Introduction
Chapter I. Origins of the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict
Chapter II. Breakdown of inter-party ties and conflict
Chapter III. Western perceptions of the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict
Conclusion
List of sources and literature used
Introduction
Relevance of the topic. Soviet Union and Federal People's Republic Yugoslavia began to cooperate closely in April 1945 in the field of diplomatic, political, and economic relations. Therefore, their breakup in 1948 was a complete surprise for citizens of both countries. The relevance of the chosen research topic - the beginning of the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict - is determined by its insufficient coverage and knowledge. The history of the clash between two communist countries in 1948 has been inherited in foreign literature for a long time. In our country, this topic was taboo for a long time, only in the late 80s. XX century the first appeared research papers scientists and political scientists dealing with the topic of Soviet-Yugoslav relations in the post-war period. Due to the ban, most of the documents, letters, transcripts of conversations of I.V. Stalin and I.B. Tito was kept secret in the archives and partially discovered only in the 90s. last century.
The study of this topic is important for assessing those events, in order to understand what was associated with the conflict of once friendly states, and to identify in retrospect the possible modern structure of relations between Russia and the countries of the former Yugoslav Republic.
Literature review. For writing this study Various types of literature were used, which can be divided into several semantic groups.
First of all, this is domestic and foreign reference and educational literature, containing the necessary base of documentation and sources to reveal an understanding of the main political processes in the world community in the post-war period, namely 1948. This literature includes “Systemic history of international relations”, “History of international relations”, “Diplomatic Dictionary”.
Of great importance for the study of the problem were the works of domestic historiography covering the Soviet- Yugoslav relations in the 20th century: Volkov, Gibiansky, Girenko. Equally important for writing coursework are the works of our contemporaries, both domestic and foreign. Their views expressed on the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict are quite interesting to study and analyze: Kostin, Lavrenov, Ristovich, Pavlovets. Also, one interesting source for studying the attitude of Western powers to the conflict in Eastern Europe in 1948 is the National Security Archive.
The literature base used allowed us to sufficiently consider the chosen topic and fully analyze the events.
Goal of the work. The purpose of the course work is to study the reasons and reasons that led to the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict in 1948 and the breakdown of relations between previously friendly communist countries.
Objectives of the work. To achieve the set goal of the work it is necessary:
consider the reasons and reasons that served as the beginning of the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict;
analyze the process of breaking inter-party ties between the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, trace the dynamics of the events of 1948 within the conflict and evaluate the results of meetings between party and statesmen what they led to; soviet yugoslav conflict communist assess the perception of the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict by Western powers. The object of the study is the Eastern European foreign policy of the USSR in the post-war period. Subject of research: the beginning of the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict, the development of relations between the military-industrial complex (b) and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia during 1948. Chronological framework. Soviet-Yugoslav relations in the period after World War II were indicative for communist countries. But in 1948, there was a sharp deterioration and cooling of relations between the fraternal peoples. Therefore in chronological framework course work, the main milestone will be 1948. But at the same time, it would be quite logical to refer to the early period of relations in order to identify the prerequisites and causes of the Soviet-Yugoslav gap and to the later period in order to see the consequences of the actions of the conflicting parties. Source base of the work. For a comprehensive study of the problem, we examined in detail documents from the archive of foreign policy of the USSR and the archive of J.B. Tito. Important role for understanding the relationship between the communist parties of Yugoslavia and Soviet Union correspondence of heads of government, foreign ministers, and ambassadors was played. To study our topic, the memoirs of Soviet figures, Yugoslav, and French witnesses of those events were studied. Work structure. The course work consists of an introduction, three chapters, a conclusion and a list of used sources and literature. Chapter I. Origins of the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia began to cooperate closely in 1941, with the conclusion of a non-aggression pact in connection with the threat of attack by Nazi Germany. Four years later, in April 1945, another agreement on friendship, mutual assistance and post-war cooperation was signed between the USSR and the FPRY (Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia). This agreement made Yugoslavia somewhat dependent on the Kremlin. Therefore, in May 1945, during a performance in Ljubljana, I.B. Tito (leader of the FPRY) stated that modern Yugoslavia would no longer be the subject of bargaining and disputes between the great powers, that “the country itself will determine its path and development.” The statement of the Yugoslav leader was supported in practice by his active activities both within the country and in the international arena. Particularly active government policy extended to the Balkan Peninsula, in particular to Bulgaria, Albania, and Greece. Professor of the University of Belgrade M. Ristovich described Yugoslav politics this way: “The activity of Belgrade, which showed itself as a leading force in the Balkans, aroused fears both in Western capitals and in Moscow.” In January 1948, due to the outbreak of civil war in Greece, J. Tito proposed to the leader of Albania E. Hoxha to prepare for the entry of a division of Yugoslav troops into the country. This move made it possible to strengthen Yugoslav influence in Albania, but the leaders of the Albanian Communist Party were afraid of ending up under Yugoslav rule. The actions of the FPRY were regarded by Moscow as a demarche, which was considered without the participation or consultation of the Kremlin, which displeased the head of the Soviet state I.V. Stalin. In the message to V.M. Molotov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, the Soviet side sharply criticized the decision of I.B. Tito about helping Albania without informing the Soviet Union. At the same time, on Balkan Peninsula Yugoslavia pursued an active policy with another state - the People's Republic of Bulgaria. Leaders of countries - I.B. Tito and G. Dimitrov jointly considered issues of the security of the Albanian borders and the creation of a Balkan federation consisting of three countries of the peninsula. In connection with the current situation in the Balkans, dissatisfied with the uncoordinated actions in the international arena of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, Stalin convened the leaders of these countries for a meeting in February 1948. On February 1948, a meeting of three communist countries took place in Moscow. The meeting was opened by V.M. Molotov, calling all existing differences “with the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and Yugoslavia and Bulgaria on the other,” noting that this is unacceptable from both party and state points of view. Molotov listed all the critical moments in the relations between the countries, first naming “the conclusion of the Yugoslav-Bulgarian Treaty of Union, then Dimitrov’s statement on the federation of Eastern European countries and Balkan states, including Greece, and, finally, Albania.” Stalin and Molotov sharply criticized the actions of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, “not only assessing them as capable of harming the interests