Secret operations of the KGB. Silent people and “storytellers”

30 years ago, on December 25, 1979, the advanced units of the Soviet army crossed the state border of Afghanistan. From this date, the Afghan war officially began, which lasted more than 9 years. The USSR lost more than 15 thousand of its soldiers and officers.

From this date, the Afghan war “officially” began, which lasted more than 9 years. As a result, during and after it (who died from wounds), the Soviet Union lost more than 15 thousand of its soldiers and officers. One of the first military operations was the seizure of the palace of the then head of Afghanistan, Hafizullah Amin, in Kabul. For a long time, only isolated fragments leaked to the press about that operation.

But much is still not clear. That’s why “KP” turned to a man who, during the long Afghan campaign, served in the structures of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the General Staff and “in two rounds” took part in hostilities. KP military observer Viktor Baranets talks with Afghan war veteran, military intelligence officer, retired colonel Ivan Taranenko.

SILENT PEOPLE AND “STORY TELLERS”

— Ivan Ivanovich, why even 30 years after that December 1979 operation in Kabul, its participants often completely refuse to talk about it? And some of those who agree to tell something sometimes contradict each other and get confused.

— All participants in those events signed a non-disclosure agreement regarding the operation. For a long time they had no right to say anything about her. And when the long period of information taboo ended, much was forgotten. Without archival documents or general information about the plan and progress of the operation at hand, individual participants tried to speculate on the events and set out their versions.

— Why was the decision made in Moscow to eliminate Amin, because he himself asked the Kremlin military assistance?

— Because the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee had no confidence in the insidious Amin. We needed a more predictable person. For example, like Babrak Karmal, Ambassador of Afghanistan to Czechoslovakia...

— When exactly was the assault on the Taj Beg Palace and who took part in it?

— Amin's Palace was taken on December 27, 1979. This operation was planned in less than three days. And it lasted less than an hour.

MUSLIM BATTALION

— Many sources indicate that the palace was stormed by special forces units “Alpha” and “Vympel”. This is true?

— Let me clarify: at that time they were called “Grom” and “Zenith” respectively. Even now very few people know about it. Both of these detachments were part of the KGB of the USSR. Some ordinary members of the KGB special forces appeared on TV screens in the early 90s and said that they stormed and captured the palace, forgetting to add that they were not alone there.

— What do you mean “not alone”?

- And the fact that GRU special forces also took part with them. Without in any way detracting from the merits of the security officers who participated in the operation, it would be unfair not to say something about those without whom this assault simply would not have taken place. I mean GRU special forces.

- And why could the assault not have taken place without the police officers?

“The fact is that within the walls of the KGB and the GRU General Staff, options were independently prepared for removing Amin from power. The main role in this was to be played by the KGB “Grom” and “Zenith”, as well as the Muslim battalion of the GRU.

- And what kind of battalion was this?

“Back in the spring of 1979, the country’s leadership came to the conclusion that it was unlikely to survive without our military intervention in Afghanistan. And therefore we must be prepared for any possible events. It was for this reason that GRU special forces colonel Vasily Vasilyevich Kolesnik received an order on May 2, 1979 from the head of the GRU, Army General Ivashutin, to form the 154th separate special forces detachment. Carrying out the order, Kolesnik developed a battalion staff (more than 500 people) and began to form it.

FAKE AFGHANS

- On what basis were soldiers, sergeants and officers selected for the Muslim battalion?

— These were military personnel mainly of three nationalities: Uzbeks, Turkmens and Tajiks. With such a national composition of the detachment, there were no problems with the necessary language training, since all the Tajiks, about half of the Uzbeks and some of the Turkmen spoke Farsi, one of the main languages ​​of Afghanistan. The battalion was headed by Major Khalbaev Khabib Tadzhibaevich. The personnel were intensively engaged in combat training during July and August. Meanwhile, Afghan army uniforms were already being sewn for Muslims in Moscow, and the necessary documents were also being prepared. Each soldier had standard documents in the Afghan language. There was no need to be clever with the names - everyone used their own. This should not have been noticeable, since in Afghanistan, especially in the northern regions, there are many Tajiks and Uzbeks, and Turkmen are not uncommon there either.

— And how did the battalion end up in Afghanistan?

— On December 9 and 10, the battalion was transferred to Afghanistan by military transport aircraft from the airfields of Chirchik and Tashkent to the Bagram air base.

— What tasks were assigned to the battalion?

“According to the initial plans of the GRU leadership, the battalion was supposed to move out from Bagram and immediately capture Amin’s residence. At that time she was in Kabul, but in a different place. Taj Beg was the newly built residence of Amin. In connection with the change in the location of Amin, adjustments were made to the plans. In December, the detachment was given the task of marching on its own and arriving in Kabul, supposedly to strengthen the security of the palace of the head of Afghanistan - this was the legal task of the detachment.

— But the Taj Beg was guarded by Afghan troops?

— The palace was guarded by Amin’s personal guard company - this was considered the first line of defense. The second line was to be our Muslim battalion, and the third was the security brigade, headed by Major Jandat, Amin’s main guarantor. The palace was protected from air strikes by an anti-aircraft regiment. Total number The military units and units near the palace numbered about 2.5 thousand people.

WHO TOOK THE TAJ-BEC?

- And with what forces were we supposed to take the palace?

- On our part, the joint forces of the Ministry of Defense and the KGB of the USSR took part in the operation to capture the Taj Beg Palace: the Grom group - 24 people (commander - Major Romanov), the Zenit group - 30 people (commander - Major Semenov), a Muslim battalion - 530 people (commander - Major Khalbaev), 9th parachute company of the 345th regiment - 87 people (commander - Senior Lieutenant Vostrotin) and anti-tank platoon - 27 people (platoon commander - Senior Lieutenant Savostyanov). GRU special forces Colonel Kolesnik was appointed head of the operation, and Major General Drozdov, head of the KGB illegal intelligence department, was appointed his deputy.

—Who developed the assault plan?

— The operation plan was drawn up by Colonel Kolesnik. Here’s how he talked about it: “I brought the plan, worked out on a map and signed by me, to Magomedov and Ivanov (respectively, the chief military adviser to the Ministry of Defense and the chief adviser to the KGB of the USSR. - I.T.) for signature. However, having approved the plan orally, neither one nor the other put their signature on the plan. It was clear that while we were deciding how to fulfill the task set by the country’s leadership, these cunning people were thinking about how to avoid responsibility if our action failed. Then, in their presence, I wrote on the plan: “The plan has been orally approved. They refused to sign.” I put the time, date and my signature, after which I headed to the battalion... General Drozdov also arrived with me. None of the performers, except us and Khalbaev, were privy to the true plans that we had to implement”...

"STORM-333"

— How was the assault carried out?

— On the morning of December 27, Drozdov and Kolesnik, according to the old Russian custom, washed in the bathhouse before the battle. A camp bathhouse was also set up for the rest of the fighters. Everyone was given fresh linen and vests... The time for the storming of the palace was postponed early date, since it became known that the Afghans were guessing about our plans. The operation, codenamed "STORM-333", began. With the onset of darkness, Khalbaev's scouts occupied advantageous positions near the palace. They captured firing points and removed sentries. However, while blocking the artillery depot, the scouts were fired upon by a sentry whom they did not immediately notice. He alarmed all the guards with his shots. The Afghans sounded the alarm. But Captain Sakhatov’s group managed to seize command of the infantry battalion. Left without control, the Afghans rushed to the rescue in droves. Special forces killed more than 200 people...

— Colonel Kolesnik recalled: “Having heard shooting at the location of the third battalion, I gave the command to begin the operation, launching a series of missiles. The attack of security officers and intelligence officers began directly on the palace. He stood on a hill, overlooking the surrounding area. A serpentine road and a pedestrian staircase one and a half meters wide led to it. As soon as the first armored personnel carrier passed the turn and approached the stairs leading to the end of the Taj Beg, heavy machine guns fired from the building. The armored personnel carrier was hit and caught fire. The personnel parachuted, some soldiers were wounded...

DEATH OF BOYARINOV

— What tasks were the KGB special forces solving at that time?

— At this time, the “Grom” and “Zenith” fighters also began to move towards Taj-Bek. The first combat vehicle cleared the barrier, crushing an Afghan soldier who rushed to close it. And the rest, having knocked down the outer guard posts, rushed along the only road that serpentinely climbed up the mountain, to the area in front of the palace. About 20 minutes after the start of the assault, nine combat vehicles of the first company found themselves on the site in front of the palace. The doors to the airborne squads swung open, and KGB and GRU special forces soldiers burst onto the first floor. A fierce battle ensued with Amin’s personal guard, who consisted mainly of his relatives. Special groups of the KGB and GRU covered the main forces of Sharipov's company and Tursunkulov's platoon; other units of the Muslim battalion and a company of paratroopers provided an outer ring of cover, repelling attacks by the Afghan security brigade. Two platoons of the Muslim battalion under the command of Captain Kudratov blocked the barracks of the 1st infantry and tank battalions and captured tanks. There were no bolts in the tank guns and machine guns. Our military advisers tried to do this - the mechanisms were removed in advance, supposedly they needed repairs. The Afghans fired hurricane fire from the windows of the palace. He pinned the commandos to the ground. The attack failed. This was the culminating moment: the commanders had to raise people to attack at all costs - to help those who had already broken into the palace. At that moment, on our part there were greatest losses- killed and wounded... Officers Boyarinov, Kozlov, Karpukhin, Golov were the first to make their way to the doors and windows of the palace.

— What was going on inside the Taj Beg at that time?

