Less than a month before the elections, Vladimir Zelensky continues to be the leader of the Ukrainian presidential race. February surveys of the most famous sociological institutions in the country - the Razumkov Center, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), the Center for Social and Marketing Research "Socis", the Center social research“Sofia” unanimously confirms this.

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On March 4, journalists from OCCRP (Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project), whose Russian partner in the investigation was Meduza, in the article “The Troika Laundromat” reported that the private investment bank of Ruben Vardanyan and his partners, Troika Dialog, was sold to In 2011, Sberbank created a network of dozens of companies through which, from 2006 to the beginning of 2013, $4.6 billion passed with the participation of “criminal schemes.”

Interview

Fan nature of the connection European countries for deportation Russian diplomats after the poisoning of the Skripals in Salisbury, he practically left Moscow alone on the European continent. The co-chairman of the Veneto-Russia association and a researcher at the Institute of Higher School of Geopolitics talks about how Italy’s position may change as a result of difficult coalition negotiations, which are currently being conducted by the right and left forces that won the parliamentary elections on March 4, in an interview with Politkom.RU. and related sciences (Milan) Eliseo Bertolasi.

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05/16/2006 | Boris Makarenko, Alexey Makarkin

Liberals in modern Russia

It is impossible to determine the boundaries of the “liberal segment” of the expert community without defining the concept of liberalism in general and the history of its “arrival” in Russian social thought in particular. In a narrow sense, “liberalism” is one of the three “big ideologies” (along with conservatism and socialism). In a broad sense, “liberalism” is a meta-ideology that defines the entire structure of liberal democracy in the West, from which, to a certain extent, historical stage(after the French Revolution) conservatism branched off and social democracy gradually “drifted” to it. It is liberalism that forms the basis of the expanding zone of consensus between these three ideologies, as well as their many convergences and hybrids. Like the other two ideologies, liberalism has many schools and shades, which are perhaps inappropriate to consider in the context of this article.

All three Western “big ideologies” were initially alien to the Soviet socio-political environment, but this “foreignness” was different in nature. Liberalism could fall on an “open field”, in the sense that this ideology is universalist in nature, and its principles had to be introduced practically from scratch. Conservatism has one of its foundations “protective principle”, protection of established state and public institutions. There was a lot of “protection” in Russian thought, but it was not the usual protection of established relationships private property and social interests built on it: at first there were simply none, and they have not yet been established. Therefore, from conservatism, only one variation has received visible development - libertarianism a la F. Hayek or M. Thatcher (“Gaidar boys”), which puts the maximization of individual freedom in the economic sphere at the forefront (this school is often incorrectly attributed to liberalism, whereas in in fact it is neoconservative). Those liberal experts who are close to large national capital, the so-called, also approach conservatism. “oligarchs” - this layer already has “something to conserve.”

However, both liberalism and conservatism at least implied the creation of a new social order in Russia. In contrast, socialism in Russian social thought in the overwhelming majority of cases was built by the method of “subtracting from communism” its most odious features in the name of preserving a significant part of the Soviet legacy (state property, state regulation, equal distribution), and only secondarily by borrowing modern developments from Western countries. socialists. If liberalism and conservatism can be blamed for insufficiently taking into account Russian realities and dominating borrowed ideas, then socialism can be blamed for an excessive emphasis on preserving the old way of life and insufficient modernization. In this sense, socialism has been a conservative ideology in Russia over the past decade and a half.

At all times, the “liberalism” of an expert strongly depended on his position in relation to the authorities: an expert independent from the authorities determined the measure of his liberalism and interpretation political events to the best of one's own convictions. The “expert in power” inevitably weighed his assessments against the interests of his “patron,” sometimes for tactical reasons (not wanting to “expose himself”), sometimes his involvement in the political struggle forced him to adjust his beliefs (for example, G. Satarov’s position in favor of canceling elections in 1995) An expert close to the liberal opposition sometimes hardened his position, criticizing the authorities, and sometimes, on the contrary, restrained himself (as the “Gaidarites” moderated criticism of the authorities in the political field in order to promote economic liberalism).

During the 90s, the main opponents of the liberals were representatives of the socialist political tradition (communists). The real danger of communist revenge was then considered quite obvious. Accordingly, one of the signs Russian liberalism During this period there was anti-communism, and various representatives of the liberal camp adhered to only different versions of it - tougher (even proposals for lustration or a ban on the Communist Party of the Russian Federation) or soft. In recent years, the relevance of discussions between liberals and communists has decreased significantly, since the political influence of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation has sharply decreased, and the discussions themselves still do not lead to any positive results.

IN Lately The main opponents of liberals are conservatives (including recent liberals), who believe that the interests of the state should prevail over the interests of the individual, recognize the objectivity (and even the necessity) of reaction, that is, a partial revision of the liberal foundations of the political course of the 90s, but reject the possibility of communist revenge. Many representatives of liberalism underwent evolution in a conservative direction - this process began in the first half of the 90s (“Conservative Manifesto” by V. Nikonov and S. Shakhrai as the ideological platform of the Party of Russian Unity and Accord), and continued in the future - with another example there may be a movement “Forward, Russia!” B. Fedorov, even the name of which is copied from the conservative “Forward, Italy!” S. Berlusconi. In recent years, this process has become even more active.

Political structure

It is obvious that the political system for a liberal is a liberal democracy with the rule of law (often incorrectly called the rule of law), guarantees of human rights, and a developed civil society. The problem and subject of dispute for liberals was not these postulates themselves (unlike supporters of other ideologies, they never questioned them), but the pace of approach to them, the assessment of specific political decisions and moves, etc. To this, of course, strong influence(as stated above) had an impact on the expert's positioning relative to power. In the “Putin era,” especially in the last year and a half, part of the “once liberals” associated with the government went so far in the pro-government interpretation of these topics that, justifying the pro-government position, they actually went beyond the “field of liberalism.”

Desirable economic, social and cultural structure:

This point marks one of the conceptual divides in the liberal camp. T.N. " economic liberals“take libertarian positions, that is, (see above) strictly speaking, they are not liberals, but conservatives. However, the largest of these figures are not limited only to the economic sphere, speaking on a wider range of issues (E. Yasin, E. Gaidar), and on other topics they often turn out to be consistent liberals.

Those liberals for whom the main thing is the political system, as a rule, do not have a detailed economic position. The consensus for them seems to be general concepts on the desirability of a market economy, the promotion of private property and the protection of property rights, the elimination of administrative barriers and the development of competition. Significant disagreements among liberals are noted on the issue of the political and economic role of the “oligarchs.” Recently - clearly as a result of the electoral defeats of the liberal parties - the liberals have finally started talking about social justice.

