Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………..2
1. Russian policy in the post-Soviet space…………………………..3
2. Geopolitical problems contributing to the crisis of relations in the post-Soviet space……………………………………………………..4
3. Political background crisis of relations in the post-Soviet space…………………………………………………………………………………6
4. Economic prerequisites for the crisis of relations in the post-Soviet space…………………………………………………………………………………8
5. Problems of the Russian diaspora in post-Soviet countries………………………9
6. New policy of Russia in the post-Soviet space…………………..11
Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………….14
List of used literature……………………………………………………...15
Introduction
At the end of the twentieth century, Russia again experienced a painful process of changing the social system. Profound changes in the economy, political and spiritual spheres of life of Russian society are becoming increasingly irreversible. At the same time, it is obvious that the goals declared by the political elite of society are still far from being achieved. There are various alternatives for getting out of the current crisis.
This largely depends on the subjective factor, that is, on the one hand, the ability of the political elite to direct social development in the required direction, and on the other hand, on the adequate participation of the general population in the ongoing transformations of society. The latter is hardly possible without high level political culture of the entire society, allowing meaningful participation in the implementation of political and socio-economic reforms in Russia. Taking into account interests in public policy depends on the conscious choice and activity of the majority of citizens various groups population.
One of the factors in the formation of a democratic political culture is knowledge of the basics of political science. Without possessing such knowledge, a person becomes an object of manipulation and subordination. Citizens' mastery of the basics of political science is the most important condition for the successful reform of Russian society. Knowledge of political science allows a person to assimilate the basic values and norms of a democratic political culture, to develop such important qualities for democratic reforms as tolerance, willingness to compromise, and the ability to express and defend their interests in a civilized and institutionalized manner.
1. Russian policy in the post-Soviet space
The policy that Russia pursued in the 90s in the post-Soviet space within the framework of the CIS and other integration associations, in the 21st century, has increasingly ceased to correspond to both the internal challenges that Russia faces and the new geopolitical situation in the world.
The emasculation of the original content of the Treaty on the Commonwealth of Independent States (a single defense policy, a single means of payment, a single humanitarian and cultural space, the absence of customs borders, etc.) turned this association into a club of state leaders, which now exists only due to the fact that The package with the previously listed but not fulfilled conditions included preferential prices for the CIS countries for Russian energy resources. Moreover, as energy prices on the world market increased, the CIS countries, due to preferential prices, began to receive an increasingly greater head start in relation to Russia. It is no coincidence that in 2004 Russia occupied last place by GDP growth among the CIS countries.
The countries of the post-Soviet space, after the orientation period of the early and mid-90s, are increasingly becoming subjects of the influence of world centers of power and are increasingly losing the “big brother” complex in relation to Russia.
Throughout the 90s, in these countries there was a process of formation of national elites with the most active participation of both world and regional powers in which Russia, focused on internal problems, practically did not take part. As a result, pro-American, pro-European, pro-Turkish, etc. were formed in these countries. elite groups, pro-Russian, or rather residual pro-Soviet groups, to which Russia provided support, were gradually pushed to the periphery of political processes. Having relied only on the conservation of the existing post-Soviet political elites, Russia did not contribute to the creation of mechanisms for a civilized transfer of power in the CIS countries.
All kinds of formal integration associations in the post-Soviet space (CIS, EuroWEC, Union of Russia and Belarus, Common Economic Space, etc.) have not become truly attractive to its members due to Russia’s lack of a real and powerful modernization project, modern industrial policy, the sliding of its economy onto a raw material export basis.
The interests of Russian business and the Russian state in the post-Soviet states have long diverged. In a situation of close energy interdependence of our countries, individual Russian energy giants are pursuing their own policies. The state interest in their actions is often not visible, which seriously chaoticizes the resulting political line.
Further inertial implementation of Russia's policy of the 90s in radically changed conditions, preservation of the Commonwealth independent states in an amorphous, unreformed form will only multiply defeats, and, moreover, will significantly block the future development and implementation of a new Russian policy in the post-Soviet space.
2. Geopolitical problems contributing to the crisis of relations in the post-Soviet space
As a result of the collapse of first the Warsaw Pact and then the Soviet Union, there was a sharp change in the entire balance of power on the world stage. This process coincided with the growing globalization and the reshaping of the European Community into a confederal state, a “liberal empire” of the 21st century. New centers of powerful economic growth have emerged, such as China and India.
If in the first decade after the collapse of the great Soviet empire there was a gradual adaptation of the world centers of power to radically changed conditions, there were relatively inertial processes of absorption of both NATO and the European Union of the countries of Eastern Europe, then in recent years the intensity of geopolitical rivalry has increased sharply, and the front of this struggle is closely approached the borders of Russia.
The United States is clearly concerned about the formation of a favorable geopolitical structure in Transcaucasia and Central Asia directed against Iran and China. At the same time, since the creation of this axis takes place in the CIS space, as a side effect there is an intensive weakening of Russia’s influence in these regions, which it naturally views as directed against its long-term strategic interests.
If in the 90s there was an illusion that integration with the European Union would be limited only to economic alliances, now it has become clear that this integration presupposes almost complete political, economic and military involvement of candidate countries with a sharp limitation of national sovereignty.
In such a situation, the slogan of the most loyal representatives of the political elites of the post-Soviet states towards Russia, “To Europe with Russia,” becomes completely irrelevant. The modern model of the formation of a united Europe does not at all imply the inclusion of the Russian Federation in its composition. Moreover, the contours of a united Europe are increasingly emerging, including Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova with rigid borders in relation to Russia, which is considered only as an external supplier of energy resources. All talk about four common spaces seems to be aimed only at neutralizing Russian resistance to the expansion of the European Union to the East. The thesis put forward by some Russian political scientists that the concept of a united Europe is becoming increasingly open in relation to Russia is constantly refuted by the real actions of Brussels.
Taking advantage of Russia's passivity, such relatively weak geopolitical players as, for example, Turkey, Poland, Romania and even Lithuania began to actively play their games in the post-Soviet space.
In such a situation, “multi-vector”, and to put it bluntly, the uncertainty and vagueness of Russia’s foreign policy, the lack of clearly expressed and firmly defended priorities, especially in the post-Soviet space, leads to the fact that from the leading subject of world politics, passively reacting to new challenges, is increasingly becoming an object of influence from real world players.
Political prerequisites for the crisis of relations in the post-Soviet space
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, unlike Russia, which inherited the capital and personnel of the collapsed common state, in the new independent states the formation of the power structure, state elite, national domestic and foreign policy proceeded practically from scratch. Russia, busy with its internal problems, practically did not participate in this process.
But the most active participation in it was taken by all kinds of non-governmental organizations of the USA and European countries such as Freedom House, Carnegie Foundation, NDI, Ebert Foundation, Adenauer Foundation, etc. Through the active work of their representative offices in the CIS countries, providing grants, and organizing trips to teach political technologies, they formed a pro-American and pro-European political elite. Standard Western models of political structure were imposed on post-Soviet countries, regardless of how ready the society of these countries was to accept them.
As a result, under the external democratic shell (universal election of presidents, political parties, elected parliament on an alternative basis), either weak and corrupt regimes or outright eastern despotism arose. In the post-Soviet space, the problem of the legitimate transfer of power between elite groups has not been resolved. This is precisely the main reason that the natural renewal of power is increasingly taking place in the form of colorful revolutions.
Those post-Soviet political elites, which Russia supported for a long time in the absence of pro-Russian elites, are leaving the political arena one after another, for which Russia was completely unprepared. Impulsive attempts to unambiguously support one of the warring parties in a political confrontation without corresponding lengthy preparatory work are turning into more and more defeats.
The new political elites, who are now beginning to come to power in the post-Soviet states, were formed under active external influence and will take, at best, a neutral, and mostly unfriendly, position towards Russia. The artificial reproduction of the external forms of Western democracy, the lack of development of mechanisms for the legitimate transfer of power in post-Soviet countries, will contribute to constant departures from the legal field and multi-colored revolutions, serious political destabilization on the borders of Russia.
Economic prerequisites for the crisis of relations in the post-Soviet space
The share of CIS countries in Russian foreign trade turnover decreased from 63% in 1990 to 21.5% in 1997 and continues to decrease. If in 1988-1990. While about a quarter of the gross domestic product was involved in inter-republican (within the borders of the former USSR) trade turnover, currently this figure has dropped to almost one tenth.
The highest intensity of Russia's trade turnover remains with Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, which account for 87.5% of Russian exports and 84% of imports with the Commonwealth countries. For the entire Commonwealth, trade with Russia, despite the sharp decline, is still of paramount importance, accounting for over 50% of their total foreign trade turnover, and for Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus - more than 70%.
In the sectoral structure of industry in all CIS countries, the share of products from the fuel, energy and other raw materials industries continues to increase and the share of products from manufacturing industries, especially mechanical engineering and light industry, continues to decrease.
In recent years, there has been a tendency to reorient the Commonwealth countries to solve their economic problems outside the CIS, with the expectation of the possibility of significantly expanding relations with countries far abroad.
Thus, the share of their exports to non-CIS countries compared to the total volume of exports was 93% for Azerbaijan in 2001 versus 58% in 1994, for Armenia - 70% and 27%, respectively, for Georgia - 57% and 25%, and for Ukraine - 71% and 45 percent. Accordingly, there is an increase in their imports from non-CIS countries.
The development of economic relations with the CIS countries continues to be influenced by the problem of their repayment of debt for government loans previously provided to them by Russia and products supplied by Russian economic entities. Of this debt, a significant part is occupied by debts for government loans provided (over $5 billion), which are mainly settled by postponing their repayment periods to a later period, transferring to Russia full or partial ownership of real estate in the CIS countries, as well as offsetting payments to Russia for the rental of individual facilities on their territory (Kazakhstan and Ukraine).
In the total volume of debts for products supplied by Russian economic entities, the main part of the debt of the CIS countries falls on fuel and energy resources, which is estimated to be approximately 3.8 billion dollars. The main debtors to Russia are enterprises from Ukraine, Moldova and Kazakhstan.
Thus, we can conclude that the “single national economic complex”, the restoration of which they talk so much about, justifying the existence of non-functioning integration associations, practically no longer exists. It was replaced by an ugly and costly system for Russia of subsidizing the already significantly reoriented industry of the CIS countries with Russian energy resources to external consumers. Outside the fuel and energy complex, there are practically no joint modernization projects aimed at taking competitive positions in the world market.
5. Problems of the Russian diaspora in post-Soviet countries
The long period that has passed since the destruction of the USSR makes it possible to judge the stable general trends in the policies of post-Soviet states towards the Russian diaspora found on their territory. In almost all former Soviet republics, sovereign statehood was asserted on an anti-Russian and anti-Russian basis. First of all, this was expressed in “language revolutions”, when in 1988-1989 new laws on languages were adopted, which approved one state language of the titular nation, and the Russian language, which was the main information carrier for the non-titular population and the huge mass of Russian-speaking citizens of the titular nationality, was either sharply limited in the possibilities of official use, or the legally undefined function of the language of interethnic communication is left to it. Language from a means of communication has become a political instrument, with the help of which from government structures, internal affairs bodies, courts, government bodies in all areas of state and public life The Russians were forced out. At the same time, Russians were deprived of the opportunity to fully participate in privatization and the acquisition of property in their countries of residence. The subsequent economic reform, which today has one common result in post-Soviet states - a sharp reduction in industrial and agricultural production, led to the fact that the Russian population, which in Soviet times made up the bulk of industrial workers and engineers, lost their jobs, and at the same time - sources of livelihood. Problems arose in obtaining education in our native language, Russian. The information space for the Russian-speaking population is sharply narrowing. In the public consciousness, through the media and the education system, a hostile image of Russia and Russians began to be formed, which became fertile ground for the growth of everyday nationalism and the growth of interethnic tension.
Despite the fact that the majority of Russians in the CIS and Baltic countries have not lived there for the first generation, for them these countries are their homeland; many are put in the position of occupiers, “newcomers,” strangers. They are actually forced to choose between losing their ethnic identity or leaving. These general trends are modulated specific features in each of the post-Soviet states.
Thus, the Russian diaspora, which could become a powerful instrument of Russian influence in post-Soviet states, is almost everywhere in a disunited, oppressed state, and has not formed influential political associations. Russia does not pursue a firm and consistent policy to defend the interests of the Russian diaspora. The fundamental problem has not been resolved: what is the Russian diaspora in these countries - a resource base for replenishing the declining population of Russia or a conductor of Russian interests in the post-Soviet space.
6. New policy of Russia in the post-Soviet space
The implementation of Russia's new policy in the post-Soviet space is impossible without a sharp change in priorities, both in domestic economic policy and in its geopolitical orientation. Without this, no sophisticated PR campaigns and diplomatic delights, attempts to “freeze” the CIS and other integration associations in their current vague and dilapidated form, will save from the fact that these countries, one after another, will be included in the spheres of influence of other world centers of power, and Russia will gradually find himself in an unfavorable environment.
1. Only the development and start of implementation of a powerful modernization project, the implementation of a real industrial policy aimed at occupying a competitive place in the global division of labor based on modern technologies, the identification of real benefits for Russia’s allies in joining this project, can create the necessary conditions for the implementation of a new effective Russian policy in the post-Soviet space.
2. It’s time for Russia to define itself geopolitically for a sufficiently long period of time. In a state of uncertainty, “multi-vector”, lack of a consistently implemented industrial policy, in the current, cruel and conflict-ridden world, it is no longer possible to develop calmly and dynamically. It is necessary to directly admit that the project for Russia proposed by Europe is essentially not modernization and, despite the beautiful outer shell, involves freezing the Russian economy at the stage of a fuel and raw material appendage and a supplier of cheap unskilled labor. work force for the European Union. This completely blocks the opportunity for Russia to become the center and leader of economic development in the post-Soviet space. In such a situation, when developing a modernization project for Russia and the post-Soviet space, it is necessary to abandon the traditional one-sided economic orientation towards the European energy market and consider the possibility of more effective interaction with such rapidly developing regions of energy consumption as China and India.
A detailed consideration of all the consequences of such a large-scale reorientation is beyond the scope of this report (it would be advisable to devote a separate SNA report to this topic). But first, it can be noted that the Indian direction looks the most promising.
3. Only the implementation of a consistent economic policy set out in the report of the National Strategy Council “State and Business” can open a “window of opportunity” for implementing a new Russian policy in the post-Soviet space.
4. It is necessary to show political will and decisively get rid of such long-standing vices in foreign policy in relation to post-Soviet states, when real Russian non-renewable resources are distributed at half price only for beautiful words and participation in mythical pseudo-integration associations. And what’s even worse is that for bad words and actions, resources are also distributed in the hope of gratitude in a bright future that never comes. Tough pragmatism, consistency and firm defense of one's own economic and political interests always evoke, in the end, more respect than unmotivated distribution of gifts and forgiveness of debts.
5. It is necessary to form a coordinating center that would deal with foreign policy issues in post-Soviet states, would coordinate the implementation of policies not only at the level of government structures, but also at the level of public associations, foundations, institutes, centers, financial and industrial groups.
6. Russia, hoping for its residual influence in post-Soviet countries, has not formed in them those levers of political influence, mechanisms for the formation of friendly political elites that the United States and Europe successfully use. These are funds, grants, educational programs, etc. And it is through them, and not only and not so much through embassies and interstate contacts, that, as one could observe, successful political projects are implemented. It is necessary to attract large Russian business to the speedy formation of this “non-governmental” sector of political influence.
7. While maintaining the developed structure of the Soviet Union for collecting information about non-CIS countries, expert analysis of economic and political trends in them, Russia did not bother to create similar tools for the post-Soviet states. We have witnessed many political mistakes of the Russian leadership based on the elementary lack of adequate information on real political processes in post-Soviet countries. It is urgent to create powerful state and non-state systems for collecting and analyzing political and economic information about neighboring countries. Otherwise, all declarations about their priority in the Russian foreign policy concept will remain empty talk, and mistakes will multiply.
