The February Revolution of 1917 had a decisive influence on the fate of Russian state in the twentieth century. For Russia, it brought fundamental changes to the political and social structure. In the capitals and provinces, revolutionary events had their own characteristics. Thus, the course of revolutionary events on the national outskirts of the Russian Empire, for example, in Central Asia, had many differences.
At the time of the events under consideration, Turkestan was in a rather difficult socio-political and economic situation. Since 1916, in a number of regions of Central Asia, a popular uprising against the Russian authorities was raging, raised by the indigenous population, dissatisfied with the land policy of the empire and the forced mobilization of the male “foreign” population for rear work in the front line. The uprising began in Khojent (now Tajikistan) and spread to other regions of Central Asia. Turkish and German agents played their role in inciting local population to protest against the Russian Empire. Cossack and army units were sent to suppress the popular uprising, but only by the end of January 1917 did the troops manage to eliminate the last major centers of resistance in the Trans-Caspian region. However, in the Turgai steppes, Kazakh rebel detachments continued to operate under the command of Amangeldy Imanov, who fought with Russian troops until mid-February 1917.
The brutal suppression of the Central Asian uprising, of course, did not contribute to the growth of sympathy for the Russian authorities on the part of the local population. Rather, it deepened the interethnic contradictions that already existed between the Cossack and Russian settler population on the one hand, and local residents on the other. It should be noted that only part of the native elite was interested in preserving the existing order, close to the “feeding trough” - provided with all kinds of privileges and having the ability to practically unhindered plunder of its own population. However, the nationalistically minded part of the intelligentsia and trading strata of the Central Asian peoples perceived the tsarist regime rather negatively. At least, the nationalists saw the need for political changes, if not in Russia as a whole, then at least in its Central Asian possessions. The February Revolution of 1917 was met with ambiguity in Central Asia. Firstly, the local population was shocked by the collapse of the regime of the “white king”, who had previously been represented as the most powerful ruler. Secondly, part of the traditional elite was at a loss, since it was not entirely clear what awaited Central Asia next and how events would develop, whether the khans and bai would be able to maintain their status, their privileges and real power over the population. Thirdly, radical nationalists welcomed the overthrow of the tsar, because they believed that the February Revolution would open new horizons for the peoples of Central Asia and become a turning point in their development. In principle, they turned out to be right. The February Revolution was indeed followed by large-scale changes in the life of Russian Turkestan.
Mustafa Chokaev’s report “Revolution in Turkestan” is dedicated to the events of February 1917. Mustafa Chokaev (1890-1941), a Kazakh public figure who came from a steppe aristocratic family, was one of the few Turkestanis at that time who received a high-quality European education. He graduated with honors from the Tashkent Men's Gymnasium, and then from the Faculty of Law of St. Petersburg University. While a deputy of the Second State Duma of the Russian Empire, Chokaev was also engaged in studying the causes and consequences of the Central Asian uprising. When a special Duma commission headed by lawyer and deputy Alexander Kerensky and deputy Kutlu-Mukhammed Tevkelev was sent to Tashkent, Chokaev was also included in the commission.
Chokaev identified several main reasons for the dissatisfaction of the Turkestan population with the policies of the Russian Empire. Firstly, he drew attention to the resettlement of Russian peasants from the western regions of the empire to Turkestan. By the way, it was precisely this circumstance that became one of the most important factors that determined the Central Asian uprising of 1916. According to Chokaev, Russian peasant settlers played a key role in Russian expansion in Central Asia and Siberia. It was to protect the settlers that the Russian government sent detachments of troops who became garrisons and provided forceful support for the establishment of imperial interests. The discontent of the Turkestan peoples, according to Chokaev, was caused by the redistribution of the most suitable lands for agriculture in favor of Russian settlers. Secondly, Chokaev noted as an important reason for social discontent the policy of imposing all kinds of fees and duties on the native population of Turkestan, which became especially strict after the outbreak of the First World War.
The February Revolution of 1917 was met by Turkestan nationalists (let’s call them “Young Turkestans”) almost separately from the Russian revolutionaries. It was the Russian-speaking revolutionaries who became the main driving force of revolutionary events in Central Asia, as Chokay noted in his memoirs. Thus, Chokay drew attention to the nature of the speech of the revolutionary Nekora at the first congress held in April 1917 in Tashkent public organizations. There, Nekora specifically emphasized that the revolution was carried out by Russian revolutionaries, soldiers and workers, so they, in fact, should enjoy its fruits, and “the natives should not make excessive demands.” These words could not have more accurately characterized the events that took place in Turkestan in those months. Indeed, the broad masses of the Central Asian population actually remained isolated from revolutionary events. But nationalist and conservative forces became more active and began to create their own structures.
Turkestan nationalists demanded that the new system of government take into account the interests of the indigenous population. To do this, it was necessary to organize it on a coalition basis - with the involvement of both Russian revolutionaries and representatives of national organizations. However, many Russian revolutionaries were not ready for such a turn of events. This was explained, first of all, by the existing “coolness” in relations between the Russian and native populations of Turkestan. Local peoples saw the Russian population as agents of foreign cultural influence, or even direct invaders of their agricultural lands. In turn, Russian peasants and workers remembered the recent Central Asian uprising of 1916, when rebel detachments brutally dealt with settlers.
Mutual misunderstanding and long-standing grievances led to the fact that Russian and Turkic socialists and revolutionaries in Turkestan acted separately. The organization "Islamic Council" - "Shura-i Islamiya" - gained wide popularity among the local population. It was headed by the famous Uzbek political figure Munavvar Kara Abdurashidkhonov (1878-1931). The executive body of Shura-i Islamiya was the Turkestan Regional Muslim Council, which was headed by Kazakh Mustafa Chokaev. Already at the April congress of Shura-i Islamiya, delegates were chosen who were to go to Moscow - to 1st All-Russian Muslim congress, which was scheduled for May 1-11, 1917.
At the Muslim Congress held in Moscow, the overwhelming majority of delegates supported the idea of a federal statehood of Russia and granting political autonomy to national regions as equal parts. However, after the end of the congress, national organizations operating in the Caucasus, the Volga region, and Central Asia continued to work in isolation from each other. In Turkestan the most strong positions gained by the Jadids who adhered to the federalist point of view. However, they could not have any real influence on the policy of the Turkestan Regional Council (Kras), which had become the main body of political governance in Central Asia. In fact, the Turkestan Regional Council represented the interests of only the Russian part of the Turkestan political spectrum. The few Turkestanis in its composition did not make any serious efforts aimed at correcting the situation. 
On the other hand, back in April 1917, the idea of political “segregation” of the Russian and native population of Turkestan was put forward. First of all, it was planned to create a binary system legislative branch in Turkestan cities - i.e., it was proposed to create separate dumas for the Russian (and equivalent) population and separate dumas for Turkestan Muslims. The author of the project for the division of city councils was the Turkologist Professor Nikolai Grigorievich Mallitsky (1873-1947), in 1907-1917. Head of the Tashkent city administration. Another politician, Socialist Revolutionary M.I. Sosnovsky, proposed holding elections to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, also guided by the principle of division along national lines. These ideas were explained by very utilitarian considerations. The Russian and Russian-speaking population in Turkestan at that time was extremely small compared to the Muslim population, therefore, with equal voting rights, Russians would simply be left without representation in the legislative bodies of power. But it would be wrong to subordinate the Russian population to the will of the Turkestanis, which is why the concept of political division along national lines found its supporters. The idea of segregation was supported by the overwhelming majority of the Russian population of Central Asia, regardless of their political views and ideas. Both revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries agreed on this, since they opposed each other on political issues, they were in solidarity on the fundamentally important issue of the situation of the Russian population in Turkestan.
Mustafa Chokaev, who in August 1917 was included in the Turkestan Committee by the Provisional Government, was the principle opponent of division on ethnic grounds. He also proposed to involve the Muslim population in serving military service, at least on a voluntary basis. By the way, some of the Turkmen of the Trans-Caspian region have already performed police service. But the idea of arming the Turkestans did not find supporters among the Russian politicians of the region. The committee also refused the proposal to replace the Russian soldiers of the 2nd Siberian Rifle Reserve Regiment stationed in Tashkent with Tatar military personnel - Chokaev believed that the Tatars, closer to Central Asians in language, religion and culture, would be able to get along with the indigenous inhabitants of Turkestan better than Russian military personnel.
From the point of view of Turkestan nationalists, such a policy of the Russian revolutionary government testified to a deep distrust of the local population. And this was indeed the case. In turn, disillusionment with the February Revolution gradually grew among Turkestan Muslims. Turkic nationalists realized that the revolutionary government was not going to make a fundamental change political system in Central Asia and does not intend to really increase the level of autonomy of the local population. Nationalist sentiments began to grow in Turkestan, and conservative forces led by the clergy gained increasingly strong positions. At the same time, contradictions among Russian revolutionaries also increased. More radical Bolsheviks and anarchists sought to further continue revolutionary changes and give the revolution a socialist character. The battles of the Russian capitals gradually spread to Central Asia. In an effort to strengthen their positions, both supporters of the Provisional Government and the Bolsheviks tried to enlist the support of Turkestan nationalists. When the October Revolution occurred, the Bolsheviks hastened to offer Mustafa Chokaev the post of chairman of the Turkestan Council of People's Commissars. On the other hand, opponents of the Soviet regime also turned to him, who believed that the Turkestan nationalists would be able to reason with the Bolsheviks. However, Chokaev quickly found out that the Turkestan population was not going to side with the Provisional Government and did not see the point in supporting it. This was also understandable, since during the months of rule of the Provisional Government, the people of Turkestan did not see any large-scale changes in their lives or in the system of government of the region.
A serious problem for Turkestan was the lack of unity political organizations and indigenous leaders. In reality, Central Asia was divided along ethnic and administrative-territorial principles and could not demonstrate a unified position on the most important political issues. Thus, the protectorates could be considered completely separately in this regard - the Bukhara Emirate and the Khiva Khanate, which were the most conservative territories of Central Asia and were distinguished by their specific political and social structure. The Kazakhs of the steppe were also divided. The Eastern Alash Orda was headed by Alikhan Bukeikhanov, a scientist and politician, the Western Alash Orda was headed by Khalil Dosmukhambetov, a graduate of the St. Petersburg Military Medical Academy, who belonged to the cadets. The Kazakhs of the Irgiz district of the Turgai region were headed by Abdulla Temirov, and the Kazakhs of the Turgai district were Akhmet Birimzhanov. The Bolsheviks were supported by Alibi Dzhangildin, a Kazakh who was baptized into Orthodoxy and studied at the Moscow Theological Seminary, but then joined the Bolsheviks.
As Mustafa Chokaev later noted, the bulk of the Kazakh elite advocated the integration of the Kazakh regions with Turkestan - the Syr-Darya and Semirechensk regions. But more Europeanized representatives of the Kazakh elite, such as Akhmet Baitursunov and Mirzhakip Dulatov, supported the idea of Kazakh lands joining the Siberian region, because they believed that conservative sentiments prevailed in Turkestan, which would have a negative impact on the Kazakhs. Thus, even in the Kazakh environment there was no unity on the issue of the political future of the region. Nationalist-minded Turkestan politicians “darted” from the Bolsheviks to their opponents, advocating either autonomy within the Russian state or independence. Foreign agents also played a role, primarily Turkish and German, who carried out subversive activities in Turkestan, provoking the local population to separatism and interethnic conflicts with Russian settlers. Although the majority of Turkestan nationalists still did not want a final disengagement with Russia and advocated the autonomous status of Turkestan, there were also more radical forces, tuned to confrontation with any Russian government, be it the tsarist government, the Provisional Government or the Bolshevik Council of People's Commissars.
For example, what is the Kokand autonomy worth, or, officially, the Turkestan autonomy - unrecognized state, which existed from November 27, 1917 to February 22, 1918 in the territories of modern Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. On November 26, 1917, the IV All-Turkestan Kurultai of Muslims was convened in Kokand under the leadership of Shura-i Islamiya. At this congress, Turkestan was declared “territorially autonomous in unity with the federal democratic Russian republic.” The government of the autonomy was headed by Mukhamedzhan Tynyshpayev (1979-1937) - Kazakh politician, former MP Second State Duma of the Russian Empire. Mustafa Chokaev was responsible for foreign relations in this government, and the Uzbek politician Ubaidulla Khojaev (1878-1937) was put in charge of the people's militia. The history of Turkestan autonomy is a topic for a separate discussion, but it is worth noting that in this entity, initially Turkic-Muslim, there was also no internal unity. The struggle between the Jadids and Kadimists continued within the leadership of the autonomy. The Jadids, as is known, advocated reforming social foundations, while the Kadimists sought to resist reformist tendencies. This struggle ultimately seriously weakened the Turkestan national movement and led to the Bolsheviks gaining a much stronger position in Central Asia.
Home > DocumentIV. UZBEKISTAN DURING THE SOVIET AUTHORITY.