of people’s democratic states and the Soviet Union, but also qualifying them as a special foreign policy line pursued without prior consultations with the USSR.” Stalin expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were preparing to sign a bilateral treaty of friendship and mutual assistance and did not inform the USSR about this. The Soviet leader considered any agreement between these two countries unacceptable without notifying the Kremlin. E. Kardelj, a member of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, admitted that “there was a rush to the Bulgarian-Yugoslav agreement.” But at the same time he asserted that the government of the USSR was notified about this agreement in a timely manner, that non-consultative actions had never been taken between Yugoslavia and the USSR. Kardel also defended his opinion on the forced entry of a division of Yugoslav troops into the NRA (People's Republic of Albania) in connection with the civil war in Greece and the current dangerous situation on the Albanian-Greek border. Subsequently I.B. Tito assured the Soviet leader that he would “abstain from the plan to send a division to Albania.” According to I.V. Stalin, discontent in Moscow was associated with a more serious problem: “the discussion around the ambitious and dangerous project for the interests of the Soviet Union of the Yugoslav-Bulgarian (conf)federation, which in the future was supposed to spread to Albania, and then to Hungary, Romania, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Greece". As a result of the February meeting of the three socialist countries on February 11, at the Soviet proposal, agreements were signed between the USSR and Bulgaria and the USSR and Yugoslavia on consultations on foreign policy issues. Having received a report from Yugoslav representatives at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia on March 1, 1948, Tito stated that “the relations of the FPRY with the USSR had reached a dead end”: the USSR was suspected of recruiting Yugoslav military personnel, there was no information about politics in the FPRY in the Soviet press, and the Soviet Union was incredulous belonged to independent Yugoslav foreign policy, although the latter (Yugoslavia) did not provide a reason for this. “Stressing that Yugoslavia has no disagreements with the USSR in the field of foreign policy, he [I.B. Tito - A.O.] spoke out against the creation of a federation with Bulgaria on the grounds that its plan resembles a “Trojan horse”. Tito decided that due to the current circumstances the creation of the federation should be postponed. It was necessary to repeatedly discuss this issue at the government level with the creation of conditions for the favorable implementation of the Balkan project. Events of the winter of 1948 caused a crack in the relations between the Soviet Union and socialist Yugoslavia. Some scholars emphasize that the Soviet leader was too dramatic when considering the issue of foreign policy agreements with “entirely solvable or already resolved problems.” The situation was aggravated by a letter dated March 27 from the CPSU to the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, thereby artificially exacerbating the brewing conflict between the two previously fraternal countries. The reasons for Soviet-Yugoslav tension lay not only in political and diplomatic relations, but also in the economic sphere of cooperation. The stumbling block was common in post-war period Communist countries have mixed economic societies. This is a form of organization of joint-stock companies, in which the partner of private capital is the state, which concentrates in its hands a certain amount of shares and takes a direct part in organizing the production, trading, and processing activities of the company. Mixed societies occupied a special place in foreign trade and the timber industry. This form of management in the USSR was used mainly with the aim of raising the decline in the country, strengthening the national economy in the Soviet Union and in the states of the Soviet bloc post-war period. In the first years after the end of World War II, the USSR offered Yugoslavia to create such societies, to which the leader of the latter responded negatively, believing that Yugoslavia was not ready for this. Since 1947 E. Hoxha and I.B. Tito discussed the creation of similar mixed societies in their countries. These actions of the Yugoslav leader towards Albania displeased the Kremlin. “Reproaches from one or another Soviet representative began to appear more and more often: why are the Yugoslavs organizing mixed societies with the Albanians if they themselves do not want to create them with the USSR?” . Moscow's desire to take the place of influential Yugoslavia in Albania is becoming obvious. Throughout the entire period of cooperation between the USSR and Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union provided the latter with constant assistance in improving the economic state of the country, industrial, military, by sending Soviet civilian and military specialists to the FPRY. However, during the March report of Yugoslav representatives at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia I.B. Tito said: “We are under economic pressure. We must focus on own strength". Tito openly made it clear to all members of the Politburo that Yugoslavia should rely less and less on the strong Soviet economic shoulder. The Soviet side learned about the March meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia from S. Zhujovich, a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee, who informed A.I. Lavrentyev, Soviet Ambassador of the USSR to Yugoslavia, about everything that happened at the meeting on March 1, 1948. The Soviet leader's response to this was the decision to recall Soviet military advisers from Yugoslavia on March 18, and on March 19 to recall civilian specialists. Soviet government this was motivated by the fact that people are surrounded by an unfriendly attitude, that the Yugoslav leadership contributed to the creation of an atmosphere of mistrust and hostility around Soviet specialists. And besides, Srzentich, an assistant to Politburo member Kidrich, told trade representative Lebedev that Soviet advisers should not be given any information relating to the country’s economy. They must contact the Government of the FPRY with all such questions. In March, Tito sent a letter to Molotov, in which he rejected all of the above, but at the same time, he confirmed that indeed the Government of the FPRY had decided to prohibit giving any information to Soviet specialists. This is explained by the fact that the Government was afraid of any kind of information leakage. Due to the recall of all Soviet people, trade relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR came to a standstill. E. Kardel subsequently said: “Then we could not even imagine that our opinions would anger Stalin so much... Of course, we understood that Stalin would be dissatisfied with our positions<…>. We believed that in reality it was not about such big differences in positions that could, in principle, cause a conflict, much less an aggravation between state relations» . Thus, February - March 1948 became a turning point in diplomatic, political and economic relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia. I.V. Stalin showed extreme distrust of the previously friendly Yugoslavia. This was explained by its growing influence and authority on the Balkan Peninsula. Therefore, in the person of I.B. Tito Soviet leadership saw a strong opponent. As a result, we see that relations between the countries deteriorated sharply, and then completely reached a dead end. Exchange of letters between the parties state level and at the level of communist parties did not lead to the expected improvements in relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia. The desire of G. Dimitrov and I.B. Tito's approach to the formation of the Danube confederation evoked Stalin's extremely disapproving assessment. He was afraid of creating a strong one independent state in the Balkans, and the Soviet leader saw the only solution to this problem in international condemnation of the policies of Yugoslavia and in a ban on the formation of a federation without consultation with the Kremlin. As a result, all hopes for restoring previous relations between the countries of the Soviet bloc were completely destroyed; Trade agreements were violated, specialists and advisers were recalled, letters began to be exchanged between the Central Committee of the Communist Parties with various types of accusations. At the end of 1948, the Soviet government concluded that the unfriendly policies of the Yugoslav government made it impossible to maintain the previous trade relations with the USSR. Chapter II. Breakdown of inter-party ties and conflict After Stalin and Molotov, on the one hand, and Tito, on the other, exchanged letters regarding the recall of Soviet military and civilian specialists to political relations their states began a difficult period that ultimately lasted for 6 years. Exchanges of letters began at the Communist Party level. The most important sources preserved in the archives of the Soviet Union and the Yugoslav Archives of I.B. Tito, there are three letters from I.