canceled. “The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Soviet government,” Marshal G.K. Zhukov noted in his memoirs, “were based on the fact that the pact did not save the USSR from the threat of fascist aggression, but made it possible to gain time in the interests of strengthening our defense, and prevented the creation united anti-Soviet front."
The conclusion of the pact also upset the plans of the Japanese militarists to organize a combined attack of Japan and Germany on the Soviet Union. After the signing of the treaty, the Hiranuma government resigned. The new Japanese government decided to resolve the conflict in the river area. Khalkhin Gol.
At the same time, the Soviet government, based on the long-term goals of the struggle for collective security, left the door open to continue negotiations with England and France on concluding a mutual assistance pact. On August 26, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR S. A. Lozovsky told the Chinese ambassador in Moscow: “If England and France agree to the proposals of the Soviet government, the possibility of concluding an agreement with them cannot be ruled out... At present, negotiations have been interrupted, but their resumption depends on England and France."
However, the governments of Chamberlain and Daladier did not want to resume negotiations with the Soviet Union, but continued to make efforts to achieve a second Munich, this time at the expense of Poland, and to conclude an alliance with Germany. Until the very moment of Germany's attack on Poland, Chamberlain was convinced that he would be able to come to an agreement with Hitler. Negotiations between the USSR, England and France in 1939 showed that the Soviet Union consistently sought to achieve a broad, equal agreement on mutual assistance with England and France, capable of keeping Germany from starting a war in Europe. In the difficult international situation of 1939, when the immediate threat of fascist aggression loomed over the world, “the Soviet Union,” noted L. I. Brezhnev, “persistently fought for the creation of a system of collective security that could curb the aggressors and prevent the Second World War.” . Even some diplomats from Western countries were forced to admit this. The US Ambassador to Moscow D. Davis wrote to G. Hopkins: “No government has seen more clearly or stated with greater precision what should be done to preserve peace and prevent Hitler from unleashing a war, as did the Soviet Union.”
Practice international relations showed the inconsistency of attempts by the ruling circles of Western states to ensure security only for their own countries at the expense of the security of the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
The experience of history also testified to the harmfulness of anti-Soviet policies reactionary regimes a number of Eastern European countries. Even in 1939, when it became obvious that Poland would be the next target of Hitler's aggression, the sanitation government refused to enter into an agreement with the Soviet Union, which could protect Poland from attack. The anti-Soviet policy of turning the countries of Eastern Europe into a “cordon sanitaire” undermined the security of these states themselves and turned them into a corridor for attacks by fascist aggressors on the USSR.
The predominance in the ruling circles of Western countries of the desire to abandon the policy of collective security and to collude with the fascist aggressors on an anti-Soviet basis was the decisive circumstance that continued the path of fascist aggression and allowed Hitler to unleash the Second World War.
Soviet proposals for organizing collective security met the interests of all European peoples. However, the balance of forces in the world in the conditions of the existence of a single socialist state did not allow the policy of Western countries to turn towards the path of cooperation with the Soviet Union, to create a broad anti-fascist front and to implement the proposals of the Soviet government to create a system of collective security in Europe. At the same time, the struggle of the Soviet Union for collective security in 1939 was of great historical significance. It made it possible to delay a new world war, ensure the creation of an anti-fascist coalition in the future and defeat the fascist aggressors in favorable foreign policy conditions.
The Soviet proposals represented a contribution to the development of the concept of European security based on a generalization of the practice of international relations of the 30s. A number of provisions and ideas put forward by the Soviet Union with the aim of ensuring European security retain their significance for the future. Some of them were subsequently taken into account when forming the union of states of the anti-Hitler coalition and when creating a new international organization to preserve peace.
Breakthrough
And yet, despite the fierce rejection of the ideology and practice of Bolshevism, the leading powers of the world were forced to enter into contacts with the Soviet state: Economic interests were above all. In March 1921, after lengthy negotiations, a trade agreement was concluded with Great Britain. Moreover, the Soviet side managed to insist on including in the text of the treaty an obligation to refrain from hostile actions against each other.
The Soviet-German trade agreement signed in May 1921, according to which the functions of a diplomatic mission were transferred to the trade mission of the RSFSR, was also interspersed with political aspects. In fact, this meant legal recognition of Soviet Russia by Germany. During 1921, the Soviet state signed trade agreements with Norway and Italy. By the summer of 1921, Soviet diplomacy had two trade agreements with leading European countries.
Genoa Conference
In the spring of 1922, an international conference was convened in Genoa (Italy) to solve European economic and financial problems. The Soviet government also received an invitation to the conference.