Conclusion
The external situation for Russia, from the point of view of our strategic security, is by no means getting worse; it has been consistently bad since the beginning of the 90s, and in this sense, perhaps, has even improved slightly. It is a political fact that Russia is the only country that emerged after the collapse of the USSR that did not receive from any international organization no real guarantees of safety. That is, despite all the assurances (and there were many assurances in the early 90s from almost all European, Euro-Atlantic and international organizations), Russia was forced to build its security entirely independently all these years. Moreover, this norm was perceived by European and Western structures as a constant factor.
It is believed that it goes without saying that Russia, both today and in the future, must completely ensure its own security without any outside guarantees. We cannot underestimate this circumstance; we accept it as a fact and act based on this fact. This situation did not arise today, it existed 10 years ago to exactly the same extent, it was just very poorly understood by our political class.
The range of foreign policy concepts and expert assessments presented in society will be taken into account to a greater extent through the development of relevant units within our executive and legislative branches, and there will be a number of permanent meetings in this area that will reach the necessary, perhaps in some cases to recreated sectors in executive departments, be it the government or the presidential administration. These organizational issues are currently being worked out, and they will become known in the near future.
Bibliography
Gordon L.A., Pliskevich N.P. Forks and traps of the transition period // Polis. - 2004. - No. 4.
Demidov A.I., Fedoseev A.A. Fundamentals of Political Science. - M., 1995.
Dryakhlov N.I. Traditions and modernization in modern Russia // Socis. - 2005. - No. 10.
Kupryashikhin G.L. Political modernization. M., 2005.
Kupryashikhin G.L. Political development // Centaur. 2004. -No. 4.
Modernization: foreign experience and Russia. M., 2005.
Pantin V.I., Lapkin V.V. Waves of political modernization in the history of Russia (to discuss the hypothesis) // Polis. - 2004. - No. 2.
Rukovishnikov V.R. Sociology of the transition period // Socis. - 2004. - No. 6, 8-9.
Salmin A.M. Political development of Russia and current problems of political science // Polis. - 12005. - No. 3.
Soloviev A.I. Political culture and modernization of Russian society. - M., 2002
Fadin A.V. Modernization through disaster (Version) // Centaur. - 2003. - No. 1.
Fokotov A.G. Russia: From a mobilization society to an innovative one. - M., 2003.
Tsygankov A.P. Between liberal democracy and the slide into authoritarianism: preliminary results of the political development of Russia, // Social and Political Journal. - 2004. - No. 1.
One of the results of the collapse of the USSR in December 1991 was the decolonization of the world's last empire. Post-Soviet colonial countries in the field of nation formation and state building, they pursue approximately the same policies as other post-colonial countries, because they also strive to get rid of the colonial legacy.
The most important role in this process is played by the liberation of national history from stereotypes imposed by the former imperial center, the creation (or revival) of national historiography, which helps to consolidate the citizens of new national states. In all countries (including those belonging to the “civilized West”), national historiography and national myths are the most important component of national consciousness.
1. Soviet national policy: the role of historical memory
USSR - colonial empire
The former USSR corresponds to the definition of an empire with a clearly defined center (Moscow) and periphery (allied and autonomous republics). The state institutions of the empire were located in the center, and the leadership on the outskirts was carried out by officials appointed by the ruling elite of the imperial center. Michael Doyle defines empire as “a relationship in which one state formally or informally controls the political sovereignty of other states.” This definition exactly corresponds to Soviet realities.
The outskirts (union republics) were subordinate to the center. The local elite ruled the outskirts on behalf of the center. The center subjugated, controlled and protected the outskirts, ruled them, played the role of an intermediary, and redistributed funds.
The dominant ideology in the Soviet empire was Marxism-Leninism and, more importantly for us, Russian imperialism. In the multinational Soviet state, Russians were called “big brothers.” In Soviet times, only the RSFSR did not have republican governing bodies; Russia, the only one of the 15 union republics, was not portrayed as the “homeland” of its titular nation. The “homeland” for Russians was the entire Soviet Union - such a policy deliberately sought to link Russian self-determination (identity) with the Soviet one.
In the case of Western empires, nation-states were formed before the conquest of colonies in other parts of the world. Therefore, England and France were able to part with their colonies relatively easily - they returned to the national state that arose before the empire. But there were two exceptions, when the boundaries between the center and the periphery turned out to be “blurred” - Ireland and Algeria, colonies included respectively in the British and French metropolises. The break with these internal colonies cost a million lives in Algeria and led to many years of bloody conflict in Northern Ireland (Ulster).
From 1922 to 1947, Ireland was a dominion, like the other "white" British colonies (Canada, Australia and New Zealand). Having gained independence in 1947, Ireland lost its industrialized but ethnically diverse northern region: Ulster went to Britain. Ukraine, on the contrary, inherited a similar region - Donbass, where 20% of its population lives.
Ireland and Great Britain maintained a special relationship. Irish citizens living in Great Britain had equal rights with the local population and could participate in elections. When the Irish Free State was formed in 1922, 96% of its exports went to the United Kingdom. Despite all efforts to reduce dependence on the British market, even today 50% of Irish exports go to the United Kingdom. The UK is the largest investor in the Irish economy. The separation of Ireland from the United Kingdom only slightly weakened the ties (economic, human, cultural) between the two states.
There are parallels between Ireland and Ukraine in how the colonial legacy is overcome. The Irish Free State (from 1947 the Irish Republic) sought to revive the Irish Gaelic language, but nothing came of this plan. Today, only 2% of the population uses Irish in everyday life. Most Irish people listen to British radio and watch British television. Something similar is happening in Ukraine, where Russian radio and television remain popular. In both cases, the powerful influence of a hegemonic language from a neighboring country deepens the consequences of colonization - Anglicization (in Ireland) and Russification (in Ukraine).
By the time independence was gained, the local population was characterized by double patriotism: in Ireland - Anglo-Irish, in Ukraine - Russian-Soviet. The Anglo-Irish were proud of their Irish heritage, but did not reject the connection with the “higher” English culture. They were patriots of their land, just as the “Russian-Soviet” felt an attachment to the Ukrainian land. However, were they “real Irish”? And can “Russian-Soviet” ones be called real Ukrainians if they do not speak Ukrainian?
The idea of “regional patriotism” is contrasted with the ethnic-cultural concept of the nation, put forward in Ireland by the Gaelic League, and in Ukraine by the Ukrainian Language Society and the “Rukh” (Movement). National liberation is associated with cultural nationalism, which is supposed to protect against the cultural and linguistic dominance of England (in the case of Ireland) or Russia (in the case of Ukraine). Hence the calls to “cross out” centuries of anglicization and russification. But since it is hardly possible to establish Irish or Ukrainian ethnocultural hegemony, the acquisition of civilized forms by local nationalism is slowing down.
In the Irish-British case, the problem of “resentment against the colonizer” is still unresolved. In this regard, Ukrainian-Russian relations are very similar to Irish-British ones. So one should not hope that Ukrainian-Russian relations will normalize over the coming decades.
Ireland lost, and Ukraine almost lost, its language. Ireland was colonized by the British and Scots, Ukraine by the Russians. In both Ireland and Ukraine, Catholics were persecuted (in Ireland, Catholics received the right to vote much later than Protestants). In both countries there was assimilation of the upper strata of society. Both the Irish and the Ukrainians became peasant nations, devoid of national dominant elites. Tens of thousands died in Ireland, millions died in Ukraine, both countries experienced famine, which in Ireland was partially contributed to, and in Ukraine to a large extent, by the authorities of the metropolis. Millions of Irish and Ukrainians left for North America, and also (in the Ukrainian case) – to Siberia and the Russian Far East.
In both Ireland and Ukraine, colonization stopped population growth, while in the metropolises it occurred at a rapid pace. In 1654, when Muscovy and Zaporozhye Sich (Left Bank Ukraine) signed the Treaty of Pereyaslavl, the population in both countries was approximately the same. Today in Russia it is three times more than in Ukraine. If we compare Ireland with Finland, we will see that during the 19th century the Finnish population tripled, and the Irish population halved. If the population in Ireland had grown at the same rate as in Finland, then by the beginning of the 20th century there would have been 13 million Irish people.
In both Ireland and Ukraine, hostility towards the dominant nation, passed down from generation to generation, greatly influenced the formation of the image of the “colonizer.” For centuries the English treated the Irish as barbarians and degenerates. English and Russian-Soviet national policies despised the Gaelic and Ukrainian languages, respectively, and considered them “peasant” and unsuitable for the modern world.
The former USSR was more reminiscent of the Ottoman Empire than any Western one. Neither Turkey nor Russia had formed national states at the time of the creation of the empire; moreover, the colonized lands were closely adjacent to the territories of the metropolises. Tsarist Russia, the USSR and the Ottoman Empire did not contribute to the formation of the Russian and Turkish nations. On the contrary: all three mentioned states erased the distinction between the core people (from which the Russian and Turkish nations were supposed to arise) and the rest of the empire. The imperial Russian (Soviet) or Ottoman one prevailed over the narrower ethnic identity.
Thanks to the efforts of the nationalist Kemal Atatürk, the Turkish nation-state emerged after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. But after the collapse of the tsarist empire, the Russians did not create their own independent state. Instead, in 1922, Russia imposed the idea of the Soviet Union on the former colonial borderlands. The center of this state (Moscow) since 1934 returned to the tsarist national policy aimed at merging imperial territorial (Soviet) and ethnic (Russian) identities.
In the second half of 1991, all union republics separated from the USSR, adopting declarations of sovereignty. The RSFSR had to come to terms with this. Russian leaders wanted to maintain a confederal union of independent states in the post-Soviet space, in which Russia would continue to dominate the political, military, economic and cultural spheres. However, this understanding of the CIS differed sharply from the idea of a “civilized divorce” that Ukraine supported - for it, independence was an absolute value.
Throughout the 90s, the Russian Federation wavered between the ideas of its own national state and a confederation with the former “union republics”. But the latter see in such a confederation a new version of subordination, and not an equal union, so it does not find support among the ruling elite even in such pro-Russian states as Armenia and Kazakhstan.
In Ukraine and Belarus, the goal of the policy of the imperial center was the complete assimilation of Ukrainians and Belarusians, who were considered as branches of a single Russian tribe. In the attitude of the imperial authorities (both tsarist and Soviet) towards Kazakhstan there was much more pure colonialism than in relation to Ukraine and Belarus: they were considered “Russians” (Eastern Slavs), and therefore not “alien”.
Ukraine and Belarus have received a difficult colonial legacy, from which they are unlikely to ever completely free themselves. The Russian language was the language of progress (urbanization, industrialization, science and technology), as well as the language of power. The Ukrainian and Belarusian languages were considered local dialects, which would be replaced by the Russian language once both of these peoples were assimilated into a single Russian nation. Ukrainians and Belarusians absorbed world culture through the mediation of the Russian language, while the Ukrainian and Belarusian languages lost their future and were left to die in village huts.
After 1934, Soviet historiography largely returned to the model of the history of the tsarist empire. Having read such a story, “the king himself would have been pleased.” This historiography served the imperial national policy of the Communist Party, developing and imposing a new historical mythology to unite all nations around the Russian “big brother”.
By the mid-50s, Soviet historiography with its myths had gone full circle back to the Russian-imperial model. Thus, after several revisions, Soviet historiography turned the Soviet version of Ukrainian-Russian relations into an exact copy of the one officially adopted in tsarist times. In 1954, “Theses on Reunification” (for the 300th anniversary of the Treaty of Pereyaslavl in 1654 between the Zaporozhye Sich and Muscovy) largely repeated the schemes of the “official national policy” of Nicholas I, first formulated in the 30s of the 19th century (for example, in the published in 1837, “Russian History” by Nikolai Ustryalov).
The fundamental points of the historical myth of Soviet historiography were the following:
(1) The superiority of the “Great Russians” (“big brothers”) over everyone else.
(2) The absence of national hostility between Russians and non-Russians, both in the past and in the present.
(3) Russia's dominance over Ukraine and Belarus was not the result of "conquest", but a "return" to the tutelage of the "Tsar-Father".
(4) Non-Russian peoples were not conquered, but joined to the Russian and Soviet empires only through “unifications” and “reunifications”.
(5) “Unification” and “reunification” gave mostly positive results and in any case were the “lesser evil” (for example, for Central Asia, “uniting” with Russia was “better” than submitting to Britain, for Belarus it was “better” submit to Russia than to Poland).
(6) The actions of nationalists in the colonies against the empire did not correspond to the desires of the local peoples, who only dreamed of merging in an embrace with the Russian “big brother.”
(7) Extreme centralization of management was declared a progressive step.
(8) The non-Russian peoples of the USSR are unable to create their own independent states.
(9) The Russian civilizing mission brought many benefits to neighboring peoples.
According to the new national policy of the USSR (versions of 1947 and 1954), Ukrainians and Belarusians were declared to belong to a single historical community, whose name is “Russian people”. They are not separate ethnic groups, but local branches of the Russian tribe. Therefore, an independent state for them is an unnatural phenomenon; it can only exist “temporarily”, until “unification” with Russia.
Soviet historiography, with its Russocentrism, limited the common historical memory and self-awareness of all peoples within the USSR to an understanding of their ethnographic specificity as geographical units of Great Russia. In Ukraine and Belarus, this Tsarist-Soviet historiography transformed the historical memory and national consciousness of the population into ethnographic local patriotism, which did not contradict Soviet-Russian patriotism.
2. History and national self-determination in the post-Soviet space
National historiography and nation formation
History is never truly objective. According to Jonathan Friedman, “conscious politics is about connecting the present to a life-affirming past. Therefore, the past is built in accordance with the aspirations of those who write history textbooks today.” Consequently, “all history, including modern historiography, is mythology,” for “history is a reflection of modernity in the past”*.
/* Russian and Soviet historian Mikhail Pokrovsky (1868-1932) argued the same thing: “History is politics thrown back into the past.” – Note edit./
It is impossible to form a new national identity that unites the population without relying on historical myths. Through myths, an understanding of a common destiny awakens; they “emphasize unity in the fight against enemies, and more clearly delineate boundaries.” To revive and invent a new “imagined community,” nationalists always look to the past. Anthony D. Smith writes:
“Without myths, collective memory and symbols that differentiate between community members and “foreigners”, without a cultural elite that develops and explains myths, a real ethnic group cannot exist”... “Myths give a cultural community a sense of significance and meaningfulness, a sense of belonging to an organized to the people."
And the colonialists strive to erase historical memory, and along with it, national consciousness, in order to thus simplify the assimilation of the “natives”. Therefore, the revival of historical memory, the renewal of national historiography is closely connected with the revival of national consciousness in opposition to oneself - the “Other” (the former metropolis). Accordingly, the question of who “belongs” the past is the question of who, in any historical period, is able to define himself and the “Other”.
The majority of the population of the former colony welcomes a rethinking of the past, while the national minority may have serious problems with identification. For example, it is difficult for Russians to get used to the fact that in Ukraine, Moldova, Latvia, Estonia and Kazakhstan they have become a national minority (in Belarus they have merged with ruling elite titular nation). In addition, previous Russian policies are no longer viewed in a positive light in the newly created independent states.
After a period when their former masters made them think that they themselves were incapable of anything without the help of their “big brother,” national elites in the former Soviet republics are striving to regain their sense of self-worth. And for this it is necessary to put an end to national discrimination and get rid of the inferiority complex instilled by the imperial authorities.
The main thing in regaining self-respect is to prove the right to one’s own national history. As Gomi Bgabga argues, “the purpose of colonial discourse is to show that the colonized population, by virtue of its racial identity, is composed of degenerates, in order to thus justify conquest and establish its own system of government and education.” The colonialist imposes on the “conquered people” his vision of their history, because this is one of the methods of “mastery, control and domination over various spheres of activity.”
