Relations between Russia and the countries of the Transcaucasus at the present stage. Russian policy in Transcaucasia...

03.08.2019

Question 26.Relations between Russia and the countries of Transcaucasia at the present stage

This region includes three countries: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia. These three countries are former republics The USSR is still part of the CIS. Armenia and Azerbaijan joined the CIS on December 21, 1991, and Georgia joined only in December 1993. Transcaucasia is a complex subregion, which is characterized by great contradictions within countries. The situation around Nagorno-Karabakh, a very difficult situation in Georgia (the problem of the Republic of South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Adjara are striving to gain independence and secede from Georgia) Presidents: Azerbaijan - Elham Aliyev, Armenia - Robert Kocheryan, Georgia - Mikheil Saakashvili. Relations between Russia and the Transcaucasian republics are built on the principles approved by the president in 2000. These are the principles of peaceful existence, good neighborliness, recognition of the integrity and borders of the state, the principle of cooperation, as well as the principle of an individual approach. Bilateral agreements have been concluded with all three countries. Russia's cooperation with these countries goes at different speeds.

After the collapse of the USSR, diplomatic relations between Russia and Azerbaijan were established on April 4, 1992. The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Security was concluded between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan in 1997. In 2001, the Baku Declaration of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan was signed. Russian-Azerbaijani political cooperation in Lately noticeably intensified. These countries interact on a wide range of issues. Both independently and within the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group. Russia continues to make efforts to promote a speedy political solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. Russia stands for maintaining a settlement scheme that would suit all parties involved and is ready to act as a guarantor of the agreements reached. Law enforcement R. and A. have reached a high level of interaction in the areas of security and the fight against terrorism. In the field of trade and economic cooperation, it was possible to utilize the potential of cooperation to a greater extent. Over the ten months of 2002, Russian-Azerbaijani trade turnover increased by 70.6% compared to the same period last year. Russian exports increased by 116%. In 2002, an agreement was signed between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan on long-term economic cooperation for the period until 2010. The Azerbaijani leadership pays attention to the problems of ethnic Russians. In secondary and higher education educational institutions a significant Russian sector remains. Russia supplies Azerbaijan with machine tools and equipment for the oil industry, and the countries cooperate in the field of new technologies.

Diplomatic relations with Armenia were established on April 3, 1992. The interaction between Russia and Armenia in the political and military fields is developing particularly dynamically and remains the dominant direction of bilateral relations. Contacts are actively being carried out at the highest and other levels. Russia and Armenia jointly guard the Armenian section of the external border of the CIS, and therefore a Russian border group is stationed in the country. The 102nd Russian military base is also located in Armenia. Armenia supports Russia in strengthening the CIS. As one of the most active participants in the Treaty on collective security, Armenia stands for increasing cooperation in this area. Trade and economic cooperation lags behind the level political relations. Nevertheless, Russia continues to be Armenia's leading trading partner. Russia ranks first in terms of volumes of direct investment in the Armenian economy. A Russian-Armenian agreement on long-term economic cooperation for the period until 2010 was signed. The most promising area of Russian-Armenian cooperation remains the fuel and energy complex.

The most difficult relations are with Georgia. Agreements are practically not implemented. Diplomatic relations were established on July 1, 1992. There is a political dialogue between the Russian Federation and Georgia within the framework of the Caucasian Four. Russian-Georgian negotiations on military affairs continue