Russian culture, from the point of view of liberals, should be fit into the global context and be as open as possible to external influences. By defending freedom of creativity and the priority of the creative individual over social (state, public) orders, liberals come into conflict with representatives of both socialist and conservative traditions, who take “protective” positions in relation to culture.

National question

The national question for Russia has two different meanings, both related to liberalism: “Russian national” and the position of national minorities in Russia. It was the liberals who raised the topic of modern Russian identity: “Russian national” became an alternative to “Soviet” for them. Subsequently, liberals (by and large) adhered to the principle of building in Russia nation state(nation state), although they recognized that Russia, with its imperial multinational destiny, is not very suitable for this. This concept was seriously developed by V. Tishkov, who proposed the “French model” of building such a state (we got France, now we will make the French), the late A. Salmin argued with him. But in principle, liberals raised the “Russian national” topic less and less: when Russian statehood established itself and gained legitimacy, they lost interest in it. They saw “statism”, “patriotism”, “power” as tools of their ideological opponents, who, not without reason, suspected of hypocritical intentions to use such terms to cover up illiberal and openly authoritarian intentions. And for these reasons, liberals lost the initiative in the discourse about the “national,” which became one of the main reasons for their weakening in the first decade of the new century.

There is one more extremely important point. Liberals were and remain, almost without exception, “Westerners.” While the general political atmosphere in Russian-Western relations was generally favorable, “Westernism” in domestic political issues was not just “politically correct”, but also advantageous. However, with the change in the foreign policy climate, especially after the “Orange Revolutions,” the “Westernization” of liberals is becoming increasingly problematic. As for the topic of national minorities in Russia, liberals (as well as the overwhelming majority of conservatives and socialists - supporters of “universalist” doctrines) remained "assimilators". While advocating respect for human rights (including specific ethnic ones) and equality, they nevertheless, unlike their European colleagues, paid little attention to the real situation of minorities, believing that the elites of most national republics (especially Muslim ones) were anti-modernization, and therefore represent a brake on the path of “Europeanization”.

Desirable position of religion

Regarding religion, liberals have always been united in their satisfaction with the degree of freedom of conscience in post-reform Russia, and for them this freedom certainly implied equality of religions and confessions, which actually denied the dominance of Orthodoxy and its rapprochement with the state. Within the Orthodox Church, the liberal movement in recent decades has constituted a clear minority , advocating a tolerant attitude towards other faiths, the development of ecumenical dialogue (mainly with Catholics and traditional Protestants). The most famous representative of this trend was Archpriest A. Men (died in 1990), the names of the late Archbishop Mikhail (Mudyugin), Archpriest A. Borisov, priest G. Chistyakov and others can also be mentioned. In the mid-1990s, some representatives of this trend (for example, priest G. Kochetkov) were persecuted by the church leadership, but in recent years the official authorities have paid little attention to their activities, since they do not see real competitors in them. On the contrary, nationalist and anti-Semitic forces appear as such, considering most of the hierarchy to be secret supporters of liberals (which seems like an obvious stretch). For some church liberals, the framework of the Russian Orthodox Church turned out to be too tight, which led to their search for alternative jurisdictions. This is associated with the transition of some of them to marginal religious organizations (G. Yakunin, excommunicated and anathematized), as well as Catholicism - this appears to be associated with the high authority of Pope John Paul II among Russian church liberals.

Methods and mechanisms for achieving the desired state

For modern Russian liberals, the absolute priority is to achieve their goals through participation in elections: in this they are close to their historical predecessors - the Cadets, who expected to come to power not through revolution, but through the quiet rustling of ballot papers. The commitment of Russian liberals to democratic values ​​makes them have a negative attitude towards any violent actions, since they hinder the modernization development of the country. Another distinctive feature of Russian (as well as any other) liberals is respect for procedure, which is opposed to outwardly expedient but illegal measures.

At the same time, for liberals, the possession of an expert resource has traditionally played a significant role, which ensured their relevance to the authorities. Even when liberal parties suffered political defeats, the value of this resource allowed them to maintain apparatus positions and direct access to power structures. This contributed to both the achievement of individual career goals and the promotion of legislative initiatives and political projects.

When solving specific political problems Over the past decade and a half, liberals have repeatedly found themselves faced with a dilemma - principles or expediency. The first time this happened was in 1993, when various representatives of the liberal political camp and the expert community disagreed diametrically on the issue of their attitude towards the dissolution of parliament by Boris Yeltsin. Then most of the liberals (“Gaidarites”) supported the president, believing that he acted in conditions emergency, and parliament hindered the modernization of the country. A minority - both politicians (the future founders of Yabloko) and experts (M. Gefter) - condemned the president’s actions: in their opinion, the illegal actions of the head of state contradicted democratic norms.

For the second time, the positions of the liberals diverged due to the attitude towards a forceful solution to the Chechen problem in 1994. – then the difference between “pragmatists” and “idealists” was most clearly revealed. The third time the discrepancy between principles and expediency appeared during the 1996 election campaign. Then the threat of communist revenge forced the liberals, who supported the president during the September-October crisis, not only to again identify with him (despite the increased number of disagreements, including on the Chechen problem), but also to “turn a blind eye” to the obvious discrimination of the opposition candidate.

The attitude of liberals towards the political regime of “Putin’s Russia” is deeply contradictory. In the period 2000-2003, most liberals experienced ambivalent feelings - a number of government measures were perceived by them purely positively as a continuation of the implementation of the reform agenda of the 90s. Against this background, other actions of the Kremlin (such as establishing de facto state control over federal television) were perceived as negative, but, in principle, “tolerable” phenomena.

In 2003, the situation changed - the increasingly noticeable gap between the authorities and the elite of the 90s (in which liberals occupied much more “weighty” positions than in society as a whole) led to a sharp decrease in the demand for liberals by the Kremlin. The actions of the authorities are increasingly at odds with the aspirations of liberal-minded politicians and experts. In this situation, liberals again faced a choice: either continue to focus on the government, which is becoming less liberal, or reconsider their attitude towards it. Different attitudes to this issue polarize even members of the same political party - serious disagreements within the Union of Right Forces are typical. The dissonance between the authorities and the liberals, as well as the example of Ukraine and Georgia, led not only to an increase in opposition, but also to the growth of “orange” groups among them. moods. Some liberals begin to perceive the government as an unconditional enemy and express sympathy for all political forces that are in opposition (a characteristic change in their attitude towards the “Limonovites”). At the same time, some liberals believe that any revolutionary change in the current government will lead to the victory of reactionary political forces and a complete rollback of reforms.