Topic 13. Establishment of Soviet power in Turkestan, Bukhara and Khiva. Independence Movement Plan: 1. The October Revolution of 1917 and the peoples of Turkestan. 2. Formation and liquidation of Turkestan Autonomy (Turkiston Mukhtoriyati). 3. Social and political processes in Bukhara and Khiva in 1917-1920. 4. Movement for independence (Istiklolchilar harakati). 1. The October Revolution of 1917 and the peoples of Turkestan After the February Revolution of 1917, the Provisional Government continued to perceive Turkestan as a source of raw materials and a Russian colony. At the end of April, a meeting was held at the Turkestan Committee of the Provisional Government on the issue of granting autonomy to Turkestan. It recognized the impossibility of introducing full political autonomy in Turkestan. This issue was the focus of attention at the 1st Regional Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, held in Tashkent from April 7 to 15, where many Bolshevik delegates opposed granting Turkestan autonomy rights under the pretext that supposedly local Muslims "are not yet enough to that's cultural." The congress remained in imperial positions and spoke in favor of establishing a strong central government in Russia. Branches of various all-Russian political parties operating in the region also made similar programmatic provisions. Appearance on the political arena of Turkestan new strength , represented by the Bolsheviks, was not an accidental phenomenon. The study of their activities (within the framework of social democratic organizations), starting in March 1917, indicates persistent and focused work among the Turkestanis. They maintain close ties with their Russian like-minded people and send their representatives to various party forums. Having received instructions and recommendations, the Turkestan Bolsheviks begin to implement them. Despite the rather motley composition of social democratic organizations, the Bolsheviks (led by Tobolin, Shumilov, Bauman, Babushkin and others) systematically propagandize (including through the newspapers “Rabochee Delo”, “Kokandskaya Pravda”, etc.) in the working class and the mass of soldiers have their own goals and objectives. From the very beginning, having stood in opposition to the Provisional Government, the Bolsheviks (despite the lack of unity in the social democratic groups) announced serious claims to their share of the “pie” in the struggle for power, while relying on the Soviets soldiers' and workers' deputies. Throughout the spring and summer of 1917, they accumulated forces, determined priorities, and gradually strengthened their positions. In the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets they win a majority, thereby inspiring peripheral organizations to take more decisive action. On September 3, at a meeting of the Tashkent organization of the RSDLP, it was said that the only government capable of leading the country out of economic ruin and a protracted military crisis could only be the government of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies. The Tashkent organization of the RSDLP presented demands for the immediate transfer of all power to the united Executive Committee of the Councils of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies of the Turkestan Territory, the dissolution of the State Duma, the State Council and the arrest of the most active figures of the "counter-revolution". Meanwhile, in the old city, no less important events took place these days. On September 7, the Second Regional Muslim Congress, convened on the initiative of Shuroi-Islomiya, began working in Tashkent. On one of the most important issues - the creation of republican power, the congress adopted the following resolution: “The Second Turkestan Regional All-Muslim Congress speaks out against the transfer of power to the Councils of Soldiers, Workers and Peasants' Deputies. Power must be coalition and rely on all the forces of the country, i.e. - Only such a government is capable of national defense of the country, strengthening the gains of the revolution and leading the country out of the difficult situation of internal devastation and economic catastrophe, which are aggravated by the ongoing war. This same nationality - a coalition of all the living forces of the country - must be transferred to the outskirts, in particular to Turkestan, where Muslims, who make up the majority, must be represented accordingly." However, once again, the proposals and wishes of the Muslims of Turkestan were ignored. By this time, the local Bolsheviks, grouped in the Executive Committee of the Tashkent Soviet, were already ready for a real seizure of power. Moreover, there were enough reasons for an anti-government uprising, in conditions of almost complete chaos and anarchy. One of them was food devastation and threat. famine, Turkestan, which (due to the imperial economic structure) consumed mainly imported bread, had long experienced an extreme shortage of it. By 1917, the problem of bread shortages became relevant not only for residents of villages and “old” cities, but also for them. the urban Russian population of Turkestan, who until recently enjoyed special benefits in matters of food distribution. Taking advantage of this situation, the Bolsheviks managed to organize a meeting of six thousand workers and soldiers of Tashkent on September 12 in Alexander Park. The meeting adopted a resolution based on the decisions of the VI Congress of the RSDLP (b): on the immediate requisition of products and basic necessities held by capitalists (including the wealthy part of Muslims), on the implementation of workers' control over the production and distribution of products; about the transfer of land without ransom into the hands of peasants; on the publication of a law prohibiting the closure of factories and factories without the permission of the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, trade unions and factory committees; on the transfer of all power into the hands of this Council. A Provisional Revolutionary Committee was elected. | Under his leadership, a coup attempt was made in Tashkent. Representatives of "Shuroi-Islomiya", "Shuroi-Ulamo", "Turk od-mi Markaziyat Firkasi" and other national organizations of Turkestan condemned the attempt to implement the revolutionary plan of the Bolsheviks. Under these conditions (September 17-20), a congress took place in Tashkent; Turkestan and Kazakh Muslims, which brought together more than 500 delegates from all over Turkestan, as well as from the Ural and Turgai regions. The convening of the congress was initiated by the Tashkent organization Shuroi-Ulamo, which competes in the “old city” with Shuroi-Islomiya and is strenuously trying to become a national consolidating force in the region. At the congress it was decided, in the face of a common threat, to create a unified ! the entire Turkestan political party called “Ittifok-i-”; Muslimin" (Union of Muslims) by uniting the organizations "Shuroi-Islomiya", "Shuroi-Ulamo" and others. The congress, held under the banner of unity, called for the preparation of lists for the all-Russian Constituent*! Assembly of "worthy" people from Russian Muslims without distinction *"! ideas and trends. Representatives of national f "| organizations attached great importance to the Constituent Assembly, since it was assumed that it was there that it would be possible to outline and determine the future of the peoples of the former Russian Empire. However, these hopes were not destined to come true. October 27, 1917 in Turkestan received news of the victory of the armed uprising in Petrograd. In the military units, pro-Bolinist regimental committees began distributing a document with a call to “not carry out any orders from the command staff.”*” On the evening of October 27, armed clashes began in Tashkent.< новения между войсками, верными Туркестанскому Комитету Времен-*! ного правительства, и отрядами "революционных бойцов", завершив-"! шиеся к 1 ноября 1917 года капитуляцией и арестом руководителей >| armed forces of Turkestan. Muslims in this confrontation are practically *| did not take part. November 1 by the Tashkent Council of Deputies and! The Military Council issued an appeal to the population of Tashkent, which stated that the so-called democratic organizations had taken over the protection and safety of the citizens of Tashkent. From November 15 to 22, the III Regional Congress of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies was held in Tashkent, which was attended by 114 delegates with a casting vote from all regions of the region. When discussing the issue of organizing the regional government, the congress was divided into two main groups. The first group, represented by the United Social Democrats, believed that the government should consist of representatives of the Council of Soldiers', Workers' and Peasants' Deputies, city governments and Muslims; and the second group (Bolsheviks and socialist-revolutionary maximalists) argued that the regional government should be created on the model of the Soviet government in Russia. It was understood that Turkestan should be governed by the Council of People's Commissars, formed from the Bolsheviks, left-wing socialist revolutionaries (without Muslims and representatives of city governments who supported the provisional government). The congress elected a new supreme body of the region: the Council of People's Commissars of 15 people, the Bolshevik F. Kolesov became its chairman. When forming the Council of People's Commissars, it was decided not to admit representatives of the local Muslim population under the pretext that: “At present, the involvement of Muslims in the bodies of the highest regional revolutionary power is unacceptable both in view of the complete uncertainty of the attitude of the native population to the power of soldiers, workers and peasants’ deputies, and in view of the fact that among the native population there are no proletarian class organizations whose representation in the body supreme authority the faction would welcome." Thus, the colonialist character of the new Soviet government in Turkestan was politically consolidated. 2. Formation and liquidation of Turkestan Autonomy (Turkiston Mukhtoriyati) After the III Regional Congress of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, which ignored the interests of the indigenous population of Turkestan by not including their representatives in the new supreme body of the region - the Council People's Commissars, - on the initiative of “Shura Islomiya” and other national organizations, from November 26 to 29, 1917, the IV Extraordinary Regional Muslim Congress was held in Kokand, in which about 300 delegates took part (including representatives of the European population), who came from all over the world. ends of Turkestan. The main issue on the agenda was the issue of Autonomy of Turkestan. One of the leaders of Shura-Islomiya, U. Khojaev, made a report justifying the need to declare Autonomy. In his speech, he noted, in particular, that “at present there is almost no hope left for convening the All-Russian Constituent Assembly - all the nations inhabiting the territory of Russia have come out to fight the Bolshevik usurpers.” He was supported by the majority of delegates participating in the debate. On November 27 at 12 o'clock at night, the delegates adopted a resolution on the proclamation of Turkestan Autonomy - "Turkiston Mukhtoriyati". (Turkestan Autonomy was included in Soviet historical literature under the name "Kokayad Autonomy") - The Congress elected the authorities: the Provisional People's Council (parliament) and the Provisional Government of Autonomous Turkestan. The Provisional People's Council included 54 people, of which: 32 - from the Extraordinary All-Muslim Congress, 4 - from city governments, the rest - from all-Russian organizations and national minorities of Turkestan. In total, the European population in the People's Council was given 18 seats (i.e. 1/3 of the total composition). The government of Turkestan Autonomy included 12 people. Famous Turkestan progressives and public figures : M. Chokaev, O. Makhmudov, Sh. Shoakhmadov, M. Tynyshpayev, U. Khodzhaev and others. This decision caused a storm of joy among the local population: telegrams and letters of welcome began to arrive from everywhere, numerous rallies and demonstrations took place. Dozens of articles, appeals, and resolutions dedicated to this event appeared in local newspapers. The Samarkand newspaper "Hurriyat" published an article by the largest ideologist of the Young Bukharan movement, Abdurauf Fitrat, which was called "Mukhtoriyat" ("Autonomy"). In it he wrote: “The path to real Autonomy cannot lie only through the decisions of congresses. They have fulfilled their task. Now everything is in the hands of the nation. To preserve Autonomy, you need strength, you need money... the nation is obliged to provide Autonomy with all this.” The declaration of Turkestan as autonomous was an event that excited the entire society. The reaction to this decision was ambiguous, but still the majority of the population of Turkestan (and not only Muslims) supported it. However, the Bolsheviks tried to convince the public of the region that “the autonomy of Turkestan was declared by the bourgeoisie and counter-revolutionaries without the participation of representatives of democratic organizations, against the will of working Muslims.” In response to these statements, the 2nd Fergana Regional Congress of Working Muslims (held in December 1917) stated that “at the Regional Congress (IV Extraordinary Muslim Congress) working Muslims were represented, that the demonstrations of all cities of Turkestan proved what The population has sympathy for the Autonomy and how enthusiastically it is greeted by the fact that newspapers more dissolute than such rumors sow discord among citizens. The Congress decided to protest against the provocative speeches of Black Hundred newspapers on this topic and solemnly declare that working Muslims will support the Provisional Government of the Autonomous Region by all means. Turkestan". In support of Autonomy, a grandiose demonstration of many thousands took place in Tashkent on December 13, 1917. But the leadership of the Tashkent Council gave the order to prevent this peaceful action, not even stopping at the use of armed force. From December 1917, under the pretext of “counter-revolutionary activities” and for supporting the “Kokand Autonomy”, on the basis of decisions of the military revolutionary committees, branches of “Shura-Islomiya” and other national organizations began to close in many places; city councils were dissolved; private bank money was seized; Revolutionary tribunals and courts were organized. Based on the decree of the central government, an order was approved to begin the formation of the Red Army and police. On January 30 (old style), a detachment of Red Guards with machine guns and artillery was sent to Kokand from Skobelev, and the very next day hostilities began between them and the “autonomist” formations. The Fergana region was declared in a state of siege. The defense of the Autonomy was taken over by the head of the Kokand police and former exile Irgash, who, however, due to the small number of his detachment, was soon forced out of the city. By the end of February 1918, the headquarters of the “revolutionary troops” telegraphed to Tashkent about the defeat of the Irgash detachments, the liquidation of the “counter-revolutionary” autonomous government and the establishment of “order” in the city of Kokand. Additional military units arrived in the region to suppress “counter-revolutionary activities”, members of the “autonomous government” and their supporters who fled to the city of Skobe-lev. By decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the Turkestan Territory, all leaders of the "Kokand Autonomy" are declared outlaws, and their property is confiscated. A separate resolution creates a “military revolutionary court” to examine the cases of persons accused of supporting the “Kokand Autonomy”. By this time, Kokand presented a terrible picture. As one of the eyewitnesses, Kokand resident Yusuf Khalil Afan-di, testified: “Many buildings in the city burned down. Among them were the buildings of Shuroi-Islomiya, the Provisional Autonomous Government, the department of education, the printing press, the outpatient clinic, and the optics department. They turned to ashes several thousand households, as well as mosques, madrassas, banks, shops, commercial offices, market stalls, dukans, schools, etc.” “Ulug Turkiston” wrote in those days: “One third of the old city has been turned into ruins. At every step there are mountains of corpses, many of which are completely burned. Now thousands of Kokand residents are left without shelter, clothing and food.” Around the region, widespread arrests began of the surviving leaders of the autonomous government and the People's Council, as well as activists of national political organizations and their like-minded people. With the dispersal of Turkestan Autonomy, the peaceful stage of development of national resistance ended and the beginning of a massive armed anti-Bolshevik movement in Turkestan was laid. The social and political situation that worsened in the region after the bloody liquidation of Turkestan Autonomy prompted the Bolshevik leadership to use the idea of Autonomy, popular among the people, in their own interests. In the very first days after the “Kokand events”, the new government began to declare that it was ready to grant autonomy to Turkestan, but only on the condition that the latter would not be “bourgeois”, but “proletarian”. The issue of Autonomy of Turkestan became the subject of discussion at the V Congress of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, which opened on April 20, 1918. On April 30, 1918, at the congress it was decided to create the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (TASSR), part of the RSFSR. The Congress of Soviets was declared the highest legislative body of the Turkestan Republic, and in the intervals between congresses the Central Executive Committee (CEC) of the TASSR was the permanent legislative body. It included 36 people (18 Bolsheviks and 18 Left Socialist Revolutionaries). Bolshevik P. Kobozev was elected Chairman of the Central Executive Committee. 16 people were elected to the executive body of the republic - the Council of People's Commissars (SNK) (8 Bolsheviks and 8 left Socialist Revolutionaries). F. Kolesov was re-elected as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. For the first time, the new government bodies included representatives from local nationalities: the Central Election Commission - 7 people, the Council of People's Commissars - 4 people. However, the creation of the TASSR did not introduce anything fundamentally new into the life of the indigenous peoples of the region. They were still deprived of the right to independently exercise state power. 3. Social and political processes in Bukhara and Khiva in 1917-1920. On the eve of the October Revolution of 1917, the socio-political situation in the former protectorates of the Russian Empire - the Emirate of Bukhara and the Khanate of Khiva - was extremely difficult. This time is characterized by an acute confrontation between the ruling khan elite and the higher, conservative clergy of Bukhara and Khiva, on the one hand, and the local Jadids - reformers (Young Bukharans and Young Khivans), on the other. During this period, the politicized part of the local Jadids put forward their reform program, which was based on the idea of transforming the Bukhara Emirate and the Khiva Khanate into constitutional monarchies. The Emir of Bukhara, Sayid Alimkhan, and the ruler of the Khiva Khanate, Asfandiyarkhan, under pressure from those close to him, began to persecute the Jadids and their supporters. Lacking broad social support within their countries, the leaders of the Young Bukharans and Young Khivans (F. Khojaev, U. Pulathodzhaev, A. Mukhitdinov, P. Yusupov, etc.) were forced to look for allies outside of Bukhara and Khiva and, above all, , on the territory of the former Turkestan Governor General. After the October Revolution of 1917, the process of distancing Bukhara and Khiva from Soviet Turkestan and bringing these states closer to Afghanistan, Iran and England began. In Khiva and Bukhara, preparations were made for a possible war with the Soviets. In particular, by March 1918, the army of Bukhara numbered more than 40 thousand people. By January 1918, interethnic contradictions in Khiva intensified due to the speeches of the Turkmens led by Junaid Khan. As a result of these events, Asfandiyarkhan was forced to make concessions by appointing Junaidkhan as commander of the troops of the Khiva Khanate. But very soon, by order of Junaidkhan, Asfandiyarkhan was killed, and the uncle of the Khiva Khan, Abdullakhan, was placed on the throne. However, Junaidkhan, who did not hide his anti-Soviet views, became the de facto ruler of Khiva. Naturally, the Bolshevik leadership of Turkestan, which had long been looking for a reason to launch aggression in Bukhara and Khiva, could not help but take advantage of the current situation. It was decided to start with Bukhara. At the end of February 8, 1918, F. Kolesov with an armed detachment arrived in New Bukhara, where, having concluded an agreement with part of the Young Bukharans, he prepared demands for the emir, in which the latter was promised to retain power subject to the inclusion of representatives from the Young Bukharans. It should be noted here that the Bolsheviks were not worried about the fate of the Young Bukharans and the Bukhara people, but, first of all, about the possibility of establishing a pro-Soviet regime in Bukhara. After the emir rejected this demand of Kolesov, on March 2, 1918, the Red Guards began to attack Old Bukhara. This offensive turned out to be a failure for Kolesov (the people came to the defense of Bukhara), but nevertheless, on March 25, 1918, peace was concluded in Kizil-Tepe (Kizil-Tepe Agreement), under the terms of which the emir pledged to reduce the regular army to 12 thousand . Human. On April 9, 1919, a similar agreement was signed with Dzhunaidkhan in the Takhta fortress (Takhta Agreement), according to which Dzhunaidkhan pledged not to undertake armed actions against the TASSR and to resume trade relations with the RSFSR and TASSR. Very soon the Bolsheviks found an opportunity to continue their aggression against Khiva and Bukhara. The goal is to establish Soviet power in these states. After stubborn battles, on January 20, 1920, the main headquarters of Junaid Khan - Takhta, and on February 1 - Khiva were occupied by the Red Army. On February 2, 1920, Sayyid Abdullakhan abdicated the throne and transferred power to the so-called Provisional Revolutionary Committee. On April 26, 1920, the First All-Khorezm Kurultai of People's Representatives was convened, which proclaimed the Khorezm People's Soviet Republic (KNSR) and adopted its constitution. Events in Bukhara followed a similar scenario. Having achieved the establishment of an alliance of Bukhara communists (N. Khusainov and others) with the Young Bukharan revolutionary organization (F. Khojaev and others), the goal of which was to overthrow the monarchy, the Turkestan Bolsheviks “recognized the existence of a revolutionary situation in the Bukhara Emirate.” On August 29, in old Chardzhou, they managed to organize a speech by Bukhara communists, which was immediately declared the beginning of the revolution and served as a signal for armed action. After fierce battles, on September 2, 1920, troops of the Turkfront under the command of M. Frunze entered Bukhara. The emir left Bukhara, and several thousand people emigrated from the country with him. On October 6-8, 1920, the First All-Bukhara Kurultai of People's Representatives proclaimed the Bukhara People's Soviet Republic (BNSR). F. Khojaev was appointed Chairman of the Council of People's Nazirs of the BNSR. However, some time after these events, many active participants in the overthrow of Alim Khan experienced bitterness and disappointment. Thus, in 1924, one of the leaders of the Young Bukharan movement, Gulyam Kodir Abduvosikov, in a letter addressed to the leadership of the emigration in Afghanistan, openly wrote: “I did not expect that after the Bukhara revolution they would mock our ideas. The revolution did not live up to our desires." Many Young Bukharans later fled to Afghanistan, including the former chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the BNSR Usmanhoja Pulathodzhaev. In general, more than 250 thousand left Bukhara (during the first wave of emigration - the 1st half of the 20s) . people, which accounted for a quarter of the population of the Bukhara Emirate.TOPIC 10. ESTABLISHMENT OF DESPOTIC SOVIET AUTHORITY IN TURKESTAN AND AN ARMED MOVEMENT AGAINST IT
2. The October Revolution and the establishment of Soviet power in Turkestan. Formation and liquidation of the “Turkestan Autonomy”.
