Autonomization plan of Stalin and Lenin. Fundamental difference between projects

02.09.2019

As is known, during the construction of the Soviet state, a need arose to determine the form of the country’s territorial structure. In the depths of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) a project was created - “Autonomization Plan”, according to which the Byelorussian SSR, Ukrainian SSR, Azerbaijan SSR, Armenian SSR, Georgian SSR were to become part of the Russian Federation (RSFSR) with the rights of subjects of the Federation (like Tatarstan, Bashkiria, Yakutia, Dagestan). However, the Autonomization Plan was criticized by V.I. Lenin, whose opinion the party took into account, therefore in real story Lenin's plan - the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - was implemented. At the same time, each union republic received the right to freely secede from the USSR, had sovereign rights. If for some reason Lenin was unable to defend his Soviet Union, then the Great Patriotic War would still exist Russian Federation(Greater RSFSR according to Stalin), which would include autonomous republics (subjects of the Federation): Belarus, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia. At the time of the formation of the USSR, almost all of Central Asia was part of the RSFSR as the Kara-Kirghiz (Kazakh) Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON RELATIONS OF THE RSFSR WITH THE INDEPENDENT REPUBLICS

August 11, 1922

The draft resolution on the relationship between the RSFSR and the independent Soviet republics was prepared by a member of the commission of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) I.V. Stalin. The project, which later received the name “autonomization plan,” aroused the critical attitude of many leading party workers and was ultimately rejected.

1. Recognize the expediency of the formal entry of the independent Soviet republics: Ukraine, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia into the RSFSR, leaving the issue of Bukhara, Khorezm and the Far Eastern Republic open and limiting the adoption of agreements with them on customs, foreign trade, foreign and military affairs and other.

NOTE: The corresponding changes in the constitutions mentioned in paragraph 1 of the republics must be made after the issue is carried out in Soviet order.

2. Recognize it expedient to formally extend the competence of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, Council of People's Commissars and STO of the RSFSR to the corresponding central Soviet institutions listed in paragraph 1 of the republics.

3. Foreign affairs (Indel, Vneshtorg), military affairs, railway, financial and sweat* mentioned in pun. 1st independent republics to unite with those of the RSFSR.

4. People's Commissariats: food, labor and national economy formally subordinate to the directives of the corresponding People's Commissariats of the RSFSR.

5. The remaining people's commissariats of the republics mentioned in paragraph 1, such as: justice, education, internal affairs, agriculture, workers' and peasants' inspection, public health and social security, should be considered independent.

NOTE: Organs fighting counter-revolution in the above-mentioned republics are to be subordinated to the directives of the GPU of the RSFSR.

6. This decision, if it is approved by the Central Committee of the RCP, is not published, but is transmitted to the national Central Committee as a circular directive for its implementation in the Soviet order through the Central Executive Committees or congresses of Soviets of the above-mentioned republics until the convening of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, at which it is declared as a wish these republics.

News of the CPSU Central Committee. 1989. No. 9. pp. 192-193.

Arsenyev F.A._

Autonomation

Autonomation is an idea put forward Stalin I.V.. V 1922 , according to which everything Soviet republics should become part of the RSFSR with the rights autonomies, which would violate their independence and equality. Until October Bolshevik revolution headed by Lenin V.I. advocated the preservation unitary state V Russia. For areas with special national composition of the population and economic way of life a regional autonomy plan was proposed as a means of solving the national question, i.e. transformation of the corresponding territories into autonomous units having the features of states or state entities within a single Russian unitary state. Before the revolution and after it, the situation changed significantly; they began to form in the outlying territories. independent nation states. Idea was rejected by V.I. Lenin, who advocated a union of equal republics.

The basis national policy Soviet power was accepted 2 NYA 1917 Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia, which granted all peoples of the former Russian Empire the right to self-determination up to and including secession and creation own nation state. In principle, the Bolsheviks preferred unitary state, but they understood that in multinational Russia, where relations between international peoples were burdened by long-standing grievances, the most acceptable form was a federal state. IN AB 1922 a commission of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee was created RKP(b) to prepare a project for uniting the republics into a state. The project she developed was based on I.V. Stalin’s proposals, which provided for the entry of the republics into the RSFSR with the rights of autonomy - the autonomization plan. The project received support from the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of Armenia and Azerbaijan. The leadership of Ukraine and Belarus was inclined to preserve the treaty relations m.republics. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia categorically rejected the project and stated that it considered it necessary to unite economic efforts and general policy, but maintaining all the attributes of independence.

In essence, the idea of local autonomy was perceived as complete sovereignty and independence from Russia. For example, at the First Congress of the Soviets of Workers, Soldiers and peasant deputies of Ust-Sysolsky county 23 MR 1918, former MP IV State Duma Popov D.Ya. noted: “We have 14,000,000 acres of forest area. Every year we can receive from the riches of the region, according to my calculations, at least 24 million rubles. With this money we can build railways, open educational establishments, issue your loans. There is no need to allow favorable time to create autonomy; when Russia reaches a stable position, it will be too late and we will have to live according to foreign laws. If there is no autonomy, then all the wealth of the Zyryans will float away by order Central government and the Zyryans will receive nothing. Discuss this issue seriously, so as not to reproach the initiators for deception later."<Журналы заседаний первого съезда Усть-Сысольского Совета рабочих, солдатских и крестьянских депутатов. Усть-Сысольск. 1918, с.18>. In order to build a new statehood in Russia, Lenin V.I. leaned towards the idea of a federation. IN JAN 1918 Russian socialist Soviet the republic was declared a federal state. However, on what basis will this federation be built, in what capacity will the new national republics be included in it - this question has not been clearly formulated. IN Constitution of the RSFSR 1918 it was only said that the Councils of regions distinguished by special everyday life And national composition, can unite into autonomous regional unions, which are part of the RSFSR on a federation basis (clause 11).

Celebrating the 300th anniversary of the reunification of Ukraine with Russia

The transformation of the newly independent republics into autonomous parts of the RSFSR would mean a significant reduction in their status and could have a negative impact on the mood of the local population, which is quite strongly inspired by the ideas national identity. It was also impossible to rule out reproaches against Russia for craving for the old imperial ambitions. Lenin V.I. categorically opposed this plan, arguing that in the new conditions we can only talk about the entry of both Russia and all the named republics on equal terms into the new federal union. IN k.SN 1922 The commission of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) accepted Stalin’s project and rejected the objections of the representatives of Georgia. Having familiarized himself with the decision of the commission and the objections of the Georgians, V.I. Lenin proposed that instead of the republics joining the RSFSR, they should be united together with the RSFSR into a new state - the Union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia. The republics, in contrast to I.V. Stalin’s project, retained the right to secede from the Union. Stalin I.V. characterized this position as “national liberalism”, but still reworked the project as proposed by Lenin I.V. spirit. 6 OK 1922 the revised project was approved Plenum Central Committee. Stalin's model devices became the basis for the creation of the USSR, where equality in fact it turned out to be formal. This unification of legally equal subjects into a new federation was formalized by the creation 30 DK 1922 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. For example, 24 NY 1924- proclaimed Turkmen SSR.