Historical doctrine, “axial” events of Russian and world history

The historical views of liberals are inextricably linked with the concept of progress, evolutionary modernization development. Unlike socialists, they consider reforms the best way to modernize social relations, and perceive revolution as a path fraught with significant costs, which is permissible only in the most extreme case, when the current government has become openly authoritarian (in the Western tradition - “usurper”) or has completely lost its reformist spirit. potential. Hence the contradictory attitude of liberals towards revolutionary cataclysms - such as the English and French revolutions. A significantly more positive reaction is caused by the American War of Independence, perceived as liberation movement against "usurpers". In the liberal tradition, the bloodless “Glorious Revolution” in England of 1688, which stopped the reaction without any significant social cataclysms, is considered “ideal.” In a completely different historical situation, “ velvet revolution» late 80s in Central and Eastern Europe, which also received a purely positive assessment from liberals.

Liberals' attitude to key periods Russian history is closely related to their ideological choice. Peter’s reforms are assessed positively from the point of view of the overall modernization of Russia (“The Bronze Horseman” was the emblem of Gaidar’s “Russia’s Choice” movement), but more reserved when it comes to their social costs. But the “Great Reforms” of the mid-19th century evoke a purely positive attitude. Unlike communists, liberals have a sharply negative assessment of the October revolution, and unlike conservatives, they are not inclined to condemn the February revolution.

Contextualization

Modern liberal politicians pay little attention to their ideological predecessors. The classics of philosophical liberalism - J. Locke, J. Hobbs, as well as domestic ones (B. Chicherin, P. Struve) are not very popular (the only one who tried to systematically comprehend the domestic liberal heritage is A. Kara-Murza). Karl Popper is mentioned a little more often.

The classics of liberal economics are more in demand, but almost exclusively along the libertarian line - from Adam Smith to Friedrich Hayek, while the “social liberal” John Keynes is clearly not in favor. But the authorities are politicians, moreover of a conservative persuasion - M. Thatcher, R. Reagan. Russians communicated irregularly with European liberal politicians. “Economists” (and they were not the only ones) preferred “right-wingers” and libertarians; Only Yabloko members communicated with the Liberal International; policy documents of European liberals - the Oxford Manifestos of 1947 and 1997. are practically unknown in Russia (even to liberals).

Modern Russian liberals consider reformers and modernizers to be their historical predecessors - from M. Speransky and the brothers D. and N. Milyutin to S. Witte and P. Stolypin. At the same time, little attention is paid to the fact that not all of them adhered to liberal views: Stolypin was a consistent conservative, Witte was rather a pragmatist (however, the determining factor for liberals was their contribution to the modernization of the country). The Cadets can be considered the direct ideological predecessors of modern liberals, with all the diversity of their ideological shades - from the left liberalism of Milyukov to the conservative liberalism of Maklakov, which objectively adjoined the “Vekhi” tradition. The Octobrists, with their desire to combine sovereignty and liberalism, can relate to the predecessors of modern liberals only with a large degree of convention.

The pre-Soviet liberal tradition was interrupted by the Bolsheviks coming to power and the subsequent repressions of the civil war and the late 1920s. Its revival is associated with the phenomenon of dissidence, when in the 60-70s there was a departure of some of its representatives (A. Sakharov, S. Kovalev, R. Pimenov, etc.) from ideological searches within the framework of the socialist paradigm and a revival of interest in classical liberalism. Currently, the dissident tradition is continued by liberal human rights activists, such as L. Ponomarev, V. Abramkin and others.

At the same time, the preservation of tradition in Soviet times was facilitated by historical studies of the problems of Russian liberalism by P. Zayonchkovsky, K. Shatsillo, V. Dyakin, far from oppositionism (and from politics in general), as well as works on history social movement such a “cult” author as N. Eidelman (currently his tradition is continued by S. Ekshtut).

In modern Russia, two complementary parts of the liberal field can be distinguished. These are liberal experts and liberal politicians (there are figures belonging to both groups - such as E. Gaidar, V. Ryzhkov, V. Lysenko).

Liberal experts became those intellectuals who, at the stage of collapse communist system perceived “transit to democracy” as a normative model for the country’s development, regardless of the path by which they came to this choice. For some it was an ideological choice, dictated by the experience of inclusion in Russian politics (G. Satarov, S. Markov), for others - rational choice, based on academic knowledge of international relations (S. Karaganov, S. Rogov), regional studies (G. Diligensky, A. Salmin, I. Bunin, K. Kholodkovsky, V. Nikonov), economic science (E. Yasin, E. Gaidar and his team) or sociology (Yu. Levada, B. Grushin), jurisprudence (M. Krasnov, A. Obolonsky). The first ones had to “gain” knowledge of the basics liberal theories, the second is to refract scientific material about foreign countries to Russian realities, both need to create a language of expert knowledge, be it academic or applied. However, the main thing was precisely the choice of democracy as a normative model desirable for political development Russia.

Liberal politicians came from the intelligentsia (both metropolitan and provincial) environment and appeared on the political arena, as a rule, in the late 80s - early 90s as activists informal organizations and the political parties created in those years. Currently, some of them have been “examined” (most shining example– E. Gaidar), some have moved into the executive branch, some are in opposition.

Current institutional localization of the position

The most famous representatives of modern Russian expert liberalism:
Political science: A. Salmin, I. Bunin, G. Satarov, SKaraganov, Rogov, K. Kholodkovsky, A. Ryabov.
Economics: E. Yasin, E. Gaidar, A. Illarionov.
Jurisprudence: S. Alekseev, M. Krasnov, A. Obolonsky.
National issues and federalism: V. Tishkov, A. Zakharov.
Religious studies: A. Krasikov, N. Mitrokhin, S. Filatov.

Institutes:
Center for Strategic Research
High School of Economics
Center for Political Technologies
INDEM Foundation
Moscow Carnegie Center
Moscow School of Political Studies
Institute of World Economy and International Relations RAS
Institute for Economics in Transition
Liberal Mission Foundation
Institute for the Study of Religion in the CIS and Baltic Countries
Research Center for Private Law under the President of the Russian Federation
Russian School of Private Law
Information and analytical center "Sova".