This was the debut of Soviet diplomacy. They prepared very carefully for it. The scenario for the behavior of the Soviet delegation was developed by V.I. Lenin (it was initially assumed that he would personally lead it). The Soviet leadership decided to use the conference, at which many journalists from different countries were accredited, primarily for propaganda purposes, to form the image of the proletarian state as a peace-loving state fighting for peace and general disarmament. The report of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs G.V. Chicherin was devoted to these problems.
However, the leaders of the Entente countries were interested in other problems. They demanded that the Soviet government pay all Russian government debts, return all nationalized property to foreign entrepreneurs, or compensate for the damage caused. The amount of debts amounted to 18.5 billion gold rubles.
The Soviet delegation put forward counterclaims to the Entente countries: to compensate Russia for losses associated with the intervention and economic blockade in the amount of 39 billion gold rubles.
FORMATION OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
Prerequisites for the merger socialist republics. After graduation civil war political map of the former Russian Empire looked like this: the zone of Soviet power consisted of formally independent Soviet socialist republics - the RSFSR, Ukraine, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, the Far Eastern Republic and two Central Asian " people's republics" - Khorezm and Bukhara. The Baltic countries - Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, as well as Finland and Poland, who defended their sovereignty, became a zone of European influence (Poland also annexed Western Ukraine and Western Belarus).
Each republic had its own bodies state power and governance, had its own constitution, but in fact power belonged to the national communist parties that were part of the unified RCP (b). The communists considered it necessary to unite all nations and nationalities to fulfill their main goal- building a socialist society. At the same time, economic circumstances also pushed for state unification: the economic interdependence of national regions that had developed over centuries. The unification also had a foreign policy reason - the need for joint survival of similar political regimes in the face of a hostile environment. In addition, the idea of belonging to a single great state lived in the minds and sentiments of the peoples inhabiting the former Russian Empire.
In 1920-1921 between the RSFSR and Ukraine, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia were concluded alliance treaties in the field of military-economic and diplomatic activities. The republics were united under the leadership of the highest government agencies The RSFSR has its armed forces, large-scale industry, finance, transport, postal and telegraph communications. And Ukraine and Belarus also united foreign trade with the RSFSR. In December 1920, at the VIII All-Russian Congress of Soviets, a state plan for the electrification of Russia (GOELRO plan) was adopted, which provided for the creation of a unified energy network and the development of the economies of all Soviet republics on this basis.
Principles of building a union state. Within the Bolshevik Party itself there were different points of view on the question of the principles of building a single multinational state. The Commission of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) put forward a “Draft resolution on the relationship of the RSFSR with the independent republics” prepared by the People's Commissar for Nationalities Affairs J.V. Stalin. The first paragraph of this document read: “Recognize the expediency of concluding an agreement between the Soviet republics of Ukraine, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia and the RSFSR on the former’s formal accession to the RSFSR...”
V.I. Lenin subjected the “autonomization plan” to sharp criticism. He believed that all Soviet republics should unite into a single state union on the basis of equality and preservation of their sovereign rights. At the same time, each republic should have retained the right to freely secede from the union. The Party Central Committee approved Lenin's principles of national government. Now the first paragraph of the said resolution sounded like this: “Recognize the necessity of concluding an agreement between Ukraine, Belarus, the Federation of Transcaucasian Republics and the RSFSR on their unification into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, reserving for each of them the right to freely secede from the Union...”
Education of the USSR. The first Constitution of the USSR. On December 30, 1922, delegations of the republics gathered in Moscow and approved the Treaty and Declaration on the Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).
The December Congress went down in history as the first Congress of Soviets of the USSR. On January 31, 1924, at the Second All-Union Congress of Soviets, the first Constitution of the USSR was adopted. The supreme authority was declared All-Union Congress Councils, and in the period between congresses - the Central Executive Committee (CEC) of the Councils. It consisted of two legislative chambers: the Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities - and had its own governing body - the Presidium of the Central Election Commission. The Council of the Union was elected at the Congress of Soviets of the USSR from the entire composition of the congress delegates. The Council of Nationalities was formed from representatives of the republics and national regions. The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR became the highest executive body.
IN union republics Ah, their own congresses of Soviets and their own government were formed. But a significant part of the powers of the republic was transferred to central bodies: international representation, defense, state security, foreign trade, transport, budget, money circulation. The republics remained in charge of internal affairs, agriculture, education, justice, social security and healthcare.
