The diversity of political parties at the present stage. Main types of party systems

Lecture 2. Political parties and interest groups in politics

1. Concept and typologies of political parties

It is difficult to imagine modern society without political parties functioning in it. Even those political regimes in which the activities of political parties are prohibited, organizations are created that perform the same functions as parties.

Political Party(from Latin pars (partis) - part, participation, share) is an organized group of like-minded people, expressing the interests of certain social strata and striving to gain state power or participate in its implementation.

Any political party has a number of signs:

1. The bearer of a certain ideology or a special vision of the world and man.
2. Focus on conquest and exercise of power.
3. The presence of a political program, i.e. a document that formulates the goals and objectives of the party both in terms of participation in political life, and in case the party comes to power.
4. Availability of organization:

a) any party has governing bodies, both central and local, which are tasked with developing strategies and tactics for the party’s political activity;

b) any party is characterized by membership, that is, it consists of a strictly defined number of members who usually pay membership fees and participate in the activities of the party in a certain way;

c) any party has a charter, that is, a document that establishes the most important norms of internal party life.

1. The presence of an extensive network of local organizations, the core of which is formed by volunteer activists.

The real diversity of parties participating in the political life of society is enormous. It is partly due to the fact that different parties profess different ideologies, which are implemented not only in words, that is, in political programs, but also in deeds, including how the parties are organized, what goals they set and what paths to achieve they choose. Here it is necessary to take into account the personal characteristics of the leaders, the leadership of the party, as well as the specifics of the country’s political regime, etc.

In order to cover the entire diversity of parties in terms of their ideology and internal structure, it is impossible to limit ourselves to any one classification principle. Therefore, in political science there are numerous classifications with the help of which any party can ultimately be described. Let's look at the different classifications of political parties.

So, by ideological orientation batches are divided into the following types.

1. Social democratic- advocate a more visible participation of the state in the life of society, in managing the economy while maintaining fundamental freedoms.

2. Communist- strive for complete nationalization of the economy, distribution of wealth taking into account the interests of all social strata of society, full state control over the spheres of education, health care, etc.

3. Conservative and liberal- focus on the denationalization of the economy and some other spheres of life, i.e., minimizing the participation of the state in the life of society.

4. Clerical- adhere to religious ideology.

5. Nationalist- build their activities on the basis of nationalist and fascist ideas.

By participation in the exercise of power there are political parties ruling(those parties that are in power) and oppositional(those parties that are not in power and have the main task of winning power). Opposition parties, in turn, are divided into legal, semi-legal, and illegal parties.

By nature of membership Parties are divided into cadre and mass parties. Personnel parties few; they have free membership; rely on professional politicians and the financial elite; they contain only those members who vote for a given party in elections; carry out activities only during the election period. Mass parties numerous; the educational function predominates in them; characterized by close ties between party members; they have strict discipline; there are primary party organizations; their activities are carried out systematically.

One of the bases for classifying parties is political spectrum scale. According to this criterion, political parties are of the following types:

• Left parties(socialist and communist parties): for reforms; for crowding out the private sector; social protection of workers; radical revolutionary methods of action.
• Center parties: are aimed at compromise and cooperation.
• Right-wing parties(liberal and conservative parties): for a strong state, security private property; for stability; negative attitude towards the revolution.

Also by way of activity parties can be divided into reformist and revolutionary. Reformist- strive for gradual transformations of society using legal means of influencing power and legal means of achieving power Revolutionary- strive to transform society using means of struggle that, from the point of view of the existing state structure and political regime, are illegal.

The set of parties participating in the formation of legislative and executive power structures is usually called party system. Depending on how many parties function in the political sphere, one-party, two-party and multi-party systems are distinguished. Let us consider the functions that political parties and party systems perform in society.

2. Functions of parties and the party system in society

Parties, as organizations that belong simultaneously to civil society and the state, occupy an intermediate position. Parties directly contact ordinary citizens, find out their needs and demands, and recruit new members among them. The top of the party, party leaders elected to government bodies, work in government agencies. Thus, political parties occupy significant positions in society and perform important functions. So, in modern democratic systems the parties perform the following Features:

• determining the goals of the party struggle and the development of society;
• accumulation and articulation of social interests;
• mobilization and socialization of citizens mainly in election campaigns;
• recruiting the leadership elite and forming government structures.

Moreover, in unstable, emerging democracies, political parties can also serve:

• relieving tension in society by moving the political struggle from the streets to parliament;
• smoothing out acute political contradictions through joint work in parliaments of representatives of various political forces;
• implementation in public consciousness democratic values ​​and norms;
• the formation of civilizational traditions of political struggle;
• making the pre-election struggle coherent and structured;
• adjusting the government course by putting pressure on the government by opposition parties.

In relation to party systems, the famous political scientist G. Almond formulated the following functions of party systems:

1. Aggregation interests and demands of citizens, i.e. giving homogeneity to the multitude and variety of different requests of citizens, their hierarchization, i.e. lining up in some kind of pyramid, taking into account their sequence and mutual subordination.

2. Articulation interests and demands of citizens, which means the formulation and expression of their interests, expectations, preferences and giving them the form of election slogans, political programs and projects.

3. Political socialization, which is the process of introducing people to politics, “entry” of individuals into the political space, their acceptance and assimilation of political values, norms and patterns of behavior.

4. Political recruitment, i.e. selection and cultivation of the political elite, preparing it to exercise power in the political system.

5. Political communication, which refers to the reception, processing, transformation and distribution political information between elements of the political system (in in this case between civil society and government institutions).

These are the main functions of parties and party systems. Let's move on to consider another participant in the political process - interest groups and find out how interest groups differ from parties, as well as how pressure groups differ from interest groups and parties.

3. Concept and typology of interest groups

The government in any country is, in one way or another, influenced by groups of individuals seeking to achieve the goals of the group. In general terms, social groups are understood as a collection of people who strive to act in harmony with other members to achieve common goals.

The concept of interest groups was developed at the beginning of the 20th century by American scientists A. Bentley and D. Truman. The researchers determined interest groups as organized associations that have specific goals and put forward specific demands to the political authorities. Thus, interest groups began to be considered in the context of the decision-making system, the process of forming public policy.

Currently, in scientific thought, interest groups are still occasionally identified with social communities and are interpreted, according to J. Meino, as associations of citizens occupying a place in society that affects the interests of other subjects with similar demands. But still, most scientists make a distinction between social groups and associations of individuals whose goal is to influence the government in ways that best suit the interests of this association (R. Dawes).

Considering the dominant approaches in political science, interest groups can be defined as predominantly voluntary associations, adapted or specially created by people to express and defend their powerful interests in relations with the state, as well as other political institutions. These political associations, being intermediaries in relations between the state and the population, represent the interests of social, national, regional and other human communities and serve as a form of collective action of their members.

Diverse interest groups have a wide range of resources to influence the government, to communicate the needs and demands of the population to persons and bodies making political decisions. Such resources may include their economic and financial capabilities, information or experience of political participation of their members, organizational structures, etc. Depending on the nature of a particular political system, interest groups have one or another weight in making decisions management decisions. The same interest groups that, using their resources, have the opportunity to maintain constant ties with the government, most often become an organic part of the mechanism of governing society. In contrast, “applications” for power from interest groups broadcasting radical and extremist demands have a destructive effect on the system of political governance of society.

By putting forward political demands and supporting specific figures in government and other structures, interest groups have a certain ability to nominate their members to work in government bodies and influence the selection of personnel participating in the decision-making process. Thus, they also perform the function of forming political elites and power structures of society.

Interest groups differ in structure, style of activity, methods of formation, base of support, etc. Various criteria serve as the basis for typologizing interest groups. However, among the more complex, systematized interest group classifications using complex criteria, we can call a typology that distinguishes their anemic, institutional, associative and non-associative varieties.

So, anemic groups- these are associations that arise spontaneously as a result of a spontaneous reaction to a particular situation (for example, the formation of a crowd, a demonstration). According to the Western political scientist P. Sharan, they are, first of all, distinguished by the absence of permanent organized actions, irregularity of inclusion in political relations with the state. Their internal structure, as a rule, is unstable and is often formed as if anew, without maintaining continuity with previous forms of organization. The lack of organizational capabilities not only reduces the effect of their activities, but also predetermines their almost constant desire to use force.

In contrast to anemic institutional groups- these are formal associations with a specific organizational structure, established functions and a professional personnel apparatus. Their targeted activities are more effective. However, groups of this type (for example, administrative bodies of the church, army, representatives of autonomies in federal centers, etc.) are not specialized political structures and, as a rule, adapt their structures created for other purposes to influence the government.

Source of origin non-associative groups is an informal and involuntary association of people on a related, religious, sociocultural basis (scientific and student societies, religious sects). Their activities, like the activities of anemic groups, are inconsistent, poorly structured and not always effective.

Association groups are voluntary associations specializing in the representation of interests and aimed at solving political problems (trade unions, business associations, civil rights movements). Their organizational and personnel structure, the procedure for using financial resources stimulate the achievement of special goals. Organically integrated into the political system, they are most effective.

So, from the presented classification it is clear that a diverse set of associations of people can at the same time be a collection of interest groups. However, not all interest groups exert their influence on government institutions through political means. A significant part of group interests is satisfied through the channels of civil society. And those interest groups that achieve their goals through targeted influence on government institutions are pressure groups.

Pressure groups- a relatively narrow public association that actively seeks to satisfy its own interests through targeted pressure on public authorities. Pressure groups operate within the legislative and executive branches, as well as within the governing bodies of major political parties. At the same time, pressure groups do not depend on the state either organizationally or in terms of resources.

The source of resource support for pressure groups are various interest groups (territorial communities, agricultural and industrial circles of various industries, ethnic groups, etc.). In other words , pressure groups are the political substrate of interest groups.

It is very important to note that pressure groups seek to exert a targeted influence on the political process, but at the same time do not claim direct participation in government. Thus, they avoid any political responsibility for their actions. Refusing claims to supreme political power, they concentrate all their influence on solving specific economic issues and governing the state. Moreover, if other interest groups can make demands on each other, then pressure groups do this only in relation to authorities.

The peculiarities of the actions of pressure groups include the fact that they are active mainly only in the sphere of making (executive or legislative) decisions. Because of this, they are distinguished by a small number of contacts with the masses, connections only with specific and not general interests, a narrower range of means used in the political game, and less public activities. The same forms of activity, such as selecting candidates for the upcoming elections, publishing mass media, forming funds to support candidates, etc., are the exception rather than the rule of their relationship with society and government.