Publications:

Gaidar E.T. State and evolution. St. Petersburg, 1997.
Gaidar E.T. For a long time. Russia in the world: Essays economic history. M., 2005.
Zakharov A.A. E pluribus unum. Essays on modern federalism. M., 2003.
Krasnov M.A. Cage for power. M., 1997.
Liberalism in Russia. Collection of articles / Kapelyushnikov R.I., Salmin A.M., Bunin I.M., Urnov M.Yu.,
Masarsky M.V., Khakamada I.M., Pappe Ya.Sh. M., 1993.
Mitrokhin N.A. Russian Orthodox Church: current state and current problems. M., 2004
Obolonsky A.V. Man and power: crossroads of Russian history. M., 2002.
Ryzhkov V.A. "The Fourth Republic" (essay political history modern Russia). M., 2000.
Salmin A.M. Modern democracy: essays on formation, M., 1997.
Sekirinsky S.S., Filippova T.A. Pedigree of Russian freedom. M., 1993.
Senokosov Yu.P. Power as a problem. Experience of philosophical consideration. M., 2005.
Modern Russian politics/ Bunin I.M., Karaganov S.A., Nikonov V.A., Ryzhkov V.A., Salmin A.M., Satarov G.A.. M., 2002.
Chkhartishvili G.Sh. Life for the king, or Crown for the horse. Lament for enlightened absolutism / Today. 2.02.96.
Ekshtut S.A. In the service of the Russian Leviathan: Historiosophical experiments. M, 1998.
Yasin E.G. New era- old worries. Political Economy. M., 2004.
Yasin E.G. New era - old worries. Economic policy. M., 2004.
Yasin E.G. Will democracy take root in Russia? M., 2005.

The paradox of liberals is that they fight against power, but they themselves will never become power. Even if a miracle happened, they could not agree among themselves. Attempts at any kind of unification have been failing for many years - everyone wants to be the boss. This is the biggest internal problem liberals.

But even if the opportunity arose to take part in the elections, the result would be modest. And this is obvious to everyone who understands politics. Including the liberals themselves.

Why then fight if the goal is unattainable?

Because struggle is for the sake of struggle. Because this is a job for money. Rock, shout, provoke. There are different jobs, and this also happens and exists.

All that liberals are truly strong at is dispersing topics and provocations in the information space. Liberals use tragedies, emergencies and scandals for information gain. Therefore, they can be classified as heroes of the negative information field.

The liberals' technology is simple: they create media reality and modify it to suit their goals. With cross-support from each other, topics are stirred up in the blogosphere and loyal media, and the waves then spill out into the larger media agenda. After p the acceleration of the media agenda keeps the event “life” until the audience’s interest is exhausted, and they take on a new acceleration.

The contribution of every serious liberal to the acceleration of the agenda is its own information weight.

It is noteworthy that the harvest in the elections from the crackdown by the liberals among the electorate is being reaped by the completely pro-government communists, Zhirinovites and Socialist-Revolutionaries. They have their own job.

In the end, everyone is happy. Everyone gets paid for what they can do better than others.
Rating of the influence of liberals on the political and information agenda "13 of the very best."

1. Alexey Venediktov (Dandelion). Media soldier.

Venediktov has a long history of fame with very few dirty spots on it. The advantage over others is the presence of the main liberal media resource in the form of radio "Echo of Moscow". Venediktov is very influential among liberals because he can steer the agenda of Echo and the presence of people from the liberal camp on air and in mentions.

2. Mikhail Khodorkovsky (Khodor). Politician.

The main source of support for liberals in Russia. At the same time, he is the biggest disappointment of the liberals. Supporters expected more from Khodorkovsky in events, but they did not receive it. In 7 years, Khodorkovsky’s story has ceased to bring even PR dividends. But liberals cannot write off Khodorkovsky - there are not many symbols, they must be preserved. Not to mention the sponsors. Advantage - money, name

3. Ilya Yashin (Jackal). Politician.

Very noticeable and active among liberal politicians. Able to somehow advance in public policy, despite opposition. The disadvantage of Yashin is his youth and the image of a pure politician (separated from the economy and serious spheres of the state structure). The advantage is the shortage of liberal politicians.

4. Garry Kasparov (Kasparych). Politician.

Big question for liberals. Kasparov's problem is that he was overestimated by his colleagues in terms of financial and organizational abilities.Advantage - it has taken a key place in the liberal space and does not give it away to anyone

5. Yulia Latynina (Lata). Media soldier.

One of the most boisterous liberal media soldiers. The advantage is access to media resources" New Newspaper" and "Echo of Moscow".

6. Demyan Kudryavtsev. Ideologist.

A rare example of a wise “senior comrade” in ideology for many young liberals.

7. Alexander Minkin (Cough, cough). Media soldier.

Minkin writes well and figuratively. Unlike most other soldiers, he can also be read by his opponents.The advantage is the presence of a powerful media resource in the form of the Moskovsky Komsomolets newspaper.

8. Alexey Navalny (Sledgehammer). Media soldier.

The most likable media soldier character for young audiences and even opponents. It does not cause categorical rejection from patriots because of the format of its activity: on its blog it is quite interesting to engage in revelations. The advantage is a successful image.

9. Boris Nemtsov (Borya). Politician.

He could have been the most attractive among liberal politicians, if not for the trail of the past from the 90s. The image of a glamorous opposition figure has exhausted itself, but in the niche of liberal politicians there is no one to replace Nemtsov. This is Nemtsov's only advantage.

10.Oleg Kozlovsky. Media soldier. Street Fighter.

A rare example of organizational skills, media soldier and street fighter. A promising politician in a liberal environment.

11. Artemy Lebedev (Topic). Media soldier.

The famous designer and scandalous blogger Lebedev does not position himself as a liberal, but he successfully is one. With the help of his blog, he successfully and funnyly attacks the authorities, infecting a large audience with a similar mood. The advantage is a large audience for a personal blog and connections through Tatyana Tolstaya (mother) with the liberal environment.

12. Leonid Nevzlin (Nevzlin). Politician.

In conjunction with Khodorkovsky, he provides great support to the liberal opposition, but he cannot be a political leader. This suits liberals very much, who need support, but are absolutely not ready to share their place in the rays of glory.

13. Mikhail Kasyanov (Misha 2 percent). Politician.

A big disappointment and source of irritation for liberals. For so many years they have been waiting for money and some kind of action from Kasyanov that they could have given up a long time ago. But they don’t give a damn, they still hope. The advantage is that high expectations remain.

Eduard Limonov (Grandfather). Politician.

Still visible and interesting to the media. But he personally cannot attract a new audience for himself. The advantage is the name.

Lyudmila Alekseeva (Grandmother). Politician.

When it is necessary to close a status hole in some event, they always remember Alekseeva. An elderly man who himself can no longer exercise his influence, but is an instrument in the hands of his colleagues. The advantage is the name.

Alexey Dymovsky (Smoke). Media soldier.

Policeman Dymovsky became mega-famous, but failed to take advantage of this fame correctly. His last video message against the backdrop of a sheet caused laughter from the audience. Nevertheless, Dymovsky retains the potential to disperse some topic or scandal if asked. The advantage is the name.