3. The beginning of the struggle for freedom and independence. (Istiklolchilar Harakati movement).
4. Social and political processes in the Bukhara Emirate and the Khanate of Khiva in 1917-1920.
On February 28, 1917, the bourgeois-democratic revolution won in Petrograd. By agreement between the Provisional Committee of the State Duma and the Socialist-Revolutionary-Menshevik leaders of the Executive Committee Petrograd Soviet, On March 2, 1917, the Provisional Government was formed. In the very first days after the February Revolution, councils of workers' and soldiers' deputies began to emerge throughout Russia as bodies of democratic power of the proletariat. These same councils subsequently played a tragic role in the life of Turkestan.
After the February Revolution in Russia, a new stage begins in the history of the struggle of the peoples of Turkestan for national independence. The entire people of Turkestan greeted the revolution with great joy, although the Turkestan administration tried in every possible way to suppress information about the Petrograd events.
The most progressive forces during this period were the Turkestan Jadids. They, in turn, greeted the February Revolution as a fact of overthrowing the tsarist regime, establishing a truly popular form of government, and gaining independence by peoples who suffered from colonial oppression.
The struggle of regional political forces for the creation of a new, democratic state system in Turkestan can be divided into three stages. The first stage (March-April 1917) saw the political awakening of Turkestan. Under the influence of the Petrograd events, there is an active process of formation of new power structures: a) councils of workers’ and soldiers’ deputies (authorities of the armed people) were created everywhere; they included representatives of the predominantly European population; b) in parallel with them, Executive Committees of public organizations (broader in national and social composition) are created, acting as unifiers of all democratic forces and claiming the role of local bodies of the Provisional Government; c) the political awakening of the Muslim population of the region begins, the formation of national democratic forces, the core of which were the Turkestan Jadids, whose activities acquire an openly expressed political character.
In organizational terms, the leaders were the Tashkent Jadids, on whose initiative on March 6 and 9-13, 1917. meetings of thousands of residents of the “old” city were held. At these meetings, overcoming serious differences, they managed to nominate single delegates from the entire Muslim population to the Tashkent Executive Committee. These meetings elected an expanded representative body (about 60 people) from all parts of the city - “Shuroi Islamiya”. Unlike the councils of workers' and soldiers' deputies, uniting the European population of the city, Shuroi Islamiya was conceived as a council of deputies of the indigenous population professing Islam. At a meeting held on March 14, 1917, the presidium of “Shuroi Islamiya” consisting of 15 people was elected. It included A. Fitrat, Munavvar Kari Abdurashidkhanov, Ubaidulla Khojaev and others. The tasks that the Turkestan Jadids set for themselves included the development of a temporary charter, the determination of the main goals and objectives at this stage, as well as work to unite the Muslims of Turkestan.
On March 31, at a joint meeting of the Tashkent Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, the Council of Muslim Deputies, the Council of Peasants' Deputies and the Tashkent Executive Committee, a decision was made: to immediately remove the Governor General, his assistant and the chief of staff from their positions and subject them to house arrest. The acting commander of the troops and the chief of staff were also elected here. The decision was made to secede civil administration edge from the military, with the entrustment of management of civil affairs to three commissars of the Tashkent Executive Committee.
After the dismissal of Kuropatkin, the Provisional Government on April 7, 1917 formed the Turkestan Committee consisting of 9 members, headed by cadet Shchepkin. The Committee exercised the power of the Provisional Government within the Turkestan region, as well as Khiva and Bukhara. The first composition of the Turkestan Committee of the Provisional Government, which included representatives of local peoples such as Bukeikhanov, Tanyshpayev, Maksudov and Davtelshin, was weak from a political point of view, had little knowledge of local conditions, and therefore it was unable to influence the development of events in the region.
After February 1917, the question of the autonomous structure of the region became the main one in public political life Turkestan. The dominant mood of Turkestan society, despite social differences, was the desire to eliminate the colonial position of the Turkestan region:
at the beginning of April (April 7-15), 1917, the 1st Turkestan Regional Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies was held in Tashkent; in April 1917 (from April 9 to April 16), a congress of delegates of the Executive Committees of the Turkestan Territory was held in Tashkent, as well as the first Regional Muslim Congress (worked in Tashkent from April 16 to 23), convened on the initiative of “Shuroi Islamia”, at which a central governing body was formed - Central Council Muslims of Turkestan (Markaziy “Shuroi Islamiya” or Regional Council), designed to protect the interests of the local population. Munavvar Kari, M. Behbudi, U. Khojaev, O. Makhmudov and others were elected as its members. On these same days A.Z. Validi traveled to Kokand and Samarkand to organize local departments of Shuroi Islamiya. With the end of the congress, the most important stage in the consolidation of the Turkestan peoples ended.
At the second stage political struggle on the way to national independence (May-August 1917). The consolidation processes in Turkestan society, which successfully began at the first stage, encountered serious obstacles at the second stage. For comparatively short term, from May to August 1917, in Tashkent, Kokand, Andijan, Samarkand and other cities and towns of Turkestan, “Councils of Muslim Workers’ Deputies”, “Unions of Muslim Workers” (Islom Mekhnatkashlari), trade unions were formed and brought the mood of class struggle into the weak differentiated Turkestan society. This, in turn, caused a response wave, which was reflected in the withdrawal of the clergy and its supporters from Shuroi Islamiya in June 1917 and the formation of an organization called Shuroi Ulema (Council of the Clergy). There were two reasons for the split in Shuroi Islamiya: 1) one was the contradictions in the issue government system Turkestan. Kadimists - supporters of the conservative trend, who opposed radical reforms, saw the future of Turkestan in the creation of a theocratic state here, part of the Russian Federation, but on the condition that all laws must be discussed in legislature"Mahkama-i-Shariya" and comply with Islamic law. This body was to be headed by a kazi-kalyan; 2) another reason concerned the participation of women in elections to the city council. The Ulemaists believed that women should not participate in elections to the city council, since according to Sharia law they are not allowed to appear in public places.
At the congress of Muslim organizations of the region in the city of Skobelev on July 12-14, 1917, it was announced the creation of the party “Turk Odami Markaziyati” (Center of the Turkic Peoples) and the demand for national-territorial autonomy for Turkestan, the Caucasus, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Bashkiria, and for Tatars of the Volga region, Crimea and other peoples of Russia - cultural and national.
The third stage (September-November 1917) saw the most difficult period of relations between local democratic forces, which sought a coalition government, and the councils of workers' and soldiers' deputies, which, regardless of the realities of Turkestan life, ignored the interests of the local population.
The failed attempt of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief L.G. Kornilov to carry out a military coup and overthrow the Provisional Government radically changed the course of the revolutionary process in Russia. The decisive actions of the Bolsheviks during the days of the Kornilov rebellion raised their authority among the workers as defenders of the revolution. The slogan “All power to the councils,” which they again put forward, was taken up throughout the country. However, in Turkestan, the attitude towards this slogan even among democratic circles of the European population was ambiguous.
The representative bodies of the Muslim population of the region took a sharply negative position. At the II Regional Muslim Congress (Tashkent, September 7-11, 1917), convened on the initiative of “Shuroi Islamiya” (Crime Council), national democracy for the first time firmly stated the fundamental foundations of its position: “The Congress opposes the transfer of power to the councils of workers, soldiers and peasants’ deputies . Power must be coalition and rely on all the forces of the country, i.e., nationwide. Muslims can and should take part in government only if its policies are democratic; the priority for the population of Turkestan is the right of free self-determination of the people; The Regional Muslim Council (Markaziy “Shuroi Islamiya”) is a legitimate pan-Muslim body acting on behalf of the entire Muslim population and protecting its interests.”
Deciding to take advantage of the dissatisfaction of the masses with the actions of the Turkic Committee of the Provisional Government in the fight against speculation, the food crisis, high prices, deteriorating living conditions, and devastation, the Bolsheviks initiated a rally that took place on September 12, 1917 in Tashkent in the Alexander Park, in which mainly soldiers of the 1st and 2nd Siberian regiments, railway workers and others. The rally acquired a sharply political character. The resolution adopted at the proposal of the Bolsheviks announced the transfer of power to the soviets. On the same day, a new composition of the Executive Committee of the Tashkent Council was elected, consisting of 36 members, mainly left Socialist Revolutionaries and Bolsheviks. Thus, a program to seize power was carried out following the example of the Petrograd Bolsheviks, which did not take into account the characteristics of the region and the opinion of the local population. Having attempted to implement a revolutionary plan, the Tashkent Bolsheviks pushed the masses of soldiers and workers to seize power and put the region under threat civil war.
The September events acquired a particularly dramatic character in connection with the arrival in Tashkent of a punitive expedition sent by the Provisional Government under the command of General P.A. Korovichenko and a retaliatory multi-day general strike of workers in Tashkent, the introduction of martial law.
Most of the regional councils, led by the Regional Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, condemned the attempt to seize power by the Bolsheviks. Shuroi Islamiya, Shuroi Ulema, the Turkic Federalist Party and other national organizations condemned the Bolsheviks for attempting to usurp power and assessed their actions as ignoring the interests and rights of Muslims immediately after the first days of the September events.
The September events had a powerful impact on the subsequent course of events in the Turkestan region. After these events, Muslims began to realize their aspirations. Moreover, the general decline in power contributed to the strengthening of demands for autonomy for Turkestan. The struggle for Turkestan autonomy activated all segments of the Muslim population and began to take place under the slogans “Long live Freedom, Justice, Equality!”, “Strength in unity!” These slogans indicated that, facing the danger of the Bolsheviks seizing power, Muslims and the overwhelming majority of leaders of national organizations realized the need for unifying efforts.
2. The October Revolution and the establishment of Soviet power in Turkestan. Formation and liquidation of the “Turkestan Autonomy”.
On October 27, a telegram was received in Turkestan about coup d'etat in Petrograd and the decision of the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets on the transfer of power to the soviets, the formation of the Council of People's Commissars headed by Lenin. This news pushed the development of events in Tashkent.
On the night of October 28, a joint meeting of the Tashkent Council with the participation of representatives of soldiers' committees, industrial enterprises of the city, and railway workshops made a decision to start an armed uprising on the morning of October 28. The Revolutionary Committee is elected to lead the uprising. On November 1, 1917, the Turkestan Regional Council announced the victory of the uprising. Having come to power, the Bolsheviks addressed all working Muslims of Russia and the East, assuring them that “they have the right to self-determination and cultural institutions, are declared free and inviolable.”