Lobbying is a means of influencing pressure groups on government institutions. In general lobbying is a step-by-step mechanism for preparing, coordinating and making political decisions that suit the interested group. Lobbying as a full-fledged institution appears when two necessary conditions already exist:

• a large variety of interests in society, arising as a result of its social differentiation, stratification, “specialization”;
• access to power is expanding on the basis of political pluralism, which is characteristic, first of all, of democratic regimes.

Due to the fact that the authorities are objectively unable to simultaneously and most fully satisfy all interests at once, the problem of priority arises, the priority of the implementation of certain interests. Hence the natural desire of various groups and strata of society to influence the behavior of the state in order to reorient policy in their favor, stimulate it, and make management decisions that are beneficial to themselves.

Lobbying are attempts to influence the formation or implementation of public policy. Lobbyist- a person whose professional services are used to influence members of a legislative or other government body in their own interests, or who recommends to clients how they should do this themselves. Lobbyists are divided into two groups:

• Professional lobbyists;
• Employees engaged in lobbying on behalf of the employer.

The development of professional lobbying can be seen as part of the general trend of turning politics into a profession.

Lobbying activities are distinguished by the following features.

Firstly, Lobbying is very tightly connected with political power. You can even derive the following pattern: there is more lobbying, as a rule, where real power is concentrated. That is, lobbying is a kind of sign of power, its specific mark. Conversely, it will not manifest itself where power is absent or where it acts only as a nominal force. Government bodies and officials are the objects of influence of lobbyists.

Secondly, Lobbying activities are always carried out in the interests of someone (classes, layers, regions, parties, public organizations, nations, confessions, etc.).

Third, lobbyists perform the function of mediation between influential interest groups, financial corporations, commercial organizations, political parties, public associations (blocs), citizens and government structures (legislative and executive bodies authorities).

Fourthly, Lobbying allows for the possibility of defending the interests of not only organizations and associations, but also individuals. After all, certain citizens and their groups can have both common and purely individual interests. It is important to learn how to legally defend both.

Fifthly, lobbying provides individuals and groups of citizens with the opportunity to indirectly participate in the creation and preparation of legal and political decisions, and this is very important since most of these groups may not have representatives in parliament interested in defending their interests, similarly in the executive branch. Thus, through lobbying activities it is possible to realize various interests that otherwise might remain unclaimed.

The goals of lobbying are varied. However, even in countries with rich democratic traditions, lobbying pursues predominantly socio-economic goals related to resolving issues of property and the rights to dispose of it; granting rights to conduct specific activities (export of raw materials, production of weapons, etc.); government order; quotas, licenses; subsidies, loans; energy tariffs; economic and tax benefits; financing of social programs.

4. The place and role of political parties in modern Russian society

Political parties in Russia began to emerge much later than in Western countries: only at the turn of the 19th - 20th centuries. Let us consider the stages of development of the party system in our country.

Stage I - turn of the XIX century- XX centuries Emerging parties operate underground, illegally. Their main political goal: to put an end to autocracy and the remnants of serfdom. There are the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP), a party of socialist revolutionaries (SRs).

Stage II- 1905 - 1907 Formation of a multi-party system on a legal basis. Participation of parties in the election campaign to the State Duma. The following parties are functioning: Party of Constitutional Democrats (Cadets), “Union of October 17” (Octobrists), Socialist Revolutionaries, RSDLP, “Union of the Russian People”.

Stage III-1917 - 1920 Preservation of a multi-party system - RSDLP(b) - Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (RCP(b)), left Socialist Revolutionaries, Mensheviks.

Stage IV-1920 - 1977 The Bolshevik-Communist Party receives the only monopoly on power. The one-party system in the USSR was not yet legally formalized.

Stage V-1977 - 1988 Legal formalization of the one-party system in the country in Art. 6 of the 1977 USSR Constitution on the leading and directing role of the CPSU.

Stage VI- 1988 - 1991 The emergence of the main political parties. Cancellation of Art. 6 of the USSR Constitution meant the end of the monopoly of the CPSU (1990). Adoption of the Law “On Public Associations”. Reform of the CPSU. Official registration of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) along with the CPSU. The current parties at this stage are the CPSU, the Movement of Democratic Reforms, the Democratic Party of Russia, the Republican Party of the Russian Federation, “ Democratic Russia", LDPR, Peasant Party of Russia, etc.

VII stage- 1991-1993 Collapse of the CPSU. Adoption of the Constitution of the Russian Federation in a referendum, which enshrined multi-party system as a constitutional principle (Article 13). The emergence of dozens and even hundreds of small political parties. Such parties as “Civil Union”, “Democratic Choice”, “Working Moscow”, “Memory”, Communist Party were active Russian Federation(Communist Party of the Russian Federation), LDPR, Agrarian Party, “Choice of Russia”, etc.

VIII stage- The turn of the XX - XXI centuries. Adoption of the “Law on Political Parties” (2001). The demarcation of political forces, the struggle over the essence, directions and pace of reforms in Russia, the participation of political parties and blocs in elections to the State Duma and the President of the Russian Federation. The most popular parties are United Russia, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, A Just Russia, the Liberal Democratic Party, and Yabloko.

XIX stage- 2000s - to this day. Dominance in the party system of one party - the “party in power”. There are four parties represented in parliament - United Russia, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, A Just Russia, and the Liberal Democratic Party.

Certain changes in the configuration of forces of all active parties in Russia occurred with the adoption February 22, 2014 Federal Law No. 20-FZ “On elections of deputies of the State Duma Federal Assembly Russian Federation". What consequences does the new law have for the modern party system of our country?

Thus, the rules for elections to the State Duma of the Russian Federation will now be as follows. Half (225 deputies) will be elected from party lists. Another half is in majoritarian districts. A single-mandate candidate can be nominated either by a party or by self-nomination. To participate in the State Duma elections, parties will either have to prove their own worth as a political force or collect 200 thousand voter signatures (with no more than 7 thousand signatures in each district). Proof of party viability will be considered either the presence of deputies from the party in the current Duma, or a three percent result in the previous elections, or the presence of at least one deputy who passed through the party lists in the legislative assembly of at least one region.

Thus, taking into account today’s “mandate count” of registered parties, if the elections of State Duma deputies were held next Sunday, 12 political forces would be exempt from collecting signatures: United Russia, Communist Party of the Russian Federation, A Just Russia, LDPR, Yabloko, Patriots of Russia , “Civil Platform”, RPR-PARNAS, “Right Cause”, “Communists of Russia”, “Motherland” and the Russian Party of Pensioners for Justice. Everyone else will have to collect 200 thousand signatures in 30 days to nominate both a single list and candidates for majoritarian districts.

An important innovation of the law is also that parties will be able to take part in elections to legislative assemblies only if they have already received a mandate in municipal elections in the same region (otherwise, the party will again need to collect signatures from voters). That is, a new political party that does not want to collect voter signatures on the eve of the Duma elections will have to win first in municipal and then in regional elections before 2016.

Single-mandate voters will have an even harder time: if a candidate in a majoritarian constituency is nominated by a party that does not meet the above-mentioned requirements, or is nominated independently, he will have to collect voter signatures: the law establishes a norm of 3% of the number of voters in the constituency, or 3 thousand votes in the case , if less than 100 thousand people vote in the district (there are two such subjects in Russia - Chukotka and Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrugs, each with about 30 thousand voters).

In addition, the law now establishes a rule limiting participation in elections for persons with an expunged or served criminal record: 10 years for those convicted of serious crimes and 15 years for those convicted of especially serious crimes. For those who have already outgrown this period and are able to run for office, this biographical fact will still be indicated on the ballots and signature sheets.

What do the introduced changes mean for the modern party system in Russia?

Firstly, multi-level system of filtering parties, municipality - legislative assembly - State Duma, has no analogues in international electoral law. In many countries, there are preferences that exempt parties from collecting signatures if they have a result in the previous election. But nowhere is the basis for exemption from collecting signatures (and in fact, unimpeded access to elections) the presence of a party as a deputy of the legislative assembly.

Secondly, The party registration system should become more open, but as work progresses, parties will be subject to qualification requirements. In addition to the main task of winning elections, parties have a public mission; they must solve the problems of popular representation. For this, parties must go to elections, and elections must be productive. According to the developers of the bill, with the adoption of the new law, the social mission of the party will be more clearly manifested.

Third, The provisions of the law are aimed at strengthening the development of the party system: parties will participate more actively in local elections, and having achieved results in the regions, they will feel more confident at the federal level.

Fourthly, The main idea of ​​the new law on elections to the State Duma of the Russian Federation is not so much a restriction on the entry of new parties into the Duma, but rather maximum restrictions on the entry into the Duma of independent single-mandate candidates. The rules have become more stringent, and at the same time they make the modern party system in Russia unlike any other in the world.

5. Interest groups in Russian politics

The modern development of interest groups in Russia has been greatly influenced by the problems of socio-political transformation and political traditions. We are talking, first of all, about the fact that civil society is only going through the stage of its formation, the interests of individual groups are only crystallizing, and the organizational forms of their expression are just beginning to take shape. Another important point is the unfinished nature of modernization, the parallel existence of traditional and modern practices and forms of organization political activity. Therefore, it can be noted that there are almost all types of interest groups in Russia. In addition, the activities of interest groups existing in Russia today are influenced by the traditions of interest groups Soviet period, forming a system of corporately organized representation. The underdevelopment of democratic principles of competition and the formation of government bodies, the imperfection of institutional conditions significantly limits the possibilities for the development of “modern” interest groups.

The peculiarities of domestic interest groups include the fact that they prefer to use various mechanisms of influence on the apparatus of state power rather than on public opinion. In this case, mechanisms of informal influence predominate. The level of institutionalization of functional representation of interests is quite low, but there is a relatively rapid development of its forms.

Development Analysis interest groups in Russia shows that these organizations play a kind of compensatory function in conditions of an “underdeveloped” system of political representation, thereby contributing to the canalization of political interests and political stabilization.

As for the activities of pressure groups, according to experts, most often lobbying in Russia carried out by executive authorities. This is due to the fact that fundamental issues in our country are still rarely resolved by the legislative branch. In fact, this happens through presidential decrees and government regulations, which play a dominant role in the legal regulation system and have direct effect.

Depending on what level of government lobbying occurs, in our country it is divided into federal (in the system of supreme government bodies) and local (carried out in republican, regional, regional bodies).

Depending on in whose favor the issue is resolved, lobbying in Russia is divided into the following types:

1. Lobbying for various social structures: public organizations, movements, parties, groups, layers (trade unions, anti-war and environmental movements, business unions, etc.).