V.V. Degoev
Russian policy in Transcaucasia in the first half of the 19th century: some
results
As the Transcaucasian territories were annexed or conquered in the first third of the 19th century.
Russia faced the problem of managing them. It was necessary to find such a form of imperial
presence in this region, which will, first of all, ensure social
political stability, which is necessary, among other things, to solve current and future
foreign policy tasks. The matter was complicated by a number of factors. From a language point of view,
religion, culture, internal structure, Transcaucasian state and
parastatals were heterogeneous. Inside them they often reigned
fragmentation and strife, and between them - enmity and rivalry, most often for the “local”
hegemony. Administrative and judicial uniformity, and even then conditional, existed
only within one territorial-political unit - be it a kingdom, a principality,
khanate, union of communities (etc.). However, the benefit from such uniformity, as a rule, was
little, due to the arbitrariness of rulers and feudal lords, the chaos in land relations and
taxation, civil strife and robbery.
These circumstances both created problems for Russia and helped them
allow. Local social elites and ordinary people gradually began to see the empire as
supreme power, arbitrator, supra-class and supranational instrument of organization
life according to rational rules. Almost all social strata sooner or later
come to realize the comforts of existence in a new, imperial order,
putting an end to the “war of all against all.” It is order, organization, system, how
synonyms of peace, security and prosperity are gradually becoming key for people,
vital ideas. The universal and ever-increasing need for this way of being
forced St. Petersburg to look for ways to satisfy it and suggested strategic
the direction in which it should have developed Russian politics in Transcaucasia.
However, this in no way detracts from the complexity and scale of the challenges facing Russia.
tasks, and in no way justifies the miscalculations she made.
It immediately became clear to the Russian authorities in Transcaucasia that the unification of this region according to
the imperial-provincial model is a risky, expensive and ineffective activity. In
In any case, such a process – historical in its content – required time.
Petersburg was in no hurry to force it, although different views were expressed on how
speed and in what forms should the involvement of Transcaucasia in the imperial
system.
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The Russian administration in the annexed territories wore predominantly
military and emergency nature. Generals and officers had to deal with
civil affairs, reconcile socio-political elites, improve cities,
build roads, etc. Russian soldiers were used as cheap and highly qualified
work force.
The notorious principle of “divide and conquer”, which is customary, although often
groundlessly, is associated with Russian policy in Transcaucasia, has lost its rational
meaning. Previously, for example, in the 18th century, it - and even then in certain situations - was useful
Petersburg. Now that this mosaic region is under the scepter of the king, the task
was not a split, but a unification of disparate elements in the name of achieving stability and
controllability.
The problem of nonviolent integration faced Russia the more acutely, the more clearly
there was a shortage of Russian troops in Transcaucasia and a lack of management experience
newly acquired lands. We can say that flexible and cautious approaches to this
problems arose partly spontaneously, under the influence of the realities of life that were not conducive to the method
cutting the intra-Caucasian Gordian knots. There was clear understanding on the part of Russia
the harmful consequences of the rapid breakdown of the traditional socio-economic, political
and cultural way of life. Hence the tolerance for local administrative diversity.
Imperial power was not introduced everywhere, but even where it was introduced, it often carried
nominal character, making itself felt only by those who openly demonstrated
disloyalty to her.
The motives for such a policy were based not only on objective difficulties, but also
instinctive and completely understandable reluctance of the Caucasian governors to delve deeply and
get involved in the complex intricacies of local life. Ultimately that's what
the circumstance became, oddly enough, a common source for two opposing concepts
integration strategy, which received the code names “centralism” and “regionalism”.
The “centralists” advocated the speediest imperial-administrative unification of Transcaucasia;
“regionalists” proposed to act gradually, without rushing to abolish those local
features that over time will either die out on their own or will be relatively
painlessly and organically replaced by new political forms.
These two approaches have never existed in pure form, that's why it shouldn't
exaggerate the intensity of the struggle between them. What is stated as a “victory of centralism” in
the second half of the 19th century, is in fact much more ambiguous
phenomenon. The “regionalist” component, as an inevitable product of healthy opportunism,
has always been and is still present in Russian policy in the Caucasus.
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Introduction of imperial administration into Russian possessions in Transcaucasia (where it is
took place) did not mean that Russian provinces were made from the annexed territories. Life
forced us to look for flexible approaches. For government service, civil and military,
representatives of local peoples were recruited, and not necessarily belonging to
social elite or Christian faith. The main criteria were loyalty to Russia and
professional suitability. They received the privileges of the ruling class, thanks to which
formation of a new Transcaucasian political elite happened relatively smoothly. Them
this marked the beginning of the process of the emergence among the non-Russian population of the imperial
identity. This trend developed in parallel with the growth of national self-awareness,
most often getting along with him, but sometimes replacing him. In socio-psychological terms
the willingness of the local elite to identify themselves with the empire was determined by the desire
belong to the corporation of the chosen, share its spirit and values, enjoy its benefits and
symbolism. Grounds for moral doubts related to the problem of responsibility to
by its peoples, was practically absent. The fact is that for part of the new ruling class
this problem never existed. The more scrupulous could console their consciences by
that they do not betray the people's interests, but protect them.
Co-optation of Georgians and Armenians into the “colonial” management system and education in them
The imperial worldview was facilitated by religious community with the Russians. In the case of
By the Muslim Turks, the same goal was achieved by the religious tolerance of the Russians.
Moreover, in relation to Islam, the Russian government took an emphatically
protective stance, with the clear intention of attracting the Muslim clergy to
implementation of the imperial political course. Later, in light of events Caucasian War, many
government officials in Russia and the Caucasus will regard this as a misguided social bet,
brought negative results.
However, the main work of the integration mechanism still took place in secular
sphere. In the first half of the 19th century. in Transcaucasia an influential layer of enlightened
"colonial" bureaucracy, represented by people who were filled with high,
a sincere sense of moral responsibility for the “civilization” task entrusted to them,
sovereign mission. Among them there were many who understood, appreciated and even admired
before the Caucasian culture, recognizing its right to original development under imperial
aegis. Far ahead of their time, they abandoned the arrogant Kulturtraeger view
on the “native” spiritual life, from the evil temptation to compare it with Russian-European
values in the context of the categories “higher-lower”, “better-worse”. They were already with everyone
course of action raised the question not of absorption, but of cultivation of the phenomenon that was
aptly named by the Canadian historian G. Rhinelander as a national-imperial culture. And in
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Ultimately, it is this and no other formula - despite the mass of objective and
subjective obstacles - will triumph in the second half of the 19th century and, even more so, in the century
twentieth.
There is both a paradox and a logic in the fact that an enlightened bureaucracy is born and begins
their active civic activities under the toughest, most imperial-minded
(in the eyes of many - the most odious) Caucasian governors - P. D. Tsitsianov and A. P.