“The battle in the building itself was brutal. It was only possible to break into the palace small group. The special forces acted desperately and decisively. If the Afghans did not leave the premises with their hands raised, ours broke down the doors and threw grenades. Of the 30 Zenit fighters and 22 Thunder fighters, no more than 25 managed to break into Amin’s palace, and many of them were wounded. These forces were not enough to guarantee the elimination of Amin. The situation was close to critical. Colonel Boyarinov jumped out of the front entrance in Afghan uniform and began to call on the fighters of the Muslim battalion to go to the palace to help. At that moment, a bullet ricocheted off the bulletproof vest and hit the colonel in the neck. Due to his official position and age (57 years), Colonel Boyarinov could not participate in the assault personally, but could lead the battle while at headquarters. However, you had to know this officer: his subordinates were going on the assault - he decided to be with them. He not only coordinated the actions of special forces groups, but actually acted as a simple attack aircraft.

WHY DID AMIN THROW AN ASHTRAY?

— In the palace, the officers and soldiers of Amin’s personal guard, his bodyguards (about 100 - 150 people) resisted steadfastly, without surrendering. What ruined them was that they were all armed mainly with German MP-5 submachine guns, and they did not penetrate our body armor. From the memoirs of the captured adjutant Amin, it is known that the “master” ordered him to notify our military advisers about the attack on the palace. At the same time, he said: “We need Soviet help!” But the adjutant reported: “That’s how the Soviets shoot!” These words infuriated the General Secretary of the PDPA Central Committee; he grabbed an ashtray and threw it at the adjutant, shouting: “You’re lying, it can’t be!” Then he tried to call the Chief of the General Staff... But there was no connection. And Amin dejectedly said: “I guessed about it, everything is right...”

— What do you know about the circumstances of Amin’s death?

“When the shooting stopped and the gunpowder smoke cleared, the attackers recognized the man lying near the bar counter as Amin. He was dead. Perhaps he was hit by a bullet from one of the special forces, perhaps by a fragment of a grenade. Some expressed the version that Amin was killed by Afghans. What actually caused his death remains unknown... After the capture of Amin’s palace, the Kabul radio station broadcast a message that, by decision of the Revolutionary Tribunal, the traitor Hafizullah Amin was sentenced to death penalty and the sentence was carried out. Then at 2 a.m. on December 28, Babrak Karmal’s taped appeal to the people of Afghanistan was broadcast. It contained the following words: “Today the machine of torture of Amin and his minions, wild executioners, usurpers and murderers of tens of thousands of our compatriots has been broken...”

— What were the losses on both sides after the assault?

— The Afghans lost about 350 people killed. In total, about 1,700 people were captured. On our side, 11 people were killed, among them Colonel Boyarinov, four paratroopers and 6 special forces from the Muslim battalion, 38 people were injured of varying severity.

WHAT FEW KNOW

— What, in your opinion, is still little known about the events of those December days in Kabul?

— Immediately after the elimination of Amin, under the “supervision” of KGB officers, the new head of Afghanistan, Babrak Karmal, was delivered to Bagram by plane from Moscow. And then an emergency happened. Here’s how the head of the airborne task force, Lieutenant General Guskov, told about it: “When the plane was landing and was already on the first drive, the lights suddenly went out on the entire airfield... The Tu-134 landed in complete darkness. True, his side lights were on. The crew commander was forced to throw out a braking parachute, but the plane rolled almost to the very edge of the runway. As it turned out later, an ardent supporter of Amin, the head of the Hakim airbase, suspected something was wrong and, when the unusual plane was landing, turned off the lights, thus deciding to cause a plane crash. However, the high professional skill of the pilots allowed us to avoid disaster.”

And here’s what Colonel Kolesnik recalled: “On the evening of the next day after the assault, all the leaders of the operation were almost killed by a machine-gun fire from a Soviet soldier. Returning in Amin's Mercedes from a banquet dedicated to the successful completion of the operation, we were fired upon not far from the General Staff building, which was guarded by paratroopers. The first to notice the strange flashes on the asphalt and realize what they meant was Lieutenant Colonel Shvets. He jumped out of the car and covered the sentry with choice obscenities. It was better than a password. The chief of guard was called. The lieutenant who appeared first got punched in the ear by Shvets, and only then listened to the procedure for using weapons by the sentry at the post. We approached a car with several bullet holes in the hood. A little higher - and neither me nor Evald Kozlov would definitely be alive. General Drozdov approached the lieutenant and said quietly: “Thank you, son, for not teaching your soldier to shoot.” After this incident, we arrived at our location and, in order to relieve nervous tension
Yes, we drank four or five bottles of vodka. But the stress was so strong that vodka did not take us. Despite two sleepless nights and the fight, I still couldn’t sleep.”

HOW THE COLONEL SMOKED WITH MARSHAL "BELOMOR"

— What happened to the Muslim GRU battalion after the assault?

— On January 2, 1980, the Muslim battalion was transferred by two An-22s to Tashkent. Colonel Kolesnik said goodbye to his personnel and left for Moscow. There he reported on the operation to Army General Pyotr Ivanovich Ivashutin, who then headed the GRU. And the next day, Ivashutin again called Kolesnik, gave him his guarantor, a car, handed him the operation plan and ordered him to report to the USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal Ustinov.

— And why did the minister call Kolesnik?

— Colonel-generals and army generals were waiting for the minister in the reception room. Great amazement appeared on their faces when they saw that the colonel was met by the minister’s envoy, who was a lieutenant general, and was helping him take off his overcoat!

Colonel Kolesnik recalled: “In his office, Ustinov hugged me, kissed me, sat me down at the table and, taking out a Marlboro, offered me a cigarette. I apologized and said that I only smoke Belomor, but I left the cigarettes in my overcoat. Ustinov asked the guarantor to bring them, we lit a cigarette, and I began to tell. When I took out the plan in order to explain how we acted, the minister saw that it had not been approved, and the very inscription that I made in Magomedov’s office. Shaking his head, the marshal said: “I understand why the cautious Caucasian Magomedov did not put his signature on your plan. But I can’t understand why Ivanov didn’t sign.”

After the report, the minister escorted the colonel to the door. Seeing this, Marshal Sokolov, who was then the first deputy minister, said: “Well, Colonel, the minister has not escorted any of us to the door yet.”

Soon Colonel Kolesnik was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Then he was awarded the rank of general.

THE PRICE OF WAR

1979 86 people

1980 1484 people

1981 1298 people

1982 1948 people

1983 1446 people

1984 2343 people

1985 1868 people

1986 1333 people

1987 1215 people

1988 759 people

1989 53 people

TOTAL- 13,833 people.

Subsequently, the final figure increased slightly due to those who died from the consequences of wounds and illnesses after leaving the Armed Forces. Until recently, irretrievable losses in the Afghan war (killed, died from wounds, diseases and accidents, missing) were estimated as follows:

Soviet army— 14,427 people

KGB— 576 people

Ministry of Internal Affairs— 28 people

TOTAL- 15,051 people.

The exact number of Afghans killed in the war is unknown. The most common figure in official sources is 1 million dead.

About the same number are wounded and shell-shocked.

The famous American intelligence officer, Allen Dulles, said: “The success of the intelligence services is not advertised. Everyone knows about failures.” But in the USSR there were successful KGB operations that were discussed by everyone. Hungary The Hungarians have excited...

The famous American intelligence officer, Allen Dulles, said: “The success of the intelligence services is not advertised. Everyone knows about failures.” But in the USSR there were successful KGB operations that were discussed by everyone.

Hungary

The Hungarians have shocked the world. The country was part of the Warsaw Pact bloc. Of course, the uprising worried the Soviet Government. KGB officers, by order of the CPSU Central Committee, on the evening of November 3, 1956, managed to arrest Pal Malater (Minister of Defense).

The code message “Thunder” was broadcast. This was the signal for the start of Operation Whirlwind. The dispersal of the rebellious Magyars was entrusted to the KGB.

The Hungarians wanted the Russians to leave. But the USSR did not want to give up a tasty piece of the European pie. The CPSU believed that the Hungarians could not be an independent republic.

Our troops have been there since the end of the war with Hitler. Combat divisions - tanks, aviation, and rifle troops - took part in suppressing the rebellion. 7th and 31st Airborne Divisions, more than sixty thousand railway troops.

Even earlier, during the preparation of the operation, special detachments were created, which were ordered to capture city targets. 150 paratroopers on BMD provided support to special forces. They were accompanied by tanks.

The main thing that needed to be done urgently was to seize the Government of Imre Nagy. Within one day, Soviet troops captured the capital of Hungary. Nagy's government hid at the gates of the Yugoslav embassy. Two weeks later, on November 22, in the evening, diplomats' cars and a bus were parked outside the Yugoslav embassy.

Naive Hungarians and Yugoslavs assumed that the interior of the bus was considered the territory of Yugoslavia. It was assumed that the Nagy Government would leave the country on a bus. But not at this time. The KGB knew how to track opponents.

The KGB lieutenant colonel politely and coldly ordered all passengers to leave the bus. But I didn’t wait for this to happen. The bus was surrounded by armored personnel carriers, and it drove off in the direction needed by the KGB.

The Hungarian uprising is suppressed. The government of the rebellious republic was arrested.

Stepan Bandera (liquidation)

It’s easy to make a decision, but it’s not easy to implement it. Stepan Bandera always walked accompanied by bodyguards. It was impossible to catch him alone. Bandera lived in Munich, but his address was classified.

An incident that Agent Stashinsky recalled with a laugh helped. During the war, Bandera used the pseudonym Poppel. In Russian, it sounds like a fool. The agent looked through the telephone directory.

Poppel was there. There was also Poppel's address. Arriving next time in Munich, Stashinsky had secret weapon with potassium cyanide. The patient wait began.

It was a success. Stashinsky, noticing the punisher’s car driving into the garage, quickly entered the entrance of the building where Bandera’s apartment was located. There were people there. You can't stay on the stairs. He might be discovered.

The agent goes down the steps. Bandera is coming towards you. They met on the third floor. Stepan recognized Stashinsky. And he asked him: “What are you doing here?”

There was a light pop.