2. Departmental lobbying - lobbying of ministries, departments, state committees, industry “pushing” certain interests. Thus, in the State Duma of the Russian Federation there are so-called departmental deputies who lobbied and are lobbying in favor of, for example, the energy, agro-industrial or military-industrial complexes, etc.

3. Regional lobbying - influence on the authorities from representatives of republics, territories, regions, regions of the Far North, Siberia, the Urals, the Far East, the Volga region and other places, wringing out certain benefits and advantages for the regions.

4. Foreign lobbying - the influence of foreign “pressure groups” or national communities on certain government bodies in order to achieve certain decisions from them.

Economic News Agency commissioned "Nezavisimaya Gazeta" conduct a study on how effective the work of representatives of commercial and government structures, deputies, aimed at lobbying projects that reflect the interests of certain structures, industries, regions or segments of society. In this case we are talking about the so-called civilized lobbying that does not involve bribery of officials or deputies .

This study was conducted following the results of the fourth quarter of 2014. The average rating was also calculated based on the results of 2014, and it was determined only in cases where the candidacy was proposed for evaluation by experts at least twice. The group of experts includes Viktor Ermakov (Russian Agency for Support of Small and Medium Businesses), Nikolay Vardul (Financial Gazeta, Novaya Gazeta); Valery Khomyakov (Council for National Strategy), Igor Kharichev (Center for Applied Electoral Technologies), Mikhail Sergeev (Nezavisimaya Gazeta), Alexey Zudin (Center for Russian Political Conjuncture), Mark Urnov (Expertise Foundation for Analytical Programs), Yuri Bondarenko ( Return Fund), Alexander Tutushkin (analyst), Sergei Turanov (Economic News Agency), Shod Muladzhanov (Moskovskaya Pravda), Yuri Yakutin (Economy and Life), etc.

The “top three” in the category “first persons” at the end of the previous year has undergone changes compared to 2013. Head of Rosneft Igor Sechin continued to move up the rating table and rose from third to second place. Let us remind you that at the end of 2013, he entered the “top three” for the first time. The First Deputy Prime Minister moved to third place Igor Shuvalov. And the head of the presidential administration retained the leading position in the table. Sergey Ivanov. Experts associate the strengthening of the latter’s rating with the strengthening of its position after the annexation of Crimea.

Moscow mayor in the regional nomination Sergei Sobyanin also retained first place. However, to some extent he lost his former influence, and his separation from his pursuers - the leaders of Chechnya and Tatarstan, respectively Ramzan Kadyrov and Rustam Minnikhanov, - decreased noticeably. Following the results of the past year, the latter made a kind of castling - Minnikhanov overtook Kadyrov and took second place.

In the fourth quarter, the rating positions of Vladimir Yakushev, who heads the Tyumen region, improved. The fact is that the legislative assemblies of the Khanty-Mansiysk and Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, which are part of it, abolished the direct elections of the heads of these regions and decided that they would be elected by district deputies from candidates proposed by the President of the Russian Federation. After consultations with the parties, candidates will be presented to the president by Yakushev, which increases his political “weight.” All these changes will come into force after their approval by the State Duma, where the corresponding bill has already passed the first reading.

The governor of the Irkutsk region, Sergei Eroshchenko, scored points due to the fact that he successfully lobbies for the creation of industrial clusters in the region, primarily in the petrochemical, pharmaceutical and aircraft manufacturing industries. Among the projects is the production of medium-haul airliners MS-21, in which, in particular, the United Aircraft Corporation will participate. To attract funds for the development of clusters, the regional government provides companies with tax and other benefits.

Governor of the Volgograd region A.I. Bocharov ranks 22nd in the ranking of regional lobbyists.

Experts also note an increase in the rating of the CEO of Aeroflot - Russian Airlines Vitaly Savelyev. This is due to the fact that thanks to his efforts, Aeroflot managed to revive its subsidiary low-cost airline. The low-cost airline Pobeda replaced Dobrolet, which came under strict EU sanctions. The new airline's flight geography is much wider than that of its predecessor, and the minimum fare for all destinations is only 999 rubles. excluding fees.

The lobbying intrigue associated with the consideration in the State Duma of a bill on compensation for Russians whose property was alienated by foreign courts - the “Rotenberg Law” - influenced the ratings of two nominees. The bill was adopted in the first reading, which led to an improvement in the position of the chairman of the specialized committee on constitutional legislation and state building, Vladimir Pligin, one of its main lobbyists. The rating of the most prominent opponent of the bill, the minister economic development Alexey Ulyukaev, decreased somewhat.

Debuted in the top 25 “professional” nomination Alexander Kalinin, who in the fourth quarter became president of Opora Russia, an organization that lobbies the interests of small and medium-sized businesses. Some observers believe that the former head of Opora Russia, Alexander Brechalov, helped him take this post.

In the “professional” nomination for the First Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration Vyacheslav Volodin in 2014 there were no competitors. The rating positions of the Deputy Prime Minister in charge of the defense industry have strengthened Dmitry Rogozin, who confidently took second place. For the first time, a Deputy Prime Minister was included in the top three in the nomination Dmitry Kozak, who ousted her colleague Arkady Dvorkovich .

Nezavisimaya Gazeta conducts a similar study every year. Therefore, anyone interested can follow the development of lobbying activities in our country. Unfortunately, it is virtually impossible for the average person to monitor shadow, “dirty” lobbying.

List of used literature

Regulations

1. Federal Law of February 22, 2014 No. 20-FZ “On the elections of deputies of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation” // URL:http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_171267/ (access date: 02/06/2015).

Scientific and educational literature

2. Political science: Political theory, political technologies: A textbook for university students. - M.: Aspect Press, 2000. - 559 p.

3. Surnacheva E. Law of conservation. New rules for the formation of the State Duma // URL:http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2405686?isSearch=True (access date: 02/06/2015).

4. Theory of politics: Tutorial/ Ed. B.A. Isaeva. - St. Petersburg: Peter, 2008. - 464 p.

5. Turanov S. The best lobbyists in Russia - December and results of 2014 // URL:

Having examined the evolution of the relationship between the system of power institutions during the years of perestroika and post-perestroika, let us move on to analyzing the views of various political parties and socio-political movements that emerged and operated in conditions of changing power relations on the problems of power.

Considering that, according to some data, by 1991

There were up to 20 all-Union parties, 500 republican and 10 thousand political clubs and politicized organizations of local significance285, with many political shades and unique approaches to the problems of power, it makes sense to identify the most general trends that appeared in the approaches of parties and movements to the problem of power during the years of perestroika and post-perestroika.

In the political landscape of the period under study, several groups (camps) of parties and movements are visible, having different views on the problems of power in the conditions of the destruction of one and the formation of another social system.

Parties and movements of a liberal, national-liberal, social-democratic nature that emerged under the conditions of perestroika identified themselves as a single camp of democratic forces. Despite the ideological differences that existed within this group of organizations on a number of issues of both a strategic and tactical nature, these parties and movements occupied close positions on key issues, representing a force in opposition to the existing social system and the power of the CPSU. The specificity of this camp was that it consisted of two groups: the actual political parties and movements of these directions, as well as the democratic movement within the CPSU itself, which was ideologically close to non-communist organizations. Thus, an analysis of the positions of parties and movements of the democratic camp on the problems of power will be incomplete without studying the positions of the democratic movement in the CPSU.

In contrast to this camp, during the years of perestroika, a tendency to form neo-communist organizations emerged. The common idea uniting these organizations was the preservation of the power of the CPSU in society, its avant-garde character, and opposition to the tendency to create and legalize non-communist and anti-communist parties and movements. These organizations were criticized by the tendency to reform the political and economic systems of Soviet society, which worked to destroy the existing model social order. A feature of the neo-communist movement during the years of perestroika was that it embraced part of the CPSU and opposed not only organizations opposed to the Communist Party, but also the official line of its party and that part of the CPSU that sought to reform the party from within.

A separate political force that played an important role during the years of perestroika was a movement representing part of the CPSU led by M.S. Gorbachev. The views of this camp on the problems of power went back to the idea of ​​​​the convergence of elements of capitalism and socialism. Thus, in its views and the role that this movement played in the political life of society, it represented centrist forces opposing both the neo-communist wave and the tendency to completely deny the norms and values ​​of the existing social system.

The peculiarities of the formation of the three listed political forces, representing different vectors of social development and therefore having different views on the problems of power, indicate that during the years of perestroika (especially in 1988-1991) there was a process of ideological and then organizational delimitation in the CPSU. From an outwardly monolithic organization, it increasingly turned into an ideologically and organizationally loose structure, whose members adhered to a wide variety of political beliefs. As it was wittily noted in one of the informal newspapers of that time, “membership in the CPSU is the same as membership in the Water Rescue Society: nothing

does not speak about the political views of the member"

Indeed, until August 1991, the CPSU united representatives of all three political movements: the democratic camp was represented by the Democratic Platform (DP), then by the Movement of Democratic Forces (DDK) and the Democratic Party of Communists of Russia (DPKR); centrist forces - a movement led by M.S. Gorbachev; neo-communist movement - the Movement of Communist Initiative (DKI), as well as the society "Unity - for Leninism and Communist Ideals", the United Front of Workers, whose supporters continued to remain at the same time in the ranks of the CPSU.

During the period under review national history there was the formation and development of parties and movements of a monarchical, national-patriotic nature (National Patriotic Front “Memory”, Christian Patriotic Union, Constitutional Monarchist Party (PRAMOS), People’s Orthodox Movement, etc.). These organizations, as a rule, were distinguished by a negative attitude towards the power of the CPSU and the existing social system. At the same time, due to their theoretical and ideological principles, these organizations opposed parties of a liberal, social democratic and nationalist nature.

Since the main line of struggle during the years of perestroika was between the camp of democratic forces, centrists and the neo-communist movement, it seems reasonable to focus on analyzing the positions of these particular political forces, leaving out of sight the views of monarchical and national-patriotic forces.

national parties and movements

The views of these three groups of political parties and socio-political movements on the problems of power did not develop immediately, but were formed and developed under the influence of the processes of reform of Soviet society during the years of perestroika (1985-1991) and post-perestroika (1991-1993).

At the first stage of perestroika (1985 -1988), the process of formation of all three political forces under consideration was outlined. Under the influence of the processes of glasnost and democratization of Soviet society, in the fall of 1986, a rapid growth of various kinds of amateur organizations, circles, discussion clubs, etc. began. Most of them were non-political in nature. However, at the same time, there was a process of re-establishing dissident circles of traditional directions: Slavophile and Westernization.