Ermolov. Professional military men brought up in the appropriate spirit, these generals
saw their purpose primarily in establishing internal order in the region and protecting it
from external threats, which from now on becomes a security problem for Russia, that is -
priority problem of any state. Hence the widespread use of power
methods. However, they were not an end in themselves and were used only in cases where peaceful
the remedies did not work, although, of course, the question remains far from idle - to what extent this or that
the other situation was truly hopeless.
P. D. Tsitsianov and A. P. Ermolov realized that, in addition to the army, another one was needed
toolkit to fight against disorder. It is with this pragmatic goal that they
created a very cohesive colonial-bureaucratic corporation in Transcaucasia, guided by
the message that its effectiveness will be directly proportional to its enlightenment. Special
patronage was enjoyed by those “cadres” who, with their views and creative
potential most of all corresponded to the ideas of the governors about the essence and form of civilizational
Russian missions.
At the same time, P. D. Tsitsianov and A. P. Ermolov could not always completely control
the process of forming an enlightened type of bureaucracy. Often he took spontaneous
character. Thus, the “proconsul of the Caucasus”, of course, had nothing to do with the appearance in
the region under his jurisdiction of the brilliant galaxy of Decembrist figures exiled there
movements. But it cannot be denied that, largely thanks to A.P. Ermolov, the Decembrists
got the opportunity to realize their talents in a new field and play
a colossal role in the Russian-Transcaucasian spiritual rapprochement. Their labors laid the foundations
the basis for the great cultural synthesis that bore such brilliant fruit in the second half
XIX century and especially in the twentieth century.
Largely thanks to the high patronage of A.P. Ermolov, the
that special spiritual environment in which the formation of the brilliant Transcaucasian
intelligentsia. The governor put the system of public education in
Transcaucasia. Before Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijani youths - regardless of their
social status and religion - prospects for obtaining excellent
education, not only in Tiflis (then the cultural capital of the Caucasus), but also in
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St. Petersburg and Moscow. Along with the prestige of the imperial education system, the
demand for it. According to G. Rhinelander, by the beginning of the 1830s. Transcaucasian intelligentsia
I experienced an increased appetite for everything Russian.
The decade of M. S. Vorontsov as the Caucasian governor was famously
sense of a “golden age” for Transcaucasia. An experienced general and a talented administrator with
a rich list of achievements in the development southern Russia, he actually received complete freedom
actions in the Caucasus and was subordinate only to Nicholas I. This region acquired something similar to
status of a “state within a state”, which was recognition from St. Petersburg
the need to take into account its specifics and not force the process of its “governmentization” according to
standard imperial pattern. Few people understood this a daunting task and was capable
cope with it better than M. S. Vorontsov.
In social, intercorporate and interethnic conflicts that took place in
Transcaucasia, M. S. Vorontsov invariably occupied the position of an arbitrator, impartial
a conciliator, a supra-class authority. This concerned disputes between Christians and
Muslims, Georgians and Armenians, Russians and non-Russians, aristocracy and merchants,
officials and the population. The governor vaccinated to the warring parties And
Transcaucasian society as a whole has a broader, imperial view of things. He saw it
a way to moderate antagonisms, resolve (or prevent) conflict situation, educate
people have a rational-egoistic understanding that benefits for the empire are benefits for
each of her subjects.
M. S. Vorontsov - thanks to his personal qualities and dedication to his work, he infected
universalist spirit most Transcaucasian social elites. They are sincere and
voluntarily accepted imperial ideals and readily offered their help in the field
putting them into practice.
M. S. Vorontsov left behind a whole “colonial-bureaucratic”
class made up of representatives different nations, religions, social classes and
crops All of them were united not only by corporate solidarity, but also by the growing imperial
self-awareness with elements of sovereign patriotism, on the one hand, and “internal Russian
cosmopolitanism,” on the other.
Under M. S. Vorontsov, national-imperial culture in Transcaucasia entered the stage
heyday One of the main prerequisites for this was a personal, deeply respectful
M. S. Vorontsov’s attitude towards spiritual heritage Transcaucasian peoples. Entrusted to him
The region experienced trusteeship from 1845 to 1854. an entire era in which elements of the Renaissance
intertwined with completely new cultural phenomena.
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The question of whether the famous Uvarov triad is suitable - “autocracy,
Orthodoxy, nationality" - for Transcaucasia and to what extent, was very relevant. This formula
contained the idea of a strong individual power uniting a heterogeneous society and standing
over it. It was precisely this kind of power that deeply impressed those Caucasian peoples who once
knew it, but lost it, and those who, having never had anything like it, strived for
autocracy, as a certain political ideal. (In this, by the way, one of the sources is hidden
temporary success of Shamil’s authoritarian project.)
The second component of the triad - “Orthodoxy” - had a more limited area
applications. Only the
Georgians, Armenians and part of the North Caucasian population professed Christianity.
As for “nationality,” this concept was generally inappropriate in relation to
multi-ethnic Caucasus.
Nevertheless, the Russian authorities - sometimes voluntarily and sometimes involuntarily - carried out a large and
unsuccessful work to adapt the “theory of official nationality” to the Caucasian
specificity, or more precisely, precisely that in this theory that could be adapted.
In relation to the Caucasus, the Uvarov triad is appropriately rethought and
adapted - was, in principle, a universal ideological means of education
imperial supra-ethnic and supra-confessional identity. Feeling of loyalty
to the Russian Tsar, combined with a sense of belonging to a “superpower”, slowly but surely
penetrated into all layers of Transcaucasian society. Imperial identity served as a common
in a sense, a protective shell for those being born (or reborn)
“national” identities, to the emergence of which socio-cultural policy
Russia was most directly involved. This policy is often not very well defined.
the correct, at least very conditional, term “Russification”. In fact
a much broader, more capacious and complex civilizational process was taking place, which deserved
in our opinion, a different name. We may be talking more about an “imperial
self-identification" of an individual, class, society, formed under the influence of specific
material and spiritual incentives, a certain cultural and ideological environment and
presupposing a conscious and voluntary choice (otherwise what kind of
"self-identification"?).
The merit of M. S. Vorontsov is that he understood this himself and taught this understanding to his
subordinates, many of whom, however, were no less insightful than their boss.
The Caucasian governor, unlike some predecessors, did not believe that the local
peoples must perceive the benefits of joining the empire as self-evident. He
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gave the opportunity to actually verify this through the active involvement of Georgians, Armenians,
Azerbaijanis in economic, social and cultural life Russia.
At the same time, M. S. Vorontsov was a resolute opponent of artificial planting
imperial forms, preferring to make the process of integration natural, gradual and
organic character. It got to the point that the most zealous Georgian adherents
“Russification” was begged to preserve, at least for a while, useful local laws and customs.
The governor created an atmosphere among his subordinates, which itself formed
something like “Caucasian patriotism”, which united people not by ethnic origin
or religion, but a feeling of involvement in the great work of creating something unprecedented. In
Thanks largely to M. S. Vorontsov, both Russians and Caucasians came to understand that
The Caucasus is their common concern and common destiny, that Russia is not a temporary worker and has come here forever.
Perhaps one of the most beneficial results of this “discovery” was a certain
a moral mood that inspired both Russians and non-Russians alike with a simple idea: everything that