Autonomy Benefits Bolshevism Everyday life Power State power State Duma State Duma, fourth State Declaration Money Railways Law Idealism Empire Communism Constitution Constitution of the RSFSR 1918

1922 - Instead of union republics, an autonomization plan for the RSFSR was introduced: the territories of potential SSRs were transformed into territories, regions and the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Formation of the Belarusian, Little Russian, Crimean, Far Eastern and Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics. Since the RSFSR is moving away from socialism towards social democracy, three main parties are represented at the Congress of Soviets (Bolsheviks - radical communists; Social Revolutionaries - left Democrats, in a bloc with the Bolsheviks; Mensheviks - right socialists, opposition)

1928 - Industrial boom in the RSFSR, caused by the NEP. The construction of developed socialism, the emergence of a dozen Russian industrial enterprises.

1930 - The RSFSR was admitted to the League of Nations after the signing of the Rappal Peace Convention. Conclusion of treaties of friendship and cooperation between the RSFSR and the Weimar Republic.

1932-1940 - growth in the number of autonomous republics. Separation of the Tskhinvali region from Georgia, its unification with parts of the former Mountain Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in the form of the Ossetian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Education in Central Asia Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Tajik, Turkmen and Karakalpak Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics.

1936 - Republican victory in the Spanish Civil War.

1938 - a pact of joint mutual assistance between Poland and Czechoslovakia was signed. Hitler has to postpone the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Nationalists come to power in Turkey. Winter War, the RSFSR completely annexes Finland.

1939 - The RSFSR enters WWII after the Reich attacks Poland and Czechoslovakia. Treaties of friendship are terminated

1940 - Soviet ultimatum to the Baltic states. In basic terms, the meaning of the ultimatums was the same - these states were required to bring governments friendly to the RSFSR to power and allow additional contingents of troops into the territory of these countries. The terms were accepted. New governments have lifted bans on activities communist parties and appointed extraordinary parliamentary elections. The elections in all three states were won by the pro-communist Blocs (Unions) of the working people - the only electoral lists admitted to the elections. The newly elected parliaments already on July 21-22 proclaimed the creation of the Estonian SSR, Latvian SSR and Lithuanian SSR and adopted the Declaration of Entry into the RSFSR. Formation of the Estonian, Lithuanian and Latvian ASSR. Joining the RSFSR Western. Ukraine, Western Belarus, Bessarabia.

1941 - The beginning of the Russian-Turkish war, which ended with the defeat of the Turks in 1943 and the acquisition of the Bosporus and Dardanelles.

1945 - Capture of Berlin, surrender of the Third Reich. The RSFSR receives all of East Prussia, the Polish Corridor, all of Finland, as well as the islands of Rügen and Spitsbergen. After the war with Japan, the RSFSR received Manchuria, Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, as well as the island of Hokkaido.

1946 - The beginning of the Cold War between NATO and the Department of Internal Affairs (RSFSR and allies).

1951 - Death of Stalin. Georgy Zhukov comes to power. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR is headed by Beria, who is actually " eminence grise"(after all, thanks to him, elements were introduced into the RSFSR market economy). Basically only the Socialist Revolutionaries win elections.

1956 - The beginning of the policy of “East Slavic unity”: Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians are declared one people. Liquidation of the Ukrainian and Belarusian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics, lifting the ban on religions.

1961 - the first human flight into space.

1962 - Death of Lavrentiy Beria during an assassination attempt. The Supreme Council headed by Suslov. Zhukov resigns. And about. Shelepin becomes Secretary General of the Communist Party of the RSFSR.

1964 - Shelepin assumes the position of President of the RSFSR. The party votes "yes". The Mensheviks win the elections, the beginning of the lifting of the Iron Curtain.

1973-1978 - The beginning of the liberalization of the Russian state. Death of Shelepin. Yu.V. comes to power. Andropov. Conducted liberal reforms, rapprochement with the USA.

1981 - The first presidential and parliamentary elections on a multi-party basis (the previously banned Cadets and Octobrists were included). The RSFSR was transformed into the Russian Federative Republic. Andropov becomes president (as interim leader).

1984 - Andropov's resignation. M.S. comes to power. Gorbachev, who announced a policy of state renewal. Formation national republics within Russia.

1989 - Formation of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) consisting of Russia, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Syria, Libya.

1992 - Poland, Yugoslavia and Greece gain membership in the CSTO

1996-2004 - The reign of Alexander Lebed as President of Russia. The policy of large-scale reforms that bring Russia to one technological level with the USA and the EU.

2004 - Election of the President of the Russian Federation. Five candidates are being nominated - Vladimir Putin (non-party, nominated by the KRO and the New Octobrists), Alexander Lukashenko (from the Bolsheviks), Ruslan Khasbulatov (from the Constitutional Democratic Party), Sergei Mironov (from the Mensheviks) and Grigory Yavlinsky (from the liberal wing of the Socialist Revolutionaries). Vladimir Putin wins by a significant margin. KRO and Octobrists create a coalition.

2008 - The end of the federalization policy, the formation of the Russian Federation. Leningrad is renamed St. Petersburg, but the capital remains in Moscow.

2010 year - World financial crisis. The Russian Federation is on the sidelines. Creation of the SCO, entry into the CSTO of Asian countries. Sending troops to Afghanistan.

2011 - The United States declares default.

Political biography of Stalin. Volume 1. Kapchenko Nikolay Ivanovich

4. Conflict over the issue of “autonomization”

The range of disagreements, or rather conflict, between Lenin and Stalin in the period 1922–1923. became increasingly wider. In addition to the already discussed problems that separated them, issues related to national and state building were added. Conventionally, all these problems in historical literature are designated as a conflict over the issue of “autonomization.” If we consider the problem in a broader historical context, then I would formulate it differently: the basis of the conflict was fundamentally different approaches to solving the problems of nation-state building Soviet Union. The discussion was about whether to build a state on a centralized basis, putting first of all national interests, the interests of centralized unity, at the forefront. Or put principles at the forefront, so to speak, democratic unity, in which considerations of national unity would prevail not first of all, but observance of the principles of equality, respect for rights, etc. Moreover, these two concepts were not expressed in all their nakedness, they were clothed in forms that sometimes obscured differences in approaches.