Blogger Tekhnomad - teh-nomad.livejournal.com (presumably Vladimir Goryachev). Media soldier.

One of the most successful specialists in stuffing and promoting topics in the negative news agenda.

Anton Nosik (Nosik). Media soldier.

Potential head of the united liberal media headquarters during the events of the 2011-2012 elections. Advantage - experience in media as a process organizer.

Alexander Ryklin. Media soldier.

Competitor of Anton Nosik for the post of head of the united liberal media headquarters during the events of the 2011-2012 elections. The advantage is access to the media resource "Daily Journal".

Matvey Ganapolsky (Gapon). Media soldier.

He still writes well, but he has ceased to be the author of vivid images.

Valeria Novodvorskaya. Glamorous character.

It's funny, but Novodvorskaya remains among the leaders of mentions. Simply because she is highly recognizable among the mass electorate, although she has had neither weight nor influence for a long time. Like Alekseeva, she is invited to events as a “glamorous star”.

Vladimir Milov (Gypsy). Media soldier.

Unknown to a wide audience, and does not have much weight among liberals. Although, it would seem, he managed to make revelations.The advantage is growth potential (a new name among tired names).

Alexander Podrabinek (Bastard). Media soldier.

The success of the provocation with veterans was one-time. I can't play more than one episode. The advantage is in the past.

Victor Shenderovich (Vitya mattress). Media soldier.

He was a bright media soldier before the story with the porn video and Katya Mumu. He came out of this story ugly, thereby burying himself as a respected public figure. The advantage is in the past.

Evgenia Albats.Media soldier.

The train left, but she remained.

Stanislav Belkovsky (Stas). Media soldier.

A victim of your own strategy. Belkovsky's loud announcements and forecasts ended in nothing. Because of this, Belkovsky's usefulness as a carrier of information became a big question. And, as they say, I’ve lost my sense of smell lately. The recent articles and spin-offs look like an envious rehash of articles by more talented colleagues. The advantage is the name.

Marina Litvinovich (Marinka). Media soldier.

As a political strategist, she has perfectly mastered the art of media provocations. Arouses suspicion among liberals due to the uncertainty of “who he works for.” The work style is not much different from the approaches of Grigory Grabovoi. The advantage is the experience of a political strategist.

Andrey Malgin (Analgin). Media soldier.

The difference from all other liberals is that Galkovsky does his job for the sake of art, not money. It turns out interesting.

The experts also mentioned other people, but due to their little fame outside their circle, they cannot exert any significant influence.

And what?

I’m still a bit of a political strategist http://www.og.ru/articles/2009/12/30/30903.shtml

Famous Russian economist, political scientist and publicist Mikhail Khazin told on his website why the liberals of the Russian Federation refused the secret proposal of the opposition group to “get out of power.”

The expert writes that today Russia lives in a period of dualism, since the main resources in the country and spheres of influence are conditionally divided between two elite groups. The first is represented by the “liberal wing”, living off the support of Western financiers and the IMF. They have taken control of the state's economic resources, but are now unable to ensure economic growth and solve problems. It is also interesting that liberals in general do not seek to improve the mechanisms of the economy, preferring to defend their property rights. The second group is the so-called “patriots”. The elite was formed in the 90s, when liberals needed to allow people into power who could stabilize the situation in the country. These people are directly interested in development economic model Russia, but do not yet have the necessary levers to implement their decisions.

According to Khazin, the “patriots” have gained enough political force, to state their claims to control the state machinery and eliminate the excessive influence of the IMF. All parties came to the understanding that it was time to change the economic model. At the same time, the political scientist draws attention to an important nuance. During their time at the levers of power, liberals were unable to form a self-sufficient elite. The oligarchs turned out to be bad entrepreneurs and mismanaged the benefits of privatization, making many enterprises in the Russian Federation unprofitable. As a result, the liberal group is unable to use the resources of its own oligarchs in the fight against the “patriots.”

Considering the strength of the “patriots” group, Khazin suggested that the liberals were told secret proposal leave positions of power on the promise of compensation and a place at the “common celebration of life.” However, the latter refused. A reasonable question arises: why?

According to the expert, there are several reasons for the refusal. First, liberals are not interested in transferring control to other groups. In addition, the IMF will not support such a proposal either. Secondly, pro-Western forces find themselves in a difficult situation due to the sanctions conflict. If capital is transferred to the West, then it can be lost abroad. And if you leave the money within the country, then control over it will pass to the “patriots”. There is only one way out of the situation: pretend to be fighting the regime, but explain your powerlessness behind the scenes.

Thirdly, the proposed assets may in reality cost not billions, but much less. And when a specific proposal came from the “patriots,” the oligarchs discovered that there was not much left for them. Therefore, they began a long and meaningless bargaining.

What should the “patriots” do in such a situation? It is necessary to put as much pressure on the “liberals” as possible, including “biting off” part of their property and gradually prepare a reform, the expert believes. Khazin believes that the days of liberals are numbered. They do not have a basic resource, the oligarchs are counting their losses, and growth is impossible to ensure.

Those who do not remember kinship: who were the ancestors of Russian liberals

Here is an incomplete list of famous journalists, politicians, and public figures who made a name for themselves through their categorical rejection of the Soviet past and way of life. In recent years, some of them, contrary to the official line, support projects like "Immortal barracks", criticizing large-scale celebrations of Victory Day and other dates associated with Soviet period history of Russia. Mikhail Shakhov decided to remind about names, positions and merits ancestors modern Russian liberals.

Evgenia Albats

Russian liberal journalist, political scientist, public figure and writer. She became famous during Perestroika as the author of Moscow News. Editor in Chief The New Times. Until May 2016, she was the host of her own program on the Ekho Moskvy radio station.

Father– Mark Efremovich Albats. Soviet intelligence officer, radio operator engineer. In 1941, he underwent training at the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army, acted as an illegal intelligence officer in Nikolaev, living in a safe house according to documents in the name of Grigory Basiliy. After the war, he worked “at the terribly secret Research Institute 10, developing radio systems for ballistic missiles launched from submarines.” According to some (for obvious reasons, unconfirmed) data, Albats rose to the rank of intelligence colonel.

Grandfather– Mark Mikhailovich Albats. Candidate member of the CPSU. After studying at the Institute. Bauman was sent to “adopt the experience of building electric railways” in the USA, then to purchase equipment in Italy. Before the arrest and execution in 1937 he managed to achieve a high position at that time as head of the Sverdlovsk railway junction.

Anton Antonov-Ovseenko

Journalist, writer, researcher, author of the collection of poetry “Classics of Russian Erotica”, the revealing book “Bolsheviks: How a bunch of people crushed the Empire”, as well as the monograph “German money in the Bolshevik press”. He worked in the apparatus of the Komsomol, Union ministries of the USSR. Now the head of the public reception office of the Yabloko party in Moscow, he speaks on talk shows on federal channels.