If the political leadership of a former colony (as in the Belarusian case) does not believe that their country was a colony during the imperial era, then there is no reason for them to abandon traditional imperial historiography. Ukraine, which is building a truly independent state, rejected Soviet historiography, which glorifies the “big brother” and does not recognize the right of Ukrainians to independence. In contrast, Belarus, which has been striving for unification with Russia for more than a decade, has used Soviet-era historiography all this time - at least at the official level.
In post-colonial states, the ruling elite sets historians the task of “proving” the right of the indigenous population to their own history. Without a national history, they will remain passive objects of political processes, and their national consciousness will continue to be shaped by former colonialists. Distortion and reinterpretation of the history of colonized countries is an important aspect colonial policy. And it concerned both the former USSR and Africa and Asia:
“Ultimately, the colonial authorities sought to convince the indigenous people that the colonizer had brought light into their darkness” (G. Bgabga)
In post-Soviet countries is coming a painful struggle over who should set the tone in the cultural policy of the newly independent states: “nativists” or “assimilated”*. These groups have different views on the formation of the nation, on the content of national history and mythology. “Nativists” see the colonial past exclusively in dark colors. The “assimilated”, if they criticize it, do so selectively; the communists, for example, view this time as a “golden age” that is not subject to criticism.
/* Nativists - from the English word “native”: local, indigenous, native. – Note edit./
It is possible that “nativists” will have to compromise with the “assimilated”, share power with them, and cultural supremacy will not belong to either one or the other. Ukraine provides an example of a compromise between “nativists” (Ukrainophiles) and “assimilated” (Russophiles).
Formation of Nations in the Former USSR: Reclaiming the Past
The Soviet Union left the 15 states that emerged on its territory with confused ideas about national identity. Ukrainians and Belarusians suffered the most from Russification and denationalization, as they sought to be completely assimilated into Soviet imperial Russia. Of the 15 states, only four - the three Baltic states (Lietuva, Latvia, Estonia) and Armenia - had consolidated national communities. In other countries, the population has not yet acquired the characteristic features of what political scientists and anthropologists call collective self-identification (national self-awareness). Therefore, in the process of “transition from empire” for post-Soviet states, the formation of a national civil community and the establishment of statehood institutions play an extremely important role.
According to many Western scientists, the post-Soviet states found themselves in a stalemate: on the one hand, “remnants of empire,” on the other, “underdeveloped democracy,” and on the third, “underformed nations.”
In the post-Soviet era, the Soviet identity inherited from the USSR did not disappear, although it was revalued. The newly independent countries inherited a difficult legacy, which predetermined the direction, pace and content of state and nation-building. According to Basinger, different cultural identities “necessarily oppose each other, are included in each other, are superimposed on one another,” since state borders often do not coincide with the areas of national identity.”
In many post-Soviet countries the content of the “national idea” is still unclear. Who will set the tone in the culture of the state depends on what form it takes. Since the Russian Federation became the legal successor of the USSR, it, by definition, also became the heir to the empire. Meanwhile, in the national myths that form the foundation of states and give integrity to their national ideas, the former invader acts as the main antagonist.
In determining the center, the titular culture (that is, “cultural hegemony”), the state (official) language, state symbols, and its own historiography, each state is inevitably influenced by its past. All post-Soviet countries inherited the ethnocultural understanding of nations from Soviet nationality policy. Each republic (with the exception of the RSFSR) was considered the homeland of its titular ethnic group, where - in theory - this ethnic group should set the tone, and its language should have official status.
Post-Soviet states cannot approach the following issues dispassionately:
- who should play a decisive role in determining a given political community: only the titular nation or the titular nation and Russians;
— which national historiography to choose;
— whether the former metropolis is a hostile “Other”;
— how many official languages to have (only your own or also Russian);
— what national symbols to choose (flag, anthem, coat of arms, names of government bodies, currency, etc.).
Post-Soviet countries are now looking for their “lost” history in pre-imperial times in order to prove that they too had their own “golden age”, that the past confirms their right to their own independent state. This is especially significant when territorial disputes remain between the former metropolis and the colony. Every nation needs to understand its common historical roots in order to see the germs of national unity in the distant past.
In the USSR, non-Russians were taught that they did not need independence, that they always wanted only one thing - to unite with the Russian “big brother”. Therefore, all attempts to restore independence were considered “treason,” because they destroyed this unity.
Residents of post-colonial countries are divided along religious, regional and class lines. Often only the intellectual elite shares the power-creative concept of nation formation (understood as an “imagined community”). As for the rest of the population, they identify themselves with their small locality and show no commitment to the newly formed nation-state. Both in the Third World and in the countries of the former USSR, the process of nation and state formation is slowed down by the fact that it goes hand in hand with decolonization.
In post-Soviet countries, the national state is built on the basis of an inherited pseudo-state (the former “administrative-ethnographic district”). In them, as in others in post-colonial countries, the “transition from empire” has four components:
(1) nation formation;
(2) state building;
(3) democratization;
(4) creation of a market economy.
Civilized nationalism and national unity help overcome the disunity of society that once contributed to their conquest.
Empires destroy the cultural foundations of colonies to the greatest extent. In our case, the culture of the titular nations in Ukraine and Belarus. Here the indigenous population en masse became Russified or became bilingual. Jerry Smolich writes:
“Social groups can be divided into separate cultural communities precisely on the basis of core values. If a group loses its core values, the result is that it disintegrates as a community capable of maintaining its unity over generations.”
When these core values (language, culture, national history, collective memory) are eroded, when national identity is under threat, then cultural life takes on special significance. It was on the basis of national culture that peoples united to resist the empire. In the 1980s, popular movements in the three Baltic countries, Ukraine and Belarus, Moldova, Georgia and Armenia arose in the wake of the struggle for their national and general democratic rights, because Soviet imperial policies threatened their cultures and languages.
The danger was increased by the resettlement of Russians to the non-Russian republics of the former USSR. Moscow sent Russian immigrants in large numbers to Latvia and Estonia, Ukraine and Belarus, Moldova and Kazakhstan. In the 80s, the titular nation made up less than half of the population in Kazakhstan, a little more than 50% in Latvia.
In the post-colonial states of the former USSR, the elite and the common people are often separated by culture, language, regional differences, and different foreign policy orientations. Some remain faithful to their native culture, others have assimilated into the culture of the former metropolis - Russia. The ideological split between “nativists” and “assimilated” is obvious in the examples of Ukraine and Belarus. Soviet national and economic policies led to the disunity of the titular nations in these countries and created a situation where the majority of the population is Russian-speaking.
In Belarus, the colonial legacy turned out to be so strong that A.G. Lukashenko, having become president, tried to reunite the country with the former empire. This is the only example in recent history when a former colony sought to return to the rule of the metropolis. As for Lukashenko himself, he, with his Soviet mentality of “Russia’s younger brother,” did not see a contradiction in such a policy, because he believed that there were no significant national-ethnic differences between Belarus and Russia. The Belarusian case (positive assessment of colonization) is an anomalous phenomenon in post-colonial states.
3. National identity in the post-Soviet space: historical aspect
Ukraine
The political “thaw” of the second half of the 80s made it possible to discuss previously taboo topics, including in historiography. As a result, national historical figures who were previously represented only in black began to be partially whitened; secondly, historians began to ask questions “why?” and “who is to blame”?
In addition, an interesting trend emerged: historians of national orientation predominantly came from a more nationally conscious Western Ukraine. One of the reasons for this is the predominance of immigrants from Western Ukraine among the Ukrainian diaspora. They finance the republication of previously banned books on the history of Ukraine or write new ones themselves. First published in 1989 and since then reprinted three times, the book “History of Ukraine” by Canadian historian Orest Subtelny has sold a total circulation of 800 thousand copies in Ukrainian and Russian and has become the most popular history textbook.
In the late 80s and early 90s, there was a rehabilitation of Ukrainian writers, intellectuals, political and historical figures. The Writers' Union created a commission headed by Dmitry Pavlychk to explore the “blank spots” in Ukrainian history. From the pages of the Ukrainian press there were calls to improve the research and description of the history of Ukraine - which was not at all welcomed by the reactionaries from the Communist Party of Ukraine. But the dam broke, and the Communist Party could do nothing. Ukrainian historians referred to their Russian colleagues, who were allowed to rehabilitate their historians and return to a clearly imperial Russian historiography. In 1988, the 12-volume “History of the Russian State” by N.M. was republished for 100,000 copies. Karamzin, where Russian history is viewed in a great-power way, and Ukrainians and Belarusians are considered branches of a single “Russian people.”
Informal associations, political parties, and popular fronts began to debunk Russian-Soviet historical myths; at the same time they were increasingly criticized by intellectuals as well as national communists. Founded in March 1989, the Ukrainian Memorial Society sought to revive historical memory and influence the consciousness of the people through revealing the “blank spots” of Soviet history. For the first time, Soviet holidays were rethought.
From 1986 to 1991, the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine increased the share of Ukrainian topics in its research from 57 to 90%, and included in their circle the period of Kievan Rus, which previously was only allowed to study by Russian historians. But the wealth of the revived national historiography reached a wide audience only in 1990-91, when the state authorities and the media began to speak the language of the opposition. The expansion of the topic of national historiography and the return to it began much faster after Ukraine gained independence in January 1992.
When Ukrainians claim that they are building their sovereignty on the foundation of a “thousand-year tradition,” they mean that medieval Kievan Rus should be considered the first proto-Ukrainian state. It is clear that this puts Russian and Western historians in a difficult position, who traditionally adhered to the imperial stereotypes of the 18th-19th centuries: they say, “Kievan Rus” was the first “Russian” state. Without Kievan Rus, Russia turns out to be younger than Ukraine*.
/* This is why Russian President D.N. Medvedev initiated a wide range of official events to celebrate the 2012 anniversary: 1150 years of Russia. The appearance of Rurik and his squad in the area of Staraya Ladoga was taken as the starting point. This allows us to emphasize the antiquity of “our” state tradition without mentioning the princes of Kyiv. – Approx. edit./
Anthropologist K. Wonder emphasizes how important history plays for post-colonial Ukraine:
“History offers rich deposits of raw materials to create a post-Soviet national culture and prove our right to statehood. New historical myths, new versions of history, set out in historical works, are the cornerstone on which the new Ukrainian state is trying to strengthen a national feeling based on a common historical past in a country with a very diverse, and also politically passive, population.”
In the new national mythology, Ukraine appears as a European peace-loving state that became a victim of foreign conquests (from Poland and Russia). It has a tradition of democratic Cossack institutions, as well as a long history confirming its right to independence. The main lesson of Ukrainian history is that the Moscow-induced famine of 1932-33, which claimed 7 million lives, the Chernobyl disaster of 1986 and other tragedies happened only because Ukraine was not a sovereign state at the time.
Thus, independence is seen as an undoubted good, and the intellectual and power elite glorify it as the only opportunity to avoid a repetition of past tragedies. History also plays a significant role in defending the ancestral right of Ukrainians to their lands when other states, especially Russia, begin to challenge it.
Teaching and popularizing Ukrainian history are integral to the formation of a nation and state. History not only gives Ukrainians a sense of connection with their ancestors, but also seeks to unite the entire population into a single national community. Every year on August 24, Ukrainian Independence Day is celebrated in Kyiv not only with a military parade, but also with a theatrical performance showing the continuity of the newly formed state with the previous 1000-year history.
After the name of the “German spy”, “bourgeois nationalist” Mykhailo Grushevsky, a historian of the early twentieth century and an elder of Ukrainian historiography, was trampled into the mud for five decades, his rehabilitation has become an extremely important task. With independence, the historical scheme proposed by Grushevsky became the official line. Now it is officially stated that the significance of Grushevsky’s figure lies in his commitment to the Ukrainian “national revival.” He developed the concept of the historical development of the Ukrainian people. “The History of Ukraine-Rus” by Grushevsky in 11 volumes (which Western historians of Russia ignored, and Soviet historians discredited in every possible way) is the “historical Bible of the Ukrainian people”...
Ukraine is building a civil nation, the roots of which are in the culture, history and language of the titular ethnic group, that is, Ukrainians. In teaching history, the Ukrainian education system throughout the country (including Crimea) is based on national historiography. The content of school textbooks is the same for all regions of the country. School textbooks instill in children respect for the Ukrainian language, state symbols, national traditions and values, as well as tolerance towards other peoples. At school, Ukrainian history is studied earlier than world history.
The assessments of Ukrainian historians, as well as the content of school textbooks, have changed primarily on seven key issues:
1. Kievan Rus is considered either as an entirely proto-Ukrainian state, or as an entity to whose heritage Ukrainians have a preferential right. The state symbol of Kievan Rus was the trident, and the currency was the hryvnia (an additional argument in favor of the 1000-year-old tradition of statehood).
2. The Pereyaslavl Treaty of 1654 is no longer considered a “reunification” of two branches of one people, but a confederal treaty of equals. Ukraine (more precisely, the Ukrainian Cossacks) was forced to it by Poland’s reluctance to recognize Rus' (Ukraine) as the third member of the Polish-Lithuanian Confederation.
3. Tsarist power is assessed purely negatively, because it brought serfdom, the liquidation of the national elite and denationalization to Ukraine.
4. Austrian domination in Galicia is described more positively, because it allowed the formation of the Ukrainian nation.
5. The Ukrainian People's Republic, the Hetmanate and the Directory in the period 1917-1921 were declared legitimate attempts to create their own state.
6. Stalinism is called the initiator of an open war against the Ukrainian language, culture, and national elite. The artificially caused famine of 1932-33 is recognized as genocide of Ukrainians.
7. P Nationalist artists from the Ukrainian Insurgent Army during World War II are portrayed as fighters against both the Nazis and the communists. However, for Ukrainian post-Soviet historiography this is the most controversial and difficult period.
Belarus
Belarusians also claimed that they were building their independence on the foundation of a “centuries-old tradition of sovereignty.” In 1991-1994, a program was launched in Belarus national revival through rethinking the past from a national position. Russia was no longer portrayed as a liberator, but as a beast of prey; those who fought against Moscow, returned from oblivion, were celebrated as national heroes.
D. Sanford expressed the idea that “the younger the state, the greater the likelihood of a “golden age” appearing in its new historiography.” This was the period of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which included all of Belarus and where the Belarusian language and Belarusian laws had the status of state ones. In 1991-95, Belarus officially used the coat of arms of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania - Pahonia.
Since 1991, national historiography has sought to revive the legendary past, emphasizing unbreakable connection Belarus with Western Europe, its difference from Russia and its “glorious” history. As a result, historiography has become a field of struggle between “nativists” and “assimilated” for the national identity of Belarusians. During the three years preceding the election in 1994 as President A.G. Lukashenko, Belarusian historiography was distinguished by its anti-Soviet and anti-Russian orientation. She negatively assessed Russian imperial policy since the end of the 18th century, because it contributed to the denationalization of Belarus.
In 1991, “A Brief Essay on the History of Belarus” by Vsevolod Ignatovsky (1926) was republished in Minsk. Like Grushevsky’s “History of Ukraine-Rus,” this book depicts the history of Belarus with its inherent national identity, which is fundamentally different from Russia’s. The “heroes” returned to Belarusian history after 1991 fought not only against the Teutonic Knights, Tatars and Poles, but also against the Muscovites (Russians). They seemed to call for a return to Europe, showing the difference between the Belarusian national character and the Russian one. This is how he described the tasks of secondary education in 1991-94. one Belarusian scientist:
“The study of Belarusian history in grades 5-11 should contribute to the national-cultural revival of the Belarusian ethnic group through familiarization with the unique historical path, material and spiritual culture of the (Belarusian) people, assessment of their national identity and values in the context of Slavic, European and world culture” .
Election in July 1994 as President A.G. Lukashenko turned Belarusian historiography back into the Russophile-Soviet direction. Lukashenko decided to abandon new history textbooks written after 1991 due to their alleged “nationalist bias.” Having rejected the achievements of the national historical school, he returned Soviet history textbooks in order to level out the differences between Belarusians and Russians and to justify his idea of unifying the country with the former metropolis. Many Belarusian writers protested against “this attempt to reverse the river of history, an attack on the spiritual and intellectual freedom of our people.” But Lukashenko remained unshakable for a long time, because he saw a return to the imperial-Soviet historiography of the 1934 model as a way to ensure support for his policy aimed at creating a Belarusian-Russian union.