And this has its own explanation. Strictly speaking, both Lenin and Stalin advocated the creation of firm state power in the country based on the unity of all its constituent national republics. However, Stalin, unlike Lenin, placed emphasis on centralization and the fight against various kinds of separatist deviations that could undermine the strength of the newly created state. Lenin, overwhelmed by hatred of great-power chauvinism, was inclined precisely through the prism of the struggle against great-Russian chauvinism to approach the consideration and solution of all fundamental aspects of nation-state building. In a letter to Kamenev in October 1922, he directly stated: “I declare a battle for life and death against Great Russian chauvinism”. In itself, Lenin’s embitterment against chauvinism in general, and Great Russian chauvinism in particular, generally left a very peculiar stamp on his political views and actions recent years life. Too often with him this hatred of Great Russian chauvinism takes on some obsessive forms. Thus, in a letter to the Hungarian communist B. Kuhn in October 1921, he states: “I must strongly protest against civilized Western Europeans imitating the methods of the semi-barbaric Russians.”. I do not presume to comment on this statement, even taking into account the possible context from which it was taken, but I am still struck by the offensive tone of this statement for every Russian person. Including, apparently, for Lenin himself as a Great Russian.

I cited only a couple of facts, but the point is not in their quantity, but in the fact that the leader of the party in this historical period, apparently under the oppressive impression of general devastation and confusion, outbursts of unbridled hatred towards Great Russian chauvinism made themselves felt more and more often and clearly. In previous chapters, I already touched upon the issue of chauvinism and nationalism, or rather, the attitude towards both on the part of Lenin and Stalin, and I suggested that one of the reasons for the political conflict between them was precisely this attitude. Let me emphasize once again: this is not generally about a declarative condemnation of chauvinism and nationalism, but about the emphasis that was placed on these issues when developing a practical line in matters of nation-state building.

IN Soviet period, especially after the start of de-Stalinization, Stalin’s mistakes in this matter were emphasized in every possible way, the matter was portrayed as if his line actually led to undermining the very idea of creating a multinational Soviet state, and its implementation would bring us innumerable disasters. Now, from the depths of the past years, the matter appears from a slightly different perspective. After the parade of sovereignties and the almost instantaneous collapse of the USSR, a look at the entire dispute between Lenin and Stalin, at the essence of their disagreements and at who better, more realistically assessed the situation and proposed more stable, more viable principles for building a unified state, now this view has undergone serious revaluation. And this reassessment was an objective reflection, a larger-scale awareness of the deep content of the changes that have occurred in our country.

I will dwell below on the struggle against chauvinism and nationalism, on how this line was pursued by Stalin during the period of Lenin’s departure from leadership, in particular, at the XII Party Congress in April 1923. Now let’s consider the question of the so-called idea of autonomization, which played the role of a kind of Bickford cord in the explosion of the relationship between Lenin and Stalin. Of course, along with other factors, as discussed above.

First of all, it is necessary to dispel the existing myth that Stalin was the initiator or author of the idea of autonomization. To do this, in the most general form, it is necessary to highlight the process of rapprochement between the independent Soviet republics, which took place on the objective basis of the coincidence of their fundamental interests, not least national ones. This was reflected in a number of treaties between the RSFSR and national republics, which provided for the protection of both national and international interests. The development of contractual relations between the republics was important stage on the way to their unification. The Communist Party of Ukraine was one of the first to propose establishing closer economic ties between the RSFSR and Ukraine. In December 1920, the plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) considered the issue of union treaty between the RSFSR and Ukraine. The draft treaty developed by the plenum was adopted by the governments of these republics. In 1920–1921, cooperation agreements with the RSFSR were also concluded by Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, as well as the Khorezm and Bukhara People's Soviet Republics.

At the beginning of November 1921, the plenum of the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), with the participation of leading party and Soviet workers of Transcaucasia, recognized that there was an urgent need to conclude a federal union between Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia. This decision was supported by the II Regional Transcaucasian Party Conference, which emphasized that with the creation of the federation, a long and difficult period of interethnic struggle in Transcaucasia ends. The meeting discussed a draft agreement between the three fraternal republics.

The Central Committee of the RCP(b) on November 29, 1921 approved these decisions, approving the draft resolution proposed by Lenin, in which the federation of the Transcaucasian republics was recognized as absolutely necessary and fundamentally correct.

However, among the party workers of the Communist Party of Georgia and partly Azerbaijan, there were also opponents of the creation of the Transcaucasian Federation. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia included a group of national deviationists led by B.G. Mdivani, which stubbornly opposed the course towards rapprochement of peoples. In addition to Mdivani, this group included L.E. Dumbadze, S.I. Kavtaradze, M.S. Okudzhava, K.M. Tsintsadze and others. They were called national deviationists. National deviationists demanded that each republic maintain its own army, its own currency, freedom of foreign trade, and party autonomy. Not taking into account that the creation of a federation was at that time crucial for strengthening Soviet power and establishing peace and friendship between peoples in Transcaucasia, they opposed its creation, agreeing only to the establishment of a union of each of the republics directly with the RSFSR.

Considering the growth of nationalist sentiments, and most importantly - based on the interests of unity of all republics, especially in the field of foreign policy, - on January 10, 1922, the then People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs G.V. Chicherin in a letter addressed to the Secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) V.M. Molotov was informed about the proposal put forward by the People's Commissar of Finance L.B. Krasin, about the need to achieve in the shortest possible time the unification of independent republics with the RSFSR on the basis of autonomy. G.V. Chicherin was also one of the initiators of this project and insisted on uniting the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. This was, so to speak, the embryonic form of the idea of autonomization, to which at that time Stalin himself had no relation. The immediate impetus for putting forward the idea of including national republics into the RSFSR was the preparation for the Genoa Conference, at which the Soviet delegation was supposed to defend common interests not only Russia itself, but also its former national outskirts. So the motivating factor was foreign policy necessity.

In this context, the brief exchange of remarks that took place at a meeting of the section on the national question of the XII Congress of the RCP (b) between Rakovsky and Stalin is of undeniable interest. Rakovsky: “In January of last year - 1922 - the idea of autonomization of the Soviet republics already arose in a well-known institution, I will not say which one, Comrade. Stalin knows this (STALIN: Tell me, I don’t know). In the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. In January, a circular was sent that the abolition of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, which was then supposed, should be the beginning of the autonomization of the Soviet republics. This was in January 1922. In Moscow, I was included in the commission of the Central Committee, which, together with comrade. Stalin and Chicherin were supposed to carry out this very liquidation.”.

Thus, based on historical reliable facts and documents it is known that it was not Stalin who first put forward the idea of autonomization and became its zealous apologist. It arose in the minds of the leading figures of the party and the Soviet state and adequately reflected the natural desire for better coordination of foreign economic, foreign policy and economic activities of all republics of the emerging Union.