Initially, it was decided to convene a regional congress of all democratic organizations on November 15 to form a regional government. At this decisive moment, a struggle broke out between the main representatives of the Muslim population - “Shuroi Ulema” and the Regional Council (Markaziy “Shuroi Islamiya”). The Ulemaists, considering it possible to participate in the work of the regional congress of councils of workers' and soldiers' deputies to develop their platform for the formation of regional power, announced the convening of a “united meeting of various Muslim groups” on November 12. Members of the Regional Council, who had moved to Kokand by this time, opposed cooperation with the Bolsheviks. By scheduling the convocation of the All-Turkestan Congress of Muslims for November 25, they emphasized their detachment from the regional congress of councils of workers' and soldiers' deputies and their intention to independently resolve the issue of power. At the same time, they refused to participate in the meeting convened by the ulemas.
In such a very tense situation, on November 15, the III Regional Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies began its work. 114 delegates attended. The most pressing issue was the question of the organization of regional government. Subsequently, the adopted “Declaration” stated: “Recognizing the existing central government and the form of its organization, the united faction of Bolsheviks and Maximalists considers the Regional Council of Workers, Soldiers and Peasants’ Deputies, which is now called the Council of People’s Commissars of the Turkestan Territory, to be the highest regional body.” Further, the “Declaration” emphasized: “The inclusion of Muslims in the body of the highest regional revolutionary power at the present time is unacceptable both due to the complete uncertainty of the attitude of the native population to the power of soldiers, workers and peasant deputies, and due to the fact that the native population does not have proletarian class organizations , whose representation in the highest authority the faction would welcome.”
The congress elected the Council of People's Commissars of the Turkestan Territory of 15 people, which included the Bolsheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionary Maximalists who sympathized with them. Despite the fact that many speakers at the congress raised the issue of the need to admit Muslim representatives to the highest authorities of the region, there was not a single Muslim among the members of the Council of People's Commissars. In addition, the congress documents did not say a word about granting autonomy to Turkestan, although this issue was also raised.
Due to the agreement between the Bolsheviks and the Left Socialist Revolutionaries in the government (the Council of People's Commissars of the Turkestan Territory), 8 seats were given to the Left Socialist Revolutionaries and 7 seats to the Bolsheviks and Maximalists. The Bolshevik F.I. Kolesov was elected chairman of the Council of People's Commissars.
On November 26, 1917, the IV Extraordinary Regional Muslim Congress began its work in Kokand. It was attended by more than 200 delegates from all regions of the region and many public organizations. On November 27, 1917, the following resolution was adopted: “Expressing the will of the nationalities inhabiting Turkestan for self-determination on the principles proclaimed by the great Russian revolution, the congress declares Turkestan territorially autonomous in unity with the Federal Russian Republic, leaving the establishment of forms of autonomy to the Turkestan Constituent Assembly.” Moreover, the congress, as specifically noted further, “solemnly declares that the rights of the national minorities inhabiting Turkestan will be protected in every possible way.”
After this decision was made, rallies of many thousands were held in Kokand, Samarkand, Tashkent, Fergana and other cities supporting the autonomy of Turkestan. On November 28, the name of the emerging entity was determined - “Turkiston Mukhtoriyati” (“Turkestan Autonomy”).
The structure of power, "Turkiston Mukhtoriyati" looked in the following way: before convocation Constituent Assembly all power was concentrated in the hands of the Turkestan Provisional Council (ministers) and the Turkestan People's (national) Assembly (Millat Majlisi).
A government of 12 people was to be formed from the members of the Provisional Council. The provisional government included:
1. Muhammadjon Tanishpayev - head of government, minister of internal affairs, member of the State Duma of the second convocation, engineer.
2. Islam Sultan corners Shoakhmedov (Shagiakhmedov) - deputy. head of government, member of the central committee of the All-Russian Muslim Council, lawyer.
3. Mustafa Chokaev - chairman of the central committee of the All-Turkestan Muslim Council, lawyer.
4. Ubaydulla Khodjaev - Minister of War, member of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Muslim Council, lawyer.
5. Yurali Agayev - Minister of Water and Land Resources, agronomist.
6. Obidzhon Makhmudov - Minister of Food, Deputy. Chairman of the Kokand City Duma, public figure.
7. Abdurakhman Urazaev - deputy. Minister of Internal Affairs, lawyer.
8. Solomon Abramovich Hertsfeld - Minister of Finance, lawyer. (According to other sources, this post was taken by Islam Shoakhmedov).
The government also included a trustee of the Knopp company - Zigal, one of the richest people in Fergana, cotton entrepreneur Vadyaev and others.
The number of 32 people in the Turkestan Provisional Council was determined by the number of previously delegated deputies from the Turkestan region to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly. The National Assembly (Millat Majlisi), with 54 seats, was supposed to include 4 representatives from the congress of city governments and 18 seats were allocated for representatives from various regional European organizations. This meant that one third of the seats were allocated to the European part of the population, whose share at that time did not exceed 7% of the population. total number residents of Turkestan.
The National Assembly included: 32 people - from the Extraordinary All-Muslim Congress, 4 - from city governments, the rest - from the following organizations and national minorities of Turkestan: the Railway Union, the Postal and Telegraph Union, the Council of Peasants' Deputies, the Socialist Revolutionary Party, the Socialist Party - democrats, the Council of Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies, the Cossack circle, the Union of Government Employees, the Union of Cooperatives, the Trade and Industrial Union, the Dashnaktsutyun Party, Jewish organizations, “native” Jews, Turkestan Ukrainians, Turkestan Poles.
The announcement of the autonomy of Turkestan caused a storm of joy among the Muslim community of the region: welcoming telegrams and letters began to arrive from everywhere; Numerous rallies and demonstrations took place. Dozens of articles, appeals, and resolutions dedicated to this event appeared in local newspapers.
The attitude of Tashkent Muslims towards the declaration of autonomy was once again demonstrated on December 6 during a grandiose rally (about 50 thousand people were present), which took place in the old city, in the courtyard of the Jami mosque. A week later, on December 13, Shuroi Islamiya organized a demonstration in Tashkent, at which it was planned to solemnly support autonomy. The Tashkent Bolsheviks regarded the demonstration as a “provocative event,” and the authorities used weapons to disperse it. According to the official version, 16 people were killed.
These bloody events left a deep imprint in the hearts of people; many had good reason to see in the actions of the Bolsheviks the familiar handwriting of the former tsarist colonial power.
In Tashkent, at the same time, in December 1917, when events finally got out of control, it was decided to requisition all the money in the accounts of the “Turkestan Autonomy”, as well as those supporting it. At the same time, a number of actions were carried out against public organizations and printed publications that raised their voices in defense of the Provisional Government: the Tashkent City Duma was dissolved, the Turkestan Bulletin newspaper was closed, and the activities of the Samarkand organization Shuroi Islamiya were banned. In the second ten days of December (December 18), even more radical steps were taken: the Executive Committee of the Tashkent Soviet decided to supply weapons to the workers of Kokand and organize the Red Guard there.
By this time, within the autonomist movement itself, contradictions between leaders representing the interests of various social strata and groups of the Muslim population were increasingly intensifying. The previous confrontation between the Ulema and Shuro-Islamists, somewhat weakened in connection with the declaration of Turkestan autonomy, again surfaced and began to pose a serious threat of undermining the unity of the autonomist movement from within. And when innocent blood was shed during a peaceful demonstration on December 13, the participants in the meeting convened on January 5, 1918 by the Tashkent organization “Ulema” expressed no confidence in the Provisional Government of Autonomous Turkestan. The decisions of the meeting had serious consequences: the unity of the Muslim population was under attack. The worsening food crisis, the maintenance of the police, the publication of newspapers, and the maintenance of the government itself increasingly aggravated the financial situation. The issued 30 million loan did not live up to expectations. With the growth of military units, costs increased even more.
With the growth of the armed forces in the government of Autonomous Turkestan, the positions of supporters of more decisive actions began to strengthen. The confrontation between the new city, where power was in the hands of the Kokand Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, and the old cities, in which the government seat of Autonomous Turkestan and urban Muslim organizations were concentrated, became increasingly conflictual.
In such a situation, the slightest reason was enough to unleash hostilities. On the night of January 30, 1918 (according to the old style), unknown persons provoked an attack on the fortress, telephone exchange, and the building of the Kokand Council.
Already on January 30 (old style) within one day, the forces of the Kokand Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies were brought into mobilization readiness; An emergency body, Revkom, was formed, and assistance was requested from Tashkent. On the same day, by order of the Council of People's Commissars, a new detachment of Red Guards with machine guns and artillery was sent to Kokand from Skobelev, and the very next day hostilities began between them and the "autonomist" formations. The Fergana region was declared in a state of siege.
In this climate of growing discontent, the cabinet of M. Chokaev resigned. Many government members left the city. The defense of the “autonomy” was taken over by the head of the Kokand police and former exile Ergash. The Bolshevik Revolutionary Committee, headed by E. Babushkin, rejected the proposals made by the “autonomists” to create a unified body to govern Kokand and made demands:
1. Disarm the bandit gangs of the “autonomous government”, transfer the weapons to the Revolutionary Committee.
2. Hand over to the Revolutionary Committee the instigators of the “autonomous government.”
These demands were naturally not accepted; military operations continued. But the poorly armed and poorly trained “autonomist” detachments, despite the courage they showed in battles with an unequal enemy, could not take the Kokand fortress and thereby decide, as it seemed to them, the outcome of the confrontation. The bombing of the old part of the city of Kokand, which had been going on for several days, aggravated the situation.
By the end of February 1918, the headquarters of the “revolutionary troops” telegraphed to Tashkent about the defeat of the Irgash detachments, the liquidation of the “counter-revolutionary” autonomous government and the establishment of “order” in Kokand. A little later, the same telegram was sent to Moscow.
Additional military units arrived in the region to suppress the “counter-revolutionary activities” of members of the “autonomous government” who fled to Skobelev and their supporters. By decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the Turkestan Territory, all leaders of the "Turkestan Autonomy" were declared outlaws, and their property was confiscated. A separate resolution created a “military revolutionary court” to examine the cases of persons accused of supporting the “Kokand Autonomy”.
After the pogrom carried out by the Bolsheviks, not a single undamaged house remained in the city of ancient culture. The attempt of local democratic forces to build a democratic society was stopped with the help of weapons.
With the defeat of Turkiston Mukhtoriyati, the peaceful stage of development of national resistance ended and the beginning of a massive armed anti-Bolshevik and anti-colonial movement in Turkestan was laid.
3. The beginning of the struggle for freedom and independence. (Istiklolchilar Harakati movement).
After the head of the Kokand police, Ergash Kurbashi, left the city and continued fighting in its vicinity, the head of the Margelan militia, Mahmud Amin-bek Ahmed-bek (Madamin), also began military operations against the Soviets on February 20, 1918. He appealed primarily to the peasants, saying: “Our fight against the Russians is being waged in the name of saving the farmers and protecting their lands.”
Thus, the beginning of the armed struggle was laid by Ergash Kurbashi and Madaminbek. Their followers were Kholkhoja from the city of Osh, Parpi Kurbashi from Andijan, Mukhiddinbek from Navkend, Aman Pakhlavon from the Khizrobod village near Namangan, Shermuhammad and his brother Nurmukhammad from Gaib-ota near Margelan and many others. By April 1918, all of them controlled their native villages. Over the next months, control over the actual armed struggle against Soviet power became increasingly concentrated in the hands of Ergash Kurbashi and Madaminbek. By mid-1918, all settlements in Fergana were guarded by rebel units.
Under the leadership of Ergash Kurbashi, in the fall of 1918, 70 Kurbashi detachments operated with a number of fighters from 20 to 1,800 people. in everyone. In October of the same year, the army of Ergash Kurbashi numbered 15,000 people, and by the end of the year its number increased to 18,000 people (in some sources - 20-24 thousand), Madaminbek - 5,000, Shermuhammadbek -6,000, Kholkhoji - 3 thousand, Aman Polvon - more than 2,500, Parpi Kurbashi - 3,600, Mukhiddinbek - 4,500, Nurmuhammadbek - 3,800, Janibek - approximately 5,700 horsemen. Thus, under the leadership of 9 major leaders, 52,200 people took part in the movement.
The freedom fighter movement in its first period is divided into 6 periods. The first period (February 1918 - November 1919) was characterized by Madaminbek's attempts to unite the disparate rebel forces. At the same time, Ergash Kurbashi declared himself the ruler of the Muslims (Amir-ul Muslimin) and the “Defender of Islam.” After the troops of the freedom fighters forced the regular units of the Red Army to abandon many settlements in Fergana, Ergash Kurbashi tried to take control over them. At the head of each newly liberated village, he placed a headman - a bek from his inner circle. He, in turn, also selected assistants from among his soldiers (askers). Madaminbek selected about 12,000 horsemen and began to conduct intensive military training. On September 29, 1919, he convened representatives of the population of Fergana to a congress (kurultai) and formed the “Provisional Government of Fergana.”
After the transition at the end of 1918. general leadership of the movement towards Madaminbek, Ergash Kurbashi and some of his major Kurbashi refused to obey the new leader. By the beginning of 1919, two large centers of the freedom fighter movement had formed in the Fergana Valley. The first center, under the leadership of Madaminbek, covered Skobelevsky, Andijan and Namangan districts. Madaminbek's residence was located in the village of Garbuna, Tashlak district, near the city of Margelan. The number of Madaminbek's military unit in February 1919 exceeded 20 thousand people. The second center, under the leadership of Katt Ergash, covered the Kokand district, its headquarters were located in the village of Bachkir, Yangikurgan volost.
While the commanders of the freedom fighters mostly came under the command of Madaminbek and Ergash, some of them, such as Akhunjan Kurbashi and Eshmuhammed Kurbashi, fought independently against the Red Army. Madaminbek and Ergash Kurbashi also could not come to unity on many issues. Not one of them was able to give up sole primacy. To suppress the movement, the Soviet government initially used exclusively military methods. In the villages recaptured from the rebels, a regime of terror was established and repressions against the civilian population were unleashed.
In the spring of 1918, under the command of M. Frunze, a front was formed, later known as the “Turkfront”. Despite the arrival of more and more Soviet troops, the freedom fighters fought bravely and successfully. On February 29, 1919, in the city of Asaka, Ergash Kurbashi and his 8,000 horsemen swore on the Koran to fight the Bolsheviks to the last drop of blood. He himself fell in the battle for the city of Margelan in the summer of 1919. His successor Kholkhoja on August 22, 1919 joined the troops of Madaminbek with his horsemen.