Grandson of the revolutionary Vladimir Aleksandrovich Antonov-Ovseenko (pseudonyms in the party - Bayonet and Nikita).

V. Antonov-Ovseenko- Russian and Ukrainian revolutionary, Menshevik until 1914, in 1917 he joined the Bolshevik Party, after October revolution became a party, state and military leader. It was he who declared the Provisional Government overthrown. In 1937, Antonov-Ovseenko was recalled from Spain, after which he was arrested by the NKVD. February 8, 1938 sentenced to execution for belonging to a Trotskyist terrorist and espionage organization. Before his death, he said the words: “I ask whoever lives to see freedom to tell people that Antonov-Ovseenko was a Bolshevik and remained a Bolshevik until his last day.”

Konstantin Borovoy

Deputy of the Duma of the 2nd convocation, ex-chairman of the Party of Economic Freedom, chairman of the political party “Western Choice”. First president of the Russian Commodity and Raw Materials Exchange (1990). He involved the exchange staff in the confrontation between Yeltsin and the Emergency Committee, organized barricades and street actions. Close associate of Valeria Novodvorskaya. In 1991 - president of the bankrupt investment pyramid "Rinako". Author of numerous scandalous statements addressed to Russia and its leadership, incl. "Vilnius ultimatum to Putin."

The son of the writer, secretary of the Association of Proletarian Writers Nathan Efimovich Borovoy, and the chief special officer of the Zheleznodorozhny District Party Committee, employee of the KGB of the USSR Elena Konstantinovna Borovoy.

Sergey Buntman

First deputy editor-in-chief of the Ekho Moskvy radio station, author of the slogan “Listen to the radio - the rest is appearances.” Came to Echo from the French editorial office of the Soviet Foreign Broadcasting. He claimed that Russia committed aggression in Georgia.

Grandfather Buntman - Petros Artemyevich Bekzadyan. Since February 1921 - Secretary of the Plenipotentiary Mission of the Armenian SSR to the Government of the RSFSR. Since March 1923 - Leningrad representative of the Armenian representative office. He worked as a senior consultant at the representative office of the Georgian SSR in Moscow. Arrested in 1937 and convicted by the Military Collegium Supreme Court USSR for participation in a counter-revolutionary nationalist organization. Shot and rehabilitated.

Alexey Venediktov

Journalist, permanent Chief Editor, co-owner (18% of shares) and presenter of the radio station “Echo of Moscow”.

On his father's side: grandson of Nikolai Andrianovich Venediktov.

N. Venediktov – military prosecutor, member of the Military tribunal. From the official presentation to the Order of the Red Star:

“Comrade Venediktov [...] directs his punitive policy towards a merciless fight against traitors, spies and traitors to the Motherland. Dozens of traitors were convicted by him and received a well-deserved punishment. He is merciless towards the enemies of the Motherland and teaches this to the workers of peripheral tribunals. The blows to the criminals are sharp. With its judicial punitive policy, it helps to strengthen iron military discipline.”

Maria Gaidar

Russian and Ukrainian political figure. Former member Federal Political Council of the Union of Right Forces. She filled government positions as deputy chairman of the government of the Kirov region (2009-2011) and deputy governor of Saakashvili in the Odessa region.

There is a popular version that this branch of the Gaidarov family is not the blood heirs of the legendary red commander and children's writer. It is known that Arkady Petrovich Gaidar (Golikov) took paternity issues lightly, and adopted at least one child (a girl, Evgenia, in his third marriage). In turn, Gaidar's second wife, Timur's mother and Yegor Gaidar's grandmother, Rakhil Lazarevna Solomyanskaya, broke up with the writer around 1931 to marry the secretary of the Shepetovsky regional committee of the RCP(b) Israel Mikhailovich Razin (later repressed). Officially in the USSR, it was the descendants of Solomyanskaya who were considered “heirs to the name of Gaidar.”

In any case, Maria Gaidar’s grandfather is Timur Arkadyevich Gaidar, head of the military department of the Pravda newspaper, her own correspondent in a number of countries. During his service at the newspaper, he was promoted several times, reaching the rank of rear admiral.

Maria Gaidar's father, Yegor Timurovich Gaidar, managed to make a communist career before the collapse of the USSR - he served as editor and head of the economic policy department in the journal of the CPSU Central Committee "Communist". In addition, following the example of his father, he headed the department of the Pravda newspaper.

Vasily Gatov

In the 90s - producer of television programs for BBC, ABC News, ZDF, press secretary of the Soros Foundation. Since 1996 – Deputy General Director of the REN-TV channel. The author of the statement “the leaders of Service “A” of the PGU of the KGB of the USSR are crying in their special hell, watching the stories of the Russia-1 TV channel.” In his own words, “in the early 90s he investigated the life of his grandfather.” The former deputy head of RIA Novosti during the time of Svetlana Mironyuk, after his dismissal, moved for permanent residence to the United States of America.

Grandfather Gatova - Ivan Samsonovich Sheredega, Soviet statesman and military leader, lieutenant general, 4th commander of the internal troops of the NKVD of the USSR. He held the position of head of the Higher Officer School of the NKVD, then - head of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Directorate for Sakhalin region. Led the resettlement operation Crimean Tatars, participated in repressions in Ukraine and the arrest of Beria.

Second grandfather– Moisey Lvovich Gatov (1902-1939) – awarded the badge “Honored Worker of the Cheka-GPU”, acting head of the 4th department and 5th department of the Main economic management(GEU) NKVD USSR, major state security. Shot in 1939 and was not rehabilitated.

Maria (Masha) Gessen

Russian and American journalist, former director of the Russian service of Radio Liberty, author of books about Stalin, Putin and Pussy Riot, activist of the LGBT movement. Lives in the USA legally married to Svetlana Generalova (better known to the general public as photographer Svenya Generalova).

Masha’s paternal grandmother, Esther Yakovlevna Goldberg (married Gessen), was a translator and memoirist who worked in the magazine “ Soviet literature" Her maternal grandmother, Rozalia Moiseevna Solodovnik (born 1920), was a career employee of the MGB, and worked as a telegram censor at the Central Telegraph in Moscow.

Dmitry Gudkov

Russian opposition politician, deputy of the State Duma of the sixth convocation on the list of “A Just Russia” (later expelled from the faction for his anti-Russian position and participation in the preparation of sanctions lists). Member of the Coordination Council of the Opposition, co-owner of family businesses - a security holding company and a collection agency.