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov, which were sent to members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia on March 27, May 4 and May 22, 1948. Relations in March '48 were very tense. In response to letters from I.B. Tito from March 18 and 20, I.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov sent a letter to members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. It can be compared to a fur horn, which increasingly heated the already difficult inter-party relations. The letter spoke of anti-Soviet sentiments and slanderous attacks against the USSR and the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) among leading figures of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia; about the reasons that led to the withdrawal of civilian and military specialists from Yugoslavia; that there are some facts between the two countries that cause displeasure to the USSR and are aimed at worsening relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. In the letter, Stalin harshly criticized the position of Yugoslavia that “the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) is degenerating, that great-power chauvinism reigns in the USSR,” that the USSR is seeking to economically enslave Yugoslavia. At the same time, the Yugoslav government was accused of “deviating from the Marxist-Leninist line, making gross mistakes of an opportunistic nature, denying the growth of capitalist elements in the country,<…>, in the absence of internal party democracy, in the fact that the party is actually in a semi-legal position, even in the patronage of English spies [meaning V. Velebit - first deputy. Minister of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia - A.O.]". This terribly outraged I.V. Stalin, and he added that this “deprives the Soviet government of the opportunity to conduct open correspondence with the Yugoslav government through the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs.” Stalin noted in the letter that the organization of work that operates in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) cannot be considered Marxist-Leninist, Bolshevik. Thus, Stalin accused the Communist Party of Yugoslavia of departing from the original plan, the idea of the Communist Party, laid down by K. Marx and V.I. Lenin. The situation turned out to be so acute that on April 12, 1948, the convened Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia discussed the letter of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and approved a response message to Stalin and Molotov. It rejected all accusations against the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, as they were unfounded, and indicated the inadmissibility of the tone Soviet letter, offensive characteristics of a number of leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and a demand was put forward for the cessation of intelligence activities by the Soviet service in Yugoslavia. Tito and Kardelj put forward a demand that a representative of the CPSU (b) come to Yugoslavia so that he could see the whole situation with his own eyes and understand the Soviet-Yugoslav differences. It should be noted that at this time, on April 24, the USSR tore up the Soviet-Yugoslav protocol on consultations of February 11, 1948. The reason for this action was the struggle between the Yugoslavs and Italians for Trieste; Moreover, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, without waiting for a response from the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) about the possibility of dialogue with the Western powers, handed a note to the European governments, which caused discontent in the USSR. Having read the letter from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, Stalin noted that not only did it not mean any progress in comparison with the previous documents of the Yugoslavs, but, on the contrary, it further confused the matter and aggravated the conflict. In turn, Stalin himself introduced more and more escalation of the situation into the correspondence. The second letter, dated May 4, 1948, not only repeated all the claims of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, but also intensified the political accusations against the Yugoslav leadership. The Yugoslav proposal to invite a Soviet specialist to examine the case on the spot was categorically rejected. In the same letter, Stalin expressed a desire to consider the Soviet-Yugoslav contradictions and disagreements at the Cominform meeting. In a response letter from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia dated May 17, this proposal was rejected. But despite everything, the meeting took place later without the participation of Yugoslav representatives. This position of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was clearly emphasized in last letter Bilateral correspondence of the Communist Parties dated May 22, 1948 After the publication of the Information Bureau resolution on June 27, 1948, the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict was widely publicized. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia at the V Party Congress qualified the criticism in the Information Bureau resolution as inaccurate and incorrect, stating that Yugoslavia is “ socialist country led by the USSR." At the congress it was emphasized that Yugoslavia considers itself a member of the Cominform, recognizes the leading role of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the need to follow its path of development. The Congress instructed the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to “do everything possible to overcome differences with the leadership of the All-Union Communist Party of Yugoslavia (Bolsheviks) so that relations between the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the All-Union Communist Party of Yugoslavia (Bolsheviks) improve again.” But this was not destined to happen. After the severance of inter-party ties, an active curtailment of interstate cooperation between the USSR and the Soviet bloc states with Yugoslavia began in mid-1948. Despite the severity of the conflict, until the end of 1948 Yugoslavia continued to act on the international stage as part of the socialist bloc. In the USSR in September 1948, anti-Yugoslav propaganda actively unfolded. On September 8, the Pravda newspaper published an article “Where the nationalism of Tito’s group leads in Yugoslavia.” It stated that “inside the country, Tito’s group has established a terrorist regime, the country is at war with its party, which is degenerating into a clique of political murderers.” In the future, it is this article that will form the basis for a new resolution of the Information Bureau in November 1949, “Yugoslavia is in the grip of spies and murderers.” Thus, 1948 became a defining milestone in inter-party and interstate relations two states of the socialist bloc - the USSR and Yugoslavia. An opportunity to improve relations was missed for both countries. The conflict grew into a phase of state and party confrontation, the activities of all Soviet specialists were curtailed, and the discussion of relations within the Soviet bloc at the Cominform Plenum did not lead to the expected improvements. The correspondence between the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks only led to an aggravation of disagreements. As a result, no agreements were reached, and it was also not possible to obtain the participation of the Yugoslav side in the Cominform meeting at the end of June. The year 1948 became stagnant for Soviet-Yugoslav relations. Chapter III. Western perceptions of the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict Relations between the CPSU and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia were aggravated by the fact that, without the knowledge of the latter, without its response, the Soviet side familiarized itself with the letter of the Central Committee of the Military-Industrial Complex (Bolsheviks) dated March 27, 1948 to the Central Committees of the Information Bureau of the Communist Parties of the People's Democracies. Already in April, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, through Soviet representatives, began to receive response resolutions that expressed agreement with the position of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Yugoslavia (Bolsheviks), without any clarification of the position of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and clarification of the whole matter directly with the second responding party to the conflict. This caused protest from the Yugoslav government and complicated bilateral relations. In a response letter to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (b) from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia on May 17, 1948, the Yugoslav side stated that it would not agree to discuss the current situation in the Information Bureau in connection with the March event. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union once again sent an invitation to a meeting at the Cominform on May 19, but the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was adamant in its response. On May 21, in a conversation with V.V. Moshetov, deputy head of the foreign policy department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Tito said that “the problem with Moscow could have been resolved confidentially, but now that it has become the property of the other parties, he refuses and will return to negotiations when things have calmed down a bit. May 1948, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), regarding the refusal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to appear at a meeting of the Cominform “as a transition to the path of splitting the united socialist front of the countries of people's democracy and the Soviet Union,” announced Central Committee Communist Party of Yugoslavia that “the issue of the situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia will be discussed, regardless of the participation of Yugoslav representatives, at a meeting of the Cominform scheduled for the second half of June.” Having reacted negatively to the Cominform notification about appearing at the meeting on June 21, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia refused to participate in the discussion with popular democracies, since “all previous attacks against the FPRY, starting with the first letter of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), convince us of the impossibility of ensuring an equal discussion, which contradicts the spirit of consent and the principles of voluntariness on which the Information Bureau is built.” The Cominform meeting took place in Bucharest (headquarters in connection with the conflict, it was moved from Belgrade) in the last ten days of June 1948. The Soviet side sent its representatives in a reinforced composition: in addition to the regular participants in the meetings of Zhdanov and Malenkov, secretaries of the Central Committee arrived. The results of the meeting were published on June 29, 1948, they consisted of a resolution “On the situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia”. The results fully satisfied the wishes of the initiators of the meeting - the USSR. The resolution accused the Communist Party of Yugoslavia of all possible sins from the point of view of Marxism-Leninism. They were accused of identifying the foreign policy of the USSR and capitalist countries; non-recognition of Marxist class theory and class struggle V transition period; pursuing the wrong policy in the countryside, refusing to nationalize the land, and eliminating the kulaks as a class; belittling the role of the working class, liquidation tendencies towards the Communist Party of Yugoslavia; the imposition of a “shameful, purely Turkish, terrorist regime”: the transition of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to the path of nationalism and a break with its internationalist traditions, was accused of a departure from Marxist-Leninist teachings. The main accusation, however, was the accusation of failure to accept the fraternal assistance of the CPSU (b) and other parties in the form of criticism. Summing up the conclusion at the meeting, A.A. Zhdanov (member of the Politburo of the Central Committee) noted that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia broke away from the rest of the communist parties. He named the leadership’s excessive self-confidence as the main reason for this, as well as hope in one’s own strength and the strengthening of nationalist tendencies in the ranks of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. In conclusion, Zhdanov noted that such a path leads to the degeneration of Yugoslavia into a “regular bourgeois state” and called for “ healthy forces» The Communist Party of Yugoslavia to influence its leaders. The remaining delegates fully approved of Zhdanov's report. As a result, the Second Meeting of the Cominform, convened largely on the initiative of the Soviet Union, is indicative in the fact that the member parties of the Communist Information Bureau fully supported the position of I.V. Stalin. Until June 29, there was no information in the press regarding the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict. After the adoption of the resolution, what had previously been a secret for many states and people became a promulgated fact - condemnation of the policies of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the actual termination of diplomatic and state relations between the Soviet and Yugoslav governments. Soon after the February events, disagreements in the Soviet bloc also became known in the Western powers. A week after the tripartite meeting in Moscow on February 10, 1948, the British Foreign Office noted that “the Russians seem to have slapped both Dimitrov and Tito, as well as Marcos [Supreme Commander of the Democratic Army of Greece, head of the Provisional Government of Free Greece - A.O.]" . By the beginning of 1948, a peculiar process of consolidation was taking place in Western Europe. This event coincided with the growing contradictions in another bloc - the Soviet one, between Yugoslavia and the USSR, associated with the discussion of the Balkan federation project. The Soviet leadership was afraid of giving the Western powers a pretext to justify their own steps (meaning Western European unification) towards the political and military integration of Western Europe, which was anti-Soviet in nature. This suggests that the Soviet Union was afraid that the powers in the West might support Yugoslavia and accept it into their bloc, thereby the USSR would receive not just one enemy, but an entire coalition of European powers. Stalin’s concern was that Belgrade’s decision to send troops to the border with Albania, which was not agreed with Moscow, could be regarded in the West as Yugoslav military aggression, “and it is not a fact that England and the United States would not have intervened in this conflict.” But Stalin did not need such a “hot spot”. Initially, until June 23, 1948, only countries belonging to the communist community and members of the Information Bureau knew about the strained relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia. In his article, researcher A.A. Kostin says that for the Western powers, information about the Information Bureau resolution “On the situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia” produced the effect of a bomb exploding. The document of that period “The attitude of this government [American - A.O.] to the events in Yugoslavia” talks about possible actions from the Western powers. Everything depended on the actions of Tito and the Yugoslav government. The West could well accept Yugoslavia into its camp, but “if the Western world begins to curry favor with Tito, Moscow will use this to incite disgust and antipathy towards him among all representatives of the international communist movement, as well as among Tito’s own followers.” Such a development of events could lead to undermining the authority of I.B. Tito in the international arena and his eventual subordination to the Kremlin. Despite this rather critical positioning, the West supported Yugoslavia's actions. The capitalist powers were amazed that the FPRY managed to break out of the communist camp, “for the