The elections of delegates to the Congress of Soviets of the USSR were not truly democratic. Five times more delegates were elected from urban residents than from rural ones. The elections were multi-stage in nature: each Council elected delegates to a higher council (district to regional, regional to republican, and then to the Congress of Soviets). Some categories of the population, as in the Constitution of the RSFSR of 1918, were deprived of voting rights: persons who used hired labor or lived on unearned income, clergy, former police officers and gendarmes.
In 1924-1925 Constitutions of the union republics were adopted, basically repeating the provisions of the all-Union one.
National politics and interethnic relations. At the initial stage of the existence of the USSR, the party tried to take into account national specifics in a certain way. In the Muslim republics in 1922, the lands that previously belonged to them were returned to the clergy, and Sharia courts were restored. State and party bodies showed tolerance towards Muslim norms of behavior in society, including communists.
A rather flexible policy was also pursued in relation to the small peoples of the North who were engaged in hunting, fishing, and reindeer herding. They were given the right to self-government, taking into account customs and traditions (tribal councils and their congresses, native governments, executive committees, etc.), conditions were created for the development of a traditional economic and cultural way of life.
The central authorities paid special attention to the development of small nationalities of the USSR. First of all, very significant funds were allocated for the development of public education, as well as for the organization of national publishing houses. Some peoples received writing developed by scientists for the first time. In Moscow and Petrograd (which after Lenin's death in 1924 was renamed Leningrad) institutes for the peoples of the East and the peoples of the North were opened.
One of the directions of national policy in the 20s. was the so-called “indigenization”. Its goal was to attract representatives of local peoples to public administration. Indigenous people began to be appointed to administrative positions by order. Through a system of benefits and “national recruitment” to universities, accelerated training of personnel began, from whom a local elite subsequently emerged, occupying the main administrative and managerial positions and a privileged social position. At the same time, the policy of “indigenization” in fact often resulted in the infringement of the rights of other nationalities.
INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND FOREIGN POLICY OF THE USSR IN THE 1920s
Overcoming diplomatic isolation by the Soviet state. Foreign policy The RSFSR, and then the USSR, had a dual character. On the one hand, it was aimed at protecting the state interests of Russia, but on the other hand, it was closely associated with the implementation of the idea of world revolution, the main goal of the ruling Communist Party.
The first international acts - peace treaties - were signed by the RSFSR in 1920 with states that had recently been part of the Russian Empire: Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Finland.
Despite the fierce rejection of the ideology and practice of Bolshevism, the leading powers of the world were forced to come into contact with the Soviet state. Economic interests came first. In March 1921, after lengthy negotiations, a trade agreement was concluded with Great Britain. Interspersed with political aspects were the Soviet-German trade agreement signed in May 1921, according to which the functions of a diplomatic mission were transferred to the trade mission of the RSFSR. In fact, this meant legal recognition of Soviet Russia by Germany. During 1921, the Soviet state signed trade agreements with Norway and Italy. By the summer of 1921, Soviet diplomacy had 11 trade agreements with leading European countries.
Genoa Conference. Treaty of Rapallo. In the spring of 1922, an international conference was convened in Genoa (Italy) to solve European economic and financial problems. An invitation to participate in it was received by soviet government.
The Bolshevik leadership decided to use the conference primarily for propaganda purposes, to form the image of the proletarian state as a peace-loving state fighting for peace and general disarmament. The report of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs G.V. Chicherin was devoted to these problems.
However, the leaders of the Entente countries were interested in other problems. They demanded that the Council of People's Commissars pay all state debts of tsarist Russia, return nationalized property to foreign entrepreneurs, or compensate for the damage caused. The amount of debts amounted to 18.5 billion gold rubles. The Soviet delegation put forward counterclaims to the Entente countries: to compensate for losses associated with the intervention and economic blockade in the amount of 39 billion gold rubles. The parties failed to reach an agreement.
On the morning of April 16, 1922, the leaders of foreign delegations learned that the previous night the Russians and Germans had met on the outskirts of Genoa - Rapallo and concluded an agreement to restore diplomatic relations and economic contacts. The conclusion of the Treaty of Rapallo was an unpleasant surprise for the victorious countries, which regarded it as an attempt to revise the principles of the post-war system, which were based on the infringement of the legal status of Germany, a defeated power, and the isolation of Russia in order to prevent the penetration of the “communist infection” into other countries.
"Strip of recognition" of the USSR. As Soviet power strengthened its position within the country, the position of the USSR in the international arena gradually stabilized. 1924-1925 entered the history of international relations as a period of diplomatic recognition of the Soviet state. In February 1924, diplomatic relations were established between the USSR and Great Britain. In the same year, the Soviet Union was recognized by Italy, Norway, Austria, Greece, Sweden, and France. In the summer of 1924, diplomatic relations were established between the USSR and Mexico.