After the death of Ergash Kurbashi, the leadership of the movement of freedom fighters passed to Madaminbek. He was also joined by the so-called "workers' and peasants' army" under the command of the Cossack general Monstrov, numbering more than 8,000 people.
September 11, 1919 After the defeat of General Dutov in the Orenburg direction, the Red Army operating in Turkestan received large reinforcements and managed to capture the city of Osh on September 26, and Jalalabad on September 30. By that time, Madaminbek’s appeal to the people to begin gazavat against the infidels dates back to that time. Until this point, the military operations of the Soviets in Turkestan were not particularly successful.
The second period of the movement of freedom fighters (November 1919-August 1920) was characterized by a decline in morale in its ranks. The so-called “Turk Commission” issued recommendations to trust the peasants more, lend them money, and also train Turkestan propagandists. In December 1919, Akchurin’s brigade entered Fergana. On the one hand, she conducted propaganda, on the other, she undertook military expeditions against the rebels. The commander of the former “workers’ and peasants’ army,” Monsters, who rose to the rank of Madaminbek’s deputy, nevertheless entered into separate negotiations on increasing fire with the Soviets on January 12, 1920. He justified his move by saying that the movement of freedom fighters is directed against Russians and calls itself an “army of Muslims.” Monsters put forward conditions: his army should not be disarmed, the soldiers should have certain advantages if they are used against the Basmachi. On January 17, 1920, Monstrov’s conditions were accepted. Despite the betrayal of the “workers’ and peasants’ army,” Madaminbek continued to fight. But the famine that broke out in the Fergana Valley as a result of military operations forced some commanders of the Basmachi formations to conclude a ceasefire agreement with the local councils.
On February 4, 1920, the Red Army launched an offensive against Madaminbek's troops. At the same time, with the aim of morally disintegrating the movement, the Red Army began peace negotiations with other rebel leaders, such as Ismatkul, Kholkhoja, Aman Pakhlavon. The Soviet peace proposals read:
1.Each individual leader of the movement retains the territory that he has already occupied.
2. His people and weapons remain at his disposal.
3. Where power belongs to the Basmachi, Soviet bodies are not created.
4.Basmach commanders enjoy the rights of a Soviet brigade commander.
Madaminbek also agreed to these negotiations, because he hoped for a pause in the war. He needed her to strengthen his strength. On March 7, 1920, the following agreement was concluded between Madaminbek and the Soviet commissioners on his recognition of the Soviet government and the transfer to its disposal of all soldiers, kurbashi and commanders.
The peace treaty between the Soviets and Madaminbek created doubts among the freedom fighters. The national circles of Turkestan assessed this step of Madaminbek differently. Some argued that Madaminbek committed treason, while others believed that he acted on instructions from national circles. Of course, this truce was considered by the Soviets only as a precondition. After Madaminbek's arrival in Tashkent, the Soviet government attempted to use his troops against other national military formations. The latter, however, refused to fight against their fellow countrymen.
After Madaminbek signed the peace treaty, one of his kurbashi, Shermuhammadbek, refused to submit and proclaimed himself commander-in-chief. May 14, 1920 Madaminbek, on the advice of the Red commanders, sends his representative to Shermuhammadbek for negotiations. However, his messenger was captured in Uch-Kurgan and shot as a Soviet spy. After his elimination, Madaminbek himself disappeared. The Soviets were quick to announce that he had joined the rebel movement. In turn, the leaders of the Basmachi, those who signed a peace treaty with the Soviets, such as Islamkul, claimed that Madaminbek was shot by the Soviets. The Red Army issued an order to disarm those formations that had concluded a peace treaty with the Soviet government. This caused their indignation, and the armed struggle against Soviet power began again.
The third period (September 1920 - September 1921) is characterized by the strengthening of Soviet power in the cities and the concentration of military forces of fighters in villages. During the same period, a rebel movement arose in Bukhara.
The fourth period (November 1921 - August 1922) was characterized by a new attitude of the Soviets towards the population and a new rise in the movement of freedom fighters after the arrival of Enver Pasha in Bukhara. By changing the tactics of its actions in relation to the population, the Soviet government strived for moral decay insurgency. On December 23, 1921, a decree “On the return of Sharia laws” was issued. At the same time, the decree of August 2, 1919, which made the Islamic legal system dependent on the “proletarian interpretation of laws,” was terminated. Private individuals were allowed to engage in trade. Farmers received seeds for crops, as well as interest-free loans for crops. On the other hand, the government did everything to separate the military and form fighters, pitting them against each other. On June 10, 1922, the combined offensive of the Red Army began. Units of Turkestan freedom fighters also switched to an all-out method of warfare. Having occupied any settlement, they shot all representatives of the Soviet government, especially commissars. On the contrary, Soviet specialists - irrigators could calmly continue their work, they were guaranteed immunity.
In the Fergana Valley, the Bolsheviks managed to achieve some success. In April 1922, Janibek Kazi concluded a peace treaty with the Red Army. Its units were renamed the “territorial regiment” and received a residence in Naryn Tal. The former commander-in-chief of the Basmachi troops, Mukhiddinbek, was pushed back to the Alai Mountains, then arrested by the Red Army and shot on September 23 in Andijan. The fighters' operations were also hampered by the famine that broke out in the valley.
The fifth period (September 1922 - June 1923) of the armed struggle is characterized by increasing disagreements between the rebel groups. The lack of supplies led to the split of the most powerful rebel group, Islamkul. Despite the deep crisis that gripped the movement of freedom fighters, the Red Army was unable to establish its power in the districts of Namangan and Kokand.
The sixth period (June 1923 - December 1923) - defeat of the armed movement against Soviet power. In June 1923, the Red Army launched an offensive against the three main centers of the insurgent movement: Andijan, Namangan and Margelan, which ended in victory for the Red Army. On August 17, 1923, after a 67-day siege, the cities fell. Scattered groups of independence fighters managed to hide in the mountains, many were captured by the Red Army.
The revolution extremely aggravated the complex interweaving of these national, social and political contradictions, placing them all at once on the agenda of urgent modernity.
There were no Bolshevik organizations in Turkestan before the revolution, but after the revolution, from the summer of 1917, the Bolshevik element began to find favorable soil, especially among the soldiers of the local garrisons, and many fellow travelers poured into the organization. Old Bolsheviks with theoretical baggage and political experience There were only a few in these organizations. It was not they who became the leaders of organizations, but usually people unknown to anyone - either young fanatics, or enterprising businessmen, or even political adventurers of a dubious type. The primitive slogans that the Bolshevik center then threw from the capital into the depths of the rearing country were repeated here in a much more primitive, coarsened form.
After the October revolution in the capitals, the Bolsheviks came to power in Turkestan. In essence, it was a dictatorship over the edge of the garrisons of the occupying army. Some support was provided by some of the city workers. Small groups of individual young intellectuals from the nationalities of the indigenous population of the region also gravitated here, hoping to achieve the state independence of Turkestan through the collapse of the country caused by the Bolsheviks. But these were only small details that did not change the main essence of the picture: the Bolshevik government of the first two years in Turkestan was a dictatorship of the garrisons of the occupying army, which found itself cut off from its centers.
Cut off for two years from the center, the Bolsheviks tried to pursue the same policy of uniting armed people, constituting a small minority in the population of the region, who, through methods of mass terror, all the time relying on armed force, tried to force the country to change not only political forms management, but also the very foundations of economic relations, and from a privately owned economy based on individual property, to move to a state economy, led precisely by them, this small armed minority. The only difference from other parts of Russia was that in Turkestan this armed minority was even smaller than in most other regions of the country, and therefore, in order to stay in power, it had to more often resort to acts of terror, carry them out in more brutal forms , to give them an even more widespread character. The anti-peasant edge of this policy, which was very clearly visible in the center, was all the more emphasized in Turkestan because the social contradiction here was intertwined and complemented by a national contradiction.
The results were very bizarre and difficult to bear even for the Bolsheviks. The Turkestan experiment of the Bolshevik dictatorship was like an evil cartoon: the foundations of the all-Russian Bolshevik experiment were preserved in it, but they were given such a cartoon form that the experimenters refused to recognize their own work. An attempt was made to shift all responsibility onto local organizations.
A special commission of the Central Committee was sent to Turkestan communist party, which arrived in the region immediately after the establishment of railway communication. Safarov, one of the members of this commission, in his book “Colonial Revolution (Turkestan Experience)”, citing really interesting material about the Bolsheviks’ rule in the region in 1917-1919, sums up the general result in the following phrases -
“Colonial criminality was intricately intertwined with the interests of the Bai. All methods of feudal usury exploitation and class oppression were transferred under the Soviet roof. The personal composition of the holders of power changed somewhat; the old forms of police and fiscal organization remained” 1 .
Local communists wrote even more harshly, especially non-Russian communists. X. Burnashev, one of the communist leaders in Fergana (i.e., precisely the region where, as we will see below, Malenkov worked during the first period of his stay in Turkestan), Soviet politics of 1918-1919. defined as a policy of “bungler tutelage of the local national economy, accompanied by food robbery.”
“All attempts,” he wrote, “of the few workers’ organizations to put the appropriate content into the October revolution were completely erased in the nightmarish chaos of shameless robberies, violence, bullying of the dictatorial Soviet city over the village, which, by the will of the Soviet rulers, was doomed to all the hardships of indemnities, confiscations, forced labor and military service" 2.
The inevitable result of this malicious “bungling” was a massive resistance movement of the local population, especially the non-urban population. It must be emphasized that attempts at resistance were also made by some groups of the Russian population. In particular, there were a number of protests by workers. But the main significance, of course, was the struggle of the rural population, almost entirely non-Russian in its national composition. This movement, called the Basmachi movement, was basically a movement of the local peasantry who resisted the experiment on them by the dictatorship of Frunze, who was then the commander of the troops of the Turkestan Front, in his order dated May 23, 1920, gave the following assessment of the Basmachi movement:
“The local government [in the Fergana region in 1918-1919] during the first period of its existence did everything possible to alienate the working population, instead of attracting to power broad circles of the working and peasant population, European and native. The governing bodies of power were seized by groups of adventurers who wanted to fish in muddy water. Instead of nationalizing production, there was open robbery of not only the bourgeoisie, but also the middle strata of the population. Instead of protecting the Muslim poor from the bais, impossible outrages were committed against them. The units of the Red Army troops operating here in the hands of some leaders turned from defenders of the revolution and the working people into an instrument of violence against them. On this basis, a movement was created known as Basmachi. The Basmachi are not just robbers: if it were so, then, of course, with they would have been finished long ago. No, the main forces of the Basmachi consisted of hundreds and thousands of those who were somehow hurt or offended by the previous [Soviet] government: not seeing protection anywhere, they went to the Basmachi and thereby gave them unprecedented strength."
This decisive criticism of the past was needed by the central communists, who came to Turkestan as victors at the end of 1919, in order to relieve themselves of responsibility for this past. In no case did they want and could not (often quite sincerely could not) admit that the evil was not at all in the “bungling” of local communists, but in the criminal error of the main political line taken by the central leaders of the Communist Party. And that it was precisely this basic line that forced, and could not help but force, the local communists to take the path of “bungler” experiments. But the essence of the issue was not at all to dissociate ourselves from what had been done in the recent past, but to outline policies for the future.
The development of this issue was carried out both at the center, in Moscow, and locally, in Turkestan, and a certain division of labor was established: in Moscow they were mainly occupied with searching for a theoretical solution to the problem, and in Turkestan they thought most of all about practical measures that would correspond to the interests of the dictatorship .
Solving the problem of Turkestan in 1920
In Moscow, the Turkestan problem was looked at as a special case of a large general problem - the path of development of communism in backward countries: what should communists do if, as a result of certain conditions, they found themselves in power in countries that do not yet have their own industrial proletariat and where else pre-capitalist forms of production dominate
Vienna relations? The debate was about whether the capitalist stage of development is necessary for such backward peoples and countries, or whether they can come to communism on non-capitalist paths of development, jumping over the capitalist stage?
Translated from the language of abstract formulas “into the language of Soviet reality in 1920, the question was this: if the capitalist stage of development is necessary, then in such economically backward areas as Turkestan, where significant masses of the population live in conditions of patriarchal-tribal relations and where there is absolutely no of its industrial proletariat, the Soviet dictatorship must refuse to interfere in the economic life of the region, giving freedom there to the development of capitalist forms of production. And since there are many economically backward regions like Turkestan in Russia, this meant creating centers of capitalist restoration everywhere within the Soviet body. it was possible to draw this conclusion only if the general possibility of development towards socialism, bypassing the capitalist phase, was theoretically recognized.
This question was raised before the Comintern at the Second Congress of the latter in the summer of 1920, the speaker was Lenin. The problem was new to the vast majority of delegates, especially those from other countries. The question was not raised to great heights; its far-reaching significance for the destinies of not only Russian, but also world communism was not even outlined. Lenin himself, apparently, did not strive for this. As a result, the congress, in the adopted resolution, recognized the possibility of a non-capitalist path of development for backward countries, subject to the obligatory condition of active assistance from countries where the proletariat was already in power, firstly, and a cautious, long-term policy of dictatorship, secondly.
The main political conclusion to which this decision was committed was correctly formulated by Stalin in his article summing up the work of this congress in the field of the national problem. “From cavalry raids in terms of the “immediate communization” of the backward masses,” he wrote, “it is necessary to move on to a prudent and thoughtful policy of gradually involving these masses in the general mainstream of Soviet development” 4.
The theoretical discussion of the issue at the congress was blurred, but the fundamental significance of the decision was extremely great: if the October uprising and the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks in Russia laid the main stone domestic policy Soviet dictatorship, having legalized the principle of violence of the minority over the majority within a given country, then the decision of the Second Congress of the Comintern on the issue of a non-capitalist path of development became the main stone for the foreign policy of the dictatorship, although still in an extremely cautious form, but it established the principle of the possibility of building the Soviet system based on on the force external to a given country, a given people.
Communist practice in Turkestan was guided by this theory, developed in Moscow. The Turkestan Commission of the Central Committee of the Party, somewhat later transformed into the Turkestan Bureau of the Central Committee, became the highest party body in the region. Local organizations, as being responsible for the mistakes of 1917-1919, were subjected to severe defeat. Their more or less significant workers of all-Russian origin, if they did not fall under more severe penalties for their activities, were evicted from Turkestan to other regions of the country as part of party discipline. Communists of national groups, of course, could not be expelled. But their rights were greatly reduced and they were actually deprived of the right to occupy positions that gave them real power over the armed forces, over punitive agencies, and over key positions in the economy. In particular, they were completely denied access to more or less responsible posts along the Cheka-GPU line.