As the processes of glasnost developed, the formation of a critical and then negative attitude in society towards certain periods of Soviet history, politicization and radicalization took place informal organizations. According to A.A. Danilova and M.L. Dubrovsky, by the end of 1987 the share of politicized formations was 10% of the total number of various types of self-

active organizations.

The main content of the activities of such politicized organizations as the Moscow club “Perestroika”, clubs of socially active citizens organized in Riga, Vilnius, Kaunas, were discussions on the socio-political problems of the development of perestroika, the promotion of alternative economic and social projects. Most clubs by the end of 1987 had moved to positions

Likish to the ideas of democratic socialism

At the same time, at the first stage of perestroika, a neo-communist tendency emerged, which manifested itself as conservative opposition to the ongoing reforms. An obvious indicator of this was N. Andreeva’s letter “I Can’t Give Up Principles,” published in “Soviet Russia” on March 13, 1988. The letter gave a harsh assessment of the processes taking place in the country, including the erosion of socialist values, the formation of informal, non-socialist political organizations, etc.290 The letter was a kind of indicator of ideological demarcation in society, and also revealed a fairly broad basis for the formation

formation of the neo-communist movement

To the extent that the formation of the democratic and opposing camp of neo-communist forces took place, there was also the development of centrism balancing between these two political flanks. Let us note that at the first stage of perestroika the centrist movement was also not formalized organizationally, however, already at this stage the centrists were maneuvering between the conservative wing of the party and that part of the CPSU and society that advocated faster and more radical political and social transformations

Thus, at the first stage of perestroika, a tendency towards the formation of political camps was clearly evident, with different systems views on the problems of organization, functioning and reform of power structures.

At the second stage of perestroika (1988-1991), the final organizational and ideological formation of these political forces took place.

The further formation of the camp of democratic forces at this stage was manifested in the politicization of circles and clubs, in the creation of club-circle unions both at the city and interregional levels. There was a division of clubs into political views. In the initially single informal movement, two branches emerged that differed in relation to the existing government, had different social ideals and differently assessed various moments of the country’s historical past: “democratic” and “national-patriotic”. These processes of self-determination within the framework of the “informal” movement created the basis for the emergence of independent political parties, social movements, popular fronts and other political organizations293. During 1988 - 1990 a significant number of parties with a bourgeois-liberal orientation were formed294. Social democratic

organizations. National parties were created in the union re-

publics

The formation of political parties at this stage was greatly influenced by the trend of democratization of society; elections of people's deputies of the USSR (spring 1989) and the formation of the first opposition to the existing government at the First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR - the Interregional Deputy Group (MDG); a powerful surge in the labor movement in the summer of 1989; as well as the abolition of the old version of Article 6 of the USSR Constitution in March 1990, which created the legislative basis for the development of a multi-party system in the country.

Despite the abundance of political parties and organizations in this part of the political spectrum, they were characterized by a number of features indicating the formation of a single political camp. An analysis of the program documents of parties of a bourgeois-liberal, social-democratic, national-liberal nature shows that, as a rule, the immediate goal of these organizations was the elimination of the monopoly power of the CPSU in society. In addition, they contained ideas for the formation of a civil society, a democratic political regime, and an economy based on the equality of all forms of property or the priority of private property297.

The fact of the formation of a single camp of democratic forces is indicated by the development of tactics of blocking these parties. The use of this tactic can be clearly seen since 1989. It was at this time that the MDG was created, which played a significant role in the consolidation of the democratic forces in opposition to the CPSU, as well as the Interregional Association of Democratic Organizations (MADO), which united popular fronts, socio-political clubs and parties. Another blocking attempt was associated with the formation in February 1990 of the Russian Democratic Forum (RDF), which partially included organizations that were part of MADO. And finally, in January 1990, the election bloc “Democratic Russia” was created, which in October of the same year turned into a movement of the same name. The peculiarity of the structure of “DemRussia” made this anti-communist bloc a relatively stable and broad political entity during the period of struggle against the power of the CPSU298.

The antithesis to the formation of this political camp was the ideological and then organizational development of the neo-communist trend. Its formation for the most part also dates back to 1989-90. In May 1989, the group “Unity - for Leninism and Communist Ideals” was formed under the leadership of N. Andreeva. In the same year, another organization of a conservative nature took shape - the United Workers' Front (UTF). The creation of the Initiative Congress of Communists of Russia dates back to 1990. In the summer of 1991, the Bolshevik Platform in the CPSU was formed, also reflecting the views of the most conservative part of the party.

At the second stage, the formation of opposing camps of political forces (democratic parties and movements, on the one hand, and neo-communist organizations, on the other) stimulated the development of the centrist camp. Its final design, apparently, can be associated with the appearance of the draft Platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the XXVIII Party Congress (February 1990) and the Letter of the CPSU Central Committee to the party “For consolidation on a positive basis” (April 1990).

Thus, at the second stage of perestroika, three political camps were formed, whose views on power differed significantly from each other. Having examined the stages and features of the formation of political camps during the years of perestroika, let us move on to analyzing their views on the problems of power.

As already noted, the main content of the activities of the united camp of democratic forces was the elimination of the CPSU monopoly on power and ultimately its removal from power. This aspect of the struggle played a key role, since only as a result of the implementation of these goals, the democratic camp was able to change social relations (including power relations) in a radical way.

The key role of the CPSU in the system of power required the democratic movement to carry out a multifaceted struggle against the Communist Party. From this point of view, efforts to eliminate the interference of the CPSU in the economic sphere of society were important. This desire essentially represented a more radical version of the implementation of the decisions of the XX Party Conference on the division of functions between party and economic bodies. This fact is eloquently indicated by the article by G.Kh. Popov “On the benefits of inequality” (November 1989). Speaking about the need to introduce market mechanisms for regulating the economy instead of directive ones, he noted that it is the actions of party bodies and organizations in the economy that represent the main obstacle on this path, are the most conclusive.

a parsimonious expression of administrative socialism

G.H. Popov, defending the need to transition to market methods, proposed to relieve the party of economic activities. This meant the curtailment of the right of control of party organizations over the activities of enterprises, the liberation of party bodies “from direct control over the activities of economic management bodies, because economic managers must be appointed and removed by the Soviets”300. “If we, not in words, but in deeds, remove the party from current economic concerns,” concluded another well-known economist who adhered to democratic convictions, V. Selyunin, “the system will not be able to function. The party apparatus is just

protects it from collapse"

The desire to eliminate the interference of the CPSU in the economic sphere was manifested in the demands of democratic organizations to eliminate the sectoral departments of party committees at various levels. An important direction in the struggle of democratic organizations was the ousting of party committees from enterprises. Let us note that this process was especially active where there were cells of

wet organizations

The democratic movement launched active work to departition state and economic structures among the labor movement. Particularly active were “Democratic Russia”, the Rukh, the Belarusian Popular Front, the SDPR and other organizations.303 If during the summer strikes of 1989, slogans for the liquidation of party committees, as a rule, did not find support from the miners, then by the summer of 1990 the situation has changed significantly. During the strikes of 1990, under the influence of democratic organizations, demands were put forward to eliminate the CPSU monopoly on power, to oust party committees from the mines, and in the summer of 1990, the First Congress of Miners of the USSR adopted a resolution on the need to deprive the CPSU of a privileged position in enterprises and institutions, to nationalize it property and creating equal conditions for activities

ties of other parties and organizations

The victory of democratic forces in a number of regions of the country in the 1990 elections to the republican and local Councils of People's Deputies transferred the fight against the power of the CPSU in various spheres of social life into the legislative channel. The First Congress of People's Deputies of Russia (1990) adopted as a basis the text of the “Decree on Power”, which prohibited “the system of party-political leadership in state enterprises, institutions and organizations, law enforcement agencies, the KGB, the Armed Forces and other paramilitary formations” 305. However, the real balance of political forces at that time did not allow these provisions of the Decree to be fully implemented. The next major step taken by the democratic camp in this direction was the decree of Russian President B.N. Yeltsin on the departition of state structures.

Along with the ousting of the CPSU from all state and other public structures, there is a noticeable tendency to form cells of democratic organizations. This tendency was most clearly manifested in the creation of the organizations “Democratic Russia”, the Rukh, and the popular fronts of the Baltic republics and Moldova. Thus, according to the CPSU Central Committee, in 1991 the “Democratic Russia” movement had its organizations in 73 regions of the RSFSR and sought to create its own structures at enterprises. In Moscow alone, more than 100 organizations of this movement operated directly in labor collectives.

An important role in the fight against the CPSU monopoly on power was played by the emphasis of the democratic forces on reforming the Communist Party itself, weakening it from within. The Democratic Union, the first political party to declare its opposition to the CPSU in May 1988, initially declared support for those forces in the Communist Party that “strive not in words, but in deeds, to carry out democratic reforms.” Later, the idea of ​​reforming the CPSU from within was also expressed by other political organizations of the democratic camp. Thus, the appeal of the SDRO (Social Democratic Workers' Association) of Perm to ordinary communists, which appeared on the eve of the elections of people's deputies of the USSR in 1989, called on them to reform their party, to transform it from a hierarchical structure into a “real democratic organization.” At the same time, the CPSU proposed to eliminate the nomenklatura principle of personnel selection, to abandon the approval by party committees of economic management

drivers, etc.

The tactic of pushing the CPSU to self-reform and to refuse to perform any power functions did not lose its significance even after some of the supporters of the Democratic Platform left the CPSU and the formation of the “Democratic Russia” movement. This can be judged from the words of Yu. Afanasyev, who noted at the All-Russian meeting of the democratic forces of Russia with B. Yeltsin on March 9, 1991: “representatives of our democratic forces are everywhere - in the CPSU Central Committee, and in the apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee, and in the KGB, and in the army"309.

The idea of ​​fighting the power of the CPSU was characteristic not only of democratic organizations outside the CPSU, but also of the democratic movement within the CPSU, which took shape in January 1990 into the movement of supporters of the Democratic Platform in the CPSU. The platform adopted at the All-Union Conference of Party Clubs and Party Organizations on January 20-21, 1990 indicated the ideological kinship of this movement and democratic organizations outside the party. “We believe,” the document noted, “that only the union of the progressive wing of the CPSU with the independent democratic movement of the people is capable of giving perestroika a real social basis, leading it out of the current crisis.”

winter state"

Defining the CPSU as the main formative element of totalitarianism, supporters of the Democratic Platform declared the need to reform the party structure. The Communist Party was asked to abandon the nomenklatura selection and placement of personnel, to make a transition from the production principle of party building to the territorial one311. The idea of ​​moral responsibility of the CPSU was expressed

for the establishment of totalitarianism

An important thesis of the DP was the idea of ​​replacing existing party committees with democratic bodies. As one of the leaders of the platform, V. Lysenko, stated, “in the future, the need for city committees and district committees will largely be symbolic, because the councils of secretaries of party organizations and interregional groups of communists will be able to take over many of their functions. The apparatus will then be purely hired and will work on a contract basis”313.