The "stripe of recognition" of the Soviet Union ended with the signing of the Japanese-Soviet Convention in January 1925. Based on this agreement, Japanese troops were evacuated from northern Sakhalin and Soviet power was established in this part of the island. Only in 1933, later than other countries, the United States of America was awarded legal recognition of the USSR.
Germany, humiliated by the Treaty of Versailles, saw the partnership with the USSR as an economic rather than a political one. Relations between countries were not limited only to mutually beneficial trade. Germany provided the Soviet Republic with great technical assistance. Military-technical cooperation was of particular importance. Conclusion of agreements with the countries of the East. The relations of the Soviet Republic with the countries of the East were successfully built, in which the liberation movement was gaining strength and came to power national governments. The Council of People's Commissars provided these countries with significant material assistance. Moreover, some party leaders, in particular Trotsky, believed that it was necessary to turn the banner of the world revolution to the East, create a well-armed corps in the Urals and throw it at India and Afghanistan. However, Lenin did not support this idea.
In 1921, the RSFSR signed treaties with Persia (Iran), Afghanistan, Turkey and Mongolia, and for the first time in their history these states acted as equal parties to diplomatic relations. At the same time, the Bolsheviks viewed these agreements as a kind of bridge that could connect the labor movement in the West with the national liberation movement in the East.
In May 1924, equal diplomatic relations were established between the USSR and China. The Soviet side declared all agreements between Tsarist Russia and other countries in which China's rights were infringed. The USSR pledged to withdraw its troops from Mongolia. Sino-Eastern Railway was transferred under the joint management of the Soviet and Chinese administration and was intended only for commercial transport.
Diplomatic conflicts with Western countries. The activity of Soviet foreign policy in the East caused discontent among the countries that had recently ruled these territories. On May 8, 1923, British Foreign Minister D. Curzon accused the USSR of pursuing an anti-British policy in the East and, in the form of an ultimatum, demanded that the following conditions be met within 10 days: to stop subversive activities in Iran and Afghanistan; end religious persecution in the Soviet Union; release British fishing trawlers (arrested, according to Moscow, for fishing in Soviet territorial waters). The conflict was aggravated by the murder of Soviet diplomat V.V. Vorovsky in Lausanne (Switzerland).
The Soviet government regarded the “Curzon ultimatum” as a crude attempt to interfere in the affairs of the USSR and launched a powerful anti-British propaganda campaign. Crowded rallies and demonstrations took place throughout the country. Fundraising began for the construction of an air squadron. But at the same time, fearing further escalation of international tension, the USSR satisfied the basic demands of the British side.
Creation and activities of the Comintern. Establishing connections with other countries was only one of the directions of Soviet foreign policy. Another, no less significant was control over the world revolutionary movement. For this purpose it was created international organization, which united communist parties from different countries - the Communist International (Comintern). The first (founding) congress of the Comintern took place in March 1919 in Moscow. It adopted a Manifesto addressed to the proletarians of the whole world. The document called on workers to unite on the principles of proletarian internationalism in revolutionary struggle for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Governing body The Comintern became the Executive Committee (ECCI). It was headed by the prominent Bolshevik figure G. E. Zinoviev.
The Second Congress of the Comintern, which worked in Petrograd and then in Moscow in the summer of 1920, stated: “The Communist International is the party of the revolutionary uprising of the international proletariat... The Comintern declared the cause of Soviet Russia its own cause.” The Red Army at this time was rushing to the capital of Poland. As the Bolshevik leaders believed, it would then enter other European countries. The Comintern announced the possibility of uniting Soviet Russia and Soviet Germany as the first step towards creating a “federation of Soviet republics around the world.”
However, already in July 1921, at the Third Congress of the Comintern, V.I. Lenin sharply criticized the supporters of the “revolutionary offensive.” And yet, when the situation in Germany worsened again in 1923, the Comintern decided to “push” the world revolution. A Comintern brigade was sent to Germany and significant funds were allocated. However, the revolutionary wave in Germany quickly waned. Attempts by representatives of the Comintern to stimulate an uprising in the Ruhr, Saxony, and Hamburg failed. Attempts to support the September 1923 uprising in Bulgaria also ended in failure.