what they do (or don’t do) in the Caucasus belongs and will belong to them and their descendants.
It was precisely this mood that forced the Transcaucasian “governors general” to create
material and spiritual environment for a prosperous life.
* * *
Being essentially a deep “tectonic” shift, the process of integration of Transcaucasia with
Russia had a complex dialectic and did not proceed without costs for both sides - inevitable and,
often tragic. For the Russian authorities to study the local situation and to adapt
Sometimes it took too much time to get to her. And before they could find
the optimal path, they managed to make serious mistakes that caused negative
social reaction. In a certain sense, Russia’s exploration of the Caucasus took place throughout
throughout the 19th century and continued into the twentieth century. Among those Russian military officers and administrators,
who on duty had to deal with this region, not everyone was given
understand it truly deeply. People who have such a gift should be sought out quickly
among those who rushed to the Caucasus at the behest of their hearts and their creative nature.
During the establishment of Russia in Transcaucasia, a certain period of difficult
mutual adaptation different cultures. Russian generals, considering their “civilizational
missionary" as an absolute good, sometimes identified it with the absolute right to bring
to the Caucasian peoples “the light of reason and enlightenment.” They did not always have enough understanding of what
ignorance of Russian and French, inability to use a fork and knife, custom
sitting on the floor, cross-legged, and other “wildness” is not barbarism, but only evidence
belonging to another culture, in its own way no less, if not richer, than the European one.
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The impression of “lack of culture” became more intrusive, the more clearly it was revealed
the dissimilarity of the Caucasian world from the Russian one, including due to the chaotic
the state in which local socio-political and economic life was.
Hence the desire to quickly restore order, which is presented as another
an indispensable attribute of civilization. This desire gave rise to haste and rash
actions in the field of social, educational and religious policy.
The strategy of “divide and conquer” was not always successful: in the end it
increased the disorganization of Caucasian societies, preventing their evolution into a “civilized”
direction.
Petersburg, and after it the Caucasian administrators, clearly underestimated
economic component of integration. Local “system” (“systems”) of management
was either patriarchal or feudal in nature, which in reality was almost one and the same
same. The main merit of Russia was that this “system” received protection from external
danger and internal chaos. However, such favorable conditions in themselves do not
gave impetus to development, they rather preserved this sphere of social life at that
level, which was quite enough for normal existence, but too little for
the emergence of economic needs in Russia and for the transformation of Transcaucasia into
an organic part of the empire.
Until the end of the Caucasian War, the economic potential of the region was virtually
remained unclaimed, even to the extent that it could have been mastered by an underdeveloped,
Compared to the West, Russian industry. Transcaucasia was a “colony” that did not know
colonial exploitation, which made it a loss-making acquisition for the Russian economy.
However, the geostrategic importance of the region paid for all the costs of its maintenance, raising
in the eyes of St. Petersburg to such a value, or rather “super value” category, on
which no imperial money or imperial troops were spared. Already in the first third of the 19th century.
gradually the conditions were being prepared so that in the future - albeit not close -
the geopolitical significance of Transcaucasia was converted into a specific economic
a result that successfully patched one of the “black holes” that was draining Russian finances for
over a long period of time.
The personnel and conceptual support of Russian politics left much to be desired
in Transcaucasia. During the period from 1801 to 1830 there were nine governors there. Of these, perhaps
only two - P. D. Tsitsianov and A. P. Ermolov - had a clear military and political
strategy, but they did not have enough time and funds to implement their plan. Other
the governors did not have a consistent and long-term program, acting rather situationally,
as problems of greater or less complexity arise here and there. They are not
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burdened themselves with creative tasks, preferring to carefully carry out often inappropriate
or hopelessly belated instructions from St. Petersburg, where they had little knowledge of the nuances of the Transcaucasian
situation and, perhaps, were waiting for proactive proposals from the scene. Eventually -
lack of a systematic approach, against the background of which illusions, experiments, miscalculations and
disappointments.
Although in the second echelon of the army (aka civilian) leadership in Transcaucasia
there were many capable people, yet the adoption of the most important decisions did not depend on them
decisions and development of strategic ideas for the long term. Concerning
the rest of the military and official apparatus, then there were all sorts of people in it: those who
conscientiously fulfilled his duty, imbued with deep respect for the “native” world and
thirst to understand him, and those who came to Transcaucasia “to catch happiness and ranks” are careerists,
bribe-takers, daredevils and misfits of different stripes, who despised both the region and its inhabitants, and
sometimes, themselves. They have committed many crimes - theft, murder, violence,
betrayal, sacrilege, insult to national feelings. It would be too much
it is a beautiful delusion to believe that their deeds did not in the least tarnish the image
Russia in the consciousness of the Transcaucasian peoples.
* * *
Despite these and other gross miscalculations that always accompany the “colonial”
politics, the process of imperial integration in Transcaucasia gained strength and acquired character
fundamental and unique phenomenon. This happened largely because in Russia
the image of the empire did not symbolize the domination of one nation over others and not the typical
relations between the metropolis and its colonies. He embodied a super-ideology,
voluntary self-identification, a state of mind and soul of a person, regardless of his faith,
ethnic origin, social class, level of education and culture. And in
in this sense, there were enough people with “imperial identity” among non-Russians and non-Orthodox,
among gentlemen and common people, among bourgeois and Bolshevik politicians.
Despite all the excesses, the transformation of form and essence in Transcaucasia was carried out gradually -
even where social receptivity to the new was extremely high. National
color was not repressed or suppressed, but organically merged with imperial culture,
complementing and enriching it. Not only did the Caucasians borrow from the Russians, but also vice versa: the Russians
willingly flaunted Caucasian paraphernalia, were proud of their “Caucasianness” as some kind of special
identity. The “Russian” theme penetrated deeply into Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijani
literature, and the Caucasus became an irresistible source of inspiration for Russian poets and
writers.
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Due to its syncretic nature, Russian imperial culture (in its broad
sense of the word) served in the Caucasus as a kind of relay of European ideas and
values. In this regard, Russia's policy was a type of Westernization. In the old
Caucasian house, the “window to Europe” was cut by Russian “imperialists” and turned to
north.
By the beginning of the 60s. XIX century, despite a number of fruitful results of Russian presence
in the Caucasus, a huge front of “colonial” work still stretched before her -
political, cultural and economic, from which there was no longer any
possibilities. Having created a support area for further imperial construction in the Caucasus,
Russia could not afford to abandon to the mercy of fate a matter that required so many
efforts and sacrifices. The accumulated experience allowed us to protect ourselves from some mistakes, but did not insure against
others. Has irreversible dynamics been achieved in the Russian-Caucasian integration
process - it's hard to say. Contemporaries who answered this question negatively may
seem overly pessimistic. Those who gave an optimistic answer were probably
would have refrained from it if they had known in advance that in the future Russia would face grave consequences in the Caucasus
tests.