Pinochet

The KGB supported the necessary regimes and “sank” hostile countries. A lot of money was spent on this. The objectives of Operation Toucan included the KGB's intentions to denigrate the Chilean General Augusto Pinochet. “Fair” public opinion should have condemned him.

Pinochet said that communist party Chile is his personal enemy. The operation was supervised by Yuri Andropov. There were two goals. Show Pinochet in an ugly light and force Western human rights activists to put pressure on him.

Information war has been declared. New York The Times published sixty-six articles on the Chilean dictator. The publication cared very much about Chile. Four articles were published on the Cambodian Khmer Rouge, and three articles were published on problems in Cuba.

Letters were fabricated and “accidentally” ended up in the hands of the media. The KGB was successful. Pinochet received a dose of negativity in many countries.

John Walker

The KGB spared no expense when it came to recruiting intelligence service specialists. In 1967, they managed to recruit John Walker, who worked as a cryptographer. The KGB had a car (KL-7). Everyone used it American intelligence agencies in working with ciphers.

Walker worked for the USSR for seventeen years. Later, journalists called his work the US Navy communications center on Red Square. Any secret exercises or meetings took place under the close attention of KGB agents.

Walker supplied information daily. But, out of stupidity, he brought his wife into the business. Now, for the rest of his life, he is in the custody of the US Government.

Hezbollah hostages

At the end of September 1985 in Beirut, employees of the USSR Embassy were detained with shooting, wearing masks and blocking a car. Two KGB officers sat quietly, without resisting.

But the diplomat, Arkady Katkov, decided to defend his status. He was stopped by a bullet.

“The forces of Khaled Bin al-Walid” reported their participation in the capture of diplomats. But smart guys always worked in the KGB. With the help of residents in Beirut, it was established who was really behind the events.

Hezbollah and Fatah activists. They demanded that the USSR put pressure on the Syrian Government. And protect their organizations from extermination, which often happened during the cleansing of the territory in Tripoli and Beirut.

The terrorists' demands were met, but no one returned the diplomats. The KGB resident put pressure on the Hezbollah leader, threatening decisive action.

The Ayatollah was told that the rocket could accidentally hit a shrine - a mosque or somewhere else. For example, to the peaceful house of the Ayatollah. It's a rocket, what can you ask of it? People make mistakes.

The relatives of the main invader, Imad Mughniyya, were arrested. A month later, the diplomats were released.

There are a lot of rumors about this organization - Committee state security The USSR was the main bogeyman of both foreign intelligence and Soviet citizens. Within the framework of the KGB, large-scale operations were carried out in foreign intelligence, operational activities, and the fight against dissent and anti-Soviet activities. Until 1991, KGB officers carried out operations that were extremely important for the entire country, but only some of them became public.

The operation to suppress the Hungarian uprising of 1956 lay on the shoulders of the Special Corps. A total of 17 tank and rifle air divisions were involved, with the active participation of the 7th and 31st airborne divisions. KGB officers were appointed as the unofficial leaders of the detachments: Major General Pavel Zyryanov, Major General Kuzma Grebennik and illegal agent Alexander Korotkov. The first priority was the arrest of the government of Imre Nagy. The operation took only a day: by the evening of November 22, KGB Chairman Vitaly Serov reported to the Central Committee about the successful completion of all assigned tasks.

Murder of Bandera

One of the best KGB residents, Bogdan Stashinsky, was sent to Germany to eliminate the Ukrainian nationalist Stepan Bandera. Having figured out where the target was hiding (the address was found in a regular telephone directory), Stashinsky managed to trick Western intelligence agents by cunning, get to the very doors of the desired apartment and shoot the enemy of the people point-blank.

Operation Toucan

The reign of Augusto Pinochet questioned the very possibility of a communist coup in Chile. Operation Toucan was aimed at creating a negative image of Pinochet in the Western media in order to influence the dictator through the hands of Western politicians. In a short time, the New York Times published about 70 articles about the Chilean dictatorship, the activities of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia and human rights violations in Cuba. All this had a huge impact on politics, and some of the letters cost the job of the deputy head of the CIA, Albert Schnobsky, falsely accused of covertly persecuting Chilean political refugees.

The fate of John Walker

In early 1967, KGB agents obtained a sample of the latest American KL-7 encryption machine. But there was no one to work on it, so the most important task The foreign station remained recruiting an American cryptographer. It was Lieutenant John Walker, who spent 17 years leaking information about secret keys straight to the Lubyanka. It all ended only thanks to his wife, Barbara: unable to cope with the betrayal, she handed Walker over to the CIA, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment.

Release of hostages in Beirut

The seizure of employees of the Soviet embassy in Beirut had political goals: the Hezbollah terrorists demanded that the USSR put pressure on Syria so that it would abandon operations to clear out combat camps in Tripoli and Beirut. But even after fulfilling all the requirements, the terrorists did not release the hostages and KGB specialists had to intervene. The head of the Beirut station organized a meeting with Sheikh Fadlala, the spiritual leader of Hezbollah. At the meeting, the agent bluntly stated that if the Ayatollah could not help free the hostages, then the Soviet SS-18 missile would soon will fall on one of the Shiite shrines, the city of Qom, moreover, during the midday prayer, when almost the entire population will gather in the square. A day later, all the diplomats were freed.

We will find our like-minded people, our allies in Russia itself.

(Allen Dulles)

A classic case of defeat in a fight, directly related to betrayal, has long been described in one phrase: “When the most impregnable fortress is not conquered by armed besiegers, then it is captured by just one donkey loaded with gold.” Our case is very close, but the resolution is somewhat different. The Soviet citadel was surrounded by enemies and repelled one onslaught after another. But some of its guards conspired among themselves to rob the rich city treasury and, abandoning their post, flee the city; for this they came into contact with an external enemy. And they told them: “Yes, we will let you in, but help us capture the fortress!” The guards stole the treasury and drilled passages in the wall - so as not to quarrel among themselves (Osya Bender “got burned,” as we remember, because he could not share the “branzulettes” with the Romanian border guards) - and one by one they fled from the city. Enemy infantry followed them through these passages... The country was rich, and there was something to steal. Therefore, they killed her and took possession of her wealth - a banal story, reminiscent of a primitive detective story. Or the adventures of the beloved hero Yu.V. Andropov, who had a pretty hard time chasing either 12 chairs or 1 million. But here everything was nearby, everything was entrusted to the Committee: the country’s gold reserves, the Diamond Fund, the budget, “the party’s gold.” And all this turned out to be the object of the primary aspirations of their own intelligence - that’s what they call it. All that remained was to say: “everything is captured, and we are in the share”, and then "take and divide" A. Chubais and K? all they got was real estate, something that couldn’t be immediately sold to the West; of course, this is also something, and not “the sleeves are from a vest, the circle is from a donkey and the ears are from a dead donkey,” but...

We understand that Operation Perestroika is a tremendous success for the KGB! He worked for the USSR for too long. The moment came after which it was possible to work for yourself. Then the paths diverged.

The Main Adversary - American spies - were well paid for their work. People from Lubyanka decided to pay themselves. Yu.V. Andropov dismantled the PGU through shady deals, showing at the same time how much money can be made from this, and even more so from the defeat of the USSR. Where is the bearded Karl Marx with his poor imagination in the form of the theory of surplus value?!

No one in the world has ever enriched themselves so dizzyingly, so quickly, as during the defeat of the USSR. Rockefeller's oil and Morgan's pirate raids, usurious operations and Cortez's aggressive campaigns, the California gold rush and South African diamond mines, speculative pyramids and treasure hunts, all this, no doubt, is not bad money either, but they required risk, vanity, dizzying adventures, and here there was no need to tear your… from the leadership chair.

And not one of the components of the notorious triad is a cool head, clean hands and a warm heart - were not needed in this case. Well, okay, the possibilities are clear - the KGB guarded everything - and saw what and how they could pocket it, they laid something out in advance so that they could then steal it - but in a crime (and there is no doubt that it happened!) it is important to understand and motives. Why were they so tired of the “scoop” that they decided on such a risky operation with an uncertain ending? When did they, like O. Bender, whom their idol liked so much, become “bored with building socialism”? Or maybe he was initially alien to these people? The motives of behavior of entire groups of the population, even if they are scattered and have never seen each other, can coincide - this is the ABC of sociology. Workers and collective farmers, these - yes, they were interested in the successful development of the country, but what was the point of the KGB colonels, officials from the CPSU Central Committee, from the ministries of the mining industry, what was the point of “building” it?

Our story looks implausible, more suitable for a movie, where you can depict an upside-down world, than for real life. And our “heroes” are just some kind of monsters. Especially in comparison with those mafiosi about whom the press was constantly talking about how they had seized everything at the root, and which the population so vividly believed - yet we perceive the social more primary, and security generally trails somewhere at the end. Yes, there are also very serious wolves there, but even the steepest hillocks are just children next to these. The limit of their dreams is a Mercedes, the nearest factory, and here the whole country is at stake! However, as they say, the whole world is not enough!!!

The methods of super-enrichment are well known: these are drugs, trade in weapons, human goods, stolen archaeological values ​​and works of art, oil, gold - by the way, the security officers were related to many of this list, if not directly, then at least indirectly: the latter was mined and processed Ministry of Internal Affairs, but again controlled by the KGB.

A group formed under CIA Director W. Casey gave him a recommendation: to drop oil prices and this would lead the economy of the socialist camp to collapse. The job was done. But there was gold left... The 6th sector was put on the table by Prime Minister N.I. Ryzhkov’s report: the economy is on the verge of collapse - they sold a batch (of gold for now, gold, not communist), then another and another, and almost all of the Soviet gold reserves were taken abroad and safely stolen there. Nikolai Ivanovich has already published his third book about “perestroika,” but never said a single word about it. Well, there is time.

On the part of Western structures, both public and private, it was necessary to create all the conditions in order to lure individuals into scams that were advantageous to them in order to obtain a good recruiting base. Comrades from the Committee received a tempting offer that they could not refuse. The first of them did not sound like a direct betrayal, but as something unpunished. The safety threshold was passed unnoticed.