All research that was objectionable to the authorities was stopped. “Independent historians today are looked upon as oppositionists,” chided one author. Deputy Prime Minister V. Zametalin warned that “provocative” materials will be erased from textbooks on the history of Belarus, because the “nationalist opposition” supports alternative historiography that condemns the repressions of the 30s against Belarusian culture.
Here are the main ideological postulates of Russophile pro-imperial Belarusian historiography:
1. Self-determination of Belarusians is associated with the Russian space, and not with Western Europe. The role of Belarusians in the history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania is kept silent. As S. Burant notes, “those who want to link the fate of Belarus with Russia have little interest in Vilnya, the Vilna region, or the Belarusian heritage of the Grand Duchy.”
2. Persecution of the Belarusian language and culture both under the tsarist regime (for example, the destruction of the Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church in the 30s of the 19th century, the ban on the Belarusian language in 1866) and under the Soviets (for example, massacres in the BSSR in 1937-41) is ignored.
3. Soviet authority supposedly was “favorable” for Belarus.
4. Before the formation of the USSR, Belarus did not exist. Therefore, the basis of Belarusian statehood is Soviet Belarus, first proclaimed in 1919.
5. In the former USSR, Belarus was the “little sister” of Russia.
6. Russians are again portrayed only as “liberators”, but not as invaders or colonizers.
7. In 1995, instead of national symbols, slightly modified Soviet symbols were returned.
8. Belarus was one of the most “educated” regions of the USSR.
9. The Belarusian language is looked down upon as a village speech. If a person chooses Russian as his native language, then this is considered an indicator of “progress”.
conclusions
In 13 of the 14 non-Russian republics of the former Union, a “farewell to the empire” is taking place, which includes the construction and consolidation of national states. This article examines examples of four post-Soviet states*.
/* The examples of Moldova and Kazakhstan are not of particular interest to our readers, therefore they were removed during editing - Note edit.
(1) Nation formation in three of them (with the exception of Belarus) is carried out according to the liberal model and is combined with the construction of a civil national community.
(2) Belarus took a different path, since state power here ended up in the hands of “assimilated” - Russian-speaking “Soviet” people. They tried to conduct an unprecedented experiment in integrating the colony back into the former empire - Russia *./* As we see now, this experiment completely failed. – Red./
(3) “Farewell to empire” in post-Soviet states is most reminiscent of the experience of post-colonial countries in Africa and Asia.
(4) Ukraine and Kazakhstan are “returning” to the national historiography that was once destroyed by the empire. In Belarus, Lukashists argued that there was no “colonization” and that Russia was a good “big brother.”
(5) Russia did not create its own national state until the formation of the empire. Only the collapse of the Soviet empire gave the Russian Federation a chance to become a national state.
But in Russia, a leader has not yet emerged who would make a sharp break with the imperial past and make a choice in favor of a national state. The Russian leadership cannot decide whether to be Russia nation state, or head new union and claim the role of a “great state”, or combine the first and second. The Tsarist and Soviet empires left Russians with a deep post-imperial crisis of self-identification associated with the search for an answer to the question - where is “Russia” now?
So, our main idea is that rethinking the past, reviving national history and collective memory play a fundamental role in “farewell to the empire” and overcoming the colonial legacy.
In post-Soviet states, the return of national history occurs simultaneously with the rejection of the Tsarist-Soviet imperial historical models that deprived these nations of the past, present and future. The new national historiography seeks to prove the right of newly formed states to independence, turning to the “golden age” in pre-imperial history. She rejects the image of her nation as a “little brother” imposed by the empire, and her culture as “lower,” provincial. Only in Belarus there is still no “transition from empire”, an integral part of which is radical changes in national historiography.
The development of integration processes in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is a direct reflection of the internal political and socio-economic problems of the member states. Existing differences in the structure of the economy and the degree of its reform, the socio-economic situation, and the geopolitical orientation of the Commonwealth states determine the choice and level of their socio-economic and military-political interaction. Currently, within the CIS, integration “based on interests” is truly acceptable and effective for the newly independent states (NIS). The fundamental documents of the CIS also contribute to this. They do not endow this international legal association of states as a whole, or its individual executive bodies with supranational powers, and do not determine effective mechanisms for implementing decisions made. The form of participation of states in the Commonwealth practically does not impose any obligations on them. Thus, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Council of Heads of State and the Council of Heads of Government of the CIS, any state included in it can declare its disinterest in a particular issue, which is not considered an obstacle to decision-making. This allows each state to choose forms of participation in the Commonwealth and areas of cooperation. Despite the fact that in recent years bilateral economic relations have been established between the former Soviet republics and now prevail, associations of individual states (unions, partnerships, alliances) have emerged in the post-Soviet space within the CIS: the Union of Belarus and Russia - the “two”, the Central Asian Economic Community Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan - “four”; The customs union of Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is the “five”, the alliance of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova is “GUAM”.
These “multi-format” and “multi-speed” integration processes reflect the current realities in the post-Soviet states, the interests of the leaders and part of the emerging national-political elite of the post-Soviet states: from intentions to create a single economic space in the Central Asian “four”, a Customs Union in the “five”, to unification of states - in the "two".
Union of Belarus and Russia
On April 2, 1996, the Presidents of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation signed the Treaty establishing the Community . The Treaty declared the readiness to form a deeply integrated politically and economically Community of Russia and Belarus. To create a single economic space, the effective functioning of a common market and the free movement of goods, services, capital and labor, it was planned to synchronize the stages, timing and depth of economic reforms by the end of 1997, to create a unified regulatory framework for eliminating interstate barriers and restrictions in the implementation of equal opportunities for free economic activity, complete the creation of a common customs space with a unified management service, and even unify monetary and budget systems to create conditions for the introduction of a common currency. In the social sphere, it was supposed to ensure equal rights for citizens of Belarus and Russia in obtaining education, in employment and remuneration, in acquiring property, owning, using and disposing of it. It also provided for the introduction of uniform standards of social protection, equalization of conditions for pension provision, the assignment of benefits and benefits to war and labor veterans, disabled people and low-income families. Thus, in implementing the declared goals, the Community of Russia and Belarus was to turn into a fundamentally new interstate association in world practice with the characteristics of a confederation.
After the signing of the Treaty, the working bodies of the Community were formed: the Supreme Council, the Executive Committee, the Parliamentary Assembly, the Commission for Scientific and Technical Cooperation.
The Supreme Council of the Community in June 1996 adopted a number of decisions, including: “On the equal rights of citizens to employment, wages and the provision of social and labor guarantees”, “On the unhindered exchange of residential premises”, “On joint actions to minimize and overcome consequences of the Chernobyl disaster." However, the lack of effective mechanisms for incorporating decisions of Community bodies into the legal acts of states, and the non-binding nature of their implementation by governments, ministries and departments, turns these documents essentially into declarations of intent. Differences in approaches to regulating socio-economic and political processes in states significantly delayed not only the established deadlines for achievement, but also called into question the implementation of the declared goals of the Community.
In accordance with Art. 17 of the Treaty, the further development of the Community and its structure was to be determined by referendums. Despite this, on April 2, 1997, the presidents of Russia and Belarus signed the Treaty on the Union of the two countries, and on May 23, 1997, the Charter of the Union, which reflected in more detail the mechanism of the integration processes of the two states. The adoption of these documents does not imply fundamental changes in state structure Belarus and Russia. So, in Art. 1 of the Treaty on the Union of Belarus and Russia states that “each state party to the Union retains state sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.
The bodies of the Union of Belarus and Russia are not vested with the right to adopt laws direct action. Their decisions are subject to the same requirements as other international treaties and agreements. The Parliamentary Assembly remained a representative body whose legislative acts are advisory in nature.
Despite the fact that the implementation of most of the provisions of the constituent documents of the CIS and the Union of Belarus and Russia objectively requires not only the creation of the necessary conditions, and, consequently, time, on December 25, 1998, the Presidents of Belarus and Russia signed the Declaration on the further unification of Belarus and Russia, the Treaty on equal rights of citizens and the Agreement on creating equal conditions for business entities.
If we assume that all these intentions are not politicking by the leaders of the two states, then their implementation is possible only with the incorporation of Belarus into Russia. Such “unification” does not fit into any of the currently known integration schemes of states or norms of international law. The federal nature of the proposed state means for Belarus a complete loss of state independence and inclusion in the Russian state.
At the same time, the provisions on state sovereignty of the Republic of Belarus form the basis of the country’s Constitution (see preamble, art. 1, 3, 18, 19). The Law “On People's Vote (Referendum) in the Belarusian SSR” of 1991, recognizing the indisputable value of national sovereignty for the future of Belarus, generally prohibits the submission of issues to a referendum that “violate the inalienable rights of the people of the Republic of Belarus to sovereign national statehood” (Article 3) . That is why all intentions about “further unity” of Belarus and Russia and the creation federal state can be regarded as unconstitutional and anti-legal actions aimed at detriment of the national security of the Republic of Belarus.
Even taking into account the fact that for a long time Belarus and Russia were part of one common state, the formation of a mutually beneficial and complementary association of these countries requires not only beautiful political gestures and the appearance of economic reforms. Without establishing mutually beneficial trade economic cooperation, convergence of reform courses, unification of legislation, in other words, without creating the necessary economic, social, legal conditions, it is premature and futile to raise the question of an equal and non-violent unification of the two states.
Economic integration means unifying markets, but not states. Its most important and obligatory prerequisite is the compatibility of economic and legal systems, a certain synchronicity and one-vector nature of economic and political reforms, if any are carried out.
The course towards the accelerated creation of a Customs Union of two states as the first step to accomplish this task, rather than a free trade zone, is a profanation of the objective processes of economic integration of states. Most likely, this is a tribute to economic fashion than the result of a deep understanding of the essence of the phenomena of these processes, the cause-and-effect relationships underlying the market economy. The civilized path to the creation of the Customs Union provides for the gradual abolition of tariff and quantitative restrictions in mutual trade, ensuring a free trade regime without embraces and restrictions, and the introduction of an agreed trade regime with third countries. Then the unification of customs territories is carried out, the transfer of customs control to the external borders of the union, the formation of a unified management of customs authorities. This process is quite lengthy and not easy. It is impossible to hastily announce the creation of the Customs Union and sign the corresponding agreements without proper calculations: after all, the unification of the customs legislation of the two countries, including the coordination of customs duties and excise taxes on a significantly different and therefore difficult to compare range of goods and raw materials, must be gradual and must take into account the possibilities and interests of states, national producers of the most important sectors of the national economy. At the same time, there is no need to fence off new equipment and technologies, high-performance equipment with high customs duties.
Differences in the economic conditions of business, the low solvency of business entities, the duration and disorder of bank payments, different approaches to the implementation of monetary, price and tax policies, the development of general norms and rules in the field of banking also do not allow us to talk not only about the real prospects for the formation of a payment system. union, but even about civilized payment and settlement relations between economic entities of the two states.
The union state of Russia and Belarus exists in 2010 more on paper than in real life. Its survival is possible in principle, but it is necessary to lay a solid foundation for it - to go through all the “missed” stages of economic integration in sequence.
Customs Union
The union of these states began to take shape on January 6, 1995 with the signing of the Agreement on the Customs Union between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus, as well as the Agreement on the Customs Union between the Russian Federation, the Republic of Belarus and the Republic of Kazakhstan on January 20, 1995. The Kyrgyz Republic joined these agreements 29 March 1996. At the same time, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and the Russian Federation signed an Agreement on Deepening Integration in the Economic and Humanitarian Fields. On February 26, 1999, the Republic of Tajikistan joined the agreements on the Customs Union and the said Treaty. In accordance with the Treaty on Deepening Integration in the Economic and Humanitarian Fields, joint integration management bodies were established: the Interstate Council, the Integration Committee (a permanent executive body), and the Interparliamentary Committee. The Integration Committee was assigned in December 1996 also the functions of the executive body of the Customs Union.
The Treaty of the Five Commonwealth States is another attempt to intensify the process of economic integration by creating a single economic space within those Commonwealth states that today declare their readiness for closer economic interaction. This document is a long-term basis for relations for the states that signed it and is of a framework nature, like most documents of this kind in the Commonwealth. The goals proclaimed in it in the field of economics, social and cultural cooperation are very broad, diverse and require a long time for their implementation.
The formation of a free trade regime (zone) is the first evolutionary stage of economic integration. In interactions with partners in this zone, states are gradually moving to trade without the use of import duties. There is a gradual abandonment of the use of non-tariff regulation measures without exceptions and restrictions in mutual trade. The second stage is the formation of the Customs Union. From the point of view of the movement of goods, this is a trade regime in which no internal restrictions are applied in mutual trade, states use a common customs tariff, a general system of preferences and exemptions from it, uniform measures of non-tariff regulation, the same system of application of direct and indirect taxes, There is a process of transition to the establishment of a common customs tariff. The next stage, bringing us closer to a common goods market, is the creation of a single customs space, ensuring the free movement of goods within the boundaries of the common market, implementing a unified customs policy, and ensuring free competition within the customs space.
The Agreement on the establishment of a free trade zone adopted within the Commonwealth on April 15, 1994, providing for the gradual abolition of customs duties, taxes and fees, as well as quantitative restrictions in mutual trade, while preserving the right of each country to independently and independently determine the trade regime in relation to third countries, could serve as a legal basis for the creation of a free trade zone, the development of trade cooperation between Commonwealth states in the conditions of market reform of their economic systems.
However, so far the agreement, even within the framework of individual associations and unions of Commonwealth states, including state parties to the Agreement on the Customs Union, remains unrealized.
Currently, members of the Customs Union practically do not coordinate foreign economic policy and export-import operations in relation to third world countries. Foreign trade, customs, monetary, financial, tax and other types of legislation of the participating states remain unified. The problems of the agreed entry of the Customs Union participants into the World Trade Organization (WTO) remain unresolved. The state's accession to the WTO, within which more than 90% of world trade is carried out, involves the liberalization of international trade by eliminating non-tariff restrictions on market access with a consistent reduction in the level of import duties. Therefore, for states with an unestablished market economy and low competitiveness own goods and services - this should be a fairly balanced and thoughtful step. The entry of one of the member countries of the Customs Union into the WTO requires a revision of many principles of this union and may harm other partners. In this regard, it was assumed that negotiations between individual member states of the Customs Union on accession to the WTO would be coordinated and agreed upon.
Issues of development of the Customs Union should not be dictated by the temporary situation and political ambition leaders of individual states, but should be determined by the socio-economic situation developing in the participating states. Practice shows that the approved pace of formation of the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is completely unrealistic. The economies of these states are not yet ready for the full opening of customs borders in mutual trade and for strict compliance with the tariff barrier in relation to external competitors. It is not surprising that its participants unilaterally change the agreed parameters of tariff regulation not only in relation to products from third countries, but also within the Customs Union, and cannot come to agreed upon principles for levying value added tax.
The transition to the country of destination principle when levying value added tax would make it possible to create identical and equal trading conditions for the member countries of the Customs Union with third world countries, as well as to apply a more rational system of taxation of foreign trade transactions, established by European experience. The destination country principle in levying value added tax means taxation of imports and complete liberation from export taxes. Thus, within each country equal conditions of competitiveness would be created for imported and domestic goods and at the same time real preconditions would be provided for the expansion of its exports.
Along with the gradual formation of the regulatory framework of the Customs Union, cooperation in solving problems in the social sphere is developing. The governments of the member states of the Customs Union signed agreements on the mutual recognition and equivalence of educational documents, academic degrees and titles, and on the provision of equal rights when entering educational institutions. Areas of cooperation have been identified in the field of certification of scientific and scientific-pedagogical workers, creating equal conditions for defending dissertations. It has been established that the movement of foreign and national currencies by citizens of participating countries across internal borders can now be carried out without any restrictions or declarations. For goods transported by them, in the absence of restrictions on weight, quantity and value, customs duties, taxes and fees are not charged. The procedure for money transfers has been simplified.