It seems obvious that all these proposals for democratizing the Communist Party, ridding it of the remnants of totalitarianism, from a strictly hierarchical structure of construction were aimed at transforming the CPSU from a party of the avant-garde type into a parliamentary party, which objectively worked towards the tendency to remove the CPSU from power: deprived of a party apparatus and a strict hierarchical structure, the Communist Party would be unable to perform those power functions that were inherent to it previously.

Let us also note that the idea of ​​the need for the CPSU to relinquish power was present in the Democratic platform in open form: “The party refuses direct intervention in economic, social and spiritual life..., the highest power passes to the Congress of People's Deputies, and locally to the Soviets "314.

The activity of DP supporters on the ground is also an indicator of the closeness of the views of the Democratic Platform and the democratic camp outside the CPSU. From this point of view, the proposals put forward by the city party club “Democratic Platform in the CPSU” of Berezniki, Perm Region in May 1990 for discussion by the city party organization of the CPSU are of interest. Among other things, the document contained the following ideas: “Transfer all managerial and power functions to the Councils of Workers’ Deputies, their local bodies, councils of labor collectives, ... completely stop direct interference in the work of public organizations, ... voluntarily and consciously help... the creation of movements and parties of a democratic orientation..., transfer the newspaper "Bereznikovsky Rabochiy" completely to the Council of People's Deputies. The editor should be approved at a session of the City Council”315.

The withdrawal of part of the Democratic Platform from the CPSU after the 28th Congress allowed the organizing committee for the creation of the “Democratic Russia” movement to conclude that “the demarcation line dividing conservatives and supporters of democratic change now lies entirely outside the CPSU”316.

As subsequent events showed, this conclusion did not correspond to reality: a significant part of the platform’s supporters continued to maintain membership in the CPSU, creating the Democratic Movement of Communists (DDC) at the All-Union Conference of representatives of democratic movements in the CPSU in October 1990. The movement retained in its ideological baggage the main provisions of the Democratic Platform and continued to fulfill its main goal - the destruction of the CPSU as a totalitarian structure, transforming it through reform from the inside from a vanguard party into a parliamentary-type party. Despite this fact, relations between the Democratic Democratic Party and the democratic camp outside the CPSU, including the Democratic Platform outside the CPSU that joined it, were tense

character

Nevertheless, the process of consolidation of supporters of the democratic camp continued in the CPSU. At the Third Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR, a split occurred in the ranks of the Communists of Russia faction, from which a new faction emerged - Communists for Democracy, led by A. Rutsky. The new faction supported the course pursued by the republican leadership led by B.N. Yeltsin, on many issues it was blocked with the Democratic Russia faction. On the basis of this faction, in the summer of 1991, the Democratic Party of Communists of Russia (DPKR) was created, uniting some of the DDK supporters in its ranks. The main idea of ​​the party organizers was the idea of ​​splitting the conservative Communist Party of the RSFSR, creating a democrat-

a technical alternative to the leadership of the Russian Communist Party. At the same time, the DPKR recognized itself as part of the CPSU until the events of August 1991.

All these facts allow us to conclude that the withdrawal of part of the DP from the CPSU in the fall of 1990 did not lead to a strict division into the “conservative” CPSU and the democratic camp. The latter, as before, remained divided, still consisting of two groups: the camp of democratic parties and organizations outside the CPSU and the democratic movement within the CPSU itself, whose activities remained predominantly anti-communist in nature. Thus, both of these groups of the democratic camp, to one degree or another, identified themselves as a force aimed at destroying the power of the CPSU in society and, ultimately, changing the existing social system.

The position of the democratic camp regarding the Soviets of People's Deputies was not so clear and underwent some evolution during the years of perestroika.

If we consider the attitude of parties of a liberal, social-democratic and national-liberal nature at the level of their strategy, it becomes obvious that almost all of them in their program documents proceeded from the need to eliminate the Soviet system of power and excluded the existence of Soviets in the future319. Such obvious unanimity regarding the Soviets at the level of strategy was absent in tactical issues, including with regard to participation in elections to the Soviets and the use of the latter as an instrument for destroying the power of the CPSU and transforming social relations and structures.

The process of delegitimization of the CPSU, the weakening of its power and the democratization of society created favorable conditions for the penetration of representatives of democratic forces into the Soviets as a result of elections to local and republican Soviets in 1990. This circumstance aggravated the question of the possibility of using the Soviets by the democratic camp to achieve these goals.

By this time, two approaches to this problem had emerged in the democratic movement. The first of them was to ignore the Soviets as bodies representing and serving the existing political regime, and, accordingly, elections to these institutions. Because of this, the tactics of organizing actions of civil disobedience were recognized as a priority.

This tactic was most clearly and consistently carried out by the Democratic Union (DU), as well as nationalist parties: the Movement for the National Independence of Latvia, the National Independence Party of Estonia, the Freedom League of Lithuania, the National Democratic Party of Georgia, etc.

Thus, the leaflet announcing the creation of the DS said: “at the moment we define the content of our activities as political opposition to the social system”320. The goal of the Democratic Union was declared to be “changes in the state system in a revolutionary democratic way, but without violence. The path is confrontation through civil disobedience. The method of action is to appeal not to the authorities, but to the people, an attempt to enlighten the people in such a way that they reject the current state power”321. This approach denied the possibility of using government bodies of the existing social system to implement the tasks of destroying the system.

At the same time, there were other tactics in the democratic camp. Its essence was to participate in the election campaign and use the institutions of Soviet power as a platform for promoting one’s ideas, as well as as a lever, the use of which made it possible to eliminate the CPSU monopoly on power and transform society in accordance with its ideals.

This position was typical for most political organizations of a social democratic, liberal nature, as well as popular fronts. The choice of this tactic was determined by the actual legalization of non-communist organizations, as well as the experience of the existence of the MDG. As the executive secretary of the Interregional Deputy Group A. Murashov noted, the activities of the MDG proved that “the enemy can be defeated, and it is precisely the peaceful

by means of parliamentary means"

The transition from the tactics of civil disobedience to participation in elections has proven quite difficult for a number of democratic organizations. In particular, this is evidenced by the inconsistency of the activities of such a large bloc of democratic forces as MADO.

On the one hand, MADO acted as one of the founders of the bloc of candidates for people’s deputies of the Russian Federation “Democratic Russia”. At the same time, the second MADO conference, held on the eve of the elections to local and republican Soviets on February 2-4 in Vilnius, reflected contradictions within the association itself on tactical issues. After three days of work, the conference was still unable to adopt a resolution due to large differences in the opinions of the participants. One of the stumbling blocks was the issue of election tactics. During the conference, two approaches to this problem emerged. Some delegates still insisted on a boycott,

another supported the idea of ​​active participation in them

The discussion on the issue of participation in the election campaign to the republican and local Soviets in 1990 also led to the division into factions of the Democratic Union. The revolutionary-democratic faction of the civil path, led by V. Novodvorskaya, still denied the productivity of the path of radical democratic forces towards political struggle in the power institutions of the existing social system (hence the very name of the faction - “non-system opposition”)324. In their views, the “non-systemicists” proceeded from the postulate of the impossibility of the evolution of totalitarianism, remaining committed to the tactics of civil disobedience. According to V. Novodvorskaya, “you cannot sit on two chairs. We must choose between the democratic revolution and parliamentary games”325. Another faction of the DS (“reformists” or “realists”), in the changed conditions, adopted the tactics of participating in elections326.

Let us note that the transition of various democratic organizations to the tactics of participation in elections, as a rule, did not mean a complete abandonment of extra-parliamentary struggle. This is evidenced by the “Action Program - 90”, developed by the Russian Democratic Forum (RDF), which united more than 40 political organizations and parties.

Both tactics are reflected in this document. On the one hand, the Program stated that the victory of democratic forces in the elections in a number of republican and local Soviets requires “to develop an offensive, to effectively break into the remaining bastions of the neo-feudal-neo-serf system”327. This recognized the importance of the activities of democratic forces in the Soviets.

On the other hand, it was stated that these organizations should continue to form civil action committees under local Soviets, turning them into parallel “micro-parliaments” into “schools of parliamentarism” and, ultimately, into a form of power for a self-governing democratic public328. In addition, it was recommended that in those regions where local Soviets are under the control of “old, reactionary forces,” they should pursue “a revolutionary policy of emancipation and democratization through organized mass actions (rallies, demonstrations, picketing, strikes, civil disobedience campaigns, personal occupation of premises) "329.

The tactics of participation in the elections contributed to the fact that representatives of the democratic camp turned out to be the most radical supporters of the resolutions adopted by the XXX Party Conference, aimed at separating the functions of party and Soviet bodies.

Speaking at the XXX party conference, one of the future leaders of the anti-communist opposition B.N. Yeltsin noted that the implementation of the slogan “All power to the Soviets” requires reforming and reducing the party apparatus of regional committees by 2-3 times, and the CPSU Central Committee by 6-10

times, as well as the liquidation of sectoral departments of party committees

The plot of the declaration of the electoral bloc "Democratic Russia", created with the participation of the largest democratic organizations, such as MADO, MOI (Moscow and Interregional Association of Voters), Moscow Popular Front, Popular Front of the RSFSR, SDA (Social Democratic Association), "Memorial" and etc., in the elections to local and republican Soviets in 1990, the thesis about the transfer of power from party committees naturally became

tetov to the Soviets. The desire to pit the Soviets against party committees and to deprive the latter of power can be seen in the election struggle of representatives of “Democratic Russia” at the local level332.

The importance of the participation of democratic forces in the Soviets, from the point of view of opposition to party bodies and representatives of the CPSU in the Soviets, was also discussed at a meeting of the “Democratic Russia” movement near the Ralo-Volga region in Izhevsk in November 1990. As one of the leaders of the movement stated, “We must make our way into the Soviets by all permitted and unauthorized means. Communists in Sove-

they’ve settled in like lice and are doing nothing.”

When they entered the Soviets, representatives of the democratic movement actively used the tactic of creating factions opposition to the CPSU. These factions, as well as those Soviets that, as a result of the 1990 elections, came under the control of the Democrats, sought the most complete transfer of power from party bodies to the Soviets.