The situation looked something like this. A preliminary analysis of a certain number of PSU employees was carried out. Then one person was selected and the Chairman himself called him. He was told: “ You have to fulfill my special assignment. Are you ready for this? - "Yes!" - “You will need to urgently go to(follows: Paris, London, Tokyo, New York), there, without coming into contact with our station, the batch will have to be sold on the local exchange(referred to as any valuable material or item). Price - million dollars(other amount and/or currency) in cash. The deadline is a month!” Let's assume that the employee completes the task ahead of schedule, sells everything for a high price and returns to Moscow with a profit and reports. The chairman tells him: "Well done!", declares gratitude and never remembers again: the comrade did not live up to expectations. Now it's the next one's turn. And he, in turn, having completed the same task in a week and with the same super-profit and finding himself in the center of world capitals, and even with a large sum“left” money, squanders his share and, returning to Moscow a month later, gives only the agreed amount and also receives gratitude!.. But someday the time will come, and they will make him an obscene offer that he cannot refuse: “My friend, we recorded your behavior in the palaces of vice(brothel, casino, restaurants, bank, where the rest of the money was deposited) and what do you tell us about this?” And this employee will now work according to new program how cute... The entire system of the West was in favor of showing the ease with which you can put a certain percentage of the deal in your pocket and help realize your wildest dreams in an area that is not available in the Union. A variant of this could be this - the task will be to service one of the accounts: either illegal intelligence for various types of operations, or one of the accounts where money for trade transactions will be located, and the amounts will appear quite tempting, and there will be an appearance that you can put your hand in this pocket with impunity.

Another point of vulnerability: they could have been caught smuggling. The intelligence agent might not have given up some large sum, intended for the source agent. It was possible to start by creating a whole “fake” network of false agents, and the CIA itself could receive money and information - in a word, there are more than enough versions. Lack of control gave rise to many, many temptations... All this, strictly speaking, is very long.

The initial stage for those who began to be taken into development looked like nothing more than an innocent scam with money. And only then did things move to something more significant. They were patronized by Andropov and/or the people behind him. What guided their choice can be understood from a small excerpt from one of the two favorite works of the Chairman himself: “This is an excerpt from “Malaya Soviet Encyclopedia“. Here is what is written about Rio de Janeiro: “1360 thousand inhabitants...” so... “a significant number of mulattoes... near the vast bay of the Atlantic Ocean...”. Exactly! “The main streets of the city are not inferior to the first cities in the world in terms of the wealth of shops and the splendor of buildings.” (In our habit of double-checking absolutely all the information, we did this in this case as well - yes, the quote from the Small Soviet Encyclopedia is correct, the only detail is that only a certificate about Rio de Janeiro was posted on 2 pages - A. Sh.) Can you imagine, Shura? Don't give in! Mulattoes, the bay, coffee export, so to speak, coffee dumping, Charleston called “My Girl Has One Little Thing” and... what to talk about!..” Yu.V. Andropov, as they recall, often quoted this and paired works, including in the presence of subordinates, who could be easily tested and read information: which is more valuable to the person being tested: “palm trees, girls, blue express trains, the blue sea, a white steamer, a little-worn tuxedo, a Japanese footman, your own billiards, platinum teeth, whole socks, dinners on pure animal oil and, most importantly, the fame and power that money gives”, or words filled with a completely different meaning: Motherland - power - communism?

Some interaction with a Western partner is very important in this matter. The interests of the CIA and the KGB could coincide so much in some positions that they could understand each other without any words. And it is unknown where and from whom the first thought was born: “We need the Lubyanka to understand how it will be extremely beneficial for them to support our side in Big Game» or: “It would be nice if Langley understood who we are and that they can completely rely on us and organize cooperation,” Or maybe someone else brought the KGB and the CIA together at the same table?

There is another aspect to all this. Not the thirst for money, but the influence of information. The plans of the RAND Corporation and other Sovietological centers demonstrated superiority, better operational capabilities, and, finally, a high probability of achieving victory over the USSR. The security officers perceived the information obtained from state and private intelligence-like structures as just such an opportunity - they just had to play along well. Of course, we cannot take any data about those who are still stubbornly silent, and about whom we can only guess... But there are defectors, and they speak quite clearly about the external influence on the fateful choice very openly: “Later in a conversation with representatives of the CIA and at a sensational press conference with the participation of Western journalists, Khokhlov motivated his behavior by the fact that he was strongly impressed by the articles of the leaders of the NTS, with whom he became acquainted in the process of preparing for the assassination attempt.” And here is A. Rezun’s letter to the XXXVII conference of the journal “Posev” (October 5–6, 1985): “In August 1968, in Czechoslovakia, I came across a tattered little book, read to the core. The book was in Russian, but the censor’s long scissors clearly never touched it... This book was a window into another world. (...) A tattered little book from Czechoslovakia haunted me. I found other similar books."

In our business, going abroad is called channels. Even if they are connected with the personal interests of certain intelligence officers, and do not benefit the entire country, they still remain so. You can use it this way and that way. But each such window (another name) is explained when it is organized, and they report on it. But control may miss what its content is really filled with. After all, there are also people there who can be deceived. You just need to motivate it in the eyes of management and get sanction. Publicly, the KGB boasted of a paltry budget, but in reality this led to off-budget funding for both intelligence and personal pockets.

Channel "Chamber of Commerce and Industry"

The head of Lubyanka has his own special window to the West - the Chamber of Commerce and Industry with the first deputy (from September 1977), and then the chairman (from March 1983 to January 19, 1988) GB General Lieutenant E.P. Pitovranov. After his appointment, “...he began appearing at trade fairs and conferences. (...) Western businessmen found Pitovranov a very entertaining conversationalist. Tall, scientist-like, fifty-six years old (described in 1973 - A. Sh.) the man seemed very level-headed and spoke to them casually and fluently in English, French and German. He raised exciting hopes of profitable trade deals. (...) Naturally, Pitovranov made an impression on Western representatives, and, undoubtedly, the impression would have been even stronger if they had known who he really was.” Contact with Yu.V. Andropov was one-sided, it was immediately said: “Only one person is dedicated to our problems - E.I. Kalgin." He will solve organizational problems. Operational, informational and other fundamentally important - Yu.V. Andropov. It was E. Pitovranov, through the mediation of the first deputy head of PSU B.S. Ivanov and the head of the PGU A.M. Sakharovsky proposed active intelligence work from the position of trade and economic circles. First meeting with Yu.V. Andropov took place in one of his safe houses in September 1969. When this became known many years later, it was interpreted in the following terms: “At the age of 50, Pitovranov leaves the authorities from the post of head of the KGB Higher School. But it only seems so. He finds his way again. Friends help. Colleagues. Lovers of broad and free Russian song, fishing, sports, hunting. Workers in American and other areas. Skillfully combining the experience of illegal intelligence with work from a legal position. Colleague Ivanov strongly recommends that Pitovranov “take a closer look at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry.” I took a closer look. Over time he took over."

Total Pitovrans in 1969–1984 made 184 trips abroad. And this is very important, because as they now note: “By the mid-60s, a “three-circuit” economy had actually formed in the USSR. The main, middle contour here was the “official” economic system under the control of the Ministry of Defense-MIC. The internal, hidden contour is the “shadow” economy, which was under the “roof” of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. And there was also an external contour of the foreign economy, legal and illegal, which was supervised by the KGB. (...) With Andropov’s arrival in the KGB, a redistribution of resources began in favor of the external circuit, where the profitability of operations was several times higher than in the military-industrial complex.” In short, the first Jewish oligarch was a security officer.

What was hidden from view in the USSR suddenly became immediately clear, as soon as a person had spent enough time abroad: “Vasily Aksenov said that, having emigrated, he came to West Berlin for the first time, to the Federal Republic of Germany, and was amazed at the number of recognizable Russian children kind of very active in business. This is the beginning of the 80s, there was no talk of any perestroika. (...) Now it is clear that it was them, “the chicks of Pitovranov’s nest,” preparing new sites.”

It is curious that E.P. Pitovranov has a son, Sergei, in those days he was in a warm place: a leading researcher at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, whose founder was the son of another NKVD general, D.M. Gvishiani (1928–2003), an interesting tandem, isn’t it? Now my son is the representative of the Russian Federation in international monetary organizations. However, he is not the only one...

Louis Channel

There was such a little man, “...he was reputed to be a powerful and mysterious man with sybarite habits - either a KGB general, or a secret adviser to the foreign department of the CPSU Central Committee, or both. (...) More or less regularly, the nimble guys “in the wings”, who did whatever they could, communicated with Victor more or less regularly. (...) These guys, who had a lively character, bore the common nickname “luyata”. Their relationship with Victor was more friendly than business. A fair number of them eventually took foreign wives and settled in the West. (...)

Judging by some of Victor Louis’s statements, Yuri Andropov was his direct supervisor and guardian. It was he who allowed Louis a very unusual line of behavior and way of life for the Soviet Union. Quite adventurous commercial operations in the West and the publication in Moscow of the UPDC (Office of Diplomatic Corps Affairs) magazine, which actively published paid advertising (an unprecedented thing at that time!), brought Victor Louis wealth. Unlike other Soviet rich people, he never hid it and used it widely.” A film was recently released about him. So touching.

Channel “Financing of Communist and Workers' Parties”

The PSU was entrusted with the responsibility of transferring money to contactees from the leadership of these parties. Once the contact was made, you had to unsubscribe to the Central Committee, and then the amount was debited from your accounts. This topic is insignificant. But at the end of “perestroika” it was very marked, so let’s pay attention to it. There was also an opportunity to warm up our hands on this. The financing methods themselves have been tested many times and, by the way, now money is left in the West using similar schemes; “firms of friends” have been in the most unexpected places: Gandhi family in India, Ed Kennedy in the USA “...was a lobbyist for some companies interested in trade with the USSR, and knew that the success of this commerce largely depended on the favor of Lubyanka.”