The Comintern decided to abandon the policy of actively inciting world revolution at the end of 1926, when it became obvious that such attempts were nothing more than an adventure. Zinoviev resigned. Bukharin took his place. Now in all European countries The Comintern began to intensively create communist parties, provide them with material assistance, and put obedient leaders at their heads. All Comintern structures were reoriented not to ignite the “fire of the world revolution”, but to form a positive image of the USSR in public opinion other countries.
What you need to know about this topic:
Socio-economic and political development of Russia at the beginning of the 20th century. Nicholas II.
Internal policy of tsarism. Nicholas II. Increased repression. "Police Socialism"
Russo-Japanese War. Reasons, progress, results.
Revolution 1905 - 1907 Character, driving forces and features of the Russian revolution of 1905-1907. stages of the revolution. The reasons for the defeat and the significance of the revolution.
Elections to the State Duma. I State Duma. The agrarian question in the Duma. Dispersal of the Duma. II State Duma. Coup d'etat June 3, 1907
Third June political system. Electoral law June 3, 1907 III State Duma. Arrangement political forces in the Duma. Activities of the Duma. Government terror. Decline of the labor movement in 1907-1910.
Stolypin agrarian reform.
IV State Duma. Party composition and Duma factions. Activities of the Duma.
Political crisis in Russia on the eve of the war. Labor movement in the summer of 1914. Crisis at the top.
International position of Russia at the beginning of the 20th century.
The beginning of the First World War. Origin and nature of the war. Russia's entry into the war. Attitude to the war of parties and classes.
Progress of military operations. Strategic forces and plans of the parties. Results of the war. Role Eastern Front in the first world war.
The Russian economy during the First World War.
Worker and peasant movement in 1915-1916. Revolutionary movement in the army and navy. The growth of anti-war sentiment. Formation of the bourgeois opposition.
Russian culture of the 19th - early 20th centuries.
The aggravation of socio-political contradictions in the country in January-February 1917. The beginning, prerequisites and nature of the revolution. Uprising in Petrograd. Formation of the Petrograd Soviet. Temporary Committee of the State Duma. Order N I. Formation of the Provisional Government. Abdication of Nicholas II. The reasons for the emergence of dual power and its essence. The February revolution in Moscow, at the front, in the provinces.
From February to October. The policy of the Provisional Government regarding war and peace, on agrarian, national, and labor issues. Relations between the Provisional Government and the Soviets. Arrival of V.I. Lenin in Petrograd.
Political parties(Cadets, Socialist Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, Bolsheviks): political programs, influence among the masses.
Crises of the Provisional Government. Attempted military coup in the country. The growth of revolutionary sentiment among the masses. Bolshevization of the capital's Soviets.
Preparation and conduct of an armed uprising in Petrograd.
II All-Russian Congress Soviets. Decisions about power, peace, land. Formation of government and management bodies. Composition of the first Soviet government.
Victory of the armed uprising in Moscow. Government agreement with the Left Socialist Revolutionaries. Elections in constituent Assembly, its convening and dispersal.
The first socio-economic transformations in the field of industry, Agriculture, finance, worker and women's issues. Church and State.
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, its terms and significance.
Economic tasks of the Soviet government in the spring of 1918. Aggravation of the food issue. Introduction of food dictatorship. Working food detachments. Combeds.
The revolt of the left Socialist Revolutionaries and the collapse of the two-party system in Russia.
The first Soviet Constitution.
Causes of intervention and civil war. Progress of military operations. Human and material losses during the civil war and military intervention.
Domestic policy of the Soviet leadership during the war. "War communism". GOELRO plan.
Policy new government in relation to culture.
Foreign policy. Agreements with border countries. Russia's participation in the Genoa, Hague, Moscow and Lausanne conferences. Diplomatic recognition of the USSR by the main capitalist countries.
Domestic policy. Socio-economic and political crisis of the early 20s. Famine 1921-1922 Transition to new economic policy. The essence of NEP. NEP in the field of agriculture, trade, industry. Financial reform. Economic recovery. Crises during the NEP period and its collapse.
Projects for the creation of the USSR. I Congress of Soviets of the USSR. The first government and the Constitution of the USSR.
Illness and death of V.I. Lenin. Intra-party struggle. The beginning of the formation of Stalin's regime.
Industrialization and collectivization. Development and implementation of the first five-year plans. Socialist competition - goal, forms, leaders.
Formation and strengthening state system economic management.
Course on complete collectivization. Dispossession.
Results of industrialization and collectivization.
Political, national-state development in the 30s. Intra-party struggle. Political repression. Formation of the nomenklatura as a layer of managers. Stalin's regime and the USSR Constitution of 1936
Soviet culture in the 20-30s.