The same position was taken by supporters of the Democratic Movement of Communists. Thus, the Moscow regional association of DDK at a conference held in February 1991 made a statement declaring that this association would support the activities of the parliamentary groups “Left Center”, “Russia”, “Smena” in the Russian parliament, as well as groups independent

deputies of the “Moscow Left” in the Moscow Council. The communist factions in these authorities (“Communists of Russia” in the Russian Supreme Council and “Moscow” in the Moscow City Council) were ignored.

Later, in the Supreme Council of Russia, the interests of the Democratic Movement of Communists began to be expressed by the “Communists for Democracy” faction. As one of the leaders of the DDK, V. Lipitsky, stated, the leadership of the movement considered the idea of ​​​​creating similar factions independent of the CPSU with a similar name in the Soviets of all levels.

The formation of opposition factions to the CPSU and the emergence of a number of “democratic” Soviets required the camp of democratic forces to coordinate activities and pursue a common political line. Such a need was recognized even on the eve of the 1990 elections. Thus, one of the leaders of the Democratic Russia electoral bloc, I. Zaslavsky, who is running for the Oktyabrsky District Council of Moscow, noted shortly before the elections: “I am sure that our district will not be the only one in the city and the country, where democratic forces will be in the majority. The interaction of such local Councils with each other, their general interaction with progressive deputies in the authorities of the republics and the Union will create in the country that “critical mass” of democracy, which will make perestroika irreversible”336.

The Democratic Russia movement has done a lot in terms of developing such coordination of democratic forces. The appeal of the organizing committee for the creation of the movement, adopted on August 24, 1990, indicated that it was important integral part of the movement being created will be the already established democratic parliamentary blocs in the Council

tach different levels. The establishment of this coordination by the “DR” movement was also facilitated by the fact that the movement itself grew out of the “Democratic Russia” electoral bloc, which united various political parties, organizations, popular fronts, socio-political clubs opposed to the CPSU.

The founding congress of the “DemRussia” movement also paid great attention to the problem of interaction between the activities of democratic deputies in the Soviets and coordination of the activities of “democratic” Soviets. One of the resolutions of the congress implied the creation within the framework of the movement of a special group that would coordinate the work of the democratic factions of “Democratic Russia” in Russian Councils at all levels. At the same time, the local “DR” factions had to be guided in their activities by the decisions of the corresponding faction in the Supreme Council of the RSFSR338. As the department for relations with socio-political organizations of the CPSU Central Committee rightly stated, “Democratic Russia” sought to subordinate to its goals and coordinate the activities of the entire parliamentary vertical from top to bottom, from the Supreme Council of the RSFSR to local Councils at the district level339. Speaking at the Founding Congress of the movement, the chairman of the organizing committee A. Murashov stated that by October 1990, the factions of “Democratic Russia” united up to 1/3 of the deputy corps of Soviets at all levels, with the exception of the union-

The desire to unite the efforts of democrats in the Soviets was also manifested in the appeal of the Founding Congress of "DemRussia" to the democratic factions in the Soviets of People's Deputies. It called for factions to boycott the program of the President of the USSR to bring the country out of the crisis. They were encouraged to implement their own election programs341.

The tendency to coordinate the activities of representatives of democratic forces in Councils at various levels indicates the presence of a single camp of democratic forces in the country. In addition, there have been attempts to coordinate the efforts of democratic and nationalist organizations in the struggle against the “old” government, which ended in January 1991 with the creation of the “Democratic Congress” (“DK”) coalition at the union level342

The main goal of “DK” was to consolidate the efforts of participating organizations for the peaceful liquidation of the totalitarian regime, the creation of sovereign democratic states, and the dismantling of imperial structures in a civilized form343. An important role was assigned to work in government bodies, using which it was planned to boycott the union treaty, achieve the resubordination of large industrial enterprises to the republican Soviets, contribute to the abolition of the union army, etc.344

The emergence of such a coalition was received ambiguously by that part of the democratic movement that, while advocating the destruction of the communist regime, at the same time opposed the destruction of a single state (RCDD, DPR, KDP) 345.

It was already noted above that in their struggle against the CPSU, democratic forces used the idea of ​​​​transferring the full power of party bodies to state bodies. At the same time, it should be emphasized that the slogan “All power to the Soviets,” which was actively used by democratic organizations during the 1990 election campaign, was of a tactical nature and did not meet the strategic goals of the democratic camp.

Already in the summer-autumn of 1990, the thesis about the need for a radical reform of the Soviet system of power and, ultimately, the de-Sovietization of society began to dominate in the democratic environment.

A well-known figure in the democratic movement, E. Yakovlev, summing up the results of the democrats’ stay in the Soviets, wrote: “All the years of perestroika, the democrats, repeating the slogan of the October Revolution, demanded: “All power to the Soviets.” And this happened, but it became obvious: the absolute power of the Council... again a dictatorship, only not of one person, but of groups of people who, for the most part, cannot agree among themselves. The logic of development inexorably pushes us to question the state structure that we so

we usually call it Soviet power"

G. Kh. Popov, one of the theorists of the democratic movement during the perestroika period, stated even more clearly about the need to get rid of the slogan “All power to the Soviets”. From his reasoning, the tactical use of the idea of ​​omnipotence of the Soviets by the democratic camp becomes obvious. “We continue to have the Leninist concept of “All power to the Soviets,” noted Popov, “which crosses out the idea of ​​​​the separation of powers into legislative, executive, and judicial. All power to the Soviets is the path to totalitarianism. All power to the Soviets is the primacy of discussions over work, the primacy of acceptance

decisions on their implementation"

Thus, the author proceeded from the thesis about the inability of the Soviets, due to their generic characteristics (large composition, syncretic power, denying the separation of powers, etc.) to effectively fulfill the role of public authorities348. “If earlier the idea was proclaimed that bad job The Mossovet or Lensovet is connected with the monopoly of the MGK or LGC on power, then after these Soviets came under the control of the democrats, it became obvious that the matter was not only in the leaders of the Soviets, but in themselves.

my Soviet system as such." According to this conclusion, Popov proposed to carry out the de-Sovietization of society, gradually destroying the Soviet system of power, replacing it with a system based on the separation of powers.

As can be seen from the arguments of G.Kh. Popov, the ideas of de-Sovietization of society and the abandonment of the slogan “All power to the Soviets” were formed not only under the influence of the program guidelines of democratic organizations, but also under the influence of the practice of participation of democrats in the work of the Soviets. The legitimacy of this conclusion is indicated by the words of the Chairman of the Leningrad City Council A.A. Sobchak, who stated in one of his articles: “We exaggerated the constructive role of the government, composed of non-professional deputies. Collective lack of professionalism is dangerous for democracy. Both here and in other cities, the Soviet system in its current form turned out to be cumbersome and ineffective.”350

In accordance with these approaches, the democratic movement sought to radically change the system of Soviet power. However, due to the partial retention of power by the CPSU, this process was gradual351. Let us recall that half a step towards the de-Sovietization of society has already been taken by the Communist Party itself, which approved at its XXX Party Conference, and then at the February (1990) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, essential changes in the Soviet system. In fact, the democratic camp only brought this process to its logical conclusion.

After a number of Soviets came under the control of democrats as a result of the 1990 elections, the existing system of state power was not broken immediately, but gradually, step by step, was modified and transformed. The idea of ​​gradual reform of Soviet power is clearly seen in I. Zaslavsky’s interview with Literaturnaya Gazeta. Thus, one of the leaders of the “DR” I. Zaslavsky proposed not to immediately break the structure of the lower levels of Soviet power, but to create in parallel with them new, alternative structures so that they would gradually take over the functions of the old divisions of the executive committees of the Soviets, pulling along with the functions and the most efficient, competent specialists352

In line with the trend of de-Sovietization of society, the activities of the democratic camp were carried out to form an executive branch of government independent from the Soviets353.

Having not supported the introduction of the post of President of the USSR for tactical reasons,354 the camp of democratic forces actively contributed to the establishment of the post of president of the republics, choosing the tactic of pitting republican structures against the center. This position predetermined support from “Democratic Russia” for the introduction of the post of President of the RSFSR355. At the level of local Soviets, under the influence of the democratic movement, there has also been a tendency to form an executive branch of government independent from the Soviets. As part of this trend, in the summer of 1991, elections for mayors of Moscow and Leningrad took place.

An attempt at the most complete de-Sovietization Russian society was associated with the draft of the new Constitution of Russia developed and published in November 1990 by the Constitutional Commission under the leadership of the Chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR B.N. Yeltsin. In this regard, let us pay attention to some of its provisions.

Article 1.5. The project provided for the extension of the principle of separation of powers to the system of government bodies in Russia, as well as to the system of local self-government bodies (Article 5.8.1)356. The highest representative body, although retaining the name of the Supreme Council, turned into bicameral parliament. There was no system of Soviets at the lower levels of power either.

In addition, the project completed the “transformation” of a deputy into a parliamentarian. Both versions of the draft Constitution (drafts of a parliamentary and presidential republic) provided for remuneration for the performance of deputy duties (Articles 5.2.12A and 5.4.31B2). During the exercise of powers, the deputy could not hold any position outside parliament (Article 5.2.12A2; Article 5.4.31 B1). The institution of recalling a deputy by his voters was completely eliminated.

Assessing the draft Constitution, one of the leaders of the “DR” A. Murashov at a meeting of the “Democratic Russia” of the Ural-Volga region in November 1990 noted: “This constitution has nothing in common with the Soviet constitution. It would put an end to Soviet history. In accordance with the Constitution, there will be held presidential elections. If Yeltsin is elected by all the people, any accountant will carry out his decrees... Following the election of the President of Russia, elections of mayors and governors will be held. We end not only

with socialism, but also with Soviet power." The balance of power in the deputy corps of the Congress of People's Deputies of Russia did not allow de-Sovietization through the adoption of a new Constitution, so the camp of democratic forces was forced to carry out this process gradually, by introducing appropriate amendments to the current Constitution of the RSFSR of 1978. This option for implementing changes marked a long path of transformation of the residual Soviet systems of state power into a system built on the principle of separation of powers.

It should be noted that the idea of ​​de-Sovietization of society existed in the CPSU itself. It can be most clearly seen in the views of supporters of the Democratic Platform358. Essentially, supporters of the platform and the later associations created on its basis in the CPSU reproduced the same logic of the elimination of power institutions of the old system, which was inherent in other democratic organizations: the transfer of power of the CPSU to the Soviets, vesting the latter with full power, and then de-Sovietization - the liquidation of the Soviet system of power itself and the formation of a different system of state power, built on the principle of separation of powers.