Part of the leadership of the Communist Party of Georgia occupied a special position. B. Mdivani’s group, even after the October (1922) Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), which supported Lenin’s position, insisted that Georgia directly, and not through the Transcaucasian Federation, become part of the USSR. The Georgian communists at the citywide meeting of the Tiflis party organization, held in October 1922, spoke out against the national deviationists and adopted a resolution condemning the position of the deviationist majority of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia. This meant the complete collapse of the Georgian national deviationists. On October 22, 1922, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia resigned, citing its disagreement with the Regional Committee. The Transcaucasian Regional Committee accepted the resignation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia and informed the Central Committee of the RCP (b) about the events that had taken place. Soon after submitting his resignation, supporters of B. Mdivani - K. Tsintsadze, S. Todria, L. Dumbadze, E. Eshba, F. Makharadze, S. Kavtaradze dictated a note via direct wire to Moscow to be passed on to V.I. Lenin. The note was directed against the head of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee, Ordzhonikidze. This report, more like a slander, displeased V.I. Lenin. At the end of October 1922, in a telegram to the Zakraykom and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, Lenin wrote: “I was surprised by the indecent tone of the note on a direct wire signed by Tsintsadze and others... I was convinced that all disagreements were resolved by the decisions of the Plenum of the Central Committee with my indirect participation, with the direct participation of Mdivani. Therefore, I strongly condemn the abuse against Ordzhonikidze and insist on transmitting your conflict in a decent and loyal tone for resolution by the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP, to which your message was transmitted via direct wire.”. At the same time, G. Ordzhonikidze also made serious mistakes. He did not always show due flexibility and caution in carrying out the national policy of the party in Georgia; he allowed administration and haste in carrying out some events. G. Ordzhonikidze did not show proper restraint in his relations with B. Mdivani’s group. In connection with a complaint to the Central Committee of the RCP (b) by Mdivani supporters, on November 25, 1922, the Politburo decided to send a commission consisting of F.E. to Georgia. Dzerzhinsky, D.3. Manuilsky and V.S. Mickevicius-Kapsukas for urgent consideration of the application of members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia. F. Dzerzhinsky's commission basically objectively assessed the situation and came to the right political conclusions, but at the same time made a number of serious mistakes. The commission ignored some of G. Ordzhonikidze’s mistakes, which were expressed in excessive haste in resolving certain issues and excessive vehemence.

In a somewhat chaotic manner, I drew a general picture of the unfolding struggle around the problem of autonomy. Although the picture is far from complete, it still gives an idea of both the essence of the problem and the opposing forces.

During this period, Stalin actively dealt with this problem. In August, the Central Committee of the RCP(b) created a commission to prepare a draft decision on the relationship between the RSFSR and the independent republics. The commission approved the project, prepared no earlier than August 11, 1922 by I.V. Stalin. This plan went down in history as the “autonomization” project.

It was called the Draft Resolution on the relationship of the RSFSR with the independent republics and included the following main points:

3. Foreign affairs (Indel, Vneshtorg), military affairs, railway, financial and telegraph (meaning post and telegraph - N.K.) the independent republics mentioned in paragraph 1 should be merged with those of the RSFSR;

4. People's Commissariats: food, labor and national economy formally subordinate to the directives of the corresponding People's Commissariats of the RSFSR.

Stalin did not limit himself to only presenting the project to Lenin, but also sent a special letter, arguing in detail each point of the plan and justifying in principle the need to make just such a decision.

In particular, he wrote:

“Comrade Lenin! We have reached a situation where the existing order of relations between the center and the outskirts, that is, the absence of any order and complete chaos, becomes unbearable, creates conflicts, resentment and irritation, and turns the so-called unified federal national economy, slow down and paralyze any economic activity on a nationwide scale. One of two things: either real independence and then - non-interference of the center, its own NKID, its own Vneshtorg, its own Concession Committee, its own railways, and general issues are resolved through negotiations between equals and equals, by agreement, and the decisions of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the Council of People's Commissars and the STO of the RSFSR are not obligatory for independent republics; or the actual unification of the Soviet republics into one economic whole with the formal extension of the power of the Council of People's Commissars, the SRT and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR to the Council of People's Commissars, the Central Executive Committee and the economic councils of the independent republics, i.e., the replacement of fictitious independence with the real internal autonomy of the republics in the sense of language, culture, justice, internal affairs, agriculture And so on…

3. In four years Civil War, when, due to the intervention, we were forced to demonstrate the liberalism of Moscow in the national question, we managed to educate among the communists, against our will, real and consistent social-independents who demand real independence in every sense and regard the intervention of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party as deception and hypocrisy on the part of Moscow ...

5. If we don’t try to adapt now form relationship between the center and the outskirts actual relationships, due to which the outskirts in everything basically must unconditionally submit to the center, i.e. if we do not now replace formal (fictitious) independence with formal (and at the same time real) autonomy, then in a year it will be incomparably more difficult to defend the actual unity of the Soviet republics

Now we are talking about how not to “offend” the nationals; in a year probably we'll talk about how not to cause a split in the party on this basis, because the “national” element is working in the outskirts not in favor of the unity of the Soviet republics, and formal independence favors this work.” In conclusion, Stalin writes: “The majority of the members of the commission are for autonomization, including Comrade Sokolnikov.”

On September 24, 1922, the Organizing Bureau Commission decided to approve the proposals, mainly made by Stalin, on the formal accession of Ukraine, Belarus, Azerbaijan, and Georgia to the RSFSR. Further, the delimitation of powers and rights of the People's Commissariats was clarified.

As one can judge from Stalin’s letter, he puts at the forefront not the issues of formal equality, but the problem of ensuring the real unity of the country and its governing bodies. This clearly reveals his role as a statist, for whom not some, albeit important, aspects of nation-state building, but the interests of a national character come first. Moreover, his criticism of the real state of affairs, in particular, criticism of nationalism and separatism that was increasingly raising their head, had a solid basis. It is therefore quite natural that he saw the struggle against the social independents as one of the reliable obstacles to strengthening the unity of the country and ensuring its integrity.

Standing on the basis of common sense and realism, it is difficult to dispute Stalin's main arguments. Moreover, they were not the fruit of abstract reflections, but the result of an analysis of the objective situation that had developed in the country and the party. Moreover, as is clear from the letter, they were not distinguished by any particular bitterness against local nationalism.

How did Lenin react to Stalin’s resolution and letter? He writes a note to Kamenev: “You have probably already received from Stalin the resolution of his commission on the entry of independent republics into the RSFSR.