The main body of the Soviet dictatorship in the region became the political apparatus of the Turkestan Front, those units of the Red Army that came to Turkestan as winners from the center. The decision on this was undoubtedly made in advance, even before the Turkfront headquarters was moved to Tashkent. The third conference of communist organizations of the 1st Army of the Turkfront, which met at the end of 1919, before this resettlement, decided on the need for army communists not only “to enter all party and Soviet institutions of Turkestan to direct party and organizational work,” but also “ begin to correct the policy of the Turkestan comrades." More specifically and in detail, the question of the tasks and tactics of this work was developed in the decisions of the congress of political workers of the Turkfront, which took place in Tashkent in June 1920.
Occupation of Turkestan by the Red Army
This was nothing more than the establishment of an actual and even formal dictatorship of the political workers of the Turkfront, that is, the occupation army, not only over the region in general, not only over the apparatus of the Soviet government of the region, but also over the entire communist movement in Turkestan. To complete the picture, it is necessary to add that this dictatorship of the political workers of the Turkfront was extended to the terror agencies. Safarov specially emphasized in his book: “Since the Turkestan Cheka until now served mainly as an instrument of personal-group rivalry and instead of fighting the counter-revolution, cases were opened against undesirable persons in it, all emergency punitive activities, willy-nilly, were concentrated in the Special Department of the Turkfront " 5 .
As we can see, very few changes occurred in the social support of the dictatorship: both during the years of the “Orenburg traffic jam” and after its liquidation, the Bolshevik dictatorship in Turkestan was the dictatorship of an occupying army. The only difference was that the composition of this occupation army had changed, and the place of the old regiments formed in the pre-revolutionary years was taken by regiments formed by the Soviet dictatorship with a staff of political workers who had gone through the school of civil war. This apparatus was well disciplined, did not allow any self-will and precisely carried out the policy that the center prescribed to it.
From this moment on, the Turkestan region became the arena of a great experiment, the distinctive feature of which was the complex game of the Soviet dictatorship with the population in the field of political, social and national; a game carried out by the communists with exceptional persistence and cruelty. The dictatorship pretended that it was making great concessions to national - not Russian - groups of the population in the areas of religious-national and social-domestic relations. “Conferences of non-party people” were held throughout Turkestan, in which the authorities especially tried to attract the most prominent representatives of the Muslim clergy and the wealthy strata of the non-urban population. Such conferences were arranged with theatrical solemnity: the first rows in the hall and seats on the presidium were invariably occupied by “honorable old men” in bright oriental robes, turbans, etc. Decisions were made to restore the land rights of the Muslim clergy and national duties in favor of the latter. They tried to introduce mullahs into local Soviets. Representatives of national groups were persistently invited to join the ranks of communist organizations, and Muslim communists were not charged for visiting mosques, they turned a blind eye to the preservation of harems, etc. Of course, economic benefits were widely used, they were given complete freedom trade in the bazaars, allowed the opening of all kinds of craft and trade enterprises, even tolerated trade with foreign countries, etc.
But all this was only external. They did not contain any genuine concessions either to the corresponding national groups or to the democratic strata of the population in general, in the sense that the communists did not let go of the slightest grain of real power from their hands. All this power remained in the hands of the dictatorship, which, under the cover of these ostentatious concessions, Time spent feverish work to create its own durable and capable apparatus, capable of becoming an obedient instrument in the hands of the dictatorship and suitable for all kinds of foreseeable and unforeseen contingencies.
The official network of Soviet institutions, which was formally considered to have all the power in the region, actually did not have any power; it was only tolerated for the time being. But behind the scenes, an apparatus of actual holders of power was being built, appointed from above, who, it is true, rejected “cavalry raids in terms of immediate communization of the region,” but who were least of all opponents of forced communization in general. On the contrary, they worked in the name of precisely this communization. They only knew its difficulties, they knew that it could only be introduced in a tough struggle against the vast majority of the population of the region, and therefore they made “prudent and thorough preparations,” in Stalin’s words, for the “gradual involvement” of the peoples of the region into the “general channel of Soviet policy.” ".
This complex internal political game was further complicated by the introduction of elements great game foreign policy. Even before moving to Turkestan, the 3rd conference of communist cells of the 1st Army of the Turkfront (it met in Orenburg in November 1919) included “support for the revolutionary movement in countries neighboring Turkestan” in the list of the most important and priority tasks of its work in Turkestan. First of all, it was, of course, about India, about anti-British movements: anti-British notes were especially characteristic of the entire foreign policy of the Soviet government in those years. It is for these reasons that in the policies of the Turkestan representatives of the central government at one time there were notes of sympathy for the pan-Turkist and even pan-Islamic movements, the wind of which the Soviets sought to take into their sails, directing it exclusively against the British Empire.
The point was not only that pan-Turkist ideas were then openly preached by some of the Muslim ministers who held important positions in the regional government. Even more important was the general policy pursued by the Turkic Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, which since November 1919 has become the highest authority in Turkestan. This policy was such that the local population initially perceived it as a policy directed against the Russians. D Furmanov, the head of the Political Administration of the Turkfront in the first months after the liquidation of the “Orenburg traffic jam,” was undoubtedly an observant person and in his diary, in notes for himself, he tried to frankly summarize his impressions. In March 1920, he rode on horseback from Tashkent to Verny (now Alma-Ata) and recorded along the way.
“The decrees of the central government (at least about the land) here in the village are refracted in such a way that now everything and everyone belongs to Muslims, that only Muslims are and should be in power, and newcomers must get out... It must be done,” adds Furmanov, - that some Muslim communists... in their hearts completely agree with this ugly interpretation" 6.
His highest point this game with the pan-Turkists was reached in an agreement that Lenin concluded with Enver Pasha, the leader of the extreme, most aggressive wing of the Turkish chauvinists, who adhered to a pro-German and anti-English orientation during the First World War. In the fall of 1920, the Congress of the Peoples of the East was convened in Baku, which was an attempt by the Comintern to lead the movement of the peoples of the East against British imperialism. Zinoviev openly declared this at the congress, and the entire congress was generally held under the slogans of a holy war against Great Britain. Enver played a big role in it, and after the congress Lenin concluded a secret agreement with him, by virtue of which Enver undertook, uniting all the Turkestan Basmachi under pan-Turkist slogans, to lead them on a campaign to India 7 . These adventurous plans collapsed, and sooner than could have been expected.
In Turkestan, where Enver arrived in the fall of 1921, he was received enthusiastically, but his mood by this time was far from the desire to pay the bills that he issued in Moscow. Calls for a holy war, however, were made, but these were not calls to go to India for gazavat against the British. Instead, Enver himself moved to the Basmachi camp and tried to lead them in a holy war, but against the Bolsheviks.
True, Enver did not have success on this path either, just as he did not have lasting success in almost all the convolutions of his confused life. He soon died, hacked to death in a fight with a detachment of special forces, the same type, a “political commissar” in which Malenkov began his career. Enver's corpse was buried unidentified somewhere on the side of one of the remote roads of Eastern Bukhara, and only later, according to his watch, which was picked up by one of the participants in that battle, it became known whose head was then blown off by the dashing blow of the unknown "Chonovets" 8.
Enver's adventure confused many cards in the already complicated game of the Bolsheviks. The Basmachi movement, which in essence never stopped, flared up with renewed vigor and captured almost the entire “paradise.” Soviet power remained only in the cities; the entire village (villages) did not recognize it, did not carry out its decrees, did not obey its orders. The Basmachi ruled there, scattered detachments of which each acted at their own risk and fear. The authorities rushed from one extreme to another, at which the communists played fraternization with the mullahs, interspersed with public executions in the bazaars of captured Basmachi and their relatives, declared hostages. punitive agencies were working. They urgently brought in “Budenovites” from the Polish borders, who “combed” the troubled areas with fire and sword. All operations were led by the command of the Turkfront and its proven political department.
The results were immediate: a terrible famine struck, claiming millions of human lives. A number of areas are empty. But the Soviet government held out, showing more and more persistence, more and more tenacity from year to year, and lowered the feed of its apparatus of power and suppression deeper and deeper into the people. Top ruling party She considered these results as proof of the correctness of the diagnosis and the possibility of the region’s “gradual involvement” in the general mainstream of Soviet development.
A small episode from Stalin’s biography, extremely characteristic both for him personally and for the entire era, dates back to this time. In the fall of 1921, at a meeting of the board of the People's Commissar of Nationalities, which was then headed by Stalin, a representative of the Bashkir Republic, who had just arrived in Moscow, made a report on the horrors of the famine. Everyone listened to the terrible story with deep emotion. At one point, one of the listeners said: “But it’s terrible what’s happening!” Stalin, who was leading the meeting, interrupted briefly:
“Horror is when we are talking about an individual person. If we are talking about millions, this is not horror, but statistics... Comrade, continue your report!”
The speaker was not interrupted again, and if in 1921 the Soviet government turned to the Americans for help, then Stalin was not to blame. Later, when he became the “master” of the country, terrible “statistics” walked with a tireless pace through the richest, most grain-producing regions of the country, and he never reckoned with the number of those who died.
Malenkov served in Turkestan in the 2nd Turkestan Division, stationed in the Fergana Valley, in the former Kokants Khanate, with headquarters in the city of Skobelev, the former New Margelan, and now the city of Fergana. It was a very small town, in which, according to the 1897 census, there were only five and a half thousand inhabitants. Later, on the eve of the First World War, the city grew greatly, as the administrative center of the region was moved to it. This transfer was caused by the exceptionally mild, healthy climate for which the area where the city is located was famous. But even after this transfer, the number of residents of Fergana did not exceed ten thousand.
The population was divided into two groups: the local population, Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, Tajiks - traders and cotton growers, and the newcomer population, Russian - officials, military men, merchants. They lived separately, with almost no contact with each other. This continued after the revolution. The 2nd Turkestan Division, which arrived in the region at the end of 1919, occupied all the buildings that belonged to the old tsarist garrison. The commissar of this division was a certain Sukhov. A man of intelligent mind, enterprising, convinced communist from the Left Socialist Revolutionaries. Malenkov became something like personal secretary under Sukhov.
It was no coincidence that an entire division with a long military history was stationed in the Fergana Valley: this valley had been one of the main, if not the main, center of the Basmachi movement since 1918. Since pre-revolutionary years, the entire economic life of this region depended on cotton growing, which developed especially rapidly during the last decade before the First World War. The October Revolution brought complete devastation to this area: the Bolshevik decree on the confiscation of all cotton stocks, no matter in whose hands they were, played a huge role in exacerbating the anti-Bolshevik movement, although the basis of the crisis was the complete destruction of transport, which suspended the export of cotton to the central provinces where it was produced its processing. As a result, the entire agricultural population of the region, who lived mainly by cotton growing, joined the Basmachi.
The political department of the 2nd Turkestan Division, as soon as it arrived in the region, immediately launched widespread propaganda among the population, sharply dissociating itself from the “perversions of Bolshevik policy” committed by the former rulers of the region, calling on the Basmachi to abandon the hopeless struggle. All participants in the Basmachi detachments, of course, were declared a complete amnesty on the condition of immediate disarmament. This campaign in Fergana was led by the same Sukhov, the political commissar of the 2nd Turkestan Division, whose secretary was Malenkov. He was very young then - he just turned 18 in Fergana.
The campaign for the disarmament of the Basmachi was initially with great success. People were tired of war and dreamed of peace, oh peaceful life. Local Muslim communists, attracted to this work by the Turkfront, traveled to the mountains, where the Basmachi rebel detachments were held, and their assurances were made strong impression They, undoubtedly, themselves believed that the representatives of the central government who came from Moscow were really bringing peace to the region and a fair solution to national disputes. But very soon, by the spring of 1920, the situation began to change dramatically. The illusions of the population quickly disappeared. The words of the new government representatives sounded, however, differently than they did before the arrival of the authorized representatives of the center; In terms of national relations, the new government flirted with the population of the region, but the general policy, in its socio-economic basis, was almost worse than before. It was carried out, in any case, more rigorously. As a result, very soon the “Muslim units” of the Red Army, where all the disarmed Basmachi were enrolled, began to increasingly desert into the mountains. The decision to transfer these units to Tashkent resulted in their refusal to obey the order. The personal intervention of Frunze, the then commander of the Turkfront, however, prevented an armed uprising, but the Basmachi protests, which began earlier, in the spring of 1920, again assumed large proportions. On May 15, Frunze gave the order to the division commander of the 2nd Turkestan Division to “immediately begin decisive action” against the Basmachi, who had recently carried out two large attacks on parts of the division. Soon the 2nd Division was transferred from Fergana to the southeast to guard the border with Afghanistan. And when the Soviet People's Commissar Chicherin, in one of his speeches, reminded England of the Russian bayonets that again sparkled on the heights of the Pamirs, he meant the bayonets of the 2nd Turkestan Division.
Afghanistan was then the center that supported the Basmachi movement in Turkestan and especially in the mountainous regions of the Uzbek and Tajik Soviet republics bordering on it 9 . The 2nd Division was tasked with fighting the Basmachi in these very areas, which until that time had been very little surveyed and difficult to reach. The Basmachi held out especially stubbornly here. It was this area that was chosen as a stronghold for the Enverpasa movement. The Gissar Valley, the areas of the Vakhsh and Pyanj rivers, the mountain slopes of the Western Pamirs - large and small detachments of the 2nd Turkestan Division visited everywhere, in all the nooks and crannies of this wild and majestic land in its wildness. For the region, these detachments did not bring peace. In the old days, the center of the Gissar region was a small town. Dushanbe differed from ordinary villages only in size: at the turn of the 20th century there were about 500 houses, almost entirely made of adobe saklyas. In 1920-1922 Dushanbe changed hands several times, withstood sieges, and was the scene of fierce battles. And when on July 14, 1922, the Red Army troops finally entered it, all that was left of the town were ruins, in which several sick and hungry residents huddled 10. Only later Dushanbe, rechristened Stalinabad, turned into a large industrial and cultural center and became the capital of the Tajik Republic.
Notes:
1 Safarov G Colonial revolution (Turkestan experience) / GIZ. M, 1921 P. 118.
2 Burnashev Hanif. The practice of new politics // Bulletin of agitation and propaganda / Organ of the Fergana Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Turkestan. 1922 February. Quote From: Socialist Herald. 1923 No. 2 S. 15.