However, it cannot be stated unequivocally that the idea of ​​de-Sovietization of society found unconditional support among supporters of the democratic camp. Certain fluctuations within the opposition CPSU and the social movement system can be traced, in particular, in the materials of the State Congress of the Russian Democratic Forum, held at the end of September 1990. Most of the speakers at the congress supported the idea of ​​de-Sovietization. At the same time, there were also performances of a different kind. So, one of the delegates is Professor V.A. Vinogradov said: “Soviet power has not exhausted itself and it has reserves. The task of the democratic movement is to support the Soviets in every possible way.”359 The idea of ​​preserving elements of the Soviet system in the future structure of Russia can be traced in the speech of V.I. Kandaurov. Talking about the crisis Soviet model power and the need to replace it with parliamentary structures, the speaker at the same time expressed the idea of ​​​​the possibility of creating at enterprises

a kind of “production parliaments”. It seems to us that this idea traces the remnants of the concept of Soviet power, implying the combination in the Soviets of the functions of state bodies and self-government bodies.

Despite these individual facts, we can conclude that the activity of democratic forces at the second stage of perestroika was dominated by the trend of de-Sovietization of society. Therefore, the activities of the democratic camp during the years of perestroika had the following logic: the fight against the power of the CPSU through the maximum redistribution of functions between party and Soviet bodies under the slogan “All power to the Soviets”, winning a majority in the Soviets, opposing them to party committees and subsequent transformation into a purely parliamentary structure within the framework of creating a system of separation of powers.

The processes of essential changes in power relations worked not only to reproduce democratic organizations in opposition to the existing regime, but also the neo-communist movement, which is in opposition to the reformist course. The main reason for the existence of the latter was the protection of the fundamental values ​​of the existing, but subject to decay and destruction of the social system. This circumstance left an imprint on the position of neo-communist organizations on power during the transition period.

Neo-communist organizations were characterized by defending the idea of ​​preserving the vanguard role of the CPSU and its power over social structures. In this regard, the conservative camp reacted sharply to the process of social democratization of the CPSU, its transformation into a parliamentary party and the transfer of power to other bodies in accordance with the decisions of the XIX Party Conference361. This predetermined the negative attitude of neo-communist organizations not only towards the camp of democratic forces, but towards the democratic and centrist currents in the party itself.

Let us note that the conservative opposition to the ongoing reforms was not always consistent and homogeneous. Some neo-communist organizations compromised with both the centrist trend in the CPSU and the Democratic Platform. Thus, on the eve of the XXVIII Congress of the CPSU in Leningrad, a unification conference of the Leningrad Regional Committee of the CPSU was held, the purpose of which was to try to find a compromise between various, clearly defined trends within the CPSU. In a co-report made by the Chairman of the Initiative Congress of Communists of Russia V.A. Tyulkin, expressed hope for the possibility of finding a consensus between these areas. In particular, he noted: “All of us sitting here note with satisfaction the convergence of the positions of both the center - towards further democratization, and the more reasonable, balanced position of the Democratic Platform and all other forces. There has already appeared

the possibility of finding consensus..."

These and other attempts by the Initiative Congress, as well as the Marxist Platform, to come to an agreement with the Democratic Platform or part of the CPSU, adhering to the positions of the Central Committee Platform for the 28th Party Congress, were rejected by supporters of the All-Union Society “Unity” and the Bolshevik Platform363.

The defense of the basic values ​​of the collapsing social system also determined the attitude of the conservative camp towards Soviet power and its reforms undertaken by centrist and opposition forces to the CPSU.

The penetration of representatives of democratic forces into the Soviets as a result of the elections of 1989 and 1990, the emerging tendency to oppose these bodies to the structure of the CPSU, and the strengthened line towards the parliamentarization of the Soviet structure indicated an ambivalent attitude of representatives of neo-communist organizations and associations to the institution of the Soviets. On the one hand, their commitment to the Soviets remained as the best form of organization of state power. On the other hand, distrust was expressed in the existing Councils, which, according to N. Andreeva, “are turning into bodies

direct reactionary coup"

The earliest reaction of neo-communist organizations to the process of reforming the Soviet system of power was the attempt of the United Front of Workers to achieve a change in the territorial principle of elections to the Soviets to the production principle. The reason for this was the elections of people's deputies of the USSR, as a result of which the representation of workers and peasants in the highest body of the state

gift power has sharply decreased

The meaning of the OFT proposal was the desire to ensure representation of the working class in government bodies and to simplify the procedure for recalling deputies. Defending the territorial principle of forming Soviets, one of the leaders of the OFT, M. Popov, wrote: “In districts created by labor collectives, it is more difficult for any crooks to get into the Soviets, because the criteria that are presented require candidates for deputies to be able to defend the interests of working people”366. This idea, which was included in the OFT charter as one of the main tasks of the organization367, was then supported by the Initiative Congress of Communists of Russia, held in June 1991 by the Movement of Communist Initiative (DCI)368.

In the action program “Towards the revival of Soviet socialist Russia!”, adopted at the 3rd stage of the Initiative Congress of Communists of Russia (October 1990), the processes of reforming Soviet power received the following assessment: “The current legislative bodies of the state, which have turned into parliamentary-type bodies, are torn off from workers. If earlier workers and peasants were not heard in these bodies, now they are no longer visible”369. The draft program of the CPSU, developed by the Initiative Congress, contained a negative description of the decisions of the XXX Party Conference in the field of reform of the Soviet system of power. “To the accompaniment of beautiful phrases about the creation of a rule of law state,” the draft said, “the formation of a professional parliament and the establishment of an authoritarian regime were sanctioned”370. A similar assessment was also contained in the materials of the Bolshevik Platform, the All-Union General

Unity "Unity".

This attitude of this political camp towards the Soviets contributed to the development of the idea of ​​reviving genuine Soviet power, through the formation of alternative Soviets and turning them into authorities. Thus, in the above-mentioned program “Towards the revival of Soviet socialist Russia!” the emphasis was placed on the creation by members of the CPSU and non-party members, supporters of the Communist Initiative Movement, of the so-called “initiative committees of communists”, the main task of which was the “revival of Soviet power”372.

On the one hand, these committees were supposed to facilitate the functioning of existing Soviets, organize reports to the communists of those people's deputies of the USSR who were elected from the party, organize the work of communist factions in

existing Councils at various levels. On the other hand, the initiative committees were asked, “without abandoning the struggle for the interests of working people within the existing authorities, to begin to restore the Soviets in Russia in their true, Leninist understanding, created from below, by the working people themselves, through elections in labor collectives and ensuring simplicity and reality

recall of deputies who have not lived up to the trust"

This concept of the formation of parallel bodies of Soviet power with the destruction of the existing Soviet system was then included by the Initiative Congress in its draft CPSU Program. It drew attention to class character created alternative Councils. Strike committees, workers' committees, workers' committees created during the strike movement in

years of perestroika

In addition to restoring the production principle of forming Councils, the project developed by the Initiative Congress included the idea of ​​​​creating higher Councils through the delegation of representatives of lower ones. Such a return to the original sources of the Soviet system implied improving the connection of the Soviets with the masses, tightening control on the part of voters and lower-level Soviets over the activities of deputies and higher authorities.

The concept of creating alternative Councils from below can also be seen in the propaganda of the OFT. Characteristic from this point of view is the “Address to all workers”376, which appeared as a reaction to the adoption by the Supreme Council of Russia of the “500 days” transition program to the market. The appeal expressed confidence that existing government institutions, including the CPSU, are handing over people's property into private hands “without a fight.” In this regard, workers were encouraged to create workers' committees at enterprises. The purpose of these committees, as follows from the document, was to oppose the privatization of enterprises, to take into their own hands the distribution of all income of the enterprise, i.e. actual implementation of administrative functions at enterprises. In addition, the appeal contained a direct call for the creation of parallel power structures: “Take local power into your own hands! This is the only way

save the country!" As in the documents of the Initiative Congress, such “parallel” institutions of power, in the OFT appeal, were the Soviets, party and trade union bodies.

An analysis of the documents of the OFT, DKI, the Unity Society, and the Bolshevik Platform allows us to conclude that there were disagreements between these organizations on the issue of the place and role of the Soviets in the life of society, the relationship between Soviet and party power, etc.

The draft CPSU Program developed by the Initiative Congress stated that the CPSU should contribute to “the establishment of the full power of the Working People's Councils”378. Since the thesis about the “omnipotence of the Soviets” was actively used by other political forces of both a radical democratic and centrist nature during the years of perestroika precisely in the sense of the priority of the power of the Soviets over the power of the Communist Party, the absence of any special reservations in this regard in the draft Initiative Congress leads to to the conclusion that the “initiators” agree in principle with such an interpretation of the relationship between state and party power in society.

The validity of this conclusion is also indicated by other aspects of this draft CPSU Program. Particularly noteworthy in this regard is the thesis: “The revival of Soviet power is a minimum communist program in the conditions of the offensive of pro-bourgeois forces”379. Thus, it was the revival of the Soviets that the Movement of the Communist Initiative saw as the main link, having restored which, the supporters of the DKI were going to complete all the other elements of the collapsing social system. “Only by reviving the Soviets,” the project noted, “by uniting their forces with their help, will the working people stop the destruction, take a creative course, and ensure the subordination of all spheres of public life to the interests of labor”380.

Based on the above quotes, we can conclude that the concept of Soviet power proposed in the documents of the Communist Initiative Movement, in general terms, went back to the perestroika concept of the omnipotence of the Soviets. It was already noted above that the thesis of transferring all power to the Soviets of People's Deputies worked to eliminate the CPSU from power and, ultimately, to the tendency to eliminate Soviet power itself. Thus, the concept developed and defended by the DKI, under certain circumstances, could hardly lead to the restoration of Soviet power and the collapsing social system. As the practice of functioning of the Soviets in 1988-1993 showed, these institutions turned out to be poorly adapted for productive independent activity without relying on the structure of a vanguard-type party or a vertical executive.

sovereign power

The concept of Soviet power, developed by the Communist Initiative Movement and shared by the United Workers' Front, was criticized by the Bolshevik Platform in the CPSU. Unlike the “initiators,” supporters of the Bolshevik platform did not have high hopes for the restoration of Soviet power as a lever capable of blocking the path of the tendency to destroy the social system. The idea of ​​returning to the production principle of forming Soviets, which existed before the adoption of the 1936 Constitution, did not find support from this part of the conservative camp.

This attitude of the Bolshevik platform to these ideas was based on the postulate about the transitional nature of socialism, in which the Soviet state is “a workers’ and peasants’ state with bureaucratic perversion or a bourgeois state without a bourgeoisie”382. In accordance with this thesis, the program statement of the Bolshevik Platform stated: “In Soviet power in itself, as a system of elected representative bodies, there is, in essence, nothing epoch-making new.” And further: “those of our comrades are wrong who persistently look for some extraordinary democratic depths in the Soviet system and are convinced that if we return from the territorial principle of elections to the production principle, something will significantly change for the better.”