first time in history a communist state appeared in the international community, based on basic Soviet organizational principles and mainly on Soviet ideology, however, independent from Moscow.” The American government hoped for fairly warm relations between the United States and the FPR Yu and assured that if the Western powers cooperated with the Yugoslav government, the US government would in no way interfere with this. From the moment the United States realized that the rupture of relations between previously friendly Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union was a reality, and not a provocation or a staging, Yugoslavia actively began to be financed economically and politically, first by the United States, then by Great Britain and other countries. At the meeting General Assembly UN in the fall of 1949, despite protests from Moscow, Yugoslavia was elected a non-permanent member of the Security Council. And this meant international political recognition of the country. Conclusion The year in the history of Soviet-Yugoslav relations will be remembered as the most intense and difficult. The reasons for this were desire Federal Republic Yugoslavia pursued policies independently of the Soviet Union and its constant control. In addition, the two countries did not agree on the issue of creating a Danube (Balkan) federation with Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia as part of it. Throughout the year, the leaders of the two communist states exchanged letters and notes, the USSR called on Yugoslavia to take part in the international meeting at the Plenum of the Central Committee. The result was a crisis in diplomatic, foreign policy, economic, and military relations. Officially, in 1949, Yugoslavia was part of the Soviet bloc, but in the same year, by a resolution of the Central Committee of the Cominform, Yugoslavia was recognized as a country “in the grip of spies and murderers.” This meant a final and irrevocable break in all relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia at the state level and between the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia along the party line. However, Yugoslavia had support from the Western powers, which was done, in our opinion, in order to show the USSR that if it excommunicated Yugoslavia from the Communist Party, it would not be left without support, in isolation. On the contrary, she was given every economic and military assistance from the USA and Great Britain. Thus, we examined and analyzed the situation in 1948 in relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia, and assessed the Western perception of the conflict in the Eastern Bloc. Naturally, after such a serious conflict in cooperation, the resumption of diplomatic relations could not be quick. Only in 1953, through the loyal policy of N.S. Khrushchev, the USSR regained the trust of Yugoslavia, renewing all relations with it. List of sources and literature used Sources: Molotov V.M., Stalin I.V. Letter to I. Broz-Tito, E. Cardel, Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia May 4, 1948 // Stalin I.V. Essays. - T. 18. - Tver: Information and Publishing Center "Soyuz", 2006. P. 472-494. Note from the Soviet government to the Yugoslav government, Moscow September 28, 1949. // Archiv Josipa Broza Tita Letter to Comrade Tito and other members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. March 27, 1948 // Archiv Josipa Broza Tita Secret Soviet-Yugoslav correspondence (public note by L.Ya. Gibiansky) // Questions of History, 1992, No. 10 P. 141-160, 4/5, 6/7 Three letters from Stalin and Molotov to Yugoslav leaders // De Jouvenel R. Tito - leader of the traitors. M.: Publishing house of foreign literature. 1951. 147 p. Djilas M. Rasgovori sa Stalinom. Beograd. Knijizevne novine. 1990. 167 s. Reference and educational literature: Diplomatic Dictionary. / Rep. ed. L.Ya. Vyshinsky, S.A. Lozovsky. M.: State Publishing House political literature. 1948 // Narinsky M.M. History of international relations. 1945 - 1975: T. 1-4. Tutorial- M., ROSSPEN, 2004. T. 1. P. 21. Systematic history of international relations in 4 volumes. 1918-1991. / Rep. ed. HELL. Bogaturov. M.: Moscow worker. 2000. T. 3. - 720 p. Research: Archives reveal secrets. International issues: Events and people. Collection of documents. M.: Politizdat. 1991. Gibiansky L.Ya., Volkov V.K. Relations between the Soviet Union and socialist Yugoslavia: historical experience and modernity // Questions of history. 1988. No. 7. Girenko Yu.S. USSR - Yugoslavia 1948 // Recent history. 1988. No. 4. Danilchenko S.L. Concession policy of the Soviet state under the conditions of the New Economic Policy // Economic Journal. 2002. No. 2 (5) // Documentation. Diplomatic Bulletin, magazine. June, 1998. // http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/dip_vest.nsf/99b2ddc4f717c733c32567370042ee43/3132998b9b19d173c3256889002a5dc1!OpenDocument Iskenderov P.A. Integration models for the Balkans: history and prospects // Kostin A.A. Washington’s perception of relations between the USSR government and Yugoslav communists in 1944 - early 1945 // Lavrenov S.Ya., Popov I.M. Soviet Union in local wars and conflicts. M.: Astrel. 2003. 778 p. // http:militera.lib.ru/h/lavrenov_popov/05.html Newtimes. No. 42 // The attitude of this government to the events in Yugoslavia //http://www.coldwar.ru/conflicts/yugoslaviya/nsc-35.php Pashin N. Marshal, who did not submit to either Hitler or Stalin // Free press. Publication date: 05/04/2010. Romanenko S. How Joseph and Josip quarreled // Top Secret. No. 8/159 // http://www.sovsekretno.ru/articles/id/870/html - publication date 08/01/2002 Pavlovets Yu.S. Yugoslav-Albanian relations in the process of forming the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe (November 1944 - November 1948) // Ristovich, M. Tito, Stalin and the Greek crisis // Rodina, 2003. No. 10. West, R. Josip Broz Tito. The power of power. 1997. 242 p.
Overcoming diplomatic isolation, Genoa Conference, Treaty of Rapallo, “strip of recognition”, agreements with the countries of the East, diplomatic conflicts with Western countries, the creation and activities of the Comintern.
Overcoming diplomatic isolation.
In the 20s The RSFSR, and then the USSR, pursued a dual foreign policy. On the one hand, it was aimed at protecting the state interests of the country, and on the other, it reflected the course of the ruling communist party towards world revolution.
The first international acts - peace treaties- were signed by the RSFSR only in 1920 with Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Finland, which were previously part of the Russian Empire.
The leading powers of the world were also forced to enter into contacts with the Soviet state. They categorically denied the theory and practice of Bolshevism, but economic interests turned out to be above all. In March 1921, a trade agreement was concluded with Great Britain. The Soviet side managed to insist on the inclusion of a political obligation in the text of the treaty - to refrain from hostile actions against each other. And in the Soviet-German trade agreement, signed in May 1921, there was a political point: the functions of a diplomatic mission were transferred to the trade mission of the RSFSR. In fact, this meant legal recognition Soviet Russia Germany. By the summer of 1921, Soviet diplomacy had 11 trade agreements with leading European countries.
Genoa Conference. Treaty of Rapallo.
In the spring of 1922, an international conference was convened in Genoa to solve European economic and financial problems. The Soviet government also received an invitation to participate. It was decided to use the conference to form a positive image of the proletarian state - a fighter for peace and general disarmament. The report of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs G.V. Chicherin was devoted to these problems.
However, the leaders of the Entente countries demanded that the Soviet government pay all government debts of Tsarist Russia (18.5 billion gold rubles), return nationalized property to foreigners, or compensate for the damage caused. The Soviet delegation put forward counterclaims to the Entente countries: to compensate 39 billion gold rubles as losses from the intervention and economic blockade. It was not possible to reach agreement.
On the night of April 16, in the Genoa suburb of Rapallo, the Soviet delegation concluded an agreement with representatives of Germany on the restoration of diplomatic relations and broad economic contacts.
"Streak of Confession."