If you have not received it, take it from the secretary and please read it immediately. I talked about this yesterday with Sokolnikov, today with Stalin. Tomorrow I will see Mdivani (Georgian communist, suspected of “independence”).

In my opinion, this is an extremely important question. Stalin has a bit of a desire to hurry...

Stalin had already agreed to make one concession. In § 1, say instead of “joining” the RSFSR -

"Formal unification together with the RSFSR into a union of Soviet republics of Europe and Asia."

The spirit of this concession, I hope, is clear: we recognize ourselves as equal in rights with the Ukrainian SSR and others, and together and on an equal basis with them we are entering a new union, a new federation, the “Union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia.”

§ 2 then also requires changes. Something like a creation along with the meetings of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR -

"Federal All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia".

It would seem that mutual agreement between Lenin and Stalin was reached. But that was not the case. Stalin continues to insist on a number of points, despite Lenin's critical statements. He displays enviable firmness and determination, simultaneously dismissing as unfounded Lenin’s reproaches for haste. Here are the main points set out in his letter addressed to Lenin and other members of the Politburo.

“Letter from I.V. Stalin

Strictly confidential.

IN AND. Lenin and members of the Politburo: vol. Zinoviev, Kalinin, Kamenev, Molotov, Rykov, Tomsky, Trotsky (Response to Comrade Lenin’s letter to Comrade Kamenev).

1. Regarding paragraph 1 of the commission’s resolution, in my opinion, we can agree with Comrade Lenin’s proposal, formulating it as follows: “to recognize as expedient the formal unification of the Soviet socialist republics of Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia with the RSFSR into the Union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia “(Bukhara, Khorezm and the Far Eastern Republic, of which the first are not socialist, and the third has not yet been Sovietized, remain outside the formal unification for now).

2. Regarding paragraph 2, Comrade Lenin’s amendment on the creation, along with the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR, of a federal All-Russian Central Executive Committee, in my opinion, should not be accepted: the existence of two Central Executive Committees in Moscow, of which one will apparently represent the “lower house”, and the other the “upper house” “, - will give nothing but conflicts and friction. Instead of Comrade Lenin’s amendment, I propose the following amendment: “in accordance with this, the Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR will be transformed into a federal Central Executive Committee, the decisions of which are binding on the central institutions that are part of the union of republics.” I think that any other decision in the sense of Comrade Lenin’s amendment should lead to the mandatory creation of a Russian Central Executive Committee with the exclusion from there of the eight autonomous republics (Tatrespublika, Turkrespublika, etc.) that are part of the RSFSR, to the declaration of the latter as independent along with Ukraine and other independent republics , to the creation of two chambers in Moscow (Russian and federal), and, in general, to deep restructuring, which at the moment is not caused either by internal or external necessity and that, in my opinion, under the given conditions it is inappropriate and, in any case, premature.

3. Regarding paragraph 3, Comrade Lenin’s minor amendments are purely editorial in nature.

4. According to paragraph 4, in my opinion, Comrade Lenin “hurried” by demanding the merger of the People's Commissariats of Finance, Food, Labor and National Economy into the federal People's Commissariats. There can hardly be any doubt that this “haste” will provide food for the “independents” to the detriment of Comrade Lenin’s national liberalism.

5. Regarding paragraph 5, Comrade Lenin’s amendment, in my opinion, is unnecessary.

I. Stalin."

Here, as they say, I found a scythe on a stone. Both leaders are firm. Lenin not only does not express readiness to come to any compromise option, but, on the contrary, intends to intensify attacks on Stalin’s position. This is evidenced by the exchange of notes between Kamenev and Stalin the day after the letter was sent to Stalin:

Kamenev: Ilyich prepared to go to war in defense of independence. He invites me to meet the Georgians. He even refuses yesterday's amendments. Maria Ilyinichna called.

Stalin: What is needed, in my opinion, is firmness against Ilyich. If a couple of Georgian Mensheviks influence the Georgian communists, and the latter influence Ilyich, then the question arises - what does “independence” have to do with it?

Kamenev: I think that since Vladimir Ilyich insists, it will be worse to resist.

Stalin: Don't know. Let him do as he pleases."

Stalin, for his part, in principle does not completely abandon his previous position. Moreover, he sarcastically “returns” Lenin’s accusations to Lenin himself and even bluntly reproaches him for national liberalism. At the same time, showing flexibility, Stalin, as if abdicating all responsibility, notes - let him do as he pleases.

But in general, there is reason to conclude that at the plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) in October 1922 definite decision in the end they managed to find it and it seemed that the conflict was put to an end. The Plenum recognized the need to conclude an agreement between Ukraine, Belarus, the Federation of Transcaucasian Republics and the RSFSR on their unification into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Plenum condemned the manifestations of great-power chauvinism, at the same time rebuffed Mdivani, who first objected to the formation of the USSR, and then insisted that Georgia join the USSR not through the Transcaucasian Federation, but directly.

However, further developments showed that this was not the end of the confrontation between Lenin and Stalin, but only a certain phase of calm, behind the scenes of which the most intense confrontation continued. There is every reason to assume that Lenin decided to give Stalin a decisive and uncompromising battle, using the problem of autonomy for this. Apparently, the critical passages he expressed in his will against Stalin did not seem convincing enough to him to achieve his release from the post of Secretary General. And he decided, as it were, to reinforce his positions by accusing Stalin of patronizing great-power aspirations and supposedly groundless attacks on Georgian national deviationists.

To this end, on Lenin’s instructions, his secretariat prepared the processing of materials from three commissions of the Party Central Committee on the Georgian issue and the corresponding conclusions. Lenin closely followed this work and directed it in the direction he needed. The conclusion, prepared in an appropriate manner (of course, anti-Stalinist), was supposed to reinforce the seriousness and scale of the accusations against Stalin.

About how much important The leader added that the commission’s materials indicate that rumors persistently circulated in his secretariat (allegedly from the words of Lenin himself) that he was “preparing a bomb” for Stalin. The notes of duty secretaries record Lenin's special activity in this matter: “On January 24, Vladimir Ilyich summoned Fotieva and gave instructions to request from Dzerzhinsky or Stalin the materials of the commission on the Georgian issue and study them in detail. This order was given to Fotieva, Glyasser and Gorbunov. The goal is a report to Vladimir Ilyich, who needs this for the party congress. He apparently did not know that the issue was being raised in the Politburo. He said: “On the eve of my illness, Dzerzhinsky spoke to me about the work of the commission and about the “incident,” and this had a very serious impact on me.”.

“On Thursday, January 25, he asked if the materials had been received. I replied that Dzerzhinsky would arrive only on Saturday. And that’s why I couldn’t ask him yet.