Central Asian cooperation
On February 10, 1994, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and the Republic of Uzbekistan entered into an Agreement on the Creation of a Single Economic Space. On March 26, 1998, the Republic of Tajikistan joined the Agreement. Within the framework of the Treaty, on July 8, 1994, the Interstate Council and its Executive Committee were created, then the Central Asian Bank for Development and Cooperation. The Economic Cooperation Program until 2000 has been developed, which provides for the creation of interstate consortia in the field of electric power, measures for the rational use of water resources, and the extraction and processing of mineral resources. The integration projects of the Central Asian states go beyond just the economy. New aspects are emerging - political, humanitarian, information and regional security. The Council of Defense Ministers was created. On January 10, 1997, the Treaty of Eternal Friendship was signed between the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Republic of Uzbekistan.
The states of Central Asia have much in common in history, culture, language, and religion. There is a joint search for solutions to regional development problems. However, the economic integration of these states is hampered by the agrarian-raw materials type of their economies. Therefore, the timing of the implementation of the concept of creating a single economic space on the territory of these states will largely be determined by the structural reform of their economies and depend on the level of their socio-economic development.
Alliance of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova (GUAM)
GUAM is a regional organization created in October 1997 by the republics of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova (from 1999 to 2005 the organization also included Uzbekistan). The name of the organization is formed from the first letters of the names of its member countries. Before Uzbekistan left the organization, it was called GUUAM.
Officially, the creation of GUAM begins with the Communiqué on cooperation signed by the heads of Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Georgia at a meeting within the Council of Europe in Strasbourg on October 10-11, 1997. In this document, the heads of state declared their readiness to make every effort to develop economic and political cooperation and spoke out for the need for joint measures aimed at integration into the EU structures. On November 24-25, 1997, following a meeting in Baku of an advisory group of representatives of the Foreign Ministries of four states, a protocol was signed, which officially announced the creation of GUAM. The formation of this alliance was possible. explain by certain political and economic reasons. Firstly, this is the need to combine efforts and coordinate activities in the implementation of projects of the Eurasian and Trans-Caucasian transport corridors. Secondly, this is an attempt to establish joint economic cooperation. Thirdly, this is a unification of positions in the field of political interaction. within the OSCE and in relation to NATO, and among themselves. Fourthly, this is cooperation in the fight against separatism and regional conflicts. In the strategic partnership of the states of this alliance, along with geopolitical considerations, the coordination of trade and economic cooperation within the framework of GUAM allows Azerbaijan to find permanent oil consumers and a convenient route for its export, Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova to gain access to alternative sources of energy resources and become an important link in their transit.
The ideas of preserving a single economic space included in the concept of the Commonwealth turned out to be unattainable. Most of the Commonwealth's integration projects were not implemented or were only partially implemented (see table No. 1).
The failures of integration projects, especially at the initial stage of the existence of the CIS - the “silent death” of a number of established interstate unions and the “sluggish” processes in currently operating associations represent the result of the impact of disintegration trends existing in the post-Soviet space that accompanied the systemic transformations taking place in the CIS.
Quite interesting is the periodization of transformation processes in the CIS territory proposed by L.S. Kosikova. She proposes to distinguish three phases of transformation, each of which corresponds to the special nature of relations between Russia and other CIS states.
1st phase - the region of the former USSR as the “near abroad” of Russia;
2nd phase - the CIS region (without the Baltics) as a post-Soviet space;
3rd phase - the CIS region as a competitive zone of the world market.
The proposed classification is based primarily on selected qualitative characteristics, assessed by the author over time. But it is curious that these qualitative characteristics also correspond to certain quantitative parameters of trade and economic relations in the region in general and in Russia’s relations with the former republics in particular, and the moments of transition from one qualitative phase to another record abrupt changes in quantitative parameters.
First phase: The region of the former USSR as the “near abroad” of Russia (December 1991-1993-late 1994)
This phase in the development of the region is associated with the rapid transformation of the former union republics that were part of the USSR into new independent states (NIS), 12 of which formed the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
The initial moment of the phase is the dissolution of the USSR and the formation of the CIS (December 1991), and the final moment is the final collapse of the “ruble zone” and the introduction into circulation of the national currencies of the CIS countries. Initially, Russia called it the CIS, and most importantly, psychologically perceived it as its “near abroad,” which was quite justified in the economic sense.
The “near abroad” is characterized by the beginning of the formation of real, rather than declared, sovereignty of 15 new states, some of which united in the CIS, and the three Baltic republics - Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania - began to be called the Baltic states and from the very beginning declared their intention to get closer with Europe. It was a time of international legal recognition of states, the conclusion of fundamental international treaties and the legitimization of leading elites. All countries paid great attention to external and “decorative” signs of sovereignty - the adoption of Constitutions, the approval of coats of arms, anthems, new names of their republics and their capitals, which did not always coincide with the usual names.
Against the background of rapid political sovereignization, economic ties between the former republics developed as if by inertia, in the residual mode of functioning of the single national economic complex of the USSR. The main cementing element of the entire economic structure of the near abroad was the “ruble zone”. The Soviet ruble circulated both in domestic economies and in mutual settlements. Thus, inter-republican ties did not immediately become interstate economic relations. All-Union property also functioned; the division of resources between the new states took place according to the principle “everything on my territory belongs to me.”
Russia was recognized leader in the CIS at the initial stage of development both in politics and economics. Not a single issue of international importance concerning the newly independent states was resolved without her participation (for example, the question of the division and payment of the external debt of the USSR, or the withdrawal nuclear weapons from the territory of Ukraine). The Russian Federation was perceived by the international community as the “legal successor of the USSR.” In 1992, the Russian Federation assumed 93.3% of the total debt of the USSR accumulated by that time (more than $80 billion) and repaid it steadily.
Trade relations in the “ruble zone” were built in a special way; they differed significantly from those in international practice: there were no customs borders, no export-import taxes in trade, interstate payments were made in rubles. There were even mandatory state deliveries of products from Russia to the CIS countries (state orders in foreign trade). Preferential prices were established for these products, significantly lower than world prices. Statistics of trade between the Russian Federation and the CIS countries in 1992-1993. was conducted not in dollars, but in rubles. Due to the obvious specificity of economic relations between the Russian Federation and other CIS countries, we consider it appropriate to apply the term “near abroad” specifically to this period.
The most important contradiction in interstate relations between Russia and the CIS countries in 1992-1994. there was an explosive combination of the political sovereignty recently acquired by the republics with the limitation of their economic sovereignty in the monetary sphere. The declared independence of the new states was also shattered by the powerful inertia of production and technological ties formed within the framework of the all-Union (Gosplan) scheme for the development and deployment of productive forces. Fragile and unstable economic unity in a region embroiled in disintegration processes due to liberal market reforms in Russia, was supported almost exclusively by financial donations from our country. During that period, the Russian Federation spent billions of rubles on maintaining mutual trade and on the functioning of the “ruble zone” in the conditions of the growing political sovereignty of the former republics. However, this unity fueled unfounded illusions about the possibility of rapid “reintegration” of the CIS countries into some kind of new Union. In the fundamental documents of the CIS period 1992-1993. contained the concept of a “single economic space”, and its founders saw the prospects for the development of the Commonwealth itself as an economic union and a new federation of independent states.
In practice, Russia's relations with its neighbors in the CIS, starting from the end of 1993, developed more in the spirit of the forecast made by Z. Brzezinski (“The CIS is a mechanism for civilized divorce”). The new national elites set a course to break away from Russia, and Russian leaders in those years viewed the CIS as a “burden” that interfered with the rapid implementation of liberal-type market reforms, at the start of which Russia surpassed its neighbors. In August 1993, the Russian Federation introduced a new Russian ruble into circulation, abandoning the further use of Soviet rubles in domestic circulation and in settlements with partners in the CIS. The collapse of the ruble zone prompted the introduction of national currencies into circulation in all independent states. But in 1994, there was still a hypothetical possibility of creating a single currency area in the CIS on the basis of the new Russian ruble. Such projects were actively discussed, six CIS countries were ready to enter a single currency zone with Russia, but potential participants in the “new ruble zone” failed to come to an agreement. Russian side The partners' claims seemed unfounded, and the Russian government did not take this step, guided by short-term financial considerations, and not at all by a long-term integration strategy. As a result, the new currencies of the CIS countries were initially “tied” not to the Russian ruble, but to the dollar.
The transition to the use of national currencies gave rise to additional difficulties in trade and mutual settlements, caused the problem of non-payments, and new customs barriers began to appear. All this finally turned the “residual” inter-republican ties in the CIS into interstate economic relations, with all the ensuing consequences. Disorganization of regional trade and payments in the CIS reached its peak in 1994. During 1992-1994. Russia's trade turnover with its CIS partners decreased by almost 5.7 times, amounting to $24.4 billion in 1994 (compared to $210 billion in 1991). The share of the CIS in Russia's trade turnover fell - from 54.6 to 24%. The volume of mutual supplies for almost all major product groups has sharply decreased. Particularly painful was the forced reduction in imports of Russian energy resources by many CIS countries, as well as a decrease in mutual supplies of cooperative products as a result of a sharp rise in prices. As we predicted, this shock could not be overcome quickly. The slow restoration of economic ties between Russia and the CIS countries was carried out after 1994 under new exchange conditions - at world prices (or close to them), with settlements in dollars, national currencies and barter.
Economic model of relations between the newly independent states on the scale of the CIS at the initial stage of its existence, it reproduced the model of central-peripheral relations within the former Soviet Union. In conditions of rapid political disintegration, such a model foreign economic relations The Russian Federation with the CIS countries could not be stable and long-term, especially without financial support from the Center - Russia. As a result, it was “exploded” at the time of the collapse of the ruble zone, after which uncontrollable disintegration processes in the economy began.
Second phase: The CIS region as a “post-Soviet space” (from the end of 1994 until approximately 2001-2004)
During this period, the “near abroad” was transformed by most parameters into the “post-Soviet space”. This means that the CIS countries located surrounded by Russia from a special, semi-independent zone of its economic influence gradually became full-fledged foreign economic partners in relation to it. Trade and other economic ties between the former republics began to be built starting in 1994/1995. basically like interstate ones. Russia was able to convert technical loans to balance trade turnover into public debts to the CIS countries and demanded their payment, and in some cases agreed to restructuring.
The region as a post-Soviet space is Russia plus its outer “ring” of CIS countries. In this space, Russia continued to be the “center” of economic relations, to which the economic ties of other countries were mainly confined. In the post-Soviet phase of transformation of the region of the former USSR, two periods are clearly distinguished: 1994-1998. (before default) and 1999-2000. (post-default). And starting from the second half of 2001 and until 2004.2005. There has been a clear transition to a different qualitative state of development in all CIS countries (see below - the third phase). The second phase of development was generally characterized by an emphasis on economic transformation and increased market reforms, although the process of strengthening political sovereignty was still ongoing.
The most pressing problem for the entire region was macroeconomic stabilization. In 1994-1997 The CIS countries solved the problems of overcoming hyperinflation, achieving the stability of national currencies put into circulation, stabilizing production in key industries, and ending the non-payment crisis. In other words, it was necessary to urgently “patch the holes” after the collapse of the single national economic complex of the USSR, and adapt the “fragments” of this complex to the conditions of sovereign existence.
The initial goals of macroeconomic stabilization were achieved in different CIS countries around 1996-1998, in Russia - earlier, by the end of 1995. This had a positive impact on mutual trade: the volume of foreign trade turnover between the Russian Federation and the CIS in 1997 exceeded $30 billion. (an increase of 25.7% compared to 1994). But the period of revival of production and mutual trade was short-lived.
The financial crisis, which began in Russia, has spread to the entire post-Soviet region. The default and sharp devaluation of the Russian ruble in August 1998, the subsequent disruption of trade and monetary and financial relations in the CIS led to a new deepening of disintegration processes. After August 1998, the economic ties of all CIS countries without exception with Russia noticeably weakened. The default demonstrated that the economies of the newly independent states had not yet become truly independent by the second half of the 90s; they remained closely tied to the largest Russian economy, which, during a period of deep crisis, “pulled” all other members of the Commonwealth with it. The economic situation in 1999 was extremely difficult, comparable only to the period 1992-1993. The Commonwealth countries were once again faced with the task of macroeconomic stabilization and strengthening financial stability. They had to be resolved urgently, relying mainly on our own resources and external borrowings.
After the default, there was a new significant decrease in mutual trade turnover in the region, to approximately $19 billion (1999). Only by 2000 it was possible to overcome the consequences of the Russian crisis, and economic growth in most CIS countries contributed to an increase in the volume of mutual trade to $25.4 billion. But in subsequent years, it was not possible to consolidate the positive dynamics of trade turnover due to the sharply accelerated reorientation of trade in the CIS countries to extra-regional markets. In 2001-2002 the volume of trade between Russia and the Commonwealth countries amounted to 25.6-25.8 billion dollars.
The widespread devaluation of national currencies in 1999, combined with measures state support domestic commodity producers had a positive impact on the revival of industries operating on the domestic market, contributed to a reduction in the level of import dependence, and allowed saving foreign exchange reserves. After 2000, post-Soviet countries saw a surge in activity in the adoption of special, short-term anti-import programs. In general, this served as a favorable impetus for the development of small and medium-sized businesses, because the previous pressure of cheap imports on domestic markets has significantly decreased. However, already since 2003, the importance of the factors that stimulated the development of import-substituting industries began to gradually fade. According to the most common assessment of experts, by this time in the CIS region the resources of extensive, “regenerative growth” (E. Gaidar) were almost exhausted.
At the turn of 2003/2004. The CIS countries felt the urgent need to change the reform paradigm. The task arose of transitioning from short-term macroeconomic stabilization programs and from a focus on import substitution to a new industrial policy and deeper structural reforms. The policy of modernization based on innovation, achieving sustainable economic growth on this basis should replace the existing policy of extensive growth.
The course of economic transformations and their dynamics have clearly shown that the influence of the Soviet “economic legacy” in general, and in particular the outdated production and technological component, remains very significant. It restrains economic growth in the CIS. We need a breakthrough into the new economy of the post-industrial world. And this task is relevant for all countries of the post-Soviet region without exception.
As the political and economic independence of the newly independent states strengthened, during the period we are considering (1994 - 2004), Russia's political influence in the CIS gradually weakened. This happened against the backdrop of two waves of economic disintegration. The first, caused by the collapse of the ruble zone, contributed to the fact that from about the mid-90s, the impact of external factors on processes in the CIS increased. The importance of international financial organizations in this region of the world grew - the IMF, the World Bank, which lent to the governments of the CIS countries and allocated tranches for the stabilization of national currencies. At the same time, loans from the West have always been conditional, which has become an important factor influencing the political elites of recipient countries and their choice of direction for reforming their economies. Following Western loans, the penetration of Western investments into the region increased. The policy of the United States, the “midwife of GUAM,” has intensified, aimed at splitting the Commonwealth by forming a subregional grouping of states seeking to break away from Russia. In contrast, Russia created its own “pro-Russian” alliances, first a bilateral one with Belarus (1996), and then a multilateral Customs Union with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
The second wave of disintegration, generated by the financial crisis in the Commonwealth, stimulated the foreign economic reorientation of economic relations of the CIS countries to extra-regional markets. The desire of partners to further distance themselves from Russia, primarily in the economy, has intensified. It was caused by the awareness of external threats, and the desire to strengthen one’s national security, understood, first of all, as independence from Russia in strategically important sectors - energy, transit of energy resources, food complex, etc.
At the end of the 1990s, the CIS space in relation to Russia ceased to be a post-Soviet region, i.e. a region where Russia, although weakened by reforms, dominated, and this fact was recognized by the world community. This was led to: intensification of the processes of economic disintegration; foreign economic and foreign policy reorientation of the Commonwealth countries in the logic of the ongoing process of their sovereignization; active penetration of Western finance and Western companies into the CIS; as well as miscalculations in Russian politics“multi-speed” integration, which stimulated internal differentiation in the CIS.