The years 1924-1925 went down in the history of international relations as a period of diplomatic recognition of the Soviet state. In February 1924, diplomatic relations were established with Great Britain. In the same year, the USSR was recognized by Italy, Norway, Austria, Greece, Sweden, and France. In the summer of 1924, diplomatic relations were established with Mexico. The “streak of recognition” ended with the signing of the Japanese-Soviet convention in January 1925. Based on this agreement, Japanese troops were evacuated from northern Sakhalin.
Humiliated by the Treaty of Versailles, Germany was guided in its relations with Russia not so much by political as by economic calculations. Mutually beneficial trade was complemented by large technical assistance from Russia, military-technical cooperation. The Juncker company received the opportunity to bypass the Treaty of Versailles to build aircraft near Moscow; arms magnate Krupp built artillery factories in Central Asia. Soviet military specialists went to Germany for training. German engineers worked at USSR enterprises. By 1929, the Soviet Union had technical agreements with 27 German firms.
The USSR skillfully took advantage of the fierce competition between foreign firms, creating most favored nation treatment for some of them. So, young entrepreneur from the USA, Lenin himself provided patronage to Armand Hammer. Hammer received a concession for the Alapaevsk asbestos mines, he launched the production of pencils, and bought works of art that belonged to Russia. Hummer's example was followed by the automobile king Ford and oil tycoon Rockefeller.
Agreements with Eastern countries.
The relationship of the Soviet Republic with the countries of the East, where it was gaining strength, was built differently. liberation movement and national governments came to power. The Soviet government provided them with significant material assistance. Moreover, some party leaders, in particular Trotsky, believed that it was necessary to “turn the route of the world revolution” to the East and send troops to India and Afghanistan. Lenin did not support this idea.
In 1921, equal treaties were signed with Persia (Iran), Afghanistan, Turkey and Mongolia. The Bolsheviks hoped to unite labor movement in the West with the national liberation movement in the East. The Soviet government confirmed the abolition of all unequal treaties and agreements with Iran, canceled all Iranian debts, and returned concessions and property acquired in Iran by Tsarist Russia. The treaty contained an important provision: if other countries try to seize Iranian territory or use it for aggression against the RSFSR, and the Iranian government is unable to prevent aggression, then the Soviet government “will have the right to send its troops into Iranian territory.”
Under the agreement with Afghanistan, the parties recognized each other’s independence and pledged “not to enter into a military or political agreement with a third power that would cause damage to one of the contracting parties.” The Soviet government expressed its readiness to provide material assistance to Afghanistan. According to the agreement with Turkey, the RSFSR renounced all the privileges that Tsarist Russia had and provided Turkey with large financial assistance.
In May 1924, diplomatic relations were established with China. The Soviet side declared all treaties and agreements between Tsarist Russia and other countries in which China's rights were infringed to be null and void.
Diplomatic conflicts with Western countries.
The activity of Soviet foreign policy in the East caused discontent among countries accustomed to ruling here. On May 8, 1923, British Foreign Secretary Lord D. Curzon accused the USSR of anti-British policies in the East. He demanded an end to subversive activities in Iran and Afghanistan and religious persecution in the Soviet Union within 10 days; release British fishing trawlers that Moscow claims were arrested for fishing in Soviet territorial waters. The conflict was aggravated by the murder of Soviet diplomat V.V. Vorovsky in Lausanne.
The USSR regarded the “Curzon ultimatum” as a crude attempt to interfere in the affairs of the USSR. Crowded rallies and demonstrations took place throughout the country. Fundraising began for the construction of an air squadron. But, fearing further escalation international tension, the USSR satisfied the basic demands of the British side.
The year 1927 was especially tense. A conflict broke out between the USSR and Great Britain over the significant financial and material assistance provided by Soviet trade unions to English miners who declared a general strike in 1926. The British government, accusing Moscow of interfering in the internal affairs of Great Britain, broke off diplomatic and trade relations with the USSR.
In 1927, France demanded the recall of the Soviet ambassador X. Rakovsky, who in one of his letters stated that in the event of war he would call on the soldiers of the “imperialist powers” to desert. Soviet plenipotentiary P. JI was killed in Warsaw. Voikov.
The Soviet leadership regarded all these disparate events as links in a single conspiracy of the “imperialist powers” against the USSR, the goal of which is war.
Creation and activities of the Comintern.
An equally significant direction of Soviet foreign policy was control over the world revolutionary movement. For this purpose, an international revolutionary proletarian organization was created, uniting the communist parties different countries, - Communist International (Comintern).
The first congress of the Comintern took place in March 1919 in Moscow. It adopted a manifesto that called on workers of all countries to unite in the revolutionary struggle to overthrow the bourgeoisie and the dictatorship of the proletariat. The governing body of the Comintern became Executive committee(ICKI). It was headed by the prominent Bolshevik figure G. E. Zinoviev.
The Second Congress of the Comintern, which worked in Petrograd and then in Moscow in the summer of 1920, stated: “The Communist International is the party of the revolutionary uprising of the international proletariat... The Communist International declared the cause of Soviet Russia its own cause.” The Red Army at this time was rushing towards Warsaw. The Bolshevik leaders were confident that a world revolution was just around the corner.
The Comintern announced the possibility of uniting Soviet Russia and Soviet Germany as the first step towards creating a “federation Soviet republics all over the world".
From the speech of N.I. Bukharin. 1922
The Communist Manifesto says that the proletariat must conquer the whole world, but this cannot be done with the movement of a finger. Here you need bayonets and rifles. Yes, the spread of the Red Army is the spread of socialism, proletarian power, revolution. The right of red intervention is based on this...
In 1923, when the situation in Germany worsened again, the Comintern decided to “push” the world revolution. A Comintern brigade was sent to Germany and significant funds were allocated. However, the revolutionary wave in Germany quickly waned. Attempts by representatives of the Comintern to stimulate an uprising in the Ruhr, Saxony, and Hamburg failed. Attempts to support the September 1923 uprising in Bulgaria also ended in failure. The Comintern decided to abandon the policy of actively fomenting world revolution only at the end of 1926, when its adventuristic nature became obvious. G.E. Zinoviev resigned. His place was taken by N.I. Bukharin. In all European countries The Comintern began to create communist parties and pro-communist public organizations, provided them with material assistance, and placed leaders obedient to Moscow at their head. The Comintern now focused not on inciting a world revolution, but on forming a positive image of the USSR in the public opinion of its countries.
Foreign policy of the Soviet state in the 20s. had a dual character. On the one hand, Soviet diplomacy made every effort to establish economic and diplomatic relations with capitalist countries. On the other hand, the leadership of the Comintern sought to spark revolutions in these countries.