On Saturday I asked Dzerzhinsky, he said that Stalin had the materials. I sent a letter to Stalin, but he was not in Moscow. Yesterday, January 29, Stalin called that he could not give materials without the Politburo. He asked if I was telling Vladimir Ilyich something unnecessary, how did he know about current affairs? For example, his article on RCTs indicates that he is aware of some circumstances. I answered - I’m not saying and I have no reason to think that he is in the know. Today Vladimir Ilyich called to find out the answer, and said that he would fight for the materials to be given.”

It is obvious that Stalin, following the decision of the plenum of the Central Committee to protect Lenin from unnecessary unrest that could affect the course of his illness, tried in every possible way to prevent Lenin’s access to information. Officially, this was presented as concern for Ilyich’s health. However, these actions of Stalin can also be legitimately interpreted as a direct attempt to deprive Lenin of the necessary information in order to prevent his direct intervention in the resolution of the ongoing conflict. In my opinion, both versions have almost an equal right to exist.

However, Lenin was impatient; he could not wait for the commission’s work to end. The instinct of a political fighter prompted him to immediately deliver another powerful blow to Stalin, which, as Lenin apparently hoped, would finally knock Stalin out of the saddle and politically discredit him. Since such serious political mistakes and miscalculations in the field of national policy generally called into question the party authority and Stalin’s position in the leadership. Lenin’s famous letter “On the question of nationalities or “autonomization”,” dictated by him on December 30 and 31, 1922, was such a blow. With this letter, Lenin dealt a preemptive blow to Stalin and his supporters.

The Congresses of Soviets of the Ukrainian SSR, BSSR, and ZSFSR, as well as the 10th All-Russian Congress of Soviets, held in December 1922, recognized the timely unification of the Soviet republics into a single union state. At the X Congress of Soviets of the RSFSR on December 26, 1922 in Moscow, Stalin made a report “On the unification of the Soviet republics.” At the 1st Congress of Soviets of the USSR, he made a report “On the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.” The First Congress of Soviets of the USSR approved the Declaration on the Formation of the USSR. It formulated the basic principles of the unification of the republics: equality and voluntariness of their entry into the USSR, the right to freely secede from the Union and access to the Union for new Soviet socialist republics. The Congress reviewed and approved the Treaty on the Formation of the USSR. Initially, the USSR included the RSFSR, Ukrainian SSR, BSSR, and ZSFSR.

It seems like some kind of historical paradox that all this happened in the midst of Lenin’s struggle against Stalin. Sharply criticized and, one might say, nailed to the post as a leader of all-Russian proportions, Stalin acted, at least officially, as the founding father of the new state. This historical paradox nevertheless contained some kind of logic, its own internal meaning. And it is no coincidence that subsequently the formation, strengthening and development of this union state, its transformation into a powerful world power of the 20th century. Paradoxical as it may sound, it was N. Bukharin - one of Stalin's main political opponents - who, if not laid the foundation, then became one of the pioneers of praising the Secretary General as the founder of the Union State. In a substantial volume published on the 10th anniversary of Lenin’s death under the auspices of the Academy of Sciences, he wrote a long article. The article, full of irrepressible praises addressed to Stalin, also contained the following passage: “on the solid rails of Lenin’s national policy, the Union was created, the idea of which belonged to Stalin”.

However, let us return to Lenin’s letter, which he began dictating just on the day of the formation of the USSR. In this, if you wish, you can also catch some kind of mystical coincidence.

I will not set forth the entire content of Lenin’s dictation “On the question of nationalities or “autonomization”.” I will only touch on aspects related directly to Stalin, the main target of which he, in fact, was.

Lenin begins with the fact that, “I am very guilty before the workers of Russia for not intervening energetically and sharply enough in the notorious question of autonomy, officially called, it seems, the question of the union of Soviet socialist republics”. He further notes that “apparently, this whole idea of “autonomization” was fundamentally wrong and untimely”. “I think that Stalin’s haste and administrative enthusiasm, as well as his anger against the notorious “social-nationalism,” played a fatal role here. In general, anger usually plays the worst role in politics.”.

Having made a sharp attack against Stalin, Lenin considered it his duty to theoretically support his position so that it did not seem too personally directed against the General Secretary and those who supported him or took a neutral position. He emphasizes: “I have already written in my works on the national question that an abstract formulation of the question of nationalism in general is no good. It is necessary to distinguish between the nationalism of the oppressing nation and the nationalism of the oppressed nation, the nationalism of a large nation and the nationalism of a small nation.

In relation to the second nationalism, almost always in historical practice, we, the nationals of a large nation, find ourselves guilty of an infinite amount of violence, and even more than that, we imperceptibly commit an infinite amount of violence and insults - one has only to recall my Volga memories of how We are treated differently by foreigners, just as a Pole is not called anything other than a “Pole”, a Tatar is not ridiculed other than a “prince”, a Ukrainian is not called anything other than a “crest”, a Georgian and other Caucasian foreigners are not called a “Kapkaz man”.

Therefore, internationalism on the part of the oppressor or the so-called “great” nation (albeit great only by its violence, great only in the way that the government is great) must consist not only in maintaining the formal equality of nations, but also in such inequality that would compensate on the part of the oppressing nation , the nation is large, the inequality that actually develops in life. Whoever did not understand this did not understand the truly proletarian attitude to the national question, he remained, in essence, on the petty-bourgeois point of view and therefore cannot help but slide every minute to the bourgeois point of view.”.

Lenin continues, without mentioning Stalin by name, but clearly meaning him, "I think that in in this case, in relation to the Georgian nation, we have a typical example of where extreme caution, consideration and compliance are required on our part by a truly proletarian attitude to business. That Georgian who is dismissive of this aspect of the matter, scornfully hurls accusations of “social-nationalism” (while he himself is a real and true “social-nationalist”, but also a rude Great-Russian idiot), that Georgian, in essence, violates the interests of proletarian class solidarity, because nothing retards the development and strengthening of proletarian class solidarity more than national injustice... That is why in this case it is better to over-salt in the direction of compliance and softness towards national minorities than to under-salt. That is why, in this case, the fundamental interest of proletarian solidarity, and consequently of the proletarian class struggle, requires that we never formally treat the national question, but always take into account the obligatory difference in the attitude of the proletarian of the oppressed (or small) nation to the oppressive (or large) nation. ».

Then follow, so to speak, the conclusions of the organizational and political plan: “... we need to roughly punish Comrade. Ordzhonikidze (I say this with all the greater regret that I personally am one of his friends and worked with him abroad in exile), also to further investigate or re-investigate all the materials of the Dzerzhinsky commission with a view to correcting the enormous mass of incorrectness and biased judgments that undoubtedly exist there . Stalin and Dzerzhinsky should, of course, be made politically responsible for this entire truly Great-Russian nationalist campaign.”.