Channel "Culture Fund - Sotheby's"

This is where P.M. was. Gorbachev. It was as a member of the Presidium of the USSR Cultural Foundation that she negotiated with... the famous diamond processing company De Beers. “There have long been rumors that Moscow supports secret contacts With South Africa in regulating the market of gold, diamonds, platinum and precious stones, over which both sides had a monopoly. The KGB played a certain role in organizing meetings between the two countries.” In the early 1980s. There was a wave of arrests among antiquarians, philatelists, second-hand book dealers, etc. The question arises: where did the confiscated goods go? Back to normal again: “ Arrested. Sentenced to deportation along with his wife and family. All valuable property was confiscated in favor of the Cheka (OGPU, NKVD, MGB).” And antiques, icons, second-hand books, jewelry, unique items, etc. floated to the West through this channel. Committee members generously took this away from collectors, substituting them under articles “for speculation” under Yu.V. Andropov, and later, after the adoption of the law on unearned income. It did not lie as “dead capital” here, but went there: for example, to London, where the local MI5 suspected Sotheby’s director P. Wilson of having connections with the KGB.

Channel "Drugs"

It is not known exactly when it arose, but it could have only one, very remarkable side: Interpol formally believed that there was no drug trafficking in the USSR, and taking advantage of this, transfers were carried out through the USSR. Let us recall that since 1986 - first deputy, and since 1987 - head of the Main Directorate of State Customs Control under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, General Lieutenant V.K. Boyarov. The deployment of troops to Afghanistan gave rise to yet another drug trade. This entire version was intensively worked out by a person hiding behind the pseudonym “O. Grechenevsky" in material published on the Internet, and then duplicated by the newspaper "Zavtra". Respectable people from any side do not try to prove this version head-on. But when they touch on this topic, they leave, hiding behind... fiction. A word from an Israeli: “John Le Kappe, in his latest novels, argues that with the end of the Cold War, the goals and ideology of the intelligence services disappeared, and they turned into drug and arms trafficking organizations. Unfortunately, apparently he is right about something.” Well, at least in such a cautious manner, but something is being blurted out...

Channel "Gold of the Party"

At one time, a lot was written about this, noisily, with great pomp and confusion.

For the time being, it was hidden that the initiative in this matter came from the KGB, as evidenced by an excerpt from the memorandum of L. Veselovsky: “Funds received as income to the party treasury and not reflected in financial documents can be used for the acquisition of anonymous shares of funds of individual companies, enterprises, banks, which, on the one hand, will provide stable income, regardless of the further position of the party, and on the other hand, these shares can be sold at any time on stock exchanges with the placement of capital in other areas in order to depersonalize party participation, but while maintaining control. To eliminate possible interference during such operations during an emergency period, it is necessary to create, both on the territory of the USSR and beyond its borders, special rapid response groups to respond to changes in the situation, staffed by professionally trained instructors from the active reserve of the KGB of the USSR or from special proxies, attracted to cooperation both on a voluntary basis and from persons dismissed from the KGB of the USSR for one reason or another.” NOT. Kruchina, to the misfortune of himself and the whole party, issued a visa: “If we do it, then only with the KGB,” and... The gold, of course, disappeared. And L. Veselovsky, before leaving for Switzerland, also managed to write an explanatory note: “In November 1990, at the request of the leadership of the CPSU Central Committee (Ivashko, Kruchin), by the decision of the department leadership (Kryuchkov and Bobkov), I was transferred from PSU to work in the Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU. By decision of the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee, I was appointed to the position of deputy. Head of the Coordination Sector economic activity economic services... The basis for my transfer to the Central Committee was the urgent need of the leadership of the Central Committee UD to create a unit capable of coordinating the economic activities of the economic structures of the party in the changed conditions... The choice fell on me, because by my education I am an international economist, I have experience working abroad and was known to most of the leading officials of the Central Committee for his activities in the Central Committee of the Komsomol and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. In addition, Kruchina believed that such a serious issue as organizing economic activity could only be entrusted to department employees, whose honesty he never doubted. I guess not last place the fact that while on a long departmental business trip in a country with a difficult situation, I was tasked with communicating with the Communist Party, which at that moment was in a semi-legal situation, played a role in the choice of my candidacy...

An agreement was reached to periodically inform Bobkov about my activities in the Administration of the CPSU Central Committee."

Channel “Diamonds for the Dictatorship of Democracy”

Looking ahead a little, let's talk about one of the most culminating moments of the organizational war against Soviet power: the elections to local representative bodies in the winter - spring of 1990. Such things now cost a lot of money, but even then they required funds. Through F.D. Bobkov carried out an operation to support candidates of the Democratic Movement, which was striving for power. The author of the source says that the operation was carried out by the 5th and 6th departments, but, as we will see below, it could not have happened without the PGU. A real alliance was created between KGB agents, agents of influence and outright criminal elements. It was supported by financial support both from within and from without. One of the Soviet counterintelligence officers, who wished to remain anonymous, said that financing channels were developed by the KGB. In the cities of Moscow, Leningrad, Gorky, Tula, Kazan and others, cooperatives and joint ventures were created that entered into fictitious contracts for the supply of scarce products; these goods were sold out, and the money was distributed among the “Democratic” candidates. Firms were opened abroad; timber, metal, and oil were pumped from the USSR through the joint venture at dumping prices. Part of the “profit” was sent back and given to the same people. It is assumed that this was how they rolled up to $100 million. It is clear that, as usual, part of it was stolen, but 20–25 million still reached the candidates’ cash register. Fortunately, there was so much money that the “democrats” did not fight. Some of them - Starovoitova and Yushenkov - were killed much later for the same thing...

* * *

Much of their dark dealings were quite widespread. Not without the fact that some intelligence person was covering for several residents at once who were selling “pebbles” on the black market in Moscow. A.N. Sterligov, as deputy head of the 6th sector of the Economic Department of the USSR Council of Ministers, supervised the diamond sector after the first shipments went abroad. He had to cover all activities from possible exposure from party control, the prosecutor's office or financial authorities. Although officially, of course, he was supposedly doing the opposite. For a cover operation...

Those who cultivated this phenomenon in every possible way knew well the vile human nature. Understanding for the rest came too late: “Of course, this was not the whole KGB, but only that part of it that conducted business abroad under the cover of foreign trade and banking institutions of the USSR. The big party dads moved their sons, fat and vicious, to this section of the “invisible front.” Everything they lacked here was abundant in the West. The Dzerzhinsky sanatorium was changed to a vacation in Miami Beach (Florida), instead of an apartment - a villa in Cote d'Azur, instead of one wife - even a whole street of red lights, instead of a salary on the twentieth (the day of the Chekist!) - all the gold of the party is in their hands. Nobody stopped them.

It was important for them only to understand the laws of socialism and draw the right conclusions for themselves. Next, the problem is formed by analogy: A. Hammer made money on the price difference between the USSR and the West. Now I had to become a Hammer on the same thing, but only with reverse side. We, of course, will get a little ahead of ourselves if we point out that, on Andropov’s orders, we studied the work of concessions and joint ventures - both world experience and our own - in the 20s. . About Yu.V. Andropov, his assistant on the Politburo line says that he “... for this reason he crossed intelligence with economics.” From the words of a certain mafioso from among those on whom all the embezzlement was later blamed, it is known: “I myself personally observed a deal in 1985 for four billion (!) dollars on a committee line.” We are most likely talking about PSUs or “roof liners”. Such an amount in dollars, and even within the country, was hardly possible. And yet, here I am completely overwhelmed by a feeling of pride for our heroes: this is not just some million, but a full-fledged four billion.

The time has come, and it has borne fruit - it has become possible to work openly: “In January 1987, at the insistence of the CPSU Central Committee, the restriction on foreign trade was partially lifted. Enterprises and others legal entities it was allowed to sell scarce goods abroad: food, raw materials, energy, gold, chemicals, and so on.

The resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR of September and October 1987 already gave directive instructions on the “mandatory” sale of deficits abroad”; the KGB itself was entrusted with the creation of the joint venture. Laws were issued that the KGB, if not itself wrote, then at least endorsed: Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR “On measures to improve the management of foreign economic relations,” published on August 19, 1986, according to which the right to foreign economic activity was given to 20 ministries and 60 large enterprises (understand: 20 ministers and 60 directors); The decree of January 1, 1987 abolished the state monopoly on foreign trade, including on strategic materials in which the West was interested; On January 13, 1987, a Decree was issued Supreme Council USSR “On issues related to the creation on the territory of the USSR and the activities of Soviet enterprises, international associations and organizations with the participation of Soviet and foreign organizations, firms and governing bodies” and the Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR “On joint entrepreneurship and joint economic associations”; The Law “On State Enterprise” of June 30, 1987 declared the priority of manufactured products intended for sale abroad. In total, until mid-1990, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry alone participated in the creation of approximately 500 joint ventures. “Our people” covered them first of all: Lieutenant General V.K. Boyarov and H.A. Ermakov, his successor as Chairman of the USSR Customs Committee, and since 1992 - Chairman of the Defense Committee economic interests Russian Federation under the President.

This shouldn’t be too surprising, because under the first chairmen it was the same: “The security officers, left without a firm master’s hand, increasingly fell into civil strife and commerce. Actually, there was little order in state security even under Dzerzhinsky. For example, in 1922, the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate reported to Dzerzhinsky that his subordinates were seizing alcohol confiscated from smugglers at customs, and even members of the GPU board were involved. He immediately wrote to his guilty comrade Stanislav Messing: “I order to stop these outrages, to severely reprimand those persons from the G.P.U. authorities who received and demanded these drinks from customs - for their illegal actions and for discrediting the G.P.U. authorities. P.U...”