The southern direction and in particular the Caucasus have always been for Russia its soft underbelly. Thus, the leadership of the Russian Empire paid a lot of attention to it, because the main Caucasus ridge, reliably closed to enemies, was the key to the security of the European part of the country from the south. In addition, Russia in Transcaucasia is an opportunity to actively influence Middle Eastern policy and a “nail in the ass” of any Turkish and Anglo-Saxon government.

It is no coincidence that they initially didn’t let her in there for hundreds of years, and then, at the first opportunity, they tried in every possible way to get her out of there. A hundred years ago this almost happened once. But Russia is back. And if you look closely, the current situation in the region sometimes resembles to the smallest detail the events of that era.

History 1920-1921

By the beginning of 1920, it became finally clear that Russia could not be crushed. The civil war left a powerful scar on it, but society was able to consolidate around one of the political forces. By the end of the difficult year of 1919, she was able to inflict a decisive defeat on all her internal enemies, and the question of who would rule Russia no longer stood. As soon as this became clear, the Bolsheviks immediately turned their attention to Transcaucasia, which in the three post-imperial years had turned into a tangle of contradictions and an arena of continuous battles.

At this time, Georgian nationalists unsuccessfully tried to resolve the Abkhaz issue. They also had conflicts with the Ossetians who lived on the southern slopes of the Caucasus range. Armenians and Azerbaijanis had a death grip on each other in Karabakh. On the background historical events in Transcaucasia, everyone was quietly and almost imperceptibly slaughtered by the big world. By this time, Türkiye, defeated in the First World War, had left there. She had no time for territorial expansion. She was surrounded on all sides by enemies who were preparing to partition her, and therefore could no longer help her Azerbaijani brothers in creating their national army, either financially or with instructors. Its influence on Georgia and pressure on Armenia also disappeared.

So, by the beginning of 1920, no one could stop Russia globally in the region. In the spring, the RSFSR attacked Azerbaijan, bringing its proteges to power in the republic with the help of the army. It would seem that this should have led Baku to the final loss of Karabakh, but then the Russians helped resolve this issue, while simultaneously preventing the Azerbaijanis from committing genocide of the indigenous population.

Few people know, but the invasion of Soviet troops into Azerbaijan was blessed by the father of all Turks, Mustafa Kemal. On April 26, 1920 he wrote a letter, in which he promised to assist Moscow in ensuring that Baku does not interfere with its return under Moscow’s wing, and at the same time hoped for Russia’s help in its fight against the Western “imperialists”. On April 27, Soviet units crossed the border and the next day were in Baku, where they proclaimed the Azerbaijan SSR.

In the autumn of the same 1920, Soviet Armenian units, including those recruited from the residents of Karabakh, and Russian troops entered Armenia. The nationalists fled after several defeats.

It's Georgia's turn. It was destroyed (occupied) for 10-12 days at the end of February - beginning of March 1921. In Abkhazia, everything went even faster and easier, and then the time came to officially consolidate the existing status quo.

Just 10 days after the Caucasus issue was resolved, the final Moscow Treaty between the RSFSR and Turkey on the division of the Caucasus was concluded in the Russian capital. What's remarkable about it?

Firstly, signing speed. Obviously, such decisions are not made within a few days, especially under the conditions of those times. Just to get to Moscow, the Turkish delegation needed several days. It seems very likely that on March 16, certain “secret protocols” that had been discussed and adopted earlier (since the spring of 1920) were simply “legalized.”

Secondly, The RSFSR at that time did not have a common border with Turkey. Even the USSR would be created almost two years later, but it was the Russian Federation that then drew the demarcation line between its future territories and Turkey.

She, in the person of her army, became the arbiter for Transcaucasia. Thus, Abkhazia ultimately, after several years of war, concluded an alliance treaty with Georgia.

It is noteworthy that for ten years it was in this status, and then in 1931 it was demoted to autonomy.

Karabakh remained formally part of Azerbaijan, but the Russian army made sure that no one offended the Armenians there.

Ultimately, it received autonomy, whose leadership consisted of former field commanders of the Armenian militia.

And this status quo lasted for almost 60 years, until Russia again found itself on the brink of destruction, which is why it was forced to leave Transcaucasia.

Transcaucasia today or a hundred years later

In the late 1980s, even before the collapse of the USSR, the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict broke out with renewed vigor. A little later, combat reports from Abkhazia and South Ossetia began to appear. Turkey, developing its concept of pan-Turkism, began to establish very close relations with Azerbaijan, turning it into its main ally in the region. Georgia also did not remain aloof from her attention.