Father – former MP Gennady Gudkov. He was deputy secretary of the Komsomol committee of the university. At the age of seventeen, he wrote a letter to Andropov to find out how he could start serving in KGB. Since 1982 he worked in the state security agencies of the USSR. Graduated from the counterintelligence school, KGB Institute named after Andropov. In 1993 he was dismissed without the right to wear a military uniform. Reserve Colonel.

D. Gudkov’s great-grandfather (Gennady Gudkov’s grandfather) is Pyotr Yakovlevich Gudkov, one of Nikolai Bukharin’s assistants. During the Civil War, my great-grandmother worked at the headquarters of Army Commander Mikhail Frunze.

Tikhon Dzyadko

Russian television and radio journalist, former deputy editor-in-chief of the Dozhd TV channel. In August 2015, he left the Dozhd TV channel to begin his work on the Ukrainian Inter TV channel in Washington. Has two brothers - Timofey and Philip, who headed the magazines Forbes and "Big City" respectively.

The Dzyadko brothers are the children of Zoya Feliksovna Svetova, a journalist (Radio France, newspaper Liberation, magazine The New Times) and a famous human rights activist.

Dzyadko’s great-grandfather is Grigory (Zvi) Fridland, revolutionary, member of the Central Committee of the Jewish Social Democratic Party “Poalei Zion”. In 1917 he actively worked in Petrograd Soviet, then was a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Lithuanian-Belarusian Republic. After the revolution, he was a Soviet Marxist historian, studied at the Institute of Red Professorships, and became the first dean of the Faculty of History of Moscow State University ( shot in 1937).

Victor Erofeev

Modern Russian writer, literary critic, radio and television presenter (“Echo of Moscow”, “Radio Liberty”). In January 2014, he took part in the scandalous broadcast of the “Amateurs” program on the Dozhd TV channel, where he stated that Leningrad should have been surrendered to German troops.

Son of the Soviet diplomat Vladimir Ivanovich Erofeev (personal translator of Joseph Stalin into French, assistant to the 1st Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers V. Molotov, assistant to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, deputy head of the 1st European Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the USSR to Senegal and the Gambia , from 1970 to 1975 – deputy general director UNESCO).

Evgeniy Kiselev

Soviet, Russian and Ukrainian TV presenter. Author of the proposal “kidnap citizens of the Russian Federation” to exchange for Nadezhda Savchenko. In 1981-1984 he taught [Persian] at the Higher School KGB USSR named after Dzerzhinsky. From 1993 to 2001 he worked for NTV, while the channel remained under the control of media tycoon Gusinsky.

Father - Alexey Alexandrovich Kiselev (1911-1988) - Soviet scientist, laureate of the Stalin Prize of the second degree (1946).

Father-in-law - Geliy Alekseevich Shakhov, was one of the leaders of the USSR State Television and Radio (editor-in-chief of Foreign Broadcasting in the USA and Great Britain; among other things, he supervised Vladimir Posner and interviewed Kerensky in 1966).

Kiselev’s biography includes the great-grandfather of the Dzyadko brothers, Grigory Fridlyand, a revolutionary and the first dean of the Faculty of History at Moscow State University. His granddaughter is Masha Shakhova, the wife of Evgeniy Kiselyov.

Irena Lesnevskaya

Journalist and one of the leading Russian television producers of the 90s. Founder REN-TV, magazine publisher The New Times. In 1991, she was an assistant director in the Kinopanorama program, but “she left television under Swan Lake so as not to work under the State Emergency Committee.” In March 2016, she sent a letter to Vladimir Putin, calling for an amnesty for Nadezhda Savchenko. In his own words, “he considers Putin his ideological enemy.”

Grandfather - Jan Lesniewski. Political prisoner, Bolshevik, friend and associate of Dzerzhinsky, organizer of workers' strikes, member of the strike committee (1903). Shot during the years of repression.

Alexander Nevzorov

Reporter, TV presenter, producer, director, publicist. Author and presenter of the perestroika program “600 Seconds”. Deputy of the State Duma of the Russian Federation of four convocations. A zealous atheist and a regular participant in Echo of Moscow programs.

Nevzorov’s maternal grandfather, MGB officer Georgy Vladimirovich Nevzorov, headed the department for combating banditry in the territory of the Lithuanian SSR in 1946-1955. Mother - Galina Georgievna Nevzorova, journalist of the newspaper "Smena", the printed organ of the Petrograd Provincial Committee of the Komsomol, then - the Leningrad Regional Committee and the City Committee of the Komsomol.

Andrey Piontkovsky

Russian opposition journalist. Former member of the Bureau of the Political Council of the Solidarity movement. Member of the Opposition Coordination Council. book author "Unloved Country", articles “The Kremlin gopnik beat the West again” and appeals to NATO with a call to introduce military doctrine alliance "limited nuclear strike for the guaranteed destruction of the highest Russian political and military leadership."

Son of Andrei Andreevich Piontkovsky, a Soviet jurist, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences (a specialist in the criminal legal views of Kant, Hegel, Feuerbach). A. Piontkovsky - vice-president of the International Association of Criminal Law, honorary doctor of the University of Warsaw, judge of the Supreme Court of the USSR during the reign of I. Stalin (from 1946 to 1951). He was buried at the Novodevichy cemetery.

Ilya Ponomarev

Entrepreneur, deputy of the State Duma of the 5th and 6th convocations, member of the “A Just Russia” faction, member of the “Left Front” Council. Currently wanted in the case of fake lectures for Skolkovo. Hiding abroad, where he seeks strengthening in various institutions international sanctions in relation to the Russian Federation.

Step-nephew of the Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, hero of socialist labor, academician Boris Nikolaevich Ponomarev. In 1934-37 Ponomarev was the director of the Institute of Party History at the Moscow Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, then an assistant to the head of the Executive Committee of the Comintern Georgiy Dimitrov, from 1955 until Perestroika - the permanent head of the Department for Relations with Foreign Communist Parties - the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee.

Also worthy of attention is the grandfather of Ilya Ponomarev - Nikolai Pavlovich Ponomarev, a Komsomol and party worker, an honorary railway worker, a diplomat, in the late 70s - the first secretary of the USSR Embassy in Poland, an honorary citizen of this country, who mediated negotiations with the Solidarity trade union.

Vyacheslav (Slava) Rabinovich

Executive Director of the management company Diamond Age Capital Advisors, former employee Hermitage Capital Bill Browder, liberal Facebook blogger, Ukrainian media expert on the collapse of the Russian economy, her domestic policy and issues of overthrowing Putin.