Around mid-2001, a shift began towards the transformation of the CIS region from the post-Soviet space into a space of international competition. This trend was consolidated in the period 2002-2004. such foreign policy successes of the West as the deployment of American military bases on the territory of a number of Central Asian countries and the expansion of the European Union and NATO to the borders of the CIS. These are milestones for the post-Soviet period, marking the end of the era of Russian dominance in the CIS. After 2004, the post-Soviet space entered the third phase of its transformation, which all countries in the region are now experiencing.
The transition from the stage of political sovereignty of the CIS countries to the stage of strengthening the economic sovereignty and national security of the newly independent states gives rise to disintegration tendencies already at the new stage of development. They lead to interstate demarcation, to a certain extent to “fencing” national economies: Many countries are pursuing a conscious and purposeful policy of weakening economic dependence on Russia. Russia itself is not lagging behind in this, actively forming anti-import production on its territory as a challenge to the threat of destabilizing ties with its closest partners. And since Russia is still the core of the post-Soviet structure of economic relations in the CIS region, trends in economic sovereignty negatively affect mutual trade as an indicator of integration. Therefore, despite economic growth in the region, mutual trade is increasingly curtailed, and the share of the CIS in Russian trade continues to fall, amounting to just over 14% of the total.
So, as a result of the implemented and ongoing reforms, the CIS region has transformed from the “near abroad” of Russia, as it was at the very beginning of the 90s, as well as from the recent “post-Soviet space” into an arena of intense international competition in military-strategic, geopolitical and economic spheres. Russia's partners in the CIS are fully established new independent states, recognized by the international community, with an open market economy involved in the processes of global competition. Based on the results of the past 15 years only five CIS countries were able to reach the level of real GDP recorded in 1990, or even exceed it. These are Belarus, Armenia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan. At the same time, the rest of the CIS states - Georgia, Moldova, Tajikistan, Ukraine - are still very far from achieving the pre-crisis level of their economic development.
Mutual relations between Russia and the CIS countries are beginning to be restructured as the post-Soviet transition period ends. There has been a move away from the “center-periphery” model, which is reflected in Russia’s refusal to provide financial preferences to its partners. In turn, the Russian Federation’s partners are also building their external relations in a new coordinate system, taking into account the vector of globalization. Therefore, the Russian vector in the external relations of all former republics is declining.
As a result of disintegration trends caused by both objective reasons and subjective miscalculations in the Russian policy of “multi-speed” integration, the CIS space appears today as a complexly structured region, with an unstable internal organization, highly susceptible to external influences (see Table No. 2.) .
At the same time, the dominant trend in the development of the post-Soviet region continues to be the “disengagement” of newly independent states and the fragmentation of the once common economic space. The main “watershed” in the CIS now runs along the line of gravity of the Commonwealth states, either to the “pro-Russian” groups, EurAsEC/CSTO, or to the GUAM group, whose members are striving to join the EU and NATO (Moldova - with reservations). The multi-directional nature of the foreign policy of the CIS countries and the increased geopolitical competition between Russia, the USA, the EU and China for influence in this region determine the extreme instability of the currently established intra-regional configurations. And, therefore, we can expect a “reformatting” of the CIS space in the medium term under the influence of internal and foreign policy changes.
We cannot exclude new changes in the composition of the EurAsEC participants (Armenia could join the union as a full member), as well as in GUAM (from which Moldova could leave). It seems quite probable and completely logical for Ukraine to withdraw from the quadripartite agreement on the formation of the SES, since it will actually be transformed into a new Customs Union of “three” (Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan).
The fate of the Union State of Russia and Belarus (USRB) as an independent grouping within the CIS is not yet entirely clear. Let us remind you that the SGRB does not have the official status of an international organization. Meanwhile, the membership of the Russian Federation and Belarus in the SGRB intersects with the simultaneous participation of these countries in the CSTO, EurAsEC and the Common Economic Space (CU - since 2010). Therefore, it can be assumed that if Belarus finally refuses to create a monetary union with Russia on the terms it proposes (on the basis of the Russian ruble and with one emission center - in the Russian Federation), then the question will arise of abandoning the idea of creating a Union State and returning to the form of an interstate union Russia and Belarus. This, in turn, will contribute to the process of merging the Russian-Belarusian union with the EurAsEC. In the event of a sharp change in the internal political situation in Belarus, it may leave both the SGRB and the members of the SES/CU, and join in one form or another the unions of Eastern European states - the “neighbors” of the European Union.
It seems that the basis of regional integration (both political and economic) in the post-Soviet space in the near future will remain the EurAsEC. Experts called the main problem of this association the aggravation of internal contradictions in it due to the entry of Uzbekistan into its membership (since 2005), as well as due to the deterioration of Russian-Belarusian relations. The prospects for the formation of a customs union within the entire EurAsEC have been postponed indefinitely. A more feasible option is to create an integrated “core” within the EurAsEC - in the form of a Customs Union from among the three countries most ready for this - Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. However, Uzbekistan's suspension of membership in the organization may change the situation.
The prospect of once again recreating the Central Asian Union of States looks real, the idea of which is now being actively promoted by Kazakhstan, which claims to be a regional leader.
Russia's sphere of influence in the region, compared to the period of the founding of the Commonwealth of Independent States, has sharply narrowed, which has made the implementation of integration policy extremely difficult. The dividing line of space passes today between two main groups of post-Soviet states:
The 1st group is the CIS countries that gravitate toward the common Eurasian system of security and cooperation with Russia (the CSTO/EurAsEC bloc);
2nd group - CIS member countries gravitating towards the Euro-Atlantic security system (NATO) and European cooperation (EU), which have already actively engaged in interaction with NATO and the EU within the framework of special joint programs and action plans (states participating in the GUAM/SDV associations ).
Fragmentation of the Commonwealth space may lead to the final abandonment of the CIS structure as such and its replacement by structures of regional unions with international legal status.
Already at the turning point of 2004/2005. The problem has become more acute: what to do next with the CIS as an international organization: dissolve or renew? A number of countries at the beginning of 2005 raised the question of dissolving the organization, considering the CIS a “civilized divorce mechanism” that carried out this moment their functions. After two years of work on the CIS reform project, the “group of wise men” proposed a certain set of solutions, but did not close the question of the future of the CIS-12 organization and the areas of cooperation in this multilateral format. The prepared Concept for reforming the Commonwealth was presented at the CIS summit in Dushanbe (October 4-5, 2007). But five out of 12 countries did not support it.
There is an urgent need for new ideas for the Commonwealth, attractive to most countries in the post-Soviet region, on the basis of which this organization was able to consolidate this geopolitical space. If the new CIS does not take place, Russia will lose its status as a regional power, and its international authority will noticeably decline.
This, however, can be completely avoided. Despite the decline in its influence in the region, Russia is still capable of becoming the center of integration processes in the territory of the Commonwealth. This is determined by the continuing importance of Russia as the center of trade gravity in the post-Soviet space. Vlad Ivanenko's research shows that Russia's pull is significantly weaker compared to the leaders of world trade, but its economic mass is quite sufficient to attract Eurasian states to itself. The closest trade ties are with Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, which have firmly entered its orbit; Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan partly experience trade attraction to Russia. These Central Asian states, in turn, are local centers of “gravity” for their small neighbors, respectively, Uzbekistan for Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan for Tajikistan. Ukraine also has its own gravitational force: being attracted to Russia, it serves as a pole of gravity for Moldova. Thus, a chain is being formed that unites these post-Soviet countries into a potential Eurasian Trade and Economic Union.
Thus, in the CIS, conditions objectively exist for the sphere of Russian influence through trade and cooperation to expand beyond the EurAsEC, including among priority economic partners Ukraine, Moldova and Turkmenistan, which for political reasons are currently outside the Russian integration group.
N.A. Baranov
Topic 16. Geopolitics in the post-Soviet space
1. Post-Soviet space and geopolitical priorities of Russia
Russian society has not yet formed a consensus regarding the preferred policy in matters of world order and determining the place that Russia should occupy in the emerging system of international relations. At the same time, the main priorities were identified.
Of primary importance for Russian geostrategy has the perimeter of the borders of the former Soviet Union.
Firstly, for historical and geographical reasons, the near abroad is more significant for Russia's security than for other great powers.
Secondly, the situation of millions of people of Russian culture in neighboring countries is not only a purely internal matter of the governments of these countries, but also a natural basis for the close attention of the Russian state.
Russia's national interests in relations with the independent states of the post-Soviet space are :
1) in their friendly position, regardless of who is in power;
2) in preventing “transit” threats to one’s security that arise outside the post-Soviet space;
3) in internal stability and the absence of conflicts between these countries, fraught with the inclusion of Russia in them.
In relations with each of the post-Soviet states, the implementation of Russian interests should have its own specifics. Strategically, Russia should strive to form a Soviet space of socially balanced, dynamically developing democratic states, forming a belt of good neighborliness and security along the perimeter of its borders .
The priority task of Russia's foreign policy in its near abroad should be economic integration with Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, since these are the states that are the most important for it from a geopolitical point of view.
Cooperation with neighboring countries as a direction of Russian foreign policy promising because it opens up the opportunity for it to become one of the world centers of integration . The realization of this opportunity will largely depend on the attractiveness of Russia itself, its ability to solve internal problems on the basis of a new, post-industrial type of economy.
Russia's relations with the CIS countries should organically integrate into the course towards creating a single economic space with the European Union and forming a partnership with NATO in the field of security . Such positioning can become an additional foreign policy resource for Russia in relations with both the CIS countries and the West, and a factor in strengthening its international status.
Russia’s desire to maintain its influence in the post-Soviet space today collides with the interests of the world’s largest powers : The European Union and the USA are in the west, Turkey, Iran and China are in the east. Indirectly involved in this rivalry are Pakistan and India. The fact is that important transport networks pass through the Eurasian post-Soviet space, which are capable of connecting the industrialized regions of the West with the most mineral-rich, but very remote regions of Eurasia in the east, and this is extremely important from a geopolitical point of view vision. Huge reserves of gas, oil, gold, nickel and other non-ferrous metals are concentrated in the post-Soviet space . In the depths of the regions of Central Asia and the Caspian Sea basin there are reserves of natural gas and oil that exceed the fields of Kuwait, the Gulf of Mexico and the North Sea.
That's why it's so The issue of laying pipelines and means of communication across Eurasia is important. If the main pipelines to the region continue to pass through Russian territory to terminals at Novorossiysk on the Black Sea, the political consequences of this will make themselves felt without any overt show of force on the part of Russia. Most areas of the post-Soviet space will remain politically dependent on Russia, and Moscow will occupy a strong position in deciding how to share the new wealth of Eurasia. Conversely, if new pipelines are laid through the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan and further to the Mediterranean Sea through Turkey, and others stretch through Afghanistan to the Arabian Sea, then there will be no Russian monopoly on access to the wealth of Eurasia.
Political pragmatism of Russia in the near abroad is possible and in the form of refusal to preserve the CIS due to the degradation of this formation . It may be more appropriate creation of a new structure from among states interested in integration. The prospects for the CIS depend to a certain extent on the results of the functioning of the Russian-Belarusian Union and the Eurasian Economic Community. Strengthening Russia’s domestic and international positions will make it possible for some states of the post-Soviet space to geopolitically consolidate around it .
At present, it is unclear how far the processes of disintegration of the post-Soviet space have gone and whether Russia, even pursuing a constructive and purposeful policy, will be able to unite at least the key CIS states in order to jointly reach a qualitative new level economic development and counter common threats.
Taking into account the gradual decline in the role predicted by experts post-Soviet space as an integral object of Russian policy its regionalization, focusing attention on individual geopolitical areas and groups of countries is inevitable and individual states . It is necessary to ensure the protection of their investments in neighboring countries, take measures to minimize transit dependence in the transportation of energy resources by building bypass pipelines and liquefied natural gas (LNG) plants, limit Negative consequences probable local conflicts in territories adjacent to the borders of Russia.
Scenarios for the expansion of Russia through the voluntary annexation of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria are problematic. Attempts to implement such scenarios would result in an increase in the zone of conflict within the Russian Federation itself, in the post-Soviet space and in relations with the West.
2. Commonwealth of Independent States: problems and contradictions strategic partnerships
After the collapse of the USSR, the post-Soviet space is not only a vacuum of power, but also characterized by internal instability. The largest supranational entity here is the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). This interstate association was founded by the heads of the BSSR, RSFSR and Ukrainian SSR by signing on December 8, 1991 the Agreement on the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States.
December 21, 1991. In Almaty, the heads of 11 former union republics, and now sovereign states - Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine signed the Protocol to this Agreement. It emphasized that these states form the Commonwealth of Independent States on an equal basis. The meeting participants unanimously adopted the Alma-Ata Declaration, which confirmed the commitment of the former Soviet republics to cooperation in various areas of foreign and domestic policy, and proclaimed guarantees of the fulfillment of the international obligations of the former USSR. Later, in December 1993, Georgia joined the Commonwealth(V 2008 she left the CIS).
The Commonwealth is based on the principles of sovereign equality of all its members: Member states of the Commonwealth are independent and equal subjects of international law . Commonwealth of Independent States is not a state and does not have supranational powers. Interaction between countries within the CIS is carried out through its coordinating institutions: Council of Heads of State, Council of Heads of Government, Inter-Parliamentary Assembly, Executive Committee. The highest body of the organization is the Council of Heads of State of the CIS, which discusses and resolves fundamental issues related to the activities of the organization.
International observers immediately ironically dubbed the CIS “the world’s largest fig leaf” on the geopolitical map of the world (P. Goble), since this structure, unfortunately, is largely formal, declarative in nature. Each of the independent CIS countries suffers from serious internal problems, and all of them have borders that are either the object of claims by neighbors or zones of ethnic and religious conflicts. If initially the Commonwealth geopolitically pursued one important goal - to ensure a “soft redistribution of space” of the former USSR, then Today the CIS is a rather artificial formation with very ephemeral structures , and only economic cooperation, which is a priority for the Commonwealth countries, has increased somewhat in recent years. Thus, the volume of foreign trade turnover of the CIS member states in 2008 amounted to 830.8 billion US dollars, which is 26.8% higher than the level of 2007 (when the total trade turnover was 655.3 billion dollars).
Essentially The Commonwealth broke up into several economic blocs , the leading ones being Eurasian Economic Community(EurAsEC), GUAM(Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova), Union State Russia and Belarus , Customs Union Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan.
Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) — international economic organization , created in 2000 in Astana by the heads Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The Treaty on the Establishment of the Community lays down the concept of close and effective trade and economic cooperation, providing for the creation of a Customs Union and a Common Economic Space. Later she joined the Community Kyrgyzstan, then Moldova and Ukraine(since 2002) and Armenia(since 2003) entered the community with observer status. In 2008 Uzbekistan declared his desire to suspend his membership in the EurAsEC.
The main goal of the EurAsEC is regional integration through the creation of a single economic space on the territory of its member countries. The organization is open to accepting new members who share its main goals and statutory provisions.
The main tasks of the EurAsEC:
— completion of the full registration of the free trade regime, the formation of a common customs tariff and a unified system of non-tariff regulation measures;
— ensuring freedom of movement of capital;
— formation of a common financial market;
— agreement on the principles and conditions of the transition to a single currency within the EurAsEC;
— establishing general rules for trade in goods and services and their access to domestic markets;
— creation of a common unified system of customs regulation;
— development and implementation of interstate target programs;
— creation of equal conditions for production and entrepreneurial activities;
— formation of a common market for transport services and a unified transport system;
— formation of a common energy market;
— creation of equal conditions for access of foreign investments to the markets of the countries belonging to the Community;
- providing citizens of the Community states with equal rights in receiving education and medical care throughout its entire territory;
— convergence and harmonization of national legislations;
— ensuring interaction of the legal systems of the EurAsEC states in order to create a common legal space within the community.