Foreign policy of the second half of the 20s - mid-30s.
Domestic policy. Growth of military production. Emergency measures in the field of labor legislation. Measures to solve the grain problem. Armed forces. The growth of the Red Army. Military reform. Repressions against the command cadres of the Red Army and the Red Army.
Foreign policy. Non-aggression pact and treaty of friendship and borders between the USSR and Germany. Entry Western Ukraine and Western Belarus in the USSR. Soviet-Finnish war. Inclusion of the Baltic republics and other territories into the USSR.
Periodization of the Great Patriotic War. The initial stage of the war. Turning the country into a military camp. Military defeats 1941-1942 and their reasons. Major military events. Surrender of Nazi Germany. Participation of the USSR in the war with Japan.
Soviet rear during the war.
Deportation of peoples.
Guerrilla warfare.
Human and material losses during the war.
Creation of an anti-Hitler coalition. Declaration of the United Nations. The problem of the second front. "Big Three" conferences. Problems of post-war peace settlement and comprehensive cooperation. USSR and UN.
Start " cold war". The USSR's contribution to the creation of the "socialist camp". Formation of the CMEA.
Domestic policy of the USSR in the mid-40s - early 50s. Restoration of the national economy.
Social and political life. Policy in the field of science and culture. Continued repression. "Leningrad case". Campaign against cosmopolitanism. "The Doctors' Case"
Socio-economic development of Soviet society in the mid-50s - the first half of the 60s.
Socio-political development: XX Congress of the CPSU and condemnation of Stalin’s personality cult. Rehabilitation of victims of repression and deportation. Internal party struggle in the second half of the 50s.
Foreign policy: creation of the Department of Internal Affairs. Entry of Soviet troops into Hungary. Exacerbation of Soviet-Chinese relations. Split of the "socialist camp". Soviet-American relations and the Cuban missile crisis. USSR and "third world" countries. Reduction in the size of the armed forces of the USSR. Moscow Treaty on the Limitation of Nuclear Tests.
USSR in the mid-60s - first half of the 80s.
Socio-economic development: economic reform 1965
Growing difficulties economic development. Declining rates of socio-economic growth.
Constitution of the USSR 1977
Social and political life of the USSR in the 1970s - early 1980s.
Foreign policy: Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Consolidation of post-war borders in Europe. Moscow Treaty with Germany. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Soviet-American treaties of the 70s. Soviet-Chinese relations. Entry of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan. Exacerbation of international tension and the USSR. Strengthening Soviet-American confrontation in the early 80s.
USSR in 1985-1991
Domestic policy: an attempt to accelerate the socio-economic development of the country. Attempt at reform political system Soviet society. Conventions people's deputies. Election of the President of the USSR. Multi-party system. Exacerbation political crisis.
Exacerbation national question. Attempts to reform the national-state structure of the USSR. Declaration of State Sovereignty of the RSFSR. "Novoogaryovsky trial". Collapse of the USSR.
Foreign policy: Soviet-American relations and the problem of disarmament. Agreements with leading capitalist countries. Withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Changing relations with the countries of the socialist community. Collapse of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the Warsaw Pact Organization.
Russian Federation in 1992-2000
Domestic policy: “Shock therapy” in the economy: price liberalization, stages of privatization of commercial and industrial enterprises. Fall in production. Increased social tension. Growth and slowdown in financial inflation. Intensification of the struggle between the executive and legislative branches. Dissolution of the Supreme Council and the Congress of People's Deputies. October events 1993 Abolition local authorities Soviet power. Elections to the Federal Assembly. Constitution of the Russian Federation 1993 Formation of a presidential republic. Exacerbation and overcoming national conflicts in the North Caucasus.
Parliamentary elections of 1995. Presidential elections of 1996. Power and opposition. An attempt to return to the course of liberal reforms (spring 1997) and its failure. Financial crisis of August 1998: causes, economic and political consequences. "Second Chechen War". Parliamentary elections of 1999 and early presidential elections 2000 Foreign Policy: Russia in the CIS. Participation of Russian troops in “hot spots” of the neighboring countries: Moldova, Georgia, Tajikistan. Relations between Russia and foreign countries. Withdrawal of Russian troops from Europe and neighboring countries. Russian-American agreements. Russia and NATO. Russia and the Council of Europe. Yugoslav crises (1999-2000) and Russia’s position.
- Danilov A.A., Kosulina L.G. History of the state and peoples of Russia. XX century.