Grandfather - musicologist David Abramovich Rabinovich. In 1919 in Kharkov he was among the first Komsomol members. Served in Cheka. He moved to Moscow and by 1930 graduated from the Moscow Conservatory, while teaching political economy there. He was an editor, then a manager. book editor and deputy manager of the state publishing house "Muzgiz". From 1933 - consultant, later - head of the music sector of the All-Union Radio. In 1937 - head. performing department of the newspaper "Music", in 1938 - music department of the newspaper "Soviet Art". In 1945-1947, art consultant at the Sovinformburo.

Excerpts from the speeches of Comrade David Rabinovich in the 30s have been preserved:

“Comrade Blum in his letter accuses the Association of Proletarian Musicians of allegedly preaching the ingrowth of bourgeois music into socialism. This is nonsense. But what does Comrade propose? Bloom? He preaches the growth of socialist proletarian music from the depths of capitalism. Completely groundlessly, he accuses the Association of “shameless Menshevism.” And what is this if not the most shameless Menshevism, if not the most open McDonaldism? I ask whether the thesis of Comrade. Bloom from McDonald's? – It’s no different. This is the most shameless Menshevism, the most shameless social-fascism on the musical front...”

In 1948, during processes that logically followed from similar “ideological disputes” of the late 30s, Rabinovich was arrested. Upon returning from the camp in 1955, he no longer held official positions, but quickly restored his reputation as one of the leading music critics. In 1958, he received an apartment in the famous “Composer’s House”, and actively hosted students there - inviting them “to get acquainted with some record received from abroad.” At the end of his life, Rabinovich became one of the largest philophonists in Moscow, heading the corresponding section at the Union of Composers; he promoted collecting and studying recordings.

Nikolai Svanidze

Named after grandfather - shot in 1937, party leader Nikolai Samsonovich Svanidze, head of the Abkhaz city committee of the Party, sibling Joseph Stalin's first wife - Kato Svanidze.

Father - Karl Nikolaevich Svanidze, despite his repressed father, made a career, becoming deputy director of Politizdat under the CPSU Central Committee. He was one of the compilers of the collection “The Goals and Methods of Militant Zionism.”

Mark Feigin

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More details and a variety of information about events taking place in Russia, Ukraine and other countries of our beautiful planet can be obtained at Internet Conferences, constantly held on the website “Keys of Knowledge”. All Conferences are open and completely free. We invite those who are waking up and interested...

Sergei Chernyakhovsky, Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor, full member of the Academy of Political Sciences

Political parties that declare themselves liberals in modern Russia have failed to enter parliament in any of the last four election campaigns. And in none of the four presidential campaigns were they able to take a minimally worthy place.

Their very name is compromised by them and practically despised. And they are looking for a new name.

If their existence depended on public support, they would have disappeared from the public sphere 15 years ago. But they do not disappear; on the contrary, they sometimes retain prestigious and status positions in elite spheres: significant media, universities, culture, and economic power blocs.

Because they are needed. Because they represent the real specific interest of collaboration, expressed in the idea of ​​​​being not citizens of Russia, but subjects of another geopolitical system, which they have long considered “their country.”

The confrontation between “patriots” and “liberals” in modern Russia is a euphemism. Designation by inaccurate and alien names of real confrontation in modern Russian society. By themselves, patriotism and liberalism cannot oppose each other, because one is a political feeling (love for the motherland and desire for good), and the other is a concrete one. political ideology, which has Freedom, Reason and Property as its basic values. And one does not exclude the other. Ideologies can oppose each other - communism, liberalism, conservatism, nationalism - in one form or another.

In Russia the confrontation is different. It is not between ideologies, but between the vast majority who believe that the fate, choice of path and determination of the social structure of Russia should be decided by its people, and those who are confident that all these points must be built in accordance with some external will and norms external centers authorities.

The first ones were designated by the name “patriots”. In the name of "liberals" - the second.

Let us repeat: the main line of confrontation today is not ideological differences. This is an attitude towards the principle of national sovereignty: is Russia sovereign or not. And the confrontation is between supporters of Russian sovereignty and collaborationists. But these names are not named.

Both names used are inaccurate and vulnerable. “Liberalism” - due to the entire mass of sins and abominations created under its mask over the last third of a century in Russia. Patriotism is due to its own moral strength and partly emotional superiority: it is not an ideology, it is a feeling - and therefore vague and non-specific. IN general view there is a desire for the good of the homeland, but everyone can see the good in their own way. One sees it in the restoration of socialism, another in the return of the Orthodox Tsar, and a third in the creation of a parliamentary republic. Vlasov and Krasnov saw him in general in the conquest of Russia Nazi Germany- and also called themselves patriots.

Behind the name of “patriotism” is the support of society. Behind the name of “liberalism” is public contempt. And support for certain elite groups who see their future and the future of their children in gaining a guaranteed position in a foreign state system.

They need collaboration, and it is supported from the outside. But it seems that it can no longer exist under the name of “liberalism”; it needs a new respected and revered one - as both the name of a democrat and the name of a liberal once were.

Hence, it is most profitable to also become a patriot. But to another, “true” one. And this is relatively easy: you just need to call the good of the collaborator a good for the homeland.

The first, it would seem, is indisputable: the development of healthcare, education, science, culture, social pensions, social infrastructure, public improvement, the fight against corruption, de-bureaucracy, tax reduction - and the list goes on. It does not contain anything unpatriotic. All this is necessary. And everything needs money.

But the second contains those recipes that allow you to find money: reducing spending on defense and security, abandoning “conflicts with other countries,” the need to “agree.”

For the latter, little is needed: abandonment of Crimea, surrender of Donbass, withdrawal from Syria, repentance before the “Conclave of Strong Races,” recognition of the power of external sovereigns over oneself.

It starts off as undeniably common sense and even patriotic.

And what emerges from it is controversial and counterproductive. Because you can't modern world to preserve even the richest economy and culture without a force capable of protecting that economy and culture.

It all ends with a call for international capitulation and renunciation of national sovereignty.

At the same time a setting is added: reduce state participation in economics, to transfer industry into private hands as much as possible, preferably associated with foreign capital, to integrate the country’s economy into the requirements of world economic centers.

Do not talk about your historical and cultural self-identification, about the right to choose own path development.

As a reward, a hearty meal is promised. comfortable life, the opportunity to leave the country without a visa and the right to “join civilization.”

They are already starting to do all this. And they are already beginning to call their collaboration “true patriotism.” Exactly the same way as they began to destroy the USSR under the slogan of “returning the Leninist face of socialism”, “awakening national consciousness” and “reforming union relations”.

In general, the manipulation technology is the same: accept the mask of what you intend to destroy. Contrast the undeniably important with the conditions for ensuring this important. And having seemingly proclaimed its priority, make its very existence impossible.