Everything is back to normal. Even the Chechen conflict proceeded according to the tracing paper of the 1917-1920s. Russia has entered an intertemporal period, and the question of its very existence has once again appeared on the agenda. And just like 100 years ago, when it seemed to everyone that the end had come, it did not come.

There is no point in describing the vicissitudes of events in Russia; we will touch only on that part of them that concerns the Caucasus. Slowly at first, and then more and more quickly, the country's patriots began to group around Putin's course (as did post-imperial Russian society after the decisive victories of the Bolsheviks in 1919). Chechen problem by the mid-2000s, it was resolved by an exact repetition of the plan of the 1920s, when part of the local elite was allowed into power and received material support from the center. It became clear that very soon Russia would return to Transcaucasia.

The Russian military base in Gyumri turned into a powerful outpost in Armenia, and Saakashvili’s adventure on 08.08.08 made it possible to strengthen not only his authority in the region, but also to finally defeat the plans of Western imperialists to expel Russia from the territory of the former Georgian SSR - Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The initiative has finally passed to Moscow, and all that remains is to create/wait for a moment, like in 1920, when Turkey will be forced to leave the region and deal with its internal problems.

Will the Bolshevik plan work again?

The essence of the RSFSR plan in 1920 was to create certain pro-Russian centers of power in each of the republics and, seizing an opportune moment, bring them to power. Then the use of military force was required Soviet republic, but today, at the beginning of the 21st century, wars have taken on different forms. Hybrid wars are fought even when the guns are not firing, and therefore there is no need to wait for tank columns in Tbilisi or Baku. Everything will be decided in the spirit of the times.

Have a precise plan of action Russian leadership probably not yet, but the main outlines of how the Transcaucasian tangle can be unraveled are already visible.

In mid-June 2016 in Moscow they received letter from Ankara from the second Ataturk, and on August 9, 2016, Turkish President Recep Erdogan arrived on a “historic,” as the press wrote, visit to St. Petersburg, where he was received in the Greek Hall of the Constantine Palace by Russian President Vladimir Putin. As a result, both sides looked satisfied. They talked about historicity, but at first glance nothing historical happened.

Meanwhile, just a few days later, out of the blue, a conflict arose between Syrian government forces and the Kurds in Hasakah. IN Russian media The rhetoric regarding the Kurdish self-defense forces and their plans to build Kurdistan, even within the framework of the Syrian state, was sharply changed.

Meanwhile, the “April war” between Azerbaijan and Armenia was stopped with the personal participation of the Russian President. Both sides were forced to recognize Russia as the arbiter in this matter, and Turkey, after several routine statements “in favor” of Baku, stepped aside, leaving Vladimir Putin to decide the further fate of the conflict himself!

A certain formula was developed, after which the conflict was extinguished. And then almost immediately there was a strange “uprising” of the Armenian veterans of Karabakh. They claimed that the country's leadership had betrayed national interests and is preparing to “surrender” Karabakh to Azerbaijan.

So, a lot of indirect evidence suggests that an agreement in principle has been reached with Turkey, according to which, in exchange for Russia’s help in the fight against the Kurdish threat, Turkey recognizes its interests in Transcaucasia and does not interfere when it establishes its own order there.

It is very likely that in the end Karabakh, as in the 1920s, will return to Azerbaijan, but only legally. Local authority will have very broad autonomy. Russian troops will guarantee this and will likely increase their presence in the region.

And then it will be Georgia's turn, where big changes have occurred over the past few years.

In 2012, Mikheil Saakashvili’s United National Movement party failed miserably in the parliamentary elections. After this defeat, power in the country passed to the Georgian Dream - Democratic Georgia party, created by Georgian businessman Bidzina Ivanishvili.

Ivanishvili’s personality is very ambiguous. You can write a lot about it, but we will briefly judge it by its results.

In fact, the work of Ivanishvili’s party greatly changed Georgia itself. After Mikheil Saakashvili, who turned the country into one big Russophobic camp, he managed to create a tolerant society in which the emergence of parties with any views, including pro-Russian ones, became possible.

At the beginning of October 2016, the next parliamentary elections will be held in Georgia. The party created by Ivanishvili, although it has lost its former public support, judging by the polls, Saakashvili will not give up power in the country to the “nationalists”.

A notable aspect of the campaign will be the high passivity of the population. About half the population does not yet support any of the main forces, each of which is heading towards the West, which has become the norm over the past 10 years.

Just like in Ukraine, where half the population is already tired of the pro-Maidan forces, but there is no force capable of mobilizing these citizens. In general, the processes in the two former Soviet republics are similar.

And here a chance appears for forces professing a different worldview (not Eurocentric). For example, such as one who suddenly appeared out of nowhere in the lenses of the central media and began to be very active election campaign openly pro-Russian socialist leader Valery Kvaratskhelia. The third group also began to occupy a strange position for Georgia. political force in the country of the Democratic Movement of Nino Burjanadze, who recently became persona non grata in Ukraine for her statements about Crimea.

Political opponents do not rule out that pro-Russian Georgian forces may enter parliament, which means that Russia will have a political force in Georgia that it can rely on in the future, especially if Burjanadze’s neutrals occupy the political center.

conclusions

So, with some variations explained by slightly different initial data, we see a repetition of events in Transcaucasia hundred years ago. Russia is gradually restoring its influence and presence in the region and, taking advantage of Turkey’s problems, is preparing to establish mine order. In doing so, it will rely on “understanding” on the part of Ankara and Tehran and on the political preconditions being created.

In the case of Armenia and Azerbaijan, an additional argument will be the consensus of the three main players: the Russian Federation, Turkey, Iran - which is not only possible, but will probably be adopted very soon (if it has not already been achieved). Yes, not everyone will like it, but the alternative for the region means endless war to destroy everyone against everyone. This is exactly what the West was able to instill in 25 years of its Caucasian policy.