This is the content of Lenin’s verdict on Stalin’s national policy and, more generally speaking, his line in general in the field of nation-state building. The blow was more than sensitive. However, Lenin himself did not give any orders regarding future fate its verdict regarding Stalin and his supporters. True, in the form of a kind of safety net, it was brought to the attention of Trotsky, whom Lenin counted on as an ally in the fight against Stalin. One gets the impression that Lenin did not fully expect that without his personal participation this letter in itself would be able to play its intended role - to overthrow Stalin politically, to achieve not only his condemnation in political terms, but also to relieve him from the post of General Secretary. Although the amount of charges was more than impressive.

Stalin and his supporters believed that differences with Lenin could have been resolved in a working manner, but this was allegedly prevented by the leader’s illness. Thus, during the party discussion in 1923, members of the Politburo (with the exception, of course, of Trotsky) gave the following explanations for the entire conflict on the national question and the reasons that prevented it from being resolved properly without aggravating the contradictions: “When the most difficult transition to the creation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was made and the national question was raised anew, some differences among our main old Bolshevik core seemed to really be emerging. First, on every issue related to this transition, we had extensive interviews with Comrade. Lenin, in particular, between Comrades Lenin and Stalin. There is no doubt that if Vladimir Ilyich’s illness had not interfered, we would have reached an agreement 100 percent. But it is precisely the impossibility of personal and then written negotiations with comrade. Lenin led to the fact that some misunderstandings remained, mainly on the issue of assessing the well-known conflict in the Georgian Communist Party. All this taken together gave rise to the famous letter from Comrade. Lenin".

But the whole problem was that Lenin could not take direct part in the battle. At the same time, he was aware that Stalin not only had supporters, but certain part Party workers both in the center and locally, to one degree or another, were in solidarity with Stalin regarding the danger of local national deviation and nationalism in general. By no means the entire party and the entire leadership accepted Lenin’s philippics against Great Russian chauvinism with an open soul and sincerely. After all, the task ahead was to create a single and cohesive state, and the only foundation for such a unification could only be the Russian people. Excessive emphasis on the fight against Great Russian chauvinism could turn into a boomerang and strike at the very idea of creating a single multinational state. In addition to the correct theoretical postulates, there was a harsh reality that could not be ignored.

Apparently internally aware of a certain vulnerability of his strategy, Lenin in early March 1923 specifically addressed Trotsky with a letter that said:

“L.D. TROTSKY

Strictly confidential.

Dear comrade. Trotsky!

I would ask you very much to take upon yourself the defense of the Georgian cause at the Party Central Committee. This matter is now under the “persecution” of Stalin and Dzerzhinsky, and I cannot rely on their impartiality. Quite the opposite. If you agreed to take on his protection, then I could be calm. If for some reason you do not agree, then return the entire matter to me. I will take this as a sign of your disagreement.

With best comradely greetings Lenin

It would seem that the hour of longed-for retribution had come for Trotsky, when he, relying on Lenin, could strike a blow at Stalin in order, if not to plunge the latter into the abyss of political oblivion, then to inflict colossal political damage on him. However, Trotsky did not actually respond to Lenin’s request, to justify which he gave an unconvincing argument: “In response to Vladimir Ilyich’s letter to Comrade Trotsky about the Georgian question, Comrade Trotsky replied that since he was ill, he could not take on such an obligation, but since he hoped that he would soon recover, he asked to send him materials (if they are not necessary for anyone) for familiarization and, if his health allows him, he will read them.”.

But the point is not in the excuses themselves, in their validity or inconsistency. One fact was clear: Trotsky avoided direct confrontation with Stalin and his then supporters.

Around the same time, Lenin sent his last letter in his life (this is generally the last document belonging to Lenin), addressed to the Georgian national deviationists. Here is its full text:

“B.G. MDIVANI, F.E. MAKHARADZE ET AL.

Strictly confidential.

vol. Mdivani, Makharadze and others. Copy - vol. Trotsky and Kamenev

Dear comrades!

I follow your business with all my heart. Outraged by the rudeness of Ordzhonikidze and the indulgences of Stalin and Dzerzhinsky. I am preparing notes and a speech for you.

Sincerely, Lenin

It was last chord in the political party that Lenin played.

On March 10, he suffered a new, even more cruel blow, from which he could not recover until his death. Since then, Lenin has actually turned into political corpse. Personally, he could not have any influence on the course of events. But this does not mean that his voice (although he lost the ability to speak and write and was actually semi-paralyzed) as the leader and undisputed leader of the party lost its significance. He and the patient, like an invisible shadow, hung over the hosts of his comrades. His letters and recommendations, although they were known only to a very narrow circle of people, continued to play an important role in the life of the party and the country, remained a powerful political weapon, which each of warring parties tried to turn it to her advantage.

Stalin remained fully vigilant at this time and tried to respond appropriately to the development of events, in the epicenter of which he himself found himself. There are good reasons to believe that he was aware of Lenin's latest political dictations. The proof of this is that literally the next day after Lenin’s address to the Georgian national deviationists, he sent the following telegram to his comrade-in-arms, the secretary of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee S. Ordzhonikidze:

"G. Moscow

Strictly confidential

Dear Sergo!

I learned from Comrade Kamenev that Ilyich was sending Comrade. A letter to Makharadze and others, where he stands in solidarity with the draft dodgers and scolds you, Comrade Dzerzhinsky and me. Apparently there is a goal to put pressure on the will of the Congress of the Communist Party of Georgia in favor of the draft dodgers. Needless to say, the draft dodgers, having received this letter, are using it with all their might against the Regional Committee, especially against you and Comrade Myasnikov. My advice:

1. The Regional Committee should not put any pressure on the will of the majority of the Communist Party of Georgia, let this will finally fully manifest itself, whatever it may be.

2. Achieve a compromise, but such a compromise that can be carried out without harsh influence on the majority of responsible workers in Georgia, i.e. a natural, voluntary compromise.

7 III.23 Moscow

Yours I. Stalin"

It is clear from the text of the telegram that Stalin was aware of the strength of his position, despite all Lenin’s efforts to discredit him politically. He already had solid capital behind him; it was he, and no one else, who made official reports on the formation of the USSR. In addition, and this apparently played a primary role, he knew about Lenin’s practically hopeless condition and understood that it would not be so easy for the latter to deprive Stalin of the positions he had won.