The desire for closer integration within the EurAsEC is more in the economic sphere than in politics. According to experts, without cooperation ties with other CIS countries, even Russia is capable of producing approximately only 65% of products. Kazakhstan, without connections with Russia, can produce only 10% of the range of industrial products, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan - less than 5%. Such high technologically driven interdependence is an important incentive for integration, forcing the former Soviet republics to retain at least some elements of the Soviet system of economic ties.
GUAM(commonwealth of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova) in many ways acts as an alternative to the EurAsEC. This regional organization established in October 1997 GUAM is an abbreviation made up of the first letters of the names of the countries included in the organization ( from 1999 to 2005 the organization also included Uzbekistan and at that time it was called GUUAM). GUAM calls itself “Organization for democracy and economic development,” but many analysts consider it a military-political bloc. In essence, GUAM is truly a political organization, since political objectives are prioritized over economic integration . The creation of GUAM was initially positioned as an opportunity for alternative integration in the CIS space, as opposed to Moscow.
Of particular importance for Russia is Treaty on the creation of the Union State of Russia and Belarus, which was signed December 8, 2000
The goals of the Union State of Russia and Belarus are:
— ensuring the peaceful and democratic development of the fraternal peoples of the participating states, strengthening friendship, increasing well-being and living standards;
— creation of a single economic space to ensure socio-economic development based on combining the material and intellectual potential of the participating states and the use of market mechanisms for the functioning of the economy;
— strict observance of the fundamental rights and freedoms of man and citizen in accordance with generally recognized principles and norms of international law;
— pursuing a coordinated foreign and defense policy;
— formation of a unified legal system of a democratic state;
— carrying out a coordinated social policy aimed at creating conditions that ensure a decent life and free development of people;
— ensuring the security of the Union State and fighting crime;
— strengthening peace, security and mutually beneficial cooperation in Europe and throughout the world, development of the Commonwealth of Independent States.
Cooperation between the two countries is developing quite actively, primarily in the economic sphere: in 2008, trade turnover between Belarus and Russia exceeded $34 billion, which is slightly more than in previous years, but still not enough for the indicators of high integration of the two economics Decisions were made to develop cooperation in the defense and military-technical fields.
Meanwhile, along with the successes of Russian-Belarusian cooperation quite often contradictions and problems arise , in recent years, have been particularly sensitive about the prices of Russian gas and regarding the quality of Belarusian products supplied to the Russian market. All this has a very negative impact on the general political climate of cooperation between the two countries.
It is very alarming that in 2009 G. more than half of Belarusians spoke out against the construction of the Union State (data Institute for Strategic Studies , BISS ). It is interesting that there are more supporters of Belarus joining the EU among Belarusians than supporters of integration with Russia (33.5 and 30%, respectively). However, 41.2% still believe that Belarus should not become a member of the EU. There are even fewer like-minded people for the full inclusion of Belarus into Russia - only14.4%. The most popular opinion among respondents (74.1%) was that Belarus should remain an independent state.
Thus, there is a real threat of Belarus leaving the sphere of Russian geopolitical influence and its transition to the zone of European attraction , which is very dangerous. In recent years, the sphere of geopolitical influence post-Soviet Russia steadily declining: the loss of the Baltic states, especially ports such as Riga and Tallinn, has significantly limited Russia's access to the Baltic Sea; Ukrainian independence led to Russia losing its dominant position on the Black Sea, where Odessa was a key seaport for trade with Mediterranean countries; the loss of influence in the southeast changed the status of Russia in the Caspian basin. With the emergence of new independent nationalist states in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia, in some places the southeastern border of Russia was pushed northward by more than a thousand kilometers.
Customs Union of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation - an interstate agreement on the creation of a single customs space, signed by Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan in the city of Dushanbe on October 6, 2007.
From July 1, 2010, the new Customs Code began to be applied in relations between Russia and Kazakhstan, and from July 6, 2010 - in relations between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. According to experts, the creation of the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia will stimulate economic development and could provide an additional 15% to the GDP of the participating countries by 2015.
Ukraine, with which economic relations have suffered greatly over the past five years since 2004, it is also proposed to join a customs union. Presidents Kyrgyzstan And Tajikistan At the EurAsEC 2010 summit in Astana, they assured that their countries were studying the possibility of joining the Customs Union.
On April 1, 2011, transport control was abolished on the border of Russia and Belarus. It was moved to the outer contour of the borders of the Customs Union
3. Basic geopolitical players: fight without rules
Although the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation names the development of bilateral and multilateral cooperation between Russia and the CIS member states as a priority in the field of foreign policy, Russian geopolitical interests in the post-Soviet space are still not clearly and unambiguously formulated. Russia's geopolitics in this direction remains passive: Moscow does not have the opportunity to initiate the events taking place. If the geo-politics of the USSR in Eurasia was characterized by the spirit of offensive and expansionism, then modern Russian geopolitics is openly defensive in nature . In other words, Moscow is trying to save what it has left of its former geopolitical bridgeheads in Eurasia.
In general, Russia’s geopolitics in the post-Soviet space faces a dilemma: Moscow is not strong enough politically to completely close this space to outside forces, and is too poor to develop the wealth of Eurasia solely on its own. . The geopolitical claims of other political actors in the region look more certain.
Zbigniew Brzezinski in this regard, emphasizes: America's primary interest is to help to ensure a situation in which no single power controls this geopolitical space, and the world community has unhindered financial and economic access to it.
America is primarily interested in developing the riches of Eurasia, laying new network oil pipelines and transport routes that will connect regions of Eurasia directly with major centers of world economic activity through the Mediterranean and Arabian Seas as well as overland. That's why The American strategy towards our country is to repel Russia’s aspirations to monopolize access to the post-Soviet space .
Brzezinski names several geopolitical centers of the CIS, which, in his opinion, deserve America's strongest geopolitical support . This Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Although the role of Kyiv, as conceived by the American strategist, is key, at the same time, Kazakhstan (taking into account its scale, economic potential and geographically important location) also deserves American support and long-term economic assistance. Brzezinski emphasizes that, over time, economic growth in Kazakhstan could help bridge the cracks in the ethnic divide that make this Central Asian shield so vulnerable to Russian pressure.
Today, to implement their plans in the post-Soviet space The US operates on several fronts . Firstly, Washington is impeding integration processes in the CIS, supporting the separatist nationalist aspirations of the newly independent states. Secondly, economic levers of influence are actively used under the pretext of assistance in the establishment of a market economy, the development of market reforms, which in general is intended to create favorable conditions for the penetration of American capital into the post-Soviet space. Third, the integration of post-Soviet states into the world community, international political and financial organizations, participation in dialogue on security and cooperation with the aim of activeopposition to Russian geopolitical interests in the post-Soviet space.
In the long term, we are talking about connecting power lines and gas pipeline systems of the Trans-Caucasian republics, the Caspian countries of Central Asia, Iran and Turkey and creating a transport and economic system from Central Asia to Europe - the so-called “Great Silk Road” in its modern version. It is known that The US Congress adopted a doctrine called the “Silk Road Strategy” , which aimed at organizing the transit of energy resources through Turkey, bypassing Russia . This project was presented in the media as the discovery of a new oil Klondike, the wealth of which is comparable to the wealth Persian Gulf.
In the post-Soviet space, America shares common interests with stable, pro-Western Turkey. Turkish nationalists see the new destiny of the Turkic peoples, led by Turkey, to dominate the Caspian Sea basin and Central Asia. Today Türkiye is establishing itself as a potential leader of the loose community of Turkic-speaking countries, using its economic and political capital for geopolitical dominance in the region . One of the ways to achieve this goal is related to the construction oil pipeline Baku - Ceyhan.
Turkish ambitions in Central Asia and the Caucasus are opposed Iranian influence, who also offers his own concept of an Islamic society. The Turks and Persians have historically opposed each other in this region. Let us remember that once upon a time Achaemenid state covered the territories of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Israel. Despite the fact that today's geopolitical aspirations of Iran are more modest and are aimed mainly at Azerbaijan and Afghanistan, nevertheless, the idea of a Muslim empire lives in the political consciousness of the religious leaders of this country.
Iran is actively using economic leverage to spread its influence in the region. Taking advantage of its geographical location, Iran is trying to expand the network of transport corridors through its territory and is participating in the construction of oil and gas pipelines to the ports of the Persian Gulf. Significant volumes of Kazakh and Azerbaijani oil are already pumped through the pipeline system in northern Iran .
The United States is seeking to counteract Iran's ambitious aspirations in the Caspian region, trying to isolate Iran from the world community, using the Iranian nuclear program as a pretext. This forces Tehran to seek political support from Russia. Iran and Russia have a partial coincidence of interests on another important geopolitical issue: both countries are interested in limiting the influence of pan-Turkism in the region .
An increasingly powerful actor in the post-Soviet space is China. The new states of Transcaucasia and Central Asia serve as a buffer between Russian and Chinese interests, but at the same time energy resources of the post-Soviet space look unusually attractive to Beijing , and gaining direct access to them - without any control from Moscow - is a promising geopolitical goal of China. Today Beijing is a serious competitor to the United States and Russia in the fight for Kazakh oil, Chinese diplomacy has made significant progress in this matter in recent years: suffice it to say agreements on cooperation in the field of oil and gas and on the laying of two oil pipelines . Beijing plans to invest heavily in the development of the oil riches of Kazakhstan and Central Asia, since China itself has few energy resources.
Today, the results of the active work of new political actors in the post-Soviet space are already very noticeable. Enacted in 1999 G. oil pipeline Baku - Supsa reduced Azerbaijan's dependencefrom Russia in pumping oil to Western markets; construction of the Tejen-Saraha-Mashhad railway opened up new opportunities for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in terms of economic development ties with Iran ; opening Karakoram Highway became an important transport bridge between China, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan . There are plans to build a railway through Iran to the Persian Gulf.
The strength of Russian geopolitical influence in the post-Soviet space remains large Russian diaspora — near 65 million people, largely predetermining Russia’s activity in its neighboring countries. On one alone Ukraine lives 10 million ethnic Russians, and over one third of the population consider Russian their native language. Russian speakers make up half the population of Kazakhstan(about 10 million people). Some analysts believe that the problem of the Russian-speaking population in the CIS countries largely stimulates tensions in Russia's relations with the newly independent states.
At the same time, it is possible with regret state fading of the Russian cultural tradition, education in the Russian language , and mass migration of the Russian-speaking population from the post-Soviet space . In the recent past, thanks to the Russification of a significant part of the elite, both power and cultural, political contacts between Russia and the newly independent states were significantly facilitated. Today there is a hasty displacement of the Russian language from official use, a decline in the production of Russian-language literature , which reduces the space of Russian influence. This is a serious geopolitical miscalculation of Moscow: to maintain cultural influence not so many funds are needed, and the sociocultural potential of geopolitics in the information society is one of the significant factors that it would be rash to discount.
The paradox of the current situation is that so far the weakening of Russian cultural influence and the displacement of the Russian language, at first glance, has not been compensated for by anything. The hopes of the new post-Soviet elites in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia that English or Turkish will eventually replace the Russian language have not yet come true. There are neither appropriate conditions nor financial resources for the mass dissemination of these languages in the vast post-Soviet spaces.
However, if you look deeper, it turns out that The emerging sociocultural vacuum today in most post-Soviet states is filled by the Islamic factor: active spread of Islamic cultural influence. Strengthening the influence of Islamists leads to the activation of radical parties and organizations, which is especially noticeable in the political culture of the Central Asian states. WITH a large share We can probably assume that in the future we will see not only the legalization of Islamists, but also their participation in power. Nationalist sentiments are skillfully fueled by the West, which, given the weakening of Russian cultural influence, will inevitably lead to an increase in the Islamic factor.
4. New hotbeds of tension and military divisions
In the post-Soviet space today they are testing new global technologies , the essence of which is political destabilization of states without the use of military force . Such technologies include:
— bribery of elites, “corruption by freedom,” encouragement of ethno-sovereignty, Russophobia of the outskirts and national nihilism in order to convince Russians that “being Russian is shameful”;
—demoralization and dehumanization of public consciousness through cultural expansion and Westernization of culture;
—seizing economic bridgeheads in critical areas of the national economy;
—transfer of internal political relations to the mode of “battles of oligarchs”;
—destruction of viable national economic and other structures;
— maintaining the permanent reform of government bodies and achieving a state of anarchy in the country and thereby transferring the state into a regime of external dependence.
Moscow initially chose the tactics of non-interference in the development of political processes in the newly independent states , which today is recognized as a serious mistake. This is largely why the post-Soviet space over the past decade has been marked by processes of archaization and demodernization, and a narrowing of the area of the European Enlightenment. Objectively, the dominant political trend has become the development of authoritarian political regimes on the borders of the Russian Federation, in which, in one form or another, the rights of the Russian-speaking population and other non-titular ethnic groups are suppressed and violated.
The toughest of existing today modes V Turkmenistan, the softest - V Kyrgyzstan; V Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan national contradictions tend to intensify . Turkmenistan, geographically protected by Kazakhstan from any direct contact with Russia, is actively developing political ties with Iran in order to weaken its previous dependence on Russia to gain access to world markets. Most of the Central Asian republics receive significant support from Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Pakistan. The formation of “axes” and coalitions hostile to Russia is taking place, an example of which is the emerging “axis of Kyiv - Tashkent - Baku - Tbilisi.”
The development of geopolitical contradictions in the post-Soviet space may lead to to two main scenarios: either the idea will triumph reintegration of the post-Soviet space , or centrifugal forces hostile to Russia will win . At the same time, it is obvious that the strengthening of nationalist dictatorships will be the final defeat and suppression of the traditions of high Enlightenment, and in the long term - this is the path to war.
Already today there are several dangerous hotbeds of tension where large-scale military operations have not yet taken place, but the situation remains explosive and its development unpredictable. In the Caucasus, there remains a threat of resumption of “frozen” conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh , present hotbed of tension in the North Caucasus , exists the danger of military clashes along the lines of the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian armed conflicts , which in 2008 had already developed into a Russian-Georgian five-day war.
Conflicts in Central Asia are provoked by regional, ethnic and religious contradictions . The civil war in Tajikistan, armed clashes in the south of the Fergana Valley on the borders of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan turned Central Asia into the “Eurasian Balkans”.
Meanwhile in Lately Another new trend has emerged in the geopolitics of the post-Soviet space: a demarcation of interests in the military-political field has begun in the CIS. On the one hand, the military-political alliance GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova) is intensifying, on the other hand, military cooperation is developing within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).
Collective Security Treaty (DKB) was signed on May 15 1992 , its participants were Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan; in 1993, the agreement was signed by Azerbaijan, Georgia and Belarus. The contract was designed for five years with subsequent extension. The CST came into force on April 20, 1994. On April 2, 1999, the presidents of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan signed a protocol extending its validity for the next five-year period; however, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan refused to extend the treaty.
At the Moscow session of the CST on May 14 2002 the decision was made to transform the DKB into a full-fledged international organization — CSTO. On October 7, 2002, the Charter and Agreement on the legal status of the CSTO were signed in Chisinau, which entered into force on September 18, 2003. On December 2, 2004, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution granting the Collective Security Treaty Organization observer status in the General Assembly UN.
In accordance with the DKB participating states ensure their security on a collective basis . In Art. 4 of the Treaty provides that in the event of an act of aggression against any of the participating states, all other participating states will provide him with the necessary assistance, including military assistance, and will also provide support with the means at their disposal in order to exercise the right to collective defense in in accordance with Art. 51 of the UN Charter.
The very essence of the Treaty, the principles and forms of cooperation contained in it, as well as the stated positions predetermined the real opportunity for it to become an integral part of a common and comprehensive security system for Europe and Asia. In its content, the Treaty is, first of all, a factor of military-political deterrence. The CSTO member states do not consider anyone as an enemy and advocate mutually beneficial cooperation with all states. IN 2009 it was a decision was made to form the Collective Rapid Reaction Force (CRRF), which should become an effective universal tool for maintaining security throughout the CSTO space. Moreover, we are talking about repelling military aggression, and about conducting special operations to eliminate terrorists, extremists, and about the fight against organized crime and drug trafficking, as well as on eliminating the consequences of emergency situations.