At the end of May, three Transcaucasian states celebrate significant dates- next anniversaries of the declaration of national independence of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. Let's agree right away. It's about not about ancient states ancient era, proto-state formations of the Middle Ages, principalities, khanates or melikates.

Building nation-states

In May 1918, after two revolutions and the collapse of the Russian Empire, the experience of creating nation-states based on European models began to be implemented in Transcaucasia.

Today, the study of the political experience of the “first republics” is extremely relevant not only for academic reasons. Numerous problems and contradictions (unresolved border disputes and ethnic conflicts, the relationship of the nationalizing republics to Russia) took shape in their current form precisely during that period. And in state symbols and memorial policy today's countries Transcaucasian events 1918-1921. are of great importance.

On May 26, 1918 it took place last meeting Transcaucasian Seim. At this meeting, the collapse of the Transcaucasian Democratic Federal Republic(a project that envisaged the creation of a federation of three state entities region). At the same time, another meeting of the National Council of Georgia opened, at which the “Act of Independence” of this republic was read out.

Two days later, on May 28, 1918, the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR) appeared, the first republican state Islamic East.

On the same day the Armenian National Council in Tiflis the powers of the government with unlimited powers were given. The Council declared the independence of Armenia, and on May 29 its first prime minister was appointed, and Yerevan was elected as the republican capital.

In occurrence national statehood in Transcaucasia in 1918 it is impossible not to see objective reasons and patterns. Russian empire, carrying out the modernization of its “Caucasian outskirts”, without having its own direct interest, in fact became the creator of future national personnel. Urban development, industrialization, and integration projects (which inevitably raised problems of the relationship between the national state and “their own,” national) were the environment in which Transcaucasian intellectuals discussed the problems of their own identity and constructed images of the national future. As a consequence, the establishment of the discourse of nationalism, the formation of ideas about “one’s own land”, “ideal borders”, and “enemies of the nation”.

Meanwhile, the experience of national statehood after the imperial collapse was short-lived for all three countries. The Azerbaijan Democratic Republic existed for only twenty-three months. The first republican Armenia lasted only seven months longer. Independence lasted the longest in Georgia - just under three years. Moreover, this country became the only independent republic of Transcaucasia that managed to adopt the Basic Law: Azerbaijan and Armenia did not have their own constitutions during the period of the “first republics”.

All independent states Transcaucasia put forward territorial claims against each other in 1918-1920. Armenia and Azerbaijan argued over the ownership of Karabakh, Zangezur and Nakhichevan (later Karabakh and Nakhichevan would be transferred to Azerbaijan, and Zangezur to Armenia). At the end of 1918, the Georgian-Armenian conflict broke out over the Lori region. In the Georgian-Azerbaijani conflict, Tiflis laid claim to the Zagatala region of Azerbaijan, populated by Ingiloy Georgians, and Baku claimed the Marneuli and Gardabani regions of Georgia, which were a region of compact residence of ethnic Azerbaijanis.

Let's add here and internal conflicts(Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian, as well as Armenian-Azerbaijani confrontations in Armenia and Azerbaijan). All these clashes took place with the intervention of Turkey and the “Central Powers”, and then the Entente countries.

Finally, let’s add to this the military-political confrontations of the first republics with the Russian Bolsheviks and White Guards, who were perceived as defenders different versions imperial project.

At the same time, thanks to the first national-state experience, such concepts and elements as parliamentarism, freedom of speech and civil rights were introduced into the political circulation of all three Caucasian republics, which, however, often coincided with ethnic boundaries.

The leaders of the first republics of Transcaucasia placed a very high value on the role of education (considering it a guarantee of freedom and independence). It is no coincidence that at a meeting of the ADR Parliament on September 1, 1919, a law was adopted on the establishment of Baku State University.

Thus, political experience The first republics cannot be reduced to border disputes and ethnic cleansing, although these practices erased the entire democratic impulse demonstrated by the politicians of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia in 1918-1921.

The political evolution of the first republics of Transcaucasia was interrupted by Sovietization (not only external and “Russification”, as is often said today in Baku, Yerevan and especially in Tbilisi, but also internal, since each of the republics had its own Bolshevik forces).

The development of nation-states in Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan was not completely stopped. It has been translated into a different format. It was within the framework of the Soviet national project that the Transcaucasian inter-republican borders were determined, which became interstate borders after the collapse of the USSR, and the attributes of the future post-Soviet statehood were formed.

There is an interesting paradox to note. Parting with the “damned Soviet past”, the new independent states of Transcaucasia are not always ready to give up those territorial configurations that were provided to them precisely during the time of the “indestructible Union”.

Meanwhile, the severity of the problem lies in the fact that today's independent states of the South Caucasus have not yet developed mechanisms for ensuring national peace and security in the region.

But if " territorial integrity"is no longer ensured with the help of the CPSU and the KGB, then new approaches must be developed! However, even timid attempts to raise the issue of federalization (in the Georgian and Azerbaijani context) do not find political support. On the contrary, the delegation of national sovereignty is seen as an attack on the unity of the country .

At the same time, all three of today's Transcaucasian states have developed their own special attitude towards the heritage of the first republics. If Georgia and Azerbaijan talk about legal succession with the Georgian Democratic Republic and the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic, then Armenia emphasizes that it has withdrawn from the USSR in accordance with the union legislative framework.

However, the Georgian and Azerbaijani approaches also have their differences. If official Tbilisi pursues a consistent policy of symbolic de-Sovietization, then Baku (taking into account the huge role in the creation of modern Azerbaijan Heydar Aliyev, who occupied high positions in the party-Soviet hierarchy) acts more selectively and tries to integrate the experience of the first independent republic and the Azerbaijan SSR within the framework of a single national historiography.