After Dzerzhinsky's death it got even worse. Things got to the point that the Politburo demanded from the OGPU a report on the activities of the economic and trade organizations providing their exact balance."

Communist ideologists with their primates of building communism all over the world have eradicated everything national, everything rooted that connects with the Motherland. With this attitude, the repulsion from my system began. For the security officers this was not a betrayal. Their own game has begun for them.

How many people were in this case? It’s impossible to say for sure, but at least as much as was needed - not a single extra.

Everything that we have just described here was then shrouded in deep mystery and uncertainty, but when the time came for perestroika, much came out and manifested itself...

And when the putsch broke out, it swept away all the obstacles in their path (expression by M.S. Gorbachev). In the biographies of the people we are interested in, one can often find the following formulation: “in 1991, he resigned from the KGB, went into business, and became a multimillionaire”. However, this is still relatively fair. It’s completely dishonest when he remained in the civil service and controlled certain flows; financial, of course. And into your pocket. Is it any wonder at the privatization of safe houses when they managed, as they say, to grab 65% of all property in the country?

And this was not yesterday, not today, but always...

Eh, if you slander organs, then slander them to the fullest extent.

Remember the joke about the Chukchi? However, there are many of them. We mean like this. An anonymous denunciation comes to the Cheka: supposedly the Chukchi is hiding gold. The Cheka grabs a translator and leaves. Chukchi is caught, interrogated by an investigator, and an interpreter translates. Investigator: they say that you are hiding gold. The translator translates. Chukchi: mine doesn’t know anything. Investigator: If you don’t tell me, we will shoot you and your family. The translator translates. Chukchi: I remembered mine, I’ll show you where I hid the gold in the taiga. The translator translates: however, shoot.

But in reality it was like this. In Khakassia, in the Chebakovo volost, there was a full-scale war of the white partisan detachment of Ivan Solovyov. 18-year-old A. Gaidar was sent to suppress. The commander had 2 years of experience in both his partisanship and, conversely, the suppression of insurgents. The bandits run away. Soloviev makes contact with a proposal: he promises to hand over gold from Ivanitsky and other mines in exchange for saving his life. When A. Gaidar reports this to the Center, he is immediately removed from command and a case is opened about excesses. The security officers have arrived. And Solovyov, tied up and locked in a bathhouse, was killed by a sentry who was “scared of something,” and “while trying to escape,” his adjutant Sashka Solovyonok and another one: Chikhachev were shot. The gold floated away. It never stopped, not even for a minute. And now when they tell us: “We must not allow warriors to turn into merchants”, we just smile: this is necessary, what kind of fools do you take us for?! Warriors do not turn into merchants (that wouldn't be so bad!), they can only turn into murderers and marauders.

Laugh or cry?

Well, this one is all right: he’s gone, and God be with him! But those that remain... Regular Internet readers have long read O. Grechenevsky’s material “The Origins of Our “Democratic” Regime” and know who has and how many billions... There are two registers there: List-90 “KGB in power” and List-90 60 “KGB in business.” When I read this thing, I always had the underlying thought that I had already seen something like this somewhere. Then I remembered. The KGB maintained an “Alphabetical list of foreign intelligence agents, traitors to the Motherland, members of anti-Soviet organizations, punitive forces and other criminals subject to search” (introduced on the basis of Order No. 0250 of 1968). You probably remember this one? Now a similar one has been brought against them. Lord, how everything changes in this world...

Notes:

Starkov B. “We won’t reward your b...s.” // Top secret. 1992. No. 5. P. 7.

Alekseeva L. Gorbachev and dissidents. Turns out, parallel lines converge. // USSR: Internal contradictions. Benson, Vermont. 1987, May. No. 19. P. 51.

Villemerest, de P. Le coup d "Etat de Markus Wolf. La Guerre Secrete deux Allemagnes 1945–1991. P.: Editions Stock, 1991. (94. No. 1. Villemaret, de P. The coup d'etat of Markus Wolf. // Politics. (M). 1992. No. 5; 94. No. 2. Villemaret, de P. Coup d'etat of Marcus Wolf. // Politics (M). // Politics (M), 1993, no. 1, p. 15, footnote.

Krasikov S.P. Near the leaders. M.: Sovremennik, 1997. P. 466.

Chertoprud S.V. Yuri Andropov: Secrets of the KGB Chairman. M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2006. P. 299.

Shevelev I. The life of remarkable executioners. From mass executions to the Chamber of Commerce and Industry. (Book review: Kiselev A. Stalin’s favorite from Lubyanka. St. Petersburg: Neva, 2003. People of special purpose). // NG-Ex Libris. 2003.9 October. No. 36. P. 6.

Markish D. Victor Louis: unanswered questions. //Lechaim. (M). 2002. No. 9. P. 40, 42.

Secret copy No. 1 To the Deputy Head of the First Main Directorate of the KGB of the USSR, Major General V.F. Grushko. About writing off expenses. V.V. Margelov. Head of the 5th Department of the PGU KGB of the USSR Colonel (...) 06/30/87 No. 161/2006

State Security Committee of the USSR. First Main Directorate. 04/14/88 No. 157/609. Moscow. Special folder. Top secret. Personally. Central Committee of the CPSU. Comrade Dobrynin A.F. About the direction of the receipt. N.S. Leonov, Deputy Head of the First Main Directorate.

State Security Committee of the USSR First Main Directorate. 10/29/87 No. 161/3012. Moscow. Special folder. Top secret. Personally. Central Committee of the CPSU. Comrade Dobrynin A.F. About the direction of the receipt. V.F. Grushko, Deputy Head of the Main Directorate.

State Security Committee of the USSR. First Main Directorate. 31.111.87 No. 157/613. Moscow. Special folder. Top secret. copy #1 Personally. Central Committee of the CPSU. Comrade Dobrynin A.F. About the direction of the receipt. V.A. Kirpichenko, Deputy Head of the First Main Directorate.

73. P. 174. “17.02. 1983. No. 349 - Ch/OV. Central Committee of the CPSU. (...) The KGB of the USSR maintains contact with the son of the Prime Minister (...) Rajiv Gandhi (with the consent of the CPSU Central Committee according to the note of the KGB of the USSR No. 1413 - A/OV dated July 14, 1980) (...) Rajiv Gandhi expresses great gratitude for the help, which comes to the Prime Minister's family through commercial transactions of the Indian company she controls with Soviet foreign trade organizations. In a confidential manner, R. Gandhi said that a significant part of the funds received by the channel is therefore used to support R. Gandhi's party. Chairman of the Committee V.M. Chebrikov" (Quoted from: (Urushadze, 1995. P. 174)).

Sergey Kuznetsov

A quarter of a century later, the former speaker of the first Russian parliament, Ruslan Khasbulatov, told Top Secret the whole truth about the events of 1991

This year marks 25 years since the August coup. The most unsuccessful operation of the KGB of the USSR in the entire history of the existence of this special service - the seizure of the parliamentary palace in August 1991 in the center of Moscow - is recalled in a new book of his memoirs by a direct participant in those tragic events - at that time the Chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR Ruslan Imranovich Khasbulatov. Khasbulatov handed over for publication to the newspaper “Top Secret” one of the chapters dedicated to the events of 1991.

Who actually came up with the idea of ​​Yeltsin's speech on a tank in front of the White House, why troops did not storm the parliamentary palace on the very first night of the coup on August 20, why Yeltsin did not flee to the US Embassy - these and other little-known details of the August military coup d'etat of 1991 , which failed...

Exactly at 10.00, the head of the KGB, Vladimir Kryuchkov, invited his deputy KGB Colonel General Geniy ​​Ageev to his office on Lubyanka, ordered him to immediately contact the First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR Vladislav Achalov and begin with him to develop the issue of blocking and seizing the building of the Supreme Soviet of Russia ... Of course, both General Ageev and other co-conspirators understood that this was not the decision of Kryuchkov alone, and that it was the result of a collective discussion of all members of the State Emergency Committee. At the same time, Kryuchkov set the task of “delivering Yeltsin and Khasbulatov to the appointed place” (the Zavidovo hunting estate near Moscow)…

Ageev proposed carrying out this operation by KGB forces in two echelons. The first to break into the Russian parliamentary palace was Karpukhin’s group “A” detachment. The detachment penetrates to the 5th floor, takes out Yeltsin (center) and Khasbulatov (east wing). The second echelon is Beskov’s group “B”, which has the main task of “cleaning up” - that is, disarming armed persons, detaining them, including people's deputies. The forces of Groups A and B each had approximately 260 men. Since both commanders unanimously stated that “there are not enough forces,” Ageev agreed with their opinion and said that he would ask Kryuchkov to “strengthen” the detachments with additional forces.

When Ageev (12.20.) with his “team” arrived at Achalov (1st Deputy Minister of Defense), there were: General Achalov himself, commander of the Ground Forces, General V.I. Varennikov, commander of the Airborne Forces, General P. Grachev. S., Commander of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, General B.V. Gromov, Deputy Commander of the Airborne Forces, General A.I. Lebed; the commander of the Moscow Military District, General Kalinin, and several other generals.

Ageev reported to the “meeting” the plan for blocking and storming the Russian parliamentary palace, which he had previously outlined in the KGB to his security generals, and explained the issue of the number of units that his “office” has at its disposal. The generals began to animatedly discuss the specific plan for the operation, which was called “Thunder.” At the same time, it’s strange, but none of these officials allowed the idea that they all became accomplices in a grandiose crime...

The start time of Operation “Thunder” was 3 o’clock in the morning on August 20 or 21, 1991, at a signal from a rocket (red) into the air, which the commander of group “A” Karpukhin should have done...

“You can't give up! We have to fight!”

After a three-day stay in Checheno-Ingushetia, on August 18, I returned to Moscow and immediately headed to the Arkhangelskoye village...