3 Frunze M. Selected works. 1951. P. 101.
4 Stalin I. Essays. T. 4. P. 362. The article was first published on October 10, 1920. Lenin’s report and debate on it at the Second Congress of the Comintern, see: Second Congress of the Communist International: Protocols. M., 1834. P. 98-161.
5 Safarov G. Decree. op. pp. 104-105, 115-116. 6 Furmanov D. From the diaries // October. 1936. March. P. 175.
7 Agabekov G. S. GPU. Notes of a security officer. Berlin, 1930. P. 47. The author of this book, who at one time held a number of prominent posts in the Cheka-GPU (worked in Turkestan, Persia, Turkey, at one time was the head Eastern sector OGPU, etc.), was privy to many of the secrets of this little-honored institution and in his books (there were two of them) reveals the behind-the-scenes side of a number of interesting events. A number of his stories received full confirmation, and therefore one should treat with confidence his story about Lenin’s agreement with Enver, especially since this agreement was completely in line with the then policy of the Soviet government.
8 Much later, during the period of the bloody “Yezhovshchina” of 1936-1938, a message appeared in the Soviet press that the operations to which Enver fell a victim were led by the future “Iron People's Commissar” Yezhov, who was embarking on the high road of his party-cheka career there. If this message is true, then it is more than likely that the beginning of Yezhov’s personal acquaintance with Malenkov dates back to those distant times.
9 Judging by some indications, at this time Malenkov worked in the political department of the 1st Cavalry Brigade, which was formed specifically for operations in the mountainous regions of southeastern Turkestan, i.e. on the territory of these republics.
10 Luknitsky P. Tajikistan. Series "Our Motherland" / Ed. Central Committee of the Komsomol. M., 1951. P. 206. See also: Ilyutko F. Basmachi in Lokai/GIZ. M., 1929.
February 28, 1917 The bourgeois-democratic revolution was victorious in Petrograd. By agreement between the Provisional Committee of the State Duma and the Socialist-Revolutionary-Menshevik leaders of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet, March 2, 1917. The Provisional Government was formed.
In the very first days after the February Revolution, councils of workers' and soldiers' deputies began to emerge throughout Russia as bodies of democratic power of the proletariat. These same councils subsequently played a tragic role in the life of Turkestan.
After the February revolution in Russia, a new stage begins in the history of the struggle of the peoples of Turkestan for national independence. The entire people of Turkestan greeted the revolution with great joy, although the Turkestan administration tried in every possible way to suppress information about the Petrograd events.
The most progressive forces during this period were the Turkestan Jadids. They, in turn, greeted the February Revolution as a fact of overthrowing the tsarist regime, establishing a truly popular form of government, and gaining independence by peoples who suffered from colonial oppression.
The very ideas of the February revolution about freedom, equality, and the right of nations to self-determination had a decisive influence on the further development of political and legal views and the activation of the political forces of Turkestan society and contributed to the growth of national self-awareness. In the process of the “February renewal”, numerous (including national) political organizations and movements are created.
From the very first days after the February Revolution, the issue of Regional Power became acute. Although the tsarist government was overthrown in Petrograd, power in Turkestan was in the hands of the same tsarist officials who had ruled Turkestan until now.
The struggle of regional political forces for the creation of a new, democratic state system in Turkestan can be divided into three stages. The first stage (March-April 1917) saw the political awakening of Turkestan. Under the influence of the Petrograd events, there is an active process of formation of new power structures:
a) councils of workers’ and soldiers’ deputies (authorities of the armed people) were created everywhere; they included representatives of the predominantly European population;
b) parallel to them, Executive Committees of public organizations (broader in national and social composition) are created, acting as unifiers of all democratic forces and claiming the role of local bodies of the Provisional Government. On March 6, on the initiative of the Tashkent City Duma, a meeting of representatives of public organizations was convened, which elected Tashkent temporary executive committee of 19 members. It included representatives of the bourgeoisie, local intelligentsia and officials. At the same time, the tsarist administrative apparatus, headed by the Governor-General, General Kuropatkin, was preserved;
c) for March - April 1917. There is a political awakening of the Muslim region, the formation of national democratic forces, the core of which were the Turkestan Jadids, who managed to take the most important steps to awaken in the minds of the people the need for unity and strengthening of national unity.
After the February revolution, the theoretical and practical activities of the Turkestan Jadids became bold, purposeful, organized and acquired an openly expressed political character. In organizational terms, the leaders were the Tashkent Jadids, on whose initiative on March 6 and 9-13, 1917. meetings of thousands of residents of the “old” city were held. At these meetings, overcoming serious differences, they managed to nominate single delegates from the entire Muslim population to the Tashkent Executive Committee. These meetings elected an expanded representative body (about 60 people) from all parts of the city - “Shuroi Islamiya”. In contrast to the councils of workers' and soldiers' deputies, uniting the European population of the city, "Shuroi Islamiya" was conceived as a council of deputies of the indigenous population professing Islam. At a meeting held on March 14, 1917, the presidium of "Shuroi Islamiya" consisting of 15 people was elected. It included people such as A. Fitrat, Munavvar Kari Abdurashidkhanov, Ubaidulla Khojaev and others.
On March 31, at a joint meeting of the Tashkent Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, the Council of Muslim Deputies, the Council of Peasants' Deputies and the Tashkent Executive Committee, many deputies spoke out for the removal of the entire tsarist administration headed by General Kuropatkin. At the meeting, facts were presented about Kuropatkin’s provocative activities, designed to incite national hatred. The meeting unanimously decided to immediately remove the governor general, his assistant and chief of staff from their positions and subject them to house arrest. The acting commander of the troops and the chief of staff were also elected here. A decision was made to separate the administration of the civilian part of the region from the military, with the management of civil affairs entrusted to three commissars of the Tashkent executive committee.
After the dismissal of Kuropatkin, the Provisional Government on April 7, 1917 formed the Turkestan Committee consisting of 9 members, headed by cadet Shchepkin. The Committee exercised the power of the Provisional Government within the Turkestan region, as well as Khiva and Bukhara. The first composition of the Turkestan Committee of the Provisional Government, which included representatives of local peoples such as Bukeikhanov, Tanyshpayev, Maksudov and Davtelshin, was weak from a political point of view, had little knowledge of local conditions, and therefore it was unable to influence the development of events in the region. Essentially, the replacement of the Turkestan Governor-General by the Turkestan Committee was a change of sign, while maintaining the same essence, which soon led to a confrontation between the Turkestan Committee and local social forces.
Political and public organizations of Turkestan immediately came out with support for the Provisional Government, and their representatives became members of its Turkestan Committee. They called on the local population to obey and support the new government and its activities. Thus, the appeal of “Shuroi Islamiya” dated March 25, 1917 to Muslims said: “No harm has come from the fall of the Russian Tsar, since in his place there is a people’s government. As for the people’s government, it is a fair government that looks at everyone equally. Therefore, do not say inappropriate words about the new government.” And in the “Temporary Charter” of “Shuroi Islamiya”, published in the newspaper “Najat” on April 28, 1917, among the tasks of this organization it is stated: “To call on the people to assist in the policies of the new government. "
On the initiative of the Turkestan Jadids, in March-April, socio-political and religious organizations were created in different cities of Turkestan: in Tashkent - as was said, “Shuroi Islamiya” (Council of Islam); in Andijan - “Ozod Khalk” (Free People), “Hurriyat” ” (Freedom), “Marifat” (Knowledge), etc.; in Samarkand - “Munavvjul Islam” (Development of Islam); in Katta-Kurgan - “Ravnakul Islam” (Development of Islam), etc. In April 1917, branches of “Shuroi Islamiya” appeared in Namangan, Samarkand, Kokand, Andijan and other cities.
The tasks that the Turkestan Jadids set for themselves included the development of a temporary charter, the determination of the main goals and objectives at this stage, as well as work to unite the Muslims of Turkestan.
After February 1917, the issue of the autonomous structure of the region became the main one in the socio-political life of Turkestan. The dominant mood of Turkestan society, despite social differences, was the desire to eliminate the colonial position of the Turkestan region.
The resolution of the issue of the state structure of the Turkestan region directly depended on the form of government in Russia itself, for at that historical period the Turkestan region was an integral part of the Russian colonial empire. And therefore, the question of the state structure in Russia was constantly present at all All-Russian and regional congresses of Soviets and Muslims.
At the beginning of April (April 7-15), 1917, the 1st Turkestan Regional Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies was held in Tashkent. 263 delegates from 75 councils (mostly of European nationality) took part in its work. The issue of regional power was on the agenda of the congress. At the congress, many options for its organization were proposed and a number of delegates demanded to take into account the sentiments and aspirations of Muslims to create a unified government with the Europeans. The majority of the congress delegates were in favor of establishing in Russia democratic republic with a strong central body. Nevertheless, the congress did not express its attitude to such important issues for the peoples of Turkestan as the autonomy of the region and the elimination of national inequality.
At the beginning of 1917, on the initiative of the Muslim faction of the IV State Duma, the organization “All-Russian Muslim Bureau” was created, which was entrusted with the task of preparing and convening the All-Russian Muslim Congress in May 1917. in Moscow. This bureau, which included Ahmad Zaki Validi, was of the view that Russia should be transformed into a Federation of Republics.
In April 1917 (from April 9 to April 16), a congress of delegates of the Executive Committees of the Turkestan region was held in Tashkent. The congress was attended by 171 delegates from 74 public organizations, 99 people from the European population and 72 delegates from the Muslim population. At the congress the question of the future form of government in Russia was discussed. Many opinions have been expressed on this matter. Akhmad Zaki Validi, who specially came to Tashkent for this purpose on April 4, took part in the work of the congress. It was he who made a proposal for a federal structure in Russia. He was supported by congress delegates Mahmoud Khoja Behbudi, Vadim Chaikin, orientalist Lev Zimin and others. The resolution adopted by the congress on April 10, 1917 recognized that “the most appropriate form of government in Russia is the establishment in Russia of a Democratic Republic on the principles of broad autonomy for individual regions of the state, with the provision in some cases of complete federalism with the protection of minority rights.”
It was from this period that the socio-political activities and demands of the Shuroists became even more radical, and the idea of independence came to the fore. This idea was voiced in the articles of M. Kh. Behbudi, N. Yakushev, O. Tirkashev, M. Shermuhammedov and others.
Already at the first Regional Muslim Congress (worked in Tashkent from April 16 to 23), convened on the initiative of “Shuroi Islamia”, the issue of national-territorial autonomy of Turkestan was considered. 150 delegates from the indigenous population took part in the congress. The focus of the congress was the main question: “On the future form of government in Russia.” At the congress, one of the ideologists of the autonomist movement in Turkestan, Akhmad Zaki Validi, gave a report “On public administration and its organization”. He tried to justify the idea of a federation with arguments. He was supported by M. Behbudi, Obidzhon Makhmudov, Muhammadjon Tynishpayev, Vadim Chaikin. There were, of course, and opponents of the federation, who came up with a proposal to leave the wording “Democratic Russian Republic”. Initially, Munavvar Kari and Ubaidulla Khodzhaev did not join the idea of a federation, but then they changed their ideological positions and went over to the side of the federalists after a heated discussion that took place at the congress, 17. April, a resolution was adopted, in accordance with which a wish was expressed for Turkestan to remain part of the Russian Federal Republic, but as a separate territorial autonomy with broad rights granted to it.
At the congress, a central governing body was formed - the Central Council of Muslims of Turkestan (Markaziy “Shuroi Islamiya" or Regional Council), designed to protect the interests of the local population. Munavvar Kari, M. Behbudi, U. Khojaev, Obidzhon Makhmudov and others were elected as its members. In the same days, A.Z. Validi traveled to Kokand and Samarkand to organize local departments of “Shuroi Islamiya”. With the end of the congress, the most important stage in the consolidation of the Turkestan peoples ended.
At the second stage of the political struggle on the path to national independence (May-August 1917). The issue of autonomy for the region began to be more actively discussed in the Muslim community after the 1st All-Russian Congress of Muslims, held in Moscow on May 1-11, 1917. with the participation of more than seven hundred representatives from almost all political movements from Azerbaijan, the Volga region, Crimea, Turkestan, Bukhara, Khiva. At this congress, A.Z. Validi made a report “The ethnic origin of Russian Muslims and their role in political life.” Heated debates surrounding the national state structure of Russia divided the participants of the congress into two large groups: one of them stood on the principles of centralism and advocated the extraterritorial cultural autonomy of Muslims within the democratic Russian Republic, and the other for the territorial autonomy of Muslims within the Russian Federation.
Ultimately, the congress decided: “To recognize that the form of government in Russia that best ensures the interests of Muslim peoples is a Democratic Republic on a national-territorial federal basis; Moreover, nationalities that do not have a defined territory enjoy national and cultural autonomy.”
At this congress, 446 delegates voted for national self-determination and a federal structure of the state, 271 voted against. At the congress, the Central Council of Muslims of Russia, consisting of 12 people, was elected. Representatives from Turkestan included Ubaydulla Khojaev, A.Z. Validi, Abdulkholik Kokanbaev (Samarkand), Rakhmonberdi Kamolidinov (Kokand) into the council.
It should be noted that the consolidation processes in Turkestan society that began so successfully at the first stage encountered serious obstacles at the second stage.
The socio-political changes that have occurred in the Turkestan region have made significant changes in the social and political balance of power. In a relatively short period of time, from May to August 1917, “Councils of Muslim Workers’ Deputies”, “Unions of Muslim Workers” (Islom mekhnatkashlari), and trade unions were formed in Tashkent, Kokand, Andijan, Samarkand and other cities and towns of Turkestan. their creation was made by returning (about 100 thousand) Turkestanis, mobilized in 1916 for rear work. Former day laborers, unskilled laborers (mardikers), during their work at factories, factories, and enterprises in Russia, came into close contact with the slogans and practices of the class struggle and introduced them. into a poorly differentiated Turkestan society. The new political forces, although still weak, openly declared their own social priorities and took a position of confrontation in relation to the forces of “those in power and their spiritual mentors.”
This, in turn, caused a response wave from the latter, which was expressed in the withdrawal of the clergy and their supporters from “Shuroi Islamiya” in June 1917 and the formation of an organization called “Shuroi Ulema” (“Council of the Clergy”). There were two reasons for the split in Shuroi Islamiya. I) One was the contradictions regarding the issue of the state structure of Turkestan. Kadimists - supporters of the conservative trend, opposed to radical reforms, saw the future of Turkestan in the creation of a theocratic state here, part of the Russian Federation, but on the condition that all laws must be discussed in the legislative body “Mahkama-i-Shariya” and comply with Islamic law . This body was to be headed by Kazi-Kalyan.2) Another reason concerned the participation of women in elections to the city duma. The Ulemaists believed that women should not participate in elections to the city council, since according to Sharia law they are not allowed to appear in public places.