Stalemate diplomatic conflict
September 2 this year , on the day of the 70th anniversary of the signing by government representatives militaristic Japan The act of unconditional surrender and the end of World War II, the Russian Foreign Ministry stated a clear position on the so-called Kuril issue, arising from historical facts and international agreements. Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation Igor Morgulov, in an interview with the Interfax news agency, ruled out the possibility of negotiations with Japan regarding the Kuril Islands. The following was stated verbatim: “We are not conducting any dialogue with Tokyo on the “Kuril problem.” This issue was resolved 70 years ago: the Southern Kuril Islands passed to our country legally, following the results of the Second World War. There is no doubt about Russia’s sovereignty and jurisdiction over them are subject to."
Then this principled position Russian state Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also confirmed, stating after negotiations with his Japanese counterpart that the ownership of the Kuril Islands “is not a subject for discussion.” At the same time, the leadership of the Russian diplomatic department agreed to continue negotiations on the issue of concluding a peace treaty between the two countries.
At the same time, let me remind you that for years Tokyo has been declaring its agreement to conclude a peace treaty with Russia only on the condition of “the return of the islands of Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and Habomai.”
Well, let's look at the essence of the created diplomatic conflict.
The war dotted the i's
All Kuril Islands, including the southern ones, belonged to the Russian Empire from the end of the 18th century! - by the decision of the Yalta (Crimean) conference of heads of state - participants in the anti-Hitler coalition - I.V. Stalin, F. Roosevelt and W. Churchill - following the war, they were transferred to its former owner, Russia - the Soviet Union. The deprivation of these islands by militaristic Japan also stemmed from the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, on the basis of which the Japanese government signed the Act of Unconditional Surrender. Output of everyone without exception Kuril Islands up to the island of Hokkaido from the jurisdiction of the state or administrative authorities of Japan was also provided for in the Memorandum of the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Powers, General D. MacArthur N 677/1 of January 29, 1946. At that time, this decision of the allies did not raise any objections from the Japanese government, because it was considered as the implementation of the terms of surrender.
In 1951, the Japanese government signed and then ratified the San Francisco Peace Treaty, in which it “renounced all rights, title and claims to the Kuril Islands and to that part of Sakhalin Island and the adjacent islands over which Japan acquired sovereignty under the Treaty of Portsmouth dated September 5, 1905." This compensated for the territorial losses of Russia (USSR) incurred as a result of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Moreover, the Japanese government confirmed Japan’s refusal of all the Kuril Islands, including their southern part. And after this, in a joint parliamentary resolution of all parties in the country dated July 31, 1952, the government was given the task of returning to Japan only the islands of Habomai and Shikotan, which Japanese parliamentarians considered not as the Lesser Kuril Ridge, but as a “continuation of Hokkaido.”
This was precisely the task set before the country’s diplomacy by Japanese Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama, who in 1955 began negotiations with the USSR on signing a peace treaty between the two countries.
Khrushchev's compromise
At the same time, Hatoyama explained that the issue of Habomai and Shikotan should not be confused with the issue of all the Kuril Islands, which was resolved by the Yalta Agreement. He admitted that since Japan renounced the Kuril Islands and South Sakhalin under the San Francisco Treaty, it has no grounds to demand the transfer of these territories to it. Knowing the position of the Japanese prime minister, Moscow, after lengthy negotiations, agreed to cede the territories sought by Japan and sign not a peace treaty, but a joint declaration on ending the state of war and restoring diplomatic relations.
The Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration, signed on October 19, 1956 in Moscow, stipulated that the USSR and Japan “agreed to continue, after the restoration of normal diplomatic relations... negotiations on concluding a peace treaty.” And this in no way meant, as our Japanese opponents and some domestic commentators who support them are trying to argue, a continuation of negotiations on territorial demarcation. After all, Article 9 of the Joint Declaration does not provide for any double interpretations: “The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, meeting the wishes of Japan and taking into account the interests of the Japanese state, agrees to the transfer to Japan of the islands of Habomai and the island of Shikotan, however, that the actual transfer of these islands to Japan will be made after conclusion of a peace treaty between the USSR and Japan."
The initiator of the compromise on the territorial issue, then leader of the USSR Nikita Khrushchev, stated that this was the maximum concession to Japan. On the eve of the signing of the Joint Declaration on October 16, he told the Plenipotentiary Representative of Japan, Minister of Fisheries, Agriculture and Forestry Ichiro Kono: “The Japanese side wants to get Habomai and Shikotan without concluding a peace treaty and subsequently resolve some other territorial issues unknown to us, which in reality does not exist. The Soviet government wants to reach an agreement with Japan as soon as possible, and it does not use the territorial issue for bargaining. But I must once again absolutely and categorically declare that we will not accept any claims from Japan on the territorial issue, except for Habomai and Shikotan. and we refuse to discuss any proposals in this regard... We cannot and will not make any further concessions. Habomai and Shikotan could be transferred to Japan under a peace treaty, but with the transfer of these islands the territorial issue entirely follows. considered permitted."