Against this background, it should be noted that today’s Transcaucasian establishment has little interest in the leaders of the first republics, be it Noe Jordania, Mamed Emin Rasulzadeh, Hovhannes Kachaznuni. None of them became a truly sacred figure for the new states.
A paradoxical situation. The first republics are viewed as historical examples, and their leaders find themselves in the shadows.

In the Georgian case, this is explained by the reluctance to give extra PR to leftist forces (and ruling party in Georgia in 1918-1921 there were social democrats), in the Azerbaijani situation, emphasizing the role of Heydar Aliyev pushes the leaders of the ADR into the shadows. And although the authorities of post-Soviet Armenia respect the experience of the first republic, it is not perceived as a predecessor state.
Thus, the experience of state building in Transcaucasia at the beginning of the twentieth century still remains relevant. And above all, because the lessons from it have not yet been fully learned.

At the end of May, the three states of Transcaucasia celebrate significant dates - the next anniversaries of the declaration of national independence of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. Let's agree right away. We are not talking about ancient states of the ancient era, proto-state formations of the Middle Ages, principalities, khanates or melikates.

Building nation-states

In May 1918, after two revolutions and the collapse of the Russian Empire, the experience of creating nation-states based on European models began to be implemented in Transcaucasia.

And in the state symbolism and memorial policy of today's Transcaucasian countries, the events of 1918-1921. are of great importance.

On May 26, 1918, the last meeting of the Transcaucasian Seim took place. At this meeting, the collapse of the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic (a project that envisaged the creation of a federation of three state entities in the region) was officially announced. At the same time, another meeting of the National Council of Georgia opened, at which the “Act of Independence” of this republic was read out.

Two days later, on May 28, 1918, the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR), the first republican state of the Islamic East, appeared.

On the same day, the Armenian National Council in Tiflis was given government powers with unlimited powers. The Council declared the independence of Armenia, and on May 29 its first prime minister was appointed, and Yerevan was elected as the republican capital.

One cannot help but see objective reasons and patterns in the emergence of national statehood in Transcaucasia in 1918. The Russian Empire, carrying out the modernization of its “Caucasian outskirts”, without having its own direct interest, in fact became the creator of future national personnel. Urban development, industrialization, and integration projects (which inevitably raised problems of the relationship between the national state and “their own,” national) were the environment in which Transcaucasian intellectuals discussed the problems of their own identity and constructed images of the national future. As a consequence, the establishment of the discourse of nationalism, the formation of ideas about “one’s own land”, “ideal borders”, and “enemies of the nation”.

Meanwhile, the experience of national statehood after the imperial collapse was short-lived for all three countries.

The Azerbaijan Democratic Republic existed for only twenty-three months. The first republican Armenia lasted only seven months longer. Independence lasted the longest in Georgia - just under three years. Moreover, this country became the only independent republic of Transcaucasia that managed to adopt the Basic Law: Azerbaijan and Armenia did not have their own constitutions during the period of the “first republics”.

All independent states of Transcaucasia put forward territorial claims against each other in 1918-1920. Armenia and Azerbaijan argued over the ownership of Karabakh, Zangezur and Nakhichevan (later Karabakh and Nakhichevan would be transferred to Azerbaijan, and Zangezur to Armenia). At the end of 1918, the Georgian-Armenian conflict broke out over the Lori region. In the Georgian-Azerbaijani conflict, Tiflis laid claim to the Zagatala region of Azerbaijan, populated by Ingiloy Georgians, and Baku claimed the Marneuli and Gardabani regions of Georgia, which were a region of compact residence of ethnic Azerbaijanis.

Let's add here internal conflicts (Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian, as well as Armenian-Azerbaijani confrontations in Armenia and Azerbaijan).

All these clashes took place with the intervention of Turkey and the “Central Powers”, and then the Entente countries.

Finally, let’s add to this the military-political confrontations of the first republics with the Russian Bolsheviks and White Guards, who were perceived as defenders of different versions of the imperial project.

Thus, the political experience of the first republics cannot be reduced to border disputes and ethnic cleansing alone, although these practices erased all the democratic impulse demonstrated by the politicians of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia in 1918-1921.

Meanwhile, the severity of the problem lies in the fact that today's independent states of the South Caucasus have not yet developed mechanisms for ensuring national peace and security in the region.

But if “territorial integrity” is no longer ensured with the help of the CPSU and the KGB, then new approaches must be developed! However, even timid attempts to raise the issue of federalization (in the Georgian and Azerbaijani context) do not find political support. On the contrary, the delegation of national sovereignty is seen as an attack on the unity of the country.

At the same time, all three of today's Transcaucasian states have developed their own special attitude towards the heritage of the first republics.

If Georgia and Azerbaijan talk about legal succession with the Georgian Democratic Republic and the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic, then Armenia emphasizes that it has withdrawn from the USSR in accordance with the union legislative framework.

However, the Georgian and Azerbaijani approaches also have their differences. If official Tbilisi pursues a consistent policy of symbolic de-Sovietization, then Baku (given the huge role in the creation of modern Azerbaijan by Heydar Aliyev, who held high positions in the party-Soviet hierarchy) acts more selectively and tries to integrate the experience of the first independent republic and the Azerbaijan SSR within a single national historiography.

A paradoxical situation. The first republics are viewed as historical examples, and their leaders find themselves in the shadows.

In the Georgian case, this is explained by the reluctance to give extra PR to the left forces (and the ruling party in Georgia in 1918-1921 were the Social Democrats); in the Azerbaijani situation, emphasizing the role of Heydar Aliyev pushes the leaders of the ADR into the shadows.

And although the authorities of post-Soviet Armenia respect the experience of the first republic, it is not perceived as a predecessor state.

Thus, the experience of state building in Transcaucasia at the beginning of the twentieth century still remains relevant. And above all, because the lessons from it have not yet been fully learned.