Meanwhile, Lenin tried to launch an offensive against Stalin not only in the field of national politics. In a number of other articles - “Less is better, but better”, “How can we reorganize the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspectorate”, etc. - Lenin subjected the work of the People’s Commissariat of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection to devastating, downright withering criticism, presenting it as the worst of all the People’s Commissariats in which things are going very bad. By the way, by the time Lenin criticized the Rabkrin, Stalin had not worked there for almost a year - shortly after his election Secretary General. In addition, long before Lenin’s criticism, Stalin himself proposed to reorganize the work of another commissariat, which he headed. At the section of the XII Party Congress on the national question, he said, in particular:

“I fought for two years to destroy the People’s Commissariat of Nationalities and was refused.

This is an organ that does nothing and slows down the work. I was not freed from drug addiction. I was a forced person here too. Still, what I proposed to the Central Committee is not the People’s Commissariat of Nationalities. The People's Commissariat is a campaign commissariat; the People's Commissariat does not have any administrative rights, but I proposed to create a second chamber, which would be on a par with the first chamber, which would report on the needs and wants of various nationalities, which would conduct, push for implementation, and so on.”

As we see, Stalin not only defended himself, but also sought to deliver, so to speak, preemptive strikes. Apparently, this explains his repeated statements about his resignation from the post of People's Commissar of the RKI. But they were rejected by others, primarily by Lenin himself. Now, in an effort to overthrow Stalin, he concentrated his criticism on the work of this People's Commissariat. By the way, in the correspondence and exchange of opinions between members of the Politburo in connection with the discussion of whether to publish Lenin’s article in Pravda, some expressed surprise that Lenin cited the NKID as an exemplary People’s Commissariat. The situation in other people's commissariats was not much better than in the People's Commissariat of the RKI. Everyone knew this well and drew the appropriate conclusion - the object of criticism is not only, and perhaps not so much the People's Commissariat itself, but Stalin, long time who stood at the head of this People's Commissariat.

The documents, by the way, recorded all the vicissitudes of the fuss around the issue of publishing Lenin’s last works, in particular, about the Rabkrin. Some members of the leadership, fearing that the leader's alarmist forecasts regarding a possible split in the party could disorganize the situation in the party and in the country as a whole, spoke out against their publication. In particular, it was even proposed to print the issue of Pravda in a single copy, in order to reassure the worried leader in this way.

This is how Trotsky presented this whole story during the party discussion in October 1923 (i.e., hot on the heels):

“It is absolutely true that I had a very negative attitude towards the old Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspectorate. However, Comrade Lenin, in his article “Less is better,” gave such a devastating assessment of the Rabkrin, which I would never have dared to give: “The People’s Commissariat of the Rabkrin does not now enjoy a shadow of authority. Everyone knows that there are no worse established institutions than the institutions of our Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate, and that when modern conditions There’s nothing to ask from this People’s Commissariat.” If we remember who stood at the head of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate for the longest time, it is not difficult to understand against whom this characterization, as well as the article on the national issue, was directed.

...At the Politburo immediately convened at my suggestion, all those present: t.t. Stalin, Molotov, Kuibyshev, Rykov, Kalinin, Bukharin were not only against Comrade Lenin’s plan, but also against the very publication of the article. Members of the Secretariat objected especially sharply and categorically. In view of Comrade Lenin’s insistent demands that the article be shown to him in printed form, Comrade Kuibyshev, the future People’s Commissar of the Rabkrin, proposed at the said meeting of the Politburo to print in one copy a special issue of Pravda with Comrade Lenin’s article in order to reassure him, at the same time hiding the article from the party.”

Personally, I believe that the version presented by Trotsky is much closer to the truth than that defended by Stalin himself and others involved in this episode.

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The relationships that had developed by this time between the independent republics were built on the basis of equal treaties on military-political and economic alliances. The tasks of strengthening defense, restoring and further developing the national economy along the path of socialism, political, economic and cultural advancement of all nationalities required closer unity of the Soviet republics into a single multinational state. Question about political form multinational Soviet socialist state and was the main one in the work of the commission of the Central Committee of the party. Plan Autonomation was discussed by the plenums of the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of the republics and was not supported at most of them. Nevertheless, the commission at meetings on September 23 and 24, 1922 approved Stalin’s theses on Autonomation This decision was wrong. Theses about Autonomation took into account the requirements of strict unity and centralization of the efforts of the Soviet republics, but at the same time violated the sovereign rights of these republics; were, in essence, a step back in comparison with already established forms of nation-state building.

V.I. Lenin (he was ill), having familiarized himself with the materials of the commission and having talked with a number of comrades, sent a letter on September 26, 1922 to members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), in which he made a fundamental criticism of the plan Autonomation, put forward and justified the idea of forming a union state on the basis of complete equality of all independent Soviet republics: “... we recognize ourselves as equal in rights with the Ukrainian SSR and others, and together and on an equal basis with them we are entering a new union, a new federation...” - wrote Lenin (Poln. sobr. soch., 5th ed., vol. 45, p. 211). Lenin emphasized that it was necessary not to destroy the independence of the republics, but to create “...another new floor, a federation of equal republics” (ibid., p. 212). On October 6, 1922, Lenin sent a note to the Politburo of the Party Central Committee in which he categorically insisted on equal representation of all union republics in the leadership of the federal Central Executive Committee (see ibid., p. 214). Lenin’s plan for the creation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics formed the basis of the commission’s new draft, which was reported by Stalin and approved by the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) on October 6, 1922.

To criticize the plan Autonomation Lenin returned in one of his last letters - “On the question of nationalities or “autonomization”.” Lenin wrote that “... this whole idea, “autonomization,” was fundamentally wrong and untimely” (ibid., p. 356), that it could only bring harm, distorting the ideas of unification of Soviet republics in the spirit of great-power chauvinism. The draft violated the principle of self-determination of nations, giving independent republics only the right to autonomous existence within the RSFSR. Lenin opposed excessive centralism in matters of unification and demanded maximum attention and caution in resolving issues of national policy. The unification of the republics must be carried out in a form that will truly ensure the equality of nations and strengthen the sovereignty of each union republic, “... the union of socialist republics should be retained and strengthened; - Lenin wrote, - there can be no doubt about this measure. We need it, just as the world communist proletariat needs it to fight the world bourgeoisie and to protect itself from its intrigues” (ibid., p. 360). Lenin’s letter was read out at a meeting of the heads of delegations of the 12th Congress of the RCP(b) (April 1923), his instructions formed the basis of the congress resolution “On the National Question”.

The triumph of Lenin's ideas of proletarian internationalism, fraternal friendship and the unity of equal and sovereign peoples was the formation of the USSR, completed by the 1st All-Union Congress of Soviets on December 30, 1922.

Lit.: Lenin V.I., On the formation of the USSR, Complete. collection cit., 5th ed., vol. 45; him, On the question of nationalities or “autonomization”, ibid.; History of nation-state building in the USSR, M., 1968, p. 355-69.

L. Autonomation Zavelev, L. V. Metelitsa.

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