Participants in the signing of the peace treaty between Russia and Japan during a conference in Portsmouth (USA). 1905 Photo: RIA Novosti
How did the “northern territories” emerge?
Khrushchev rejected the Japanese-proposed agreement that negotiations for a peace treaty would include the territorial issue. Apparently, this is unknown to those who are trying to claim that “according to the Joint Declaration, we should continue to discuss the territorial problem with Japan for at least a hundred years.”
At the same time, supporters of this position claim that allegedly “the Soviet Union conducted such negotiations on the territorial issue for decades.” Such, to put it mildly, incompetent people again do not know that the negotiations for concluding a peace treaty after 1956, as envisaged by the Joint Declaration, were actually terminated by the Japanese government. Under open pressure from the US administration, which was not interested in the final normalization of Japanese-Soviet relations, in violation of the conditions reached in the Joint Declaration, the Japanese government arbitrarily put forward a demand to “return” to Japan not only Habomai and Shikotan, but also the largest and most developed islands of the Kuril ridge - Kunashir and Iturup.
Anti-Soviet-minded American and Japanese circles set out to block the process of concluding a Japanese-Soviet peace treaty for many years, by putting forward conditions that were obviously unacceptable to Moscow and unjustified. The situation worsened in 1960, when the Japanese government, instead of a peace treaty with the USSR, contrary to the will of the Japanese people, re-entered a military alliance with the United States directed against the USSR and China, which confirmed the right of the American armed forces to have numerous military bases on Japanese territory.
A situation arose where, if the islands were transferred to Japan, US military installations aimed at our country could be created on them. Therefore, on January 27, 1960, the USSR Foreign Ministry sent a memorandum to the Japanese government, in which it indicated that “only subject to the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Japanese territory will the islands of Habomai and Shikotan be transferred to Japan, as provided for in the Joint Declaration of the USSR and Japan of October 19 1956". In response, the Japanese government began to spread anti-Soviet sentiments in the country, accusing the USSR, contrary to what had been signed, including by Japan itself, international agreements in the alleged "illegal seizure of ancestral Japanese lands." From the state budget and “donations” from big business, a fund was formed to finance a noisy campaign “for the return of the northern territories.” Given the refusal of the Japanese government to implement the provisions of the Joint Declaration, its reluctance to negotiate the signing of a peace treaty and the use by official Tokyo of a far-fetched " territorial problem"To intensify hostility towards the USSR, the Soviet government declared that such a problem did not exist in Soviet-Japanese relations, because it was resolved following the war.
After which the USSR Foreign Ministry invariably rejected the Japanese side’s attempts to impose a discussion on the artificially created so-called problem of the northern territories.
As for the peace treaty, the Soviet leadership never refused to conclude it and develop relations with Japan. So, in 1977 general secretary Central Committee of the CPSU L.I. Brezhnev noted: “In the joint Soviet-Japanese statement of October 10, 1973, an agreement was recorded to continue negotiations on concluding a peace treaty. The Soviet Union is ready, if, of course, the Japanese side does not put forward unacceptable conditions, to complete this important matter for our countries to the end. With a sober approach from the Japanese side to the realities that emerged as a result of World War II, this could be done - and done quickly."
Iturup Island. Olya Bay. Paradise for seagulls. Photo: RIA Novosti
Historical realities are undeniable
It is gratifying that after decades of unclear policies, the current Russian government, following the will of the people, finally dotted the i's and reaffirmed the inalienability of its sovereign territories - the Kuril Islands - from Russia. At the same time, it believes that the signing of a peace treaty would help draw a line under the post-war period and comprehensive development relations between two neighboring states.
The conditions of our country for concluding a peace treaty are known to the Japanese government. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recently recalled them, pointing out that progress on this issue is possible only after Japan recognizes post-war historical realities, including the UN Charter in its entirety. But, as they show latest events, Tokyo refuses to acknowledge these realities, continuing to link the issue of concluding a peace treaty with unfounded territorial claims.
Well, we lived without a peace treaty for 70 years, we will live longer. By the way, we do not have a peace treaty with the main enemy in the war - Germany, and for decades this did not interfere with the development of political, trade, economic, cultural and other relations between the two countries and peoples.
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