At the same time, at the same time, events occurred that made a new intensification of the rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States inevitable. Beginning in the 50s, the Soviet leadership began to actively support the liberation movement in the so-called “Third World” countries. In 1955, the USSR provided protection to the President of Egypt G.A. Nasser, when, after the nationalization of the Suez Canal, he was attacked by England, France and Israel. In 1957, the Soviet Union successfully tested intercontinental ballistic missile and launched an artificial satellite into Earth orbit. This event for the first time created the hypothetical possibility of a nuclear attack by the USSR on US territory.
The emergence of a new round of tension occurred in connection with the problem of West Berlin.” Since 1958, N.S. Khrushchev began to seek a change in his status. Meeting of the Soviet leader with the new president USA D. Kennedy, held in April 1961 in Vienna, was an obvious failure of the Soviet foreign policy. In August 1961 By decision of the political leadership of the Warsaw Pact countries, a line of fortifications was erected in Berlin, completely isolating West Berlin from the rest of the GDR.
The apogee of the Cold War. Caribbean crisis
The most acute was Cuban Missile Crisis 1962., caused by the USSR's deployment of medium-range nuclear missiles in Cuba in close proximity to the United States. The world was on the verge of nuclear war. It was avoided only thanks to a timely secret compromise between D. Kennedy and N. S. Khrushchev, within the framework of which Soviet missiles were withdrawn from Cuba in exchange for the US promise to renounce aggression against this country and the dismantling of American nuclear missiles in Turkey.
The Cuban missile crisis gave way to a period of relative detente in Soviet-American relations and international relations in general. On August 15, 1963, an agreement was signed on the prohibition nuclear tests V atmosphere, space and underwater, which became the first strategic arms control agreement.
At the same time, the Caribbean crisis led to a final division within socialist camp. Soviet-Chinese relations have reached extreme severity. In 1963, the Chinese leadership formulated a statement regarding the territorial claims of this country to the USSR; This diplomatic step was accompanied by a number of provocations at the border. The culmination was the armed conflict of 1969 in the area of Damansky Island.
Discharge - By the beginning of the 70s. The atomic arms race between the two superpowers led to an oversaturation of their arsenals, effectively putting the world in the face of a nuclear disaster. The attitude of the public has also changed Western countries to the course of their governments. Not the least role in achieving detente was played by the generally balanced policy of the USSR regarding the US war in Vietnam and the Middle East crisis of 1967.
In the first half of the 70s. International relations have entered an era of détente. In 1969, the Warsaw Pact countries made a proposal to convene the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). On August 12, 1970, a Soviet-West German treaty was signed, according to which the post-war borders in Europe were recognized as final and a renunciation of the use of force was recorded. In December 1970, a similar agreement was concluded between Germany and Poland, and in December 1973 - between Germany and Czechoslovakia. In December 1972, mutual recognition of the Federal Republic of Germany and the GDR took place.
In September 1971, an agreement was signed between the USA, USSR, England and France on West Berlin, which was also based on the concept of non-use of force or threat of force in resolving issues related to the status of this city.
In May 1972, the first visit in the history of Soviet-American relations to Moscow by US President R. Nixon took place, during which the Systems Limitation Treaty was concluded air defense, Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT-1), as well as a document fixing the “Fundamentals of the relationship between the USSR and the USA.” These agreements, along with the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War signed in 1973, were the most important documentary acts that marked a turn from confrontation to détente in relations between the two superpowers.
In March 1975, the Convention on the Prohibition of Exploitation and Stockpiling came into force bacteriological and toxic weapons and their destruction. In 1976, a Soviet-American treaty was signed regulating the conduct of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.
The culmination of the détente process was the signing of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe on August 1, 1975 in Helsinki. The basic element of this document was a declaration of the principles of relations between the countries participating in the meeting: their sovereign equality; non-use of force or threat of force; the inviolability of post-war borders; peaceful settlement of disputes; non-interference in internal affairs; respect for human rights, etc. However, against the background of detente, regional conflicts continued to flare up. In 1971, another war began between India and Pakistan. In 1973, a new Arab-Israeli war broke out.
The crisis of the policy of "détente". Exacerbation of contradictions. The fate of détente was short-lived. The main reason for its failure was not only the diametrically opposed understanding of the causes and prospects of detente, but also the subsequent attempts to use it to change the balance of forces in the world in their favor. Since 1976, the Soviet leadership began to deploy nuclear medium-range missiles (IRBMs) in the territory East Germany and Czechoslovakia, which created an additional threat to Western European countries. The confrontation between the USSR and the USA also grew within the framework of local conflicts (in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, etc.).
The final collapse of détente occurred after the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan in December 1979. The international atmosphere again acquired the features of confrontation. Under these conditions, the supporter of a tough approach to the USSR, R. Reagan, won the presidential elections in the United States. In the United States, plans began to be developed for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which provides for the creation of a nuclear shield in space. In 1983, NATO began deploying new American medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe. This sharply worsened the strategic position of the USSR. A new round of the nuclear missile arms race was planned.
Perestroika and “new thinking” in foreign policy. End of the Cold War
The Soviet leadership found itself forced to once again change its strategic guidelines. foreign policy in order to ease international tension. These changes coincided with the change of top leadership in the USSR. Initially the new Soviet leader M.S. Gorbachev set as its goal to achieve another warming in the climate of international relations, without fundamental changes in the foreign policy course itself. Nevertheless, the circumstances developed in such a way that since 1987 a transition to “new political thinking” was proclaimed.
The ruling Soviet elite declared its commitment to the principles collective security and respect for the sovereign right of peoples to choose own paths development. In 1987, the leaders of the superpowers signed a treaty on the destruction of intermediate-range missiles. In 1989, the USSR withdrew troops from Afghanistan. In the same year, the normalization of relations with China began. The USSR refused to suppress the “velvet” revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe, With territories whose territories began to be withdrawn Soviet troops. The Cold War was gradually approaching its end. The collapse of the USSR in 1991 effectively meant the end of the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the formation of the CIS marked the beginning of Russian foreign policy.
After the collapse of the USSR, Russia and the West went through a difficult path from love to hatred. At first, they had a chance to become allies - an alliance of the West with the largest country in the world would strengthen the politics, economy and security of the entire European space. But after the end of the Cold War, “Eurossia” never emerged: Western Europe began to build its future with the United States, and Russia rejected the orders of the West and refused to play by its rules. So what awaits us tomorrow - endless wars or the long-awaited peace? German international journalist Alexander Rahr tried to draw a perspective for the future, holding a meeting dedicated to the difficult international situation.