The next day, August 19, as usual, I got up at 6 o’clock in the morning, quickly got myself in order, warmed up the coffee, and drank a cup. The driver, Volodya, came in and said that we could go (by the way, I didn’t have any security). The phone rang, I picked it up and my wife said excitedly and asked:

What's happened? The neighbors say there has been a coup, do you know about this?

I answer, I don’t know anything.

Turn on TV!

I turn it on. Fragments from Tchaikovsky's ballet "Swan Lake".

The stingy one appears official information Regarding the fact that President Mikhail Gorbachev is ill, his duties are performed by Vice President Gennady Yanaev. Created State Committee By state of emergency(GKChP). On certain territories countries (including Moscow and Leningrad) a state of emergency has been introduced...

Got it: this is a revolution!

I ran to the Yeltsins’ house. At the outer door, on the street, Yeltsin’s guard Alexander Korzhakov stands dejectedly and opened the door for me. I entered, saw the confused Naina Iosifovna, said hello, and asked: “Where is Boris Nikolaevich?” Answers: “Upstairs.”

I run to the second floor, open the bedroom door - a half-naked, old, flabby man was sitting on the bed. Looks like he's very tired and sleep-deprived. He didn’t even react to my noisy intrusion, his head was bowed almost to his knees, he was indifferent. I looked at him in surprise for several seconds, not understanding his condition, then I came close, half-embraced his limp, large body and said, trying as softly as possible: “Get up, Boris Nikolaevich, get yourself in order. We have new things to do, but time is short, we need to act.”

Frankly speaking, I did not expect to see Yeltsin completely confused. I felt sorry for him - he was morally crushed, with a dull look, sluggish movements. I studied him thoroughly again, shook him and said harshly: “Shave, wash and get dressed, we don’t have much time, we need to formulate a plan of struggle, convene a meeting of our supporters, here, with you, Boris Nikolaevich!”

Yeltsin says listlessly: “Why is this? It's all over, Kryuchkov won. Now nothing can be done. Gorbachev is sitting.”

I was indignant: “We have to fight! Do you want to give up without a fight?

Appeal “To the Citizens of Russia!”

An excited Ivan Stepanovich Silaev arrived, who, although he was not in the village, managed to get there before others who lived here in the neighborhood; then Rutskoy, ministers Yaroshenko, Poltoranin, Burbulis, Shakhrai and someone else arrived...

Yeltsin told those gathered that time was short, it was necessary to quickly resolve the issue of preparing one document, which Ruslan Imranovich and I had already agreed on. This should be an “Address to the People”...

I told Poltoranin: “Mikhail Nikiforovich, you are our chief journalist (former Chief Editor"Moskovskaya Pravda"). Write!”

He began to look for a pen in his pockets and could not find it. I took out my pen and handed it to him, pushing a stack of paper towards him. Everyone looked at Poltoranin to see where he would start. It doesn’t work - my hand is shaking.

“Give me my pen here,” the phrase involuntarily escaped me with anger, “my hand isn’t shaking!”

So I wrote the text, which by the evening of the same day, August 19, 1991, had spread throughout the USSR in handwritten form, written in my hand. And most importantly, Yeltsin read it out on a tank. Along the way they made comments to me, I took some things into account; but I wrote quickly - I had to hurry...

He rushed to Moscow at great speed. Following me, Yeltsin, Silaev and others. See the full text of this document, in which the leadership Russian Federation declared war on the putschists.

Appeal “to the citizens of Russia!” From the archive of R. Khasbulatov

Photo by Sergei Kuznetsov

The Supreme Council enters the fight

All the short journey (15 minutes, no more) I thought about the situation... The only, in fact, our political force is the parliament, the Supreme Council of Russia, the deputy corps, as well as the apparatus, which I knew well and trusted (more than 500 people)...

The full members of the Presidium were waiting for me. Their faces are alarmed... Everyone is waiting for my first words, reaction - their eyes are fixed on me. I began by stating a phenomenon - a putsch had occurred in the country, the possibility of which was talked about a lot, but I personally did not believe in such a turn of events. Regarding the fate of Gorbachev, nothing is known... Lukyanov, as Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, who is not a member of the criminal State Emergency Committee, is the only legal authorized head of the union center. We will negotiate with him regarding the current situation in the country. And now, dear colleagues, time is running out, we don’t have it: I propose to adopt a resolution of the Presidium of two or three points...

Both of these documents (the resolution of the Presidium and the “Appeal to the Citizens of Russia.” - Ed.) were replicated on all photocopiers of the Supreme Council and the Russian government. Numerous assistants to deputies and employees of our apparatus contacted the regions, read out the texts of documents; Volunteers in their cars took them to metro stations, train stations, bus stations, and airports.

In my speeches to the deputies I had to recall the classics of the revolutionary struggle: control over transport, important facilities, mail and telegraph, army, etc.

The resistance began, becoming explosive. Moscow, which had been hiding, perked up. The initial fear quickly passed...

Breaking the information blockade

One of the employees of my office had a relative who worked in the office of Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov, one of the most active participants in the State Emergency Committee. She gave her about 10 of our documents - the “Appeal”, the resolution of the Presidium on convening the Extraordinary Session, my instructional letter to the regional authorities, some of Yeltsin’s decrees and a number of other documents. She, in turn, taking advantage of the general confusion going on around Pavlov and his senior officials, sent all these documents stamped “USSR Government. For official use" to all leaders of the union republics, autonomies, regions and territories of the Russian Federation and even some foreign governments.

The leaders, having received these documents, were at a loss - they could not even imagine that they were sent to them without the official permission of the Kremlin. But they wondered: for what purpose are they being introduced to them? Later, our provincial leaders also reported that they had “received” the documents. Of course, Kryuchkov’s KGB services recorded these conversations and realized what a blunder had been made, but the job was done...

When Major Evdokimov’s tanks, roaring with powerful engines and releasing clouds of black smoke, positioned themselves almost at our doors, at the front entrance of the parliamentary palace, pointing the long muzzles of their guns directly at our windows and doors, we all - Yeltsin, me, Silaev, Ilyushin, Sukhanov, Korzhakov and someone else quickly went down to the first floor and approached the huge door in the lobby. The whole picture is in full view...

We looked at tanks. It was more than worrying. They were silent. Without thinking too much, I said: “Boris Nikolaevich, a tank, of course, is not an armored car (a hint at Lenin’s performance on an armored car at the Finlyandsky Station in October 1917), but you can perform on it. How do you feel about climbing onto this “tribune” and addressing the Muscovites - there are so many of them gathered around the tanks!

Yeltsin: “Are you serious, Ruslan Imranovich? They could kill me!”

Me: “There is no threat. Can you imagine the effect of your performance? Grandiose! This will make such an impression on Yanaev! Can you imagine? To the world?..”

Yeltsin was silent and pondered.

Me: “Boris Nikolaevich, this is a historic chance; I have never seen a more suitable platform. From the three of us - from you, from me, from Silaev - people expect some powerful act, action. In the end, it doesn't matter which of the three of us performs. If you don’t want to, I’ll go.”

Yeltsin: “No, I thought, I agree. You’re right - I need to speak.”

And then he decisively walked with long strides towards the tank. Korzhakov rushed after him. And now Yeltsin is already climbing onto the spacious platform of the tank. Begins his famous performance...

The effect of the speech was amazing, thousands of people listened with bated breath to the Russian president, dozens of foreign television journalists filmed historical footage. From that moment on, world news began with this picture - Yeltsin on a tank in the midst of people, branding the putschists who removed Gorbachev from power. With this one action, we instantly broke through the information blockade. The organizers of the State Emergency Committee were shocked...

Photo by Sergei Kuznetsov

Saving conversation with Lukyanov

August 19. 10 pm. In Yeltsin’s office they gathered: his owner - Yeltsin, me, Silaev, Yuri Petrov, Skokov, Ilyushin, it seems there was Burbulis and someone else...

Boris Nikolaevich! - I turned to Yeltsin. - It seems to me that there is one chance of getting a relatively safe night. I am now immediately calling the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Lukyanov. He is not officially listed in the State Emergency Committee, so we are not violating our “no negotiations with putschists” approach. I will invite him to meet tomorrow
tra in the morning. If he agrees, we get an important break...

Everyone was surprised by this unexpected proposal. However, no one dared to object - no one had any other ideas...

And so I dialed the phone number, they answered: “Lukyanova’s reception.” I introduce myself, please speak to the chairman. Lukyanov’s voice is right there. Hello. I immediately get to the point, saying that the matter is bad, it could end in blood. We should meet and talk - maybe we can find ways to peacefully resolve the “problem”.

Lukyanov invites you to immediately come to him in the Kremlin. But we don’t need “immediately”.

Me: “Well, why look at night. Let's do it tomorrow morning."

Lukyanov is silent, apparently thinking, and agrees... I’m sure today The fact is that it was my conversation with Lukyanov that had a decisive influence on the fact that the troops were not sent for the assault on that first tragic night. Later, General Vladislav Achalov, Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, confirmed this.

...In the morning, the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR greeted us quite cordially. We sat down at the desk. The owner ordered coffee for everyone. Lukyanov began the conversation - he immediately raised the issue of his complete non-involvement in the State Emergency Committee, the fact that he was summoned by telegram from vacation on the 18th, etc. I interrupted him, saying that, given his non-involvement in the junta, we decided to meet with him and only him...

Silaev immediately took our “Document” out of the folder and handed it to Lukyanov. The Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR began to read it carefully. I read carefully, thoroughly... I reached the tenth point: “Dissolve the illegally created “State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR”, “cancel all its decisions and orders.” Lukyanov was already openly indignant here.

Lukyanov: “But “they” will not agree with such demands. It’s not worth even talking about the dissolution of the “state committee,” the interlocutor snapped. He was thoroughly shocked, apparently, he did not expect such demands from us... For all his self-control, Lukyanov was noticeably worried. Having calmed down somewhat, he pressed the button. I thought - who will he call? Will people in uniform and with handcuffs really come in now to arrest us? A nice guy came in, he didn’t seem to be a military man. “Multiply it, give it to them,” he handed the assistant our “Document” with “requirements”...