After a long debate on the issue of women’s participation in elections, the “Ulemists” and “Islamists” came to a compromise: separate booths were created especially for women participating in elections, where registration should be carried out by a woman, to whom the voter reveals her face. Although a compromise was reached on the second issue, the contradictions on the first issue pushed them towards isolation.
By the summer of 1917, the essence of the Turkestan Committee became clearer. The committee’s recognition of the impossibility of “introducing political autonomy in Turkestan” undermined faith in its democracy. However, the leaders of national democracy continued to support the Turkic Committee, since by this time the incompatibility of the positions of the Markazi “Shuroi Islamiya” (Crime Council) and the Council of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, which became take rigid class positions on all problems of social life in the region. Their increasing claims to power and ignoring the national interests of the indigenous peoples pushed national democracy away from the councils and intensified the confrontation between them.
The decisions of the Second All-Russian Muslim Congress, held in the second half of July 1917 in Kazan, had a significant influence on the ideology of the movement for the autonomy of Turkestan. The congress was attended by 260 delegates from all Muslim regions of Russia.
The congress adopted the following resolution: “The resolution of the issue of the form of government of Turkestan, Kyrgyzstan, the Caucasus and Crimea should be left to the population of these outskirts, and for the Muslims of internal Russia and Siberia to accept broad national and cultural autonomy. This meant complete national self-determination of the Muslim peoples." But the democratic forces of Turkestan did not set themselves the task of separating Turkestan from Russia.
Back in the early summer of 1917. Turkestan autonomists are aware of the need to programmatically substantiate their goals and objectives. In view of this, they are beginning to develop a model for the development of Turkestan society. This led to the drawing up of a program for the Turkestan political party, the approval of which took place at the congress of Muslim organizations of the region in the city of Skobelev on July 12-14, 1917.
At the congress it was stated that the party “Turk Odami Markaziyati” (Center of Turkic Peoples) created at the congress demands national-territorial autonomy for Turkestan, the Caucasus, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Bashkiria, and for the Tatars of the Volga region, Crimea and other peoples of Russia - cultural-national .
They demanded complete independence for the subjects of the federation in matters of governance, finance, Sharia, culture, justice and public education. Moreover, each autonomous republic was to be divided into regions and districts, endowed with rights local government. The program provides explanations on such issues as: the Turkestan Parliament, the rights of the European population of Turkestan, the land and water issue, the court, military units and etc.
With the intensification of the confrontation between the councils and the national democracy in its movement for expanding the rights of the indigenous population in the administration of the region, to which the national democracy attached decisive importance, new nuances appeared. The moderately liberal tactics of its leaders, their hopes through persuasion to persuade the Provisional Government to make concessions in solving the national problems of the region no longer corresponded to the realities of life in Turkestan society. The polarization of forces occurring within it showed the ambiguity of their positions. These forces, which had taken shape organizationally by this time (“Shuroi Islamiya” led by the Regional Council, “Shuroi Ulema”, councils of Muslim workers’ deputies) approached the problems of the essence of power and its goals from the standpoint of their interests. This was clearly manifested in the pre-election campaign that flared up in the summer of 1917 fight for seats in the city council.
At the elections to the Tashkent City Duma (held on July 30, 1917), 14 lists were nominated from various parties and public associations, including from the indigenous population; 3 lists: from “Shuroi Ulema”, the union of Muslim construction workers and from the united Muslim organizations of the old and a new city (the latter were represented mainly by Shuroi Islamiya). The election results brought victory to “Shuroi Ulema”: out of 112 seats, it received 62, the Social Democrats - 5, the Socialist Revolutionaries - 24, “Shuroi Islamiya” - 11. In total, 74 votes came from the indigenous population, and 38 from the European population.
The victory of the “Ulem” in the elections was perceived negatively by democratic circles among the European population, although they received 2/3 of the seats. They openly declared the political immaturity of the main masses of the indigenous population and the dominance of conservative forces over them. All this did not have the best effect on interethnic relations.
Growing interethnic antagonism turned Turkestan into a seething cauldron. He was overwhelmed by numerous conflicts on ethnic grounds from local in nature(unrest about the infringement of political rights during the elections of local government structures, social rights during the distribution of products, etc.) to conflicts covering entire regions of the region. The bloody clashes in Semirechye between Russian peasant settlers and Kyrgyz and Kazakhs who returned after the February revolution from China, where they fled after the suppression of the uprising of 1916, became an open wound. searches and requisitions of local merchants' goods by workers and soldiers.
In conditions of complete political, national, social instability of Turkestan society, the intensifying processes of polarization of its forces, the idea of national consolidation put forward by national democracy was under threat. And only the events in Petrograd at the end of the summer and autumn of 1917, which echoed in Turkestan, again put the problems of national consolidation on the agenda.
The third stage (September-November 1917) saw the most difficult period of relations between local democratic forces, which sought a coalition government, and the councils of workers' and soldiers' deputies, which, regardless of the realities of Turkestan life, ignored the interests of the local population.
The failed attempt of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief L. G. Kornilov to carry out a military coup and overthrow the Provisional Government radically changed the course of the revolutionary process in Russia. The decisive actions of the Bolsheviks during the days of the Kornilov rebellion raised their authority among the workers as defenders of the revolution. The slogan “All power to the Soviets,” which they again put forward, was taken up throughout the country. However, in Turkestan, the attitude towards this slogan even among democratic circles of the European population was ambiguous.
The representative bodies of the Muslim population of the region took a sharply negative position. At the II Regional Muslim Congress (Tashkent, September 7-11, 1917), convened on the initiative of “Shuroi Islamiya” (Crime Council), national democracy for the first time firmly stated the fundamental foundations of its position: “The Congress opposes the transfer of power to councils of workers, soldiers and peasants’ deputies. The power must be coalition and rely on all the forces of the country, i.e. Muslims can and should take part in the government only if its policy is democratic; the priority for the population of Turkestan is the right of free self-determination of the people (Markaziy “Shuroi”); Islamiya”) is a legitimate pan-Muslim body acting on behalf of the entire Muslim population and protecting its interests.”
From the decisions of the II Regional Muslim Congress, the Turkestan Bolsheviks realized that at the moment the slogan “All power to the soviets” did not find support not only among the democratic circles of the European population of Turkestan, but also among Muslims. Nevertheless, they began to persistently demand the transfer of all power to the workers’ and workers’ councils. soldiers' deputies.
Deciding to take advantage of the dissatisfaction of the masses with the actions of the Turkic Committee of the Provisional Government in the fight against speculation, the food crisis, high prices, deterioration of living conditions, devastation, the Bolsheviks acted as instigators of a rally held on September 12, 1917 in Tashkent in the Alexander Park, in which mainly soldiers of the 1st and 2nd Siberian regiments, workers - railway workers and others. The rally, which began with a discussion of food issues, acquired a sharply political character. The resolution adopted by the protesters at the proposal of the Bolsheviks announced the transfer of power to the council. The resolution adopted at the meeting proposed:
1) immediately elect a temporary Revolutionary Committee;
2) requisition food supplies from capitalists, lords and kulaks;
3) nationalize industrial enterprises and banks;
4) transfer the landowners' lands to the peasants;
5) establish revolutionary workers' control over production.
On the same day, a new composition of the Executive Committee of the Tashkent Council was elected, consisting of 36 members, mainly left Socialist Revolutionaries and Bolsheviks. Thus, a program to seize power was carried out following the example of the Petrograd Bolsheviks, which did not take into account the characteristics of the region and the opinion of the local population. Having attempted to implement a revolutionary plan, the Tashkent Bolsheviks pushed the masses of soldiers and workers to seize power and put the region under the threat of civil war.
The September events acquired a particularly dramatic character in connection with the arrival in Tashkent of a punitive expedition sent by the Provisional Government under the command of General P. A. Korovichenko and the retaliatory multi-day general strike of the workers of Tashkent, the introduction of martial law.
Most of the regional councils, led by the Regional Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, condemned the attempt to seize power by the Bolsheviks. Thus, in an appeal to the population of Fergana, the Fergana Regional Council and the Commissariat assessed the Tashkent events as an unauthorized attempt by a small group of people to impose their will on the entire region. Similar resolutions against the Revolutionary Committee and the Tashsovet were passed by the councils of Namangan, Kokand, Samarkand, Pishpek, Osh and other cities.
Shuroi Islamiya, Shuroi Ulema, the Turkic Federalist Party and other national organizations condemned the Bolsheviks for attempting to usurp power and assessed their actions as ignoring the interests and rights of Muslims immediately after the first days of the September events.
The September events had a powerful impact on the subsequent course of events in the Turkestan region. After these events, Muslims began to realize their aspirations. Moreover, the general decline in power contributed to the strengthening of demands for autonomy for Turkestan. The struggle for Turkestan autonomy activated all layers of the Muslim population and began to take place under the slogans “Long live Freedom, Justice, Equality!”, “Strength in unity!” These slogans indicated that, facing the danger of the Bolsheviks seizing power, Muslims and the overwhelming majority of national leaders organizations realized the need for unifying efforts.
So, the autonomist movement entered a new stage of its development. It already had different qualitative characteristics compared to the spring of 1917 and, above all, was distinguished by the consciousness and organization of its participants. Consolidation processes intensified, in which the role of “Shuroi Ulema” began to increase. A very important event that laid the organizational foundations of Turkestan autonomy was the congress of Turkestan and Kazakh Muslims, held on September 17-20 in Tashkent on the initiative of the Shuroi Ulema and Khaloik societies. Despite the long, heated disputes between the “Ulemists” and “Shuro-Islamists” , the congress managed to find compromise ways. To guide the Muslims of all Turkestan and Kazakhstan, it was decided to create a single political party called “Ittifaq al-Muslimin” (“Union of Muslims”) instead of the organizations “Shuroi Islamiya”, “Turon”, “Shuroi Ulema” and others.
The main issue in the work of the congress was the question of the future political structure of the Turkestan region. The adopted resolution put forward the idea of forming a territorial autonomous federation within the democratic Russian Republic. Having given the autonomy the name “Turkestan Federative Republic,” the congress determined the basic principles and norms of the future state structure.
According to the resolution of the Congress of Muslims, legislative power on issues of internal governance of the Turkestan Federation and its self-government belongs to the Turkestan Parliament, elected on the basis of universal direct, equal and secret voting for a period of 5 years, with mandatory proportional representation of all nationalities inhabiting the Turkestan region.
The resolution provided for the formation of a special secretariat, elected by the Turkestan Parliament and approved by the Government of the Russian Republic. This secretariat was entrusted with the function of actual management of all sectors of the Turkestan Federation.
The resolution also provided for the creation of a higher judicial body - the Senate under the name “Mahkama-i-Shariya” (House of Laws), which would have the right to publish and explain laws, supervision over the exact implementation of public laws and Sharia requirements (in relation to the local population), supervision for all government institutions, persons and the correct execution of laws by all judicial institutions and persons. The Senate was to be a collegial body, which would consist of the chairman and its members - the prosecutor, who would be the supreme guardian of the laws of the Turkestan Federation. Senators were to be elected. by the population of the Republic through universal, direct and secret voting for a period of 5 years.
The resolution also included a clause “On the representation of the Turkestan Federative Republic in the government of the Russian Republic.” According to Muslims, it should have taken part in the consideration of national issues.
Muslims also attached significant importance to the issue of delimiting the functions of the Turkestan federal and Russian republics. In their opinion, the Russian Republic should carry out such functions as protecting external borders in wartime, managing criminal and civil courts (for Russian citizens), mail, telegraph, railway, until such time as the Turkestan Federation is able to accept them under their jurisdiction, political relations between Russia and foreign states, and Russian defense affairs. All other issues related to the socio-economic, political-legal and cultural life of the Turkestan Federative Republic must be at its disposal and resolved independently by state authorities, administration and the court.
These were to be: the publication of laws on issues within the competence of the Turkestan Federative Republic; creating your own government agencies, its own militia for internal service within the federation and its own troops for protection in Peaceful time borders of the federation with foreign states; its customs offices at the borders both with foreign countries and with the Russian Republic; Federal Bank Treasury; minting coins and issuing banknotes.
The congress delegates, speaking for the independence of Turkestan as a whole, brought to the fore the idea economic independence. They knew that without achieving economic independence, one cannot have freedom in the fields of politics, law, culture and religion. To do this, they believed, it was necessary to declare the land, its subsoil, and waters the common property of the peoples of Turkestan; transfer management of land, industry, agriculture, trade, construction into the hands of Turkestanis; organize the production of necessary goods in Turkestan itself; build plants and factories; develop new lands; develop trade, industry, and irrigated agriculture.
At the September congress, very important decisions were made on the issue of land and water. Having reacted negatively to the creation of land committees formed to prepare land reform, “since they adhere to the line of socialization of lands and waters,” the congress decided that “the lands and waters of Turkestan should be under the control of the national assembly.” It should be noted that this decision expressed the will of the indigenous population of Turkestan for self-determination on a peaceful basis, that is, the transfer of power from the Provisional Government to the hands of the autonomists was implied not through a revolutionary coup, but through the reformation of Turkestan society.
The participants of the congress acted as supporters of the equality of all nations and nationalities of Turkestan in all spheres of economic, socio-political, legal and cultural life. They paid special attention to the protection of the rights and freedoms of national minorities.
The party of Turkestan federalists (“Turk adami markaziyat federalist firkasi”), the first political party of Muslims in Turkestan, also determined its attitude to these important political issues. Its local organizations were created in the summer of 1917. in Fergana, Tashkent, Margilan, Andijan and other cities of Turkestan. In the program and charter of the party, developed by the leaders of national democracy M. Kari, M. Behbudi, famous lawyers, spiritual scholars, the idea of creating a democratic republic in Turkestan on the principles of national-territorial autonomy within the Russian Democratic Republic and taking into account the specifics of public life was deeply substantiated Muslims
The creation of political parties and their adoption of program documents already testified to the political maturity achieved by the national movement in Turkestan.
The main task of the activities of political forces during this period was the following: to come to the Russian Constituent Assembly as a single, cohesive group from Turkestan and the rest of the Eastern Turkic peoples. Participants in the national movement pinned great hopes on the Constituent Assembly. Unfortunately, during this historical period, these hopes were not destined to come true.
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