COLD WAR OF THE XXI CENTURY Lecture by a German journalist entitled “Russia – the West: what is the real essence of the conflicts of the last 25 years?” took place at the Yeltsin Center. The most pressing topics and issues related to the confrontation between Russia and Europe were touched upon at the meeting. “If someone had said 25 years ago that today the West and Russia would fight for Ukraine, no one would have believed it,” Alexander Rahr noted with regret. According to the political scientist, the war that has arisen today will continue for a very long time, and there will be no winner, but both sides are capable of severely crippling each other psychologically. Do we need it? In war, all means are good - everyone knows this. The techniques used in the confrontation between Russia and the West are also very sophisticated. Here everyone strives to build their own truth, destroy alternative points of view, declare the enemy’s argumentation propaganda, not listen to it and stop dialogue, but with such behavior, the journalist is sure, a compromise will never be achieved. Alexander Rahr sees the situation as follows: in Russia the main weapon is the media, in the West it is sophisticated forms of inquisition that hit the enemy morally. A well-established technique in the Western press is to demonize the image of Putin, and Russia’s favorite technique is to blame the United States for all its sins. In addition, the journalist notes, in the West today it is used dangerous weapon- rewriting history. “When they start writing that Warsaw was liberated by Ukrainians during World War II, it becomes scary. Of course, all this is superimposed on people’s impressions and knowledge, forms a certain opinion in them, zombifies them and plays on the age-old complexes of entire nations. In this way, they try to deprive the enemy of his dignity. But I think this is not a game by the rules.”
DOES EUROPE NEED RUSSIA?
Today, a political war is being waged on the world stage, in which each participant strives to find the opponent’s pain points and hit them as hard as possible. Among the harsh methods of soft politics, Alexander Rahr highlights the desire to defeat the enemy through international courts, forcing him to admit his guilt, pay fines and lose face, the use of sanctions as blackmail of Western countries and regime change through protest movements. But all this rather increases violence and negativity than reconciles the warring countries. The problem with Russia, according to the political scientist, is that it accuses the West of exporting color revolutions to the post-Soviet space, and the West of accusing Russia of waging hybrid wars in Ukraine and even in Germany. “Looking at the endless bickering between the West and Russia, you involuntarily come to the conclusion that the Cold War never ends. Meanwhile the only way out will be an attempt to hear each other and stop throwing mutual accusations,” notes Alexander Rahr. But the most big mistake The West, according to the journalist, is that it has put a large and complex Ukraine before a tough choice: either it remains with Russia or goes to Europe. Meanwhile, not everyone in the European Union is categorical about breaking relations with Russia. There are a number of countries that are in favor of lifting sanctions and resuming all contacts, while other five to seven states, on the contrary, want them to be tightened and our country weakened long years. Today, Europe is divided into two camps, one of which believes that Europe should clench into a military-political fist and confront the aggressive Russians, and the second is trying to resume dialogue with all its might and attempt to bring Russia into the European home. In Germany, too, there are people who support and promote the idea of the “Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok” project. Of course, it will not be possible to implement this concept tomorrow, but what prevents us from doing this in 20, 30 or even 50 years? In this case, we need to think about this topic and discuss the possibilities of its implementation today; according to Alexander Rahr, Vladimir Putin spoke about this at a forum in China.
TRUMP FACTOR
Today, under the pressure of the Trump factor, Brexit and other manifestations of Euroscepticism, there is a possibility that the concept of “Europe different speeds", which will be offered by Germany and France. There will be further integration with the creation strong institutions in Brussels: European Foreign Ministry, the European Ministry of Defense and the President, which a number of countries will join on a voluntary basis. The remaining states will remain outside the line, in the second circle, and will remain there until they understand that they are ready to join the general concept. The political scientist and journalist believes that perhaps this will be the salvation for the historical integration project that should be implemented in Europe in this and the next centuries. “I don’t know how the situation will develop further, and whether Russia will end up in a European home. Today, the world, instead of unification, is moving towards a three-bloc order. The first military-political is a transatlantic bloc that will unite the USA and Europe. The second will be the Eurasian one, created by Russia and China. All of them will have to confront the threats of Islamic extremism, the likelihood of which exists in Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia.”
WHO IS GUILTY?
What is the real essence of the conflict today, everyone finds it difficult to answer. If earlier it could be explained by the confrontation between communism and capitalism, today it is not about Ukraine, as many believe. At first glance, it may seem that the conflict is purely geopolitical in nature. This is explained by the fact that all the states of the former Warsaw Pact came under the influence of NATO, except for Ukraine and Belarus, which Russia does not allow to be taken away. But the reason is not geopolitics. “Putin is often asked what is the contradiction between Russia and the West? His answer is always simple: “The West does not like Russian competition.” When Angela Merkel is asked the same question, she replies that human rights are suppressed in Russia. If you ask an ordinary German what he doesn’t like about Russia, he will say: nationalism, the functions of democracy and corruption. A Russian, when asked about Germany, will answer the following: on the one hand, you can learn from the German economy, but on the other hand, Germany is not independent, it is run by the Americans.” IN Russian society there is an eternal dispute between fans of the ideas of Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov, which Alexander Rahr touched upon in the discussion. The essence of the dispute is that Sakharov considered freedom to be the main human value, and Solzhenitsyn advocated for the preservation of statehood. The journalist notes that in Europe today the same issues are being raised, and countries one after another are making a choice in favor of authoritarianism and strengthening the state. Now the fate of democracy is being decided, and residents are fearing for their future, and if democracy cannot prove that it is capable of protecting the rights of its citizens, then they will have to look for other alternatives. The German journalist was asked many questions regarding the situation in Europe and Germany. Those present were interested in how the German media spoke about Russia, whether the story with Crimea would repeat itself in Kaliningrad, what would happen to the European Union if Germany ceased to be a pillar of Europe, and how to still come to a peace agreement between the countries? Alexander Rahr sees the solution to the issue quite categorically: admit your mistakes and return to dialogue. “Today we need to find a common idea to restart the discussion. I am completely in favor of this and hope that support will increase in Russia. Today it is important that politicians talk about this, only then the situation will change for the better and it will be possible to make an attempt at reconciliation.”
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