Despite the fact that in recent years the activities of the CSTO have somewhat intensified, unfortunately, in many cases this organization is not effective. Experts write with alarm that the Russian military is gradually leaving one country after another. Despite the existence of a large number of bilateral treaties, cooperation has not been established in the post-Soviet space in the military-economic and military-technical spheres , in the production and supply of weapons and military equipment even within the framework of the main Collective Security Treaty.
Meanwhile the geopolitical situation in the post-Soviet space remains unstable. Disagreements between Russia and the states of the Caspian basin regarding the status of the Caspian Sea have intensified , control over its oil regions, transport corridors and energy delivery routes, which led to to open rivalry between Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. As a result, a fundamentally new geopolitical situation, which analysts called the “second big game.” In the south block perform Türkiye, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. To the north block included Russia, China, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan. With such a geopolitical balance of power Russia needs or increase its economic and military-political presence in the post-Soviet space , which, largely for economic reasons, is an impossible task today, or conduct active diplomatic work to create a workable collective security system in the CIS .
If the latter does not happen, then the CIS countries, in search of other peacekeepers, will increasingly appeal to the West, the UN, and the OSCE, which is already partly happening today. The West actively supports these aspirations in order to make the conflicts of the post-Soviet space an object of geopolitical bargaining with Russia. Manipulation of conflicts is becoming one of the important elements of oil policy: games around Caspian oil have a hidden geopolitical subtext, the essence of which is to counteract the integration of the post-Soviet space. It is impossible not to notice that there is a certain connection between the “conflict map” and the “route map”: almost all proposed oil pipeline routes run through zones of ethnic conflicts.
5. Russia’s role in Eurasia: new rules of the game and possible scenarios
Based on its overall geopolitical potential, Russia could lay claim to the role of a stabilizing factor in Eurasia. The desire to maintain its economic and military-political presence in the Caucasus, Caspian and Central Asian regions, responsibility for the fate of ethnic Russians living in conflict zones, the direct impact of instability in the post-Soviet space on the ethnopolitical situation in the border areas Russian Federation, the need to prevent the threat of the spread of religious extremism and terrorism - all these reasons force Russia to one way or another participate in the conflicts of Transcaucasia and Central Asia. A striking example of recent years is operation to force Georgia to peace in August 2008, when Russia came to the defense of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In terms of their significance, the events of August 2008 went far beyond the scope of the regional conflict: there was a transition from a politically correct clarification of relations between Moscow and the West to open confrontation in the post-Soviet space. Having recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia Russia has shown the West that the Caucasus is part of its geopolitical interests, which it intends to defend from now on.
However, the openly anti-Russian coverage of this military operation in global media channels shows that military presence Russia, the very fact of the presence of Russian military units outside their country does not provide Moscow with the expected political and economic influence in its neighboring countries. Russian military and border contingents, having done the “dirty work” of stopping the bloodshed, often become objects of manipulation in the eyes of the world public opinion. Meanwhile, a skillful emphasis on the peacekeeping mission in the post-Soviet space could help Russia solve two problems at once: influence the geopolitical orientation of the newly independent states and maintain stability on its borders. It has long been known: the one who plays the role of a peacemaker simultaneously has control over the space of conflict. However, for this to happen, the status and functions of peacekeeping military units must be well worked out legally and firmly established in CIS documents in order to exclude possible political speculation on this issue. Until this happened, The West is trying with all its might to compromise Russia’s peacekeeping actions in order to limit its geopolitical influence .
However, it should be noted that many conflicts in the post-Soviet space cannot be resolved by force of arms : they require a flexible combination of diplomatic and economic means. Such methods include the creation of enclaves of free economic zones in conflict border areas, the introduction of the institution of dual citizenship, which would significantly mitigate the severity of the humanitarian problem associated with the regime of crossing state borders for residents of border areas.
A serious question arises about what can be opposed to the policy of disintegration in the post-Soviet space. Russian geopoliticians at different times proposed four main options for the integration of the post-Soviet space.
Historically the first was the liberal “pro-Western” version of integration according to the model of the European Union under the auspices of Moscow. In the early 1990s. it was published by the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy in the official report “Strategy for Russia,” which developed the concept of “post-imperial enlightened integration” as a program of action for the post-Soviet economic space.
Zbigniew Brzezinski was one of the first to rebuff the “restoration of Russian imperialism.” In his opinion, “...the emphasis on the “near abroad” was not just a politically soft doctrine of regional economic cooperation. Its geopolitical content had an imperial context. Even a rather moderate report in 1992 spoke of a restored Russia that would eventually establish a strategic partnership with the West, a partnership in which Russia would “regulate the situation in Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Far East.”
As a result of political pressure from the West, even this “soft” liberal version of integration did not take place .
The second integration option is a Slavic-Nophile geopolitical version, which was based on a “Slavic union” of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus . Today, real steps have been taken only towards achieving Russian-Belarusian integration. On December 25, 1998, the Declaration on the further unification of Belarus and Russia was signed, and on December 2, 1999, an agreement on the creation of the Union State was signed. However, these documents are of a framework nature: real political agreements on the basis of which issues of a single monetary, economic and economic policy could be resolved have not yet been achieved.
International actors, primarily the USA and the EU, are trying to actively influence the Russian-Belarusian integration process. This happens in different ways: throughopen support for the opposition, non-recognition of the results of the presidential elections, trade and economic sanctions. There is only one goal: to prevent integration by any means, since the real appearance on the political stage of the Union State of Russia and Belarus would significantly change the balance of power on the geopolitical map of Eurasia.
The third, “Eurasian” option for the integration of the post-Soviet space is proposed by Eurasians led by Alexander Dugin , who emphasizes in his works that Russia “is like the heart of the Eurasian island, like Heartland , in the current geopolitical situation, better than all other regions, could resist Atlanticist geopolitics and be the center of an alternative Greater Space.”
The “moderate” version of Eurasianism was developed by the President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, who put forward the concept of the “Eurasian Union” as an alternative to the faceless and ineffective CIS. The fact is that in Kazakhstan there was a split between the indigenous Kazakhs and Russian settlers, the number of whom was approximately the same, so there was a desire to find a formula that could somewhat ease the pressure from Moscow aimed at political integration. Nazarbayev argues that Eurasia, geographically defined by borders similar to those of the Soviet Union, is an organic whole that should also have a special political dimension.
All these integration concepts suffer from one significant flaw: they had some support from the Kremlin (at different stages of modern political history), but they were not supported by the post-Soviet elites of the newly independent CIS states (except for Belarus). As a result, they remained projects.
It seems that the real concept of integration of the post-Soviet space in modern conditions could become a geo-economic model. Fortunately, the organization of a “cordon sanitaire” around Russia by Western countries did not succeed. Russian geopoliticians are today celebrating the first modest successes of the economic re-integration of the post-Soviet space - Moscow is spreading its influence primarily through economic methods. It is developing quite actively cooperation within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is a regional international organization founded in 2001 by the leaders of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.
Today, Russia is still objectively the most influential geo-economic entity in Eurasia, since it has at its disposal the most scarce resources of the continent - oil and gas. However, Russia still does not use enough economic leverage in its geopolitical strategy. To strengthen integration processes in the post-Soviet space, modern geo-economic methods could be effectively used : transition to a strictly selective system of distribution of scarce energy resources, introduction of the principle of economic preferences - a system of internal prices for energy resources and other scarce raw materials. This can create additional incentives for economic and political unification, to intensify integration processes in the post-Soviet space. Thus, a new geo-economic model for the integration of the post-Soviet space could become a real alternative to the process of deindustrialization and archaization in the near abroad. We can safely assume that geoeconomics will be followed by geopolitics.
In general, it can be argued that the guideline for Russia’s foreign policy should not be the defense of partially lost, unnecessary or expensive positions in the new conditions, but the focus on a worthy place in the world community. In the foreseeable future, it obviously will not be able to become a superpower, but for it it is realistic and achievable establishment as an influential, competitive trans-regional power of Eurasia, capable of exerting influence at the global level.
The interests of the country are met renunciation of great power and imperial aspirations , eliminating the “besieged fortress” syndrome that gives rise to xenophobia. What is needed is a balanced, balanced course that takes into account the dynamic and contradictory realities of the modern world, allowing us to fit into the processes of globalization with the greatest gains and the least costs.
The strategy for Russia to acquire a new global role as an independent center of power can only be effective through the creation of an innovative economy, the consistent strengthening of democratic foundations and institutions, and the formation of a rule of law state. Now, more than ever in the past, Russia's movement towards democracy and the prospects for its modernization and breakthrough into the post-industrial, information era are interconnected. On this basis, it can establish itself as one of the great powers and contribute to the establishment of a democratic world order.
Russia's relations with the newly independent states in the post-Soviet space At first, they were determined by the problems of forming political and economic cooperation within the CIS, protecting the interests of the Russian-speaking population (25 million people) in the near abroad, dividing the “legacy” of the once united union state, and, above all, the enormous military potential of the Soviet Armed Forces.
Immediately after the collapse of the USSR, relations between Russia and Ukraine sharply deteriorated, which was associated with the problem of the division of the Black Sea Fleet and the question of the status of Crimea and the naval base of Sevastopol. An attempt to create the United Armed Forces of the CIS, made in 1992, was unsuccessful. In this regard, the Russian leadership in May 1992 decided to form the Russian Armed Forces. Their number was established by law at 1% of the total population of the country. This entailed a sharp reduction in the total number of military personnel and the development of a program for the necessary reorganization of the entire structure of the Armed Forces. At the same time, there was a withdrawal of military groups from the countries of the former Warsaw bloc, Germany and the Baltic republics. In the complex of military issues, an important place was occupied by the problem of reducing the nuclear potential that Russia inherited from the USSR. After the collapse of the allied power, nuclear missile weapons remained not only on the territory of the Russian Federation, but also in Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Three former Soviet republics declared their nuclear-free status and pledged to transfer nuclear weapons located on their territory to Russia. However, due to the deterioration of Russian-Ukrainian relations, Kyiv delayed for a long time the practical implementation of the transfer of the nuclear arsenal. Only in January 1994, a joint American-Russian-Ukrainian statement on the elimination of nuclear weapons in Ukraine and its accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was signed in the Kremlin.
Military-political problems, perhaps, were the most significant during the “civilized divorce” (in the words of the first President of Ukraine L. Kravchuk) of the former Soviet republics, since at the initial stage of development of the CIS it was not possible to overcome the powerful wave of centrifugal tendencies in the leadership of the new independent states . At the same time, despite all the statements about complete “independence and sovereignty,” neighboring states could not do without effective military-political support from Russia. The way out of this situation (after the collapse of the CIS Allied Forces) was the conclusion May 15, 1992 V Tashkent Collective Security Treaty (CST), signed by the leaders of Armenia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, and by the end of 1993 to dkb Azerbaijan, Belarus and Georgia, which joined the CIS in 1993, joined.
Acting under the auspices of the Commonwealth, the Russian Armed Forces in 1992-1993. took on important functions in resolving interethnic and interethnic conflicts that broke out on the periphery of the post-Soviet space (Transnistrian, Ossetian-Georgian, Georgian-Abkhazian and inter-Tajik conflicts).
After the collapse of the union state became irreversible, and its main material and military resources were divided, ties between the member countries of the Commonwealth began to acquire an increasingly distinct interstate character. There has been some progress in the development of CIS structures. 22 January 1993 seven Commonwealth countries signed in Minsk Charter of the CIS. However, the effectiveness of the interstate bodies of the Commonwealth, and primarily the Council of Heads of State and the Council of Heads of Government, and the decisions they make remained very insignificant. The main problem was the establishment of mutually beneficial economic cooperation between the CIS countries. But due to the collapse of the ruble zone by the end of 1992, Russia was forced to switch to trading with the Commonwealth countries primarily in energy resources at world prices. As a result, the external debt of the former Soviet republics began to grow rapidly, and trade turnover within the CIS decreased significantly. Thus, during the first two years of the Commonwealth’s existence, disintegration processes in the post-Soviet space intensified significantly. It was only in 1994 that trends towards greater economic and political cooperation emerged between the CIS countries. The thesis about “multi-speed and multi-level integration” has gained particular popularity. In this regard, the main direction in cooperation between Russia and the CIS countries was the establishment of bilateral relations. In October 1994, at the next summit of CIS leaders, a decision was made to create an Interstate Economic Committee and form a Customs Union of the Commonwealth member states. March 29, 1996 quadrilateral was signed Agreement "On Deepening Integration in the Economic and Humanitarian Fields" between Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia. Within the framework of this agreement, a decision was made to create the executive bodies of the Quartet, and 2 April in The signing of the Agreement took place in Moscow on the formation of the Community of Belarus and Russia. The President of Belarus A.G. Lukashenko was approved as Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Community. The date of signing the agreement was declared the Day of Unity of the Peoples of Russia and Belarus, which for the majority of citizens of both countries visibly demonstrated the revival of Slavic unity. And exactly a year later, the Russian-Belarusian Community was transformed into Union of Belarus and Russia. After a nationwide discussion, on May 23, 1997, the Charter of the Union was approved.
Against the background of the rapprochement of the fraternal Slavic republics, Russian-Ukrainian relations, primarily due to the problem of the division of the Black Sea Fleet and the status of Sevastopol, continued to remain extremely tense. Only after Russia met Ukraine halfway in resolving these issues, at the end of May 1997, an agreement was signed in Kyiv on the parameters of the division of the Black Sea Fleet on the territory of Ukraine (in Crimea), as well as on the lease of the Sevastopol naval base. As a result May 31, 1997 signing took place Treaty of friendship, cooperation and partnership between Moscow and Kiev. At the same time, Russian-Ukrainian relations are still one of the most difficult problems of Russian foreign policy.
Significant efforts were made in Russia's foreign policy activities in the field of strengthening security and conducting peacekeeping operations in the post-Soviet space. Thus, on July 21, 1994, a Russian-Moldovan agreement was signed with the participation of the leaders of the “self-proclaimed” Transnistrian Moldavian Republic on the cessation of hostilities and the dissolution of warring factions in Transnistria. And on May 8, 1997, with the guarantee of the presidents of Russia and Ukraine, the leaders of Moldova and Transnistria P. Lucinsky and I. Smirnov signed a Memorandum in Moscow on the principles of normalization of relations. Also, with the mediation of Russia, in the summer of 1997, direct negotiations between the leaders of Georgia and Abkhazia E. Shevardnadze and V. Ardzinba took place with the aim of resolving the protracted Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. In addition, an agreement on the cessation of hostilities and the formation of a commission for national reconciliation in Tajikistan also took place in Moscow. The importance of the Russian border service in protecting the external borders of the Commonwealth countries remains great, especially in connection with the ongoing civil war in Afghanistan.
It should be noted that, despite the significant efforts made by Moscow, the effectiveness of interstate cooperation within the CIS remains very low. Although by the end of 1997 about 800 fundamental international legal acts had been signed within the Commonwealth, the vast majority of them are either advisory or outright declarative in nature. In October 1997, at a meeting in Chisinau, the leaders of 11 CIS countries decided on the need to prepare proposals for reorganizing the structure of the Commonwealth, refusing to sign further declarations. How consistently Russia will act as the main integrating force in the post-Soviet space will depend all further fate CIS. On the other hand, the fate of Russia will depend on which model of establishing economic and political cooperation in the development of the Commonwealth will be taken as a basis.
Surveyor. Who is a surveyor? Description of the profession. Profession surveyor Surveyor training
Magellanic clouds: who are they?
Pepper Steak Sauce Creamy Pepper Sauce
How to create a competent portfolio for a designer
If you dreamed that a house burned down - interpretation of the dream according to the dream book