We left Lukyanov’s office with the feeling that we would be detained. We got into the cars. Let's get going. We left through the Kremlin gates. Breathed a sigh of relief...

First night, from the 19th to the 20th, on the barricades in front of the White House

Photo by Sergei Kuznetsov

Silaev: “Tonight there will be an assault!”

On August 20, at 11 o’clock, Kryuchkov held a meeting at Lubyanka, which was attended by all his deputies, members of the board and heads of departments. It lasted only 30-35 minutes. The board of the USSR KGB did not make any decisions, Kryuchkov did not give any instructions to anyone, he smiled slightly all the time... The start of Operation Thunder was scheduled for 3 a.m. on August 21...

Achalov, Ageev and Gromov were appointed heads of Operation Thunder - each of them had to ensure the precise implementation of the task from their department (army, KGB, Ministry of Internal Affairs)...

From the second half of August 20, the situation remained tense, growing as new armored units were introduced into the center of Moscow. They continuously maneuvered, around them, literally in steps, people moved and stood, frantically shouting protest slogans...

In the evening it started to rain more often, frequent drops continuously hit the glass of the huge windows of the parliamentary palace... At about 10 pm I was with Yeltsin - the two of us were discussing something. I was sitting, he was walking nearby, when the phone rang sharply - Yeltsin came up and pressed the button.

Yeltsin, I see, has become gloomy and says: “Well, Ivan Stepanovich, we’re sitting here with Ruslan Imranovich, working out the details of the defense. Maybe you’ll come in?”

Silaev: “Ruslan Imranovich, goodbye, Boris Nikolaevich, goodbye. Tonight it will be the end of us. This is reliable information. Let them take it at home. Farewell…"

The phone went off. Yeltsin, somewhat exhausted and gray, looks at me gravely and is silent.

The sight of a confused Yeltsin, Silaev’s departure from the White House - all this already caused not just doubts, something more, and even some kind of indifference... I rose heavily from my chair and left without saying goodbye.

Lubyanka. Preparations for the assault

Upon returning to Lubyanka (21 o'clock), Ageev invited Karpukhin, Beskov, Raschepov, Zhardetsky and Prilukov to his place and invited them to report on the situation. The KGB generals reported that the barricades around the Russian parliamentary palace are quite large, chaotic structures, they are reinforced with concrete rings and slabs, and tanks cannot overcome them. Large crowds of people gathered around the entire perimeter of the building, 40-50 thousand people, many women, teenagers... During the assault, large casualties are inevitable, so the operation in the form as it was planned was inappropriate to carry out. The military seems to be inclined to this opinion...

Kryuchkov was not there. Ageev called Gromov, and then Achalov, asking for their opinion. Gromov answered evasively, Achalov said that it was necessary to study the situation more carefully...

After this, Ageev called Kryuchkov again and, having learned that he was there, went to see him. And he reported the situation. Kryuchkov was very dissatisfied with the development of events.

Yeltsin: “We need to move to the American embassy”

...Approximately one o'clock in the morning on August 20th. At that moment the door swings open - Korzhakov runs in and shouts: “Ruslan Imranovich, hurry up to the president!” And then he disappears. I, assuming the worst (suicide), jumped up and ran to the president. There is no one in the reception area, the huge office is empty. The security guard stands at the other end of the office, at the door to the rest room, waving his hand at me: “This way!”

We go to the elevator and go down to the garage. I see standing: Yeltsin, Petrov, Sukhanov, Ilyushin, Korzhakov, and someone else. They are walking around Yeltsin’s huge armored ZIL - I hardly knocked it out of Kryuchkov in September 1990, when Yeltsin got into some kind of car accident and fell into depression.

Yeltsin stepped towards me and said: “Ruslan Imranovich, you and I urgently need to move to the American embassy. The assault will begin very soon, you and I will be liquidated. There is an agreement - there will be a big noise in the world, these people from the State Emergency Committee will be forced to leave - we will return in a few days. We need to save ourselves for Russia”...

While I was listening to Yeltsin and the “explanations” of how we could “escape,” all the events of the last days quickly flashed by: Yeltsin’s confusion in the first hours of the putsch, his readiness to accept defeat, complete absence any initiative, some childish games of “government in Sverdlovsk”, “government in exile” in Paris, etc. And now - this obvious and outright cowardice. Moreover, he invites me to become an accomplice in the shameful flight... The rage that had taken hold of me was ready to break loose - the most insulting and contemptuous words were ready to fall on the man standing in front of me. I clenched my teeth and lips - my brain controlled my tongue. I'm silent.

Korzhakov came close and said: “We must hurry. There may have been an information leak. Then they will block the passage.”

Yeltsin, apparently believing that I agreed to run away with him, stepped towards the car door, Korzhakov opened it. I stood motionless, then slowly said: “Boris Nikolaevich, you made the right decision. Your life is dear to all of us. You are the first Russian President. Leave. My situation is different, there are 400 of my deputies here. I am their leader and must stay with them. Farewell!"

He turned and walked to the elevator, pressed the button, the door swung open, stepped - the door began to close. At that moment I heard Yeltsin’s loud voice: “Ruslan Imranovich!..” The door closed, I did not hear what he wanted to say. I walked again through his huge empty office and reception room - to myself...

I had barely sat down at my desk when Yeltsin’s usual phone rang. I was surprised. Pressed the button.

Me: “Thank you, Boris Nikolaevich!”

I felt a huge inner relief. He leaned back in his work chair. In general, it became good and calm. As far as the situation allowed...

Waiting for the assault

By morning, psychological tension increased... Around one in the morning I heard the first shots. He walked up to the window overlooking the square. - “Don’t come to the window,” one of the guards shouted, “there are snipers on the roof of the CMEA, they are holding your office at gunpoint!”

...The most dangerous time is from 4 to 5 am. Psychologists have found this out. Attention and reaction are dulled. Is that when they will begin to act? This was a critical period for the White House defenders. psychological aspect. It was necessary to support them with words, to encourage them. At this time, journalist Bella Kurkova came in. I tell her: “Let’s go to the radio room, I want to speak to our defenders”...

Photo by Sergei Kuznetsov

In general, I spoke for about thirty minutes. Then they told me that this, like my first performance on the 19th, was one of the best performances, and - most importantly - at an exceptionally right time, when extreme physical and psychological fatigue of people set in...

Reflections of an old marshal

Already from the evening of the 20th, Marshal Yazov (Minister of Defense of the USSR - Ed.) was seized with anxiety, doubts arose about the success of the actions taken and even about their correctness. It seemed to him that nothing could stand if the army, the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs took a position of supporting the State Emergency Committee - this confidence was now quickly leaving, anxiety and understanding of the error of their actions were growing...

Photo by Sergei Kuznetsov

About three hours after Achalov’s report, the two of them finally decided not to participate in the storming of the parliamentary palace. But the old marshal still did not take any action.

Yazov made the final decision at about 7 am. I called Achalov and informed him of my decision to begin the withdrawal of troops. I called Kalinin and ordered the appropriate preparations to begin for the return of the district troops brought into Moscow to their places of permanent deployment...

Yazov to Achalov: “You seem to know Khasbulatov, contact him. Let him convey to the Moscow city authorities (Luzhkov) my request that I need to talk with them about clearing the barricades. It is necessary to withdraw troops from Moscow.

...You go to Kryuchkov, tell him that the army will not commit bloodshed, will not fight with the deputies and the people. I need to fly to Gorbachev..."

Yazov invited the boss General Staff Moiseev (he was on vacation), handed over all matters to him. Already on his plane, Yazov learned that Silaev and Rutskoy were flying on a parallel course to Gorbachev on behalf of the Supreme Council of Russia.

Kryuchkov's disappointment

Closer to the night of August 21, Ageev called Kryuchkov again and, having learned that he was there, went to see him. In Kryuchkov’s office were the leaders of the State Emergency Committee Baklanov and Shenin, as well as a whole group of senior KGB officers, heads of various divisions of this department. Everyone was talking quietly to each other. Kryuchkov constantly called, or people called him, he did not respond to the remarks and conversations of those gathered.

When Ageev entered, Kryuchkov suggested moving to another office and listened to his report on the need to cancel Operation Thunder. He didn’t say anything - both returned to the conspirators who were waiting for them. And again an incomprehensible “meeting”, pointless conversations - negotiations about everything and nothing in particular.

At approximately 2.20 a.m., Varennikov called Kryuchkov and said that the situation at the White House was extremely tense, and, apparently, it was inappropriate to carry out a military operation to seize the parliamentary palace. At this time, Achalov came into the office and resolutely stated that the assault was impossible, he went to the place, got acquainted with the situation in detail and became convinced that the task set as part of Operation Thunder was impossible without major bloodshed - and the army cannot afford this ; the Minister of Defense is of the same opinion...

This made a very difficult impression on those present. It became clear that the army was refusing to use force in the conflict unleashed by the Emergency Committee. After discussing the situation, the final decision was made - to cancel the storming of the building of the Supreme Soviet of Russia - Operation Thunder failed.

Everyone was depressed. For some reason, Kryuchkov did not let the crowd go, asked them to wait, he was always on the phones - he was clearly waiting for some important message. The phone rang, Kryuchkov grabbed it and listened. Then he loudly announces: “Yeltsin has fled to the American embassy!” Everyone is shocked, they don’t know how to react, Kryuchkov laughs somehow unnaturally... Several minutes pass. Another phone call, Kryuchkov grabs the phone, listens, asks again: “Didn’t run away? “Has Khasbulatov ruined everything?” He sinks into his chair, exhausted and limp. He says: “It seems we lost.” The military leaves without saying goodbye...

Full version of memories of August events 1991 can be read in a new book by Ruslan Khasbulatov, which will be published this year by the Yauza-Press publishing house.

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