On the other hand, ideas from the period of perestroika in the CPSU and society were rejected and revised in the Bolshevik Platform, according to which the need to rid the CPSU of “unusual” power functions, including the functions of public administration, was affirmed. In contrast to these theses, the platform put forward the idea of ​​an objective law for the nationalization of the Communist Party. Due to the existence of this pattern, it was the party that was recognized as the “engine” that ensured the functioning of the entire state machine. Hence the conclusion was drawn that “the Soviet system - a system of participation in power... without the “engine” of the Communist Party built into it is practically ineffective”384

The ideas of various neo-communist organizations about the essence and prospects of Soviet power, as well as about the relationship between the Communist Party and the Soviets, indicate the existence of deep differences within the conservative camp on the issue of power, which, of course, weakened the position of this camp as a whole, and slowed down the process of developing unified tactics and strategy actions, although attempts to find compromises between organizations of this

directions existed.

The lack of unity among these organizations and associations in their views on power and government institutions is also indicated by their attitude towards the institution of the presidency. If DKI, the Bolshevik Platform, the Unity society had a negative attitude towards its existence,

tion, linking its emergence with the trend of de-Sovietization, the group of people’s deputies of the USSR “Union”, which in general shared the positions of conservatives, turned in December 1990 into the All-Union Association of People’s Deputies of All Levels with the same name.

nєm, was loyal to the institution of the presidency

In a number of cases, it was proposed to use the institution of presidential power to combat the negative processes of liquidation of the existing social and state system. This concept was expressed most clearly in the famous article “Sobering up” by the secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee of the CPSU Yu. Belov388.

The author, speaking from a conservative position and giving harsh assessments of the activities of the leadership of the CPSU during the perestroika period, at the same time stated the following: “The only guarantee today to stop the slide of society into the abyss of catastrophe is presidential power, with all its harshly critical attitude towards its current state. The party must support this government and demand decisive action from the President of the USSR to protect the constitutional order. Otherwise she will be forced to express to him

mistrust"

An analysis of the views and activities of neo-communist organizations during the years of perestroika (1985-1991) allows us to conclude that in those historical conditions the activities of organizations of this direction were of a conservative nature, since they were aimed at counteracting the further erosion of the existing system of power, the destruction of the statehood of a certain type.

The formation of two opposing parts of the political spectrum, two camps (democratic parties and movements and organizations of a neo-communist nature) created fertile ground for the development of a centrist trend in political life.

Its essence was to find a public consensus that would allow maintaining stability and moving forward along the path of reforming Soviet society. In other words, it was a balancing act between two lines, concepts of social development, two ideas about power.

On the one hand, the centrist movement expressed its negative attitude towards the old, previous model of society and, accordingly, the model of the organization of power, which in the resolution of the XXVIII Congress of the CPSU on the political report of the CPSU Central Committee was designated as a “totalitarian”, “Stalinist system”, which caused “enormous damage to the country”. -

not, the people, the party, the socialist idea itself." But while denying this model of socialism, the centrist movement opposed the other “extreme” - the complete elimination of socialism, and therefore the positions of the camp of democratic forces were criticized.

Formulating the basic principles of the centrist movement, M.S. Gorbachev, in a speech in February 1991, noted: “a genuine centrist position does not accept a return to Stalinism and stagnation... But for a truly centrist position, the adventurism of forces that call themselves radical”391 and which “took the last step” is unacceptable.

time is an openly anti-communist course." In this way, the centrist movement has identified itself as a force maneuvering between two opposing trends in social development.

This special position of the centrist movement in the balance of political forces during the years of perestroika was reflected in the specifics of its platform in terms of views on power, including the problem of reforming power and the extent of this reform. The key role of the centrist camp in the leadership of the country and the CPSU during the years of perestroika contributed to the fact that, unlike other political forces, it was the views of this movement on the problems of power that received the greatest dissemination and implementation. This is evidenced by the analysis of decisions and resolutions of the XXX Party Conference, subsequent party forums, mainly reflecting the views

centrists

Since the problem of changing the policy of the CPSU in the direction of power relations has already been considered by us in the previous section, we will dwell only on some aspects of the views of the centrist current in the CPSU on power.

The intermediate position of the centrist camp in the alignment of political forces during the years of perestroika was reflected in the attitudes of this movement towards the role of the Communist Party in society. The centrists were characterized by the idea of ​​restoring “Lenin’s concept of the party as the vanguard of society”394. This concept, according to the centrists, assumed that the CPSU would refuse to perform government functions and transfer them to Soviet and economic bodies. In addition, the party implied the refusal of the “formal” nomenklatura approach and control over the activities of enterprise administrations. In return, the centrists proposed focusing on the theoretical development of “the most important issues of the country’s development, ... the development

ideology of perestroika"

This concept of reforming the CPSU, on the one hand, denied the ideas of the neo-communist camp about the need to preserve for the CPSU its special status in society and powers of power. On the other hand, the centrists advocated maintaining the “avant-garde role” of the party in society as opposed to the concept of transforming the Communist Party into a parliamentary party put forward by the Democratic Platform of the CPSU. The most acute criticism of this approach was made in the open letter of the CPSU Central Committee to the country's communists “For consolidation on a principled basis.” It contained an accusation against the DP as a liquidationist tendency in the CPSU. At the same time, the drafters of the Platform were accused of trying to “transform the party into some kind of shapeless association with complete freedom of factions and groupings, i.e. practically destroy it”396.

This attitude towards the CPSU predetermined the reaction of the centrist movement to the trend towards the de-partization of state structures and, in particular, the de-partization of law enforcement agencies. In the report M.S. Gorbachev’s position on this issue at the 28th Congress was clearly centrist. On the one hand, it rejected the position of the conservative camp, based on the need to maintain the leading role of the CPSU in all institutions of society. On the other hand, complete de-partization, which the democratic forces in the CPSU and outside it insisted on, was recognized as unacceptable. As a result, the thesis about the work of the CPSU in government bodies, the court, the prosecutor's office, the army, and the KGB in the report took on the following form: “It is difficult to imagine depoliticized government bodies, it is difficult to find an army in the world where there are no bodies for maintaining morale and educating soldiers and officers. Here we also do not claim exclusivity - this is the natural right of all parties that will be legally registered with us”397. It is obvious that this approach, although it preserved the right of the CPSU to political work in the security forces, was at the same time one of the factors in its curtailment.

This conclusion is confirmed by the subsequent actions of the leadership of the CPSU during attempts to departition the security forces and government bodies undertaken by republican government institutions. In this regard, the information note of the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee “On the issue of depoliticization of law enforcement agencies,” dated October 16, is of particular interest.

1990. The document contained an analysis of the situation complicated by attempts to departition the security forces. These attempts were characterized as “illegal acts” aimed at ousting members of the CPSU from law enforcement agencies399.

In accordance with this assessment of the situation, local party bodies were tasked with fighting against this trend, placing the strictest implementation of the law “On Public Associations” by all government bodies and public organizations at the forefront. Further outlining the meaning of this struggle, the Secretariat of the Central Committee noted: “Where illegal acts have been adopted prohibiting the creation of such organizations (party organizations in the security forces - D.K.), it would be necessary to use the experience of party committees, which, based on the provisions of the CPSU Charter , unite party members working in law enforcement agencies into primary organizations at the place of residence, adhering, if conditions permit, to a compact union of these workers into single party collectives, or create such party organizations in accordance with

relevant city and district party committees"

Thus, from the text of the document it becomes obvious that, while proclaiming in words the fight against “illegal acts,” in reality, the Secretariat’s recommendations boiled down to the idea of ​​​​non-resistance to departition under the current circumstances. Probably, this position is explained by the general approaches of the centrist movement to the role of the CPSU in society and the position formulated in the quoted thesis of Gorbachev’s report at the 28th Party Congress. It makes sense to assume that such a calm reaction of the Secretariat of the Central Committee to the departitionization of state structures was also due to the thesis about the need to develop the territorial structure of the CPSU, sounded in the report to the XXVIII Congress of the CPSU. The importance of the formation and development of territorial organizations of the CPSU was associated with the transfer of power to the Soviets and the special significance of the elections of people's deputies. As stated in the report, “it is to this territory that the center is moving political work during such

major political campaigns"

These facts indicate that the views of the centrist camp on the position of the CPSU in society and its reform contributed to the removal of the CPSU from power and determined the gradual, peaceful nature of the departition of state and law enforcement structures. The views of the centrist movement on the Soviets, as well as its position regarding the power of the party, differed from the positions of the democratic and conservative camps. On the one hand, many of the views of the centrists were close to the ideas of the democrats (in particular, the ideas of separation of powers, the need for a numerical reduction in the deputy corps, etc.). This convergence of positions on the issue of parliamentarization of the Soviets allowed the local bodies of the CPSU to draw the following conclusions: “We believe that the main provisions of the program statements of the RPR, SDPR and DPR on democratization, the market, forms of ownership, Soviets, etc. coincide with the ideas of the Program Statement of the XXVIII Congress, the decisions of the last conference

our district party organization"

However, it seems to us that this coincidence was only partial. Although the views of the centrist movement changed and gradually became radicalized, a significant difference in views remained the commitment of the centrists to the idea of ​​preserving the Soviets as a form of organization of power subject to their parliamentarization, while representatives of the democratic camp sought complete de-Sovietization. In other words, the views of these two political forces differed in varying degrees of denial of Soviet power.

Emphasizing these differences, supporters of the Democratic Platform noted: “The Central Committee Platform aims to combine the advantages of the Soviet system with the benefits of parliamentarism. Again an attempt to combine the incompatible. Parliamentary democracy presupposes the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers. The Soviet system is based on the combination of all forms of power and is designed for direct democracy... The democratic platform directly points to the need to create parliamentary democracy, the rule of law, and civil society”403.

At the same time, the positions of the centrists regarding reform of the Soviet system of power were rejected by supporters of the organizations

neo-communist character. Thus, the positions of the centrists on the issue of organizing power found themselves under the crossfire of representatives of neo-communist and democratic forces, which indicates their intermediate nature.

The elimination of the CPSU from the political arena and the formation of a new system of power had a significant impact on the alignment of party and political forces in society. If before August 1991 the camp of democratic parties and organizations was a force primarily aimed at destroying the communist regime, then after the victory over the State Emergency Committee it identified itself as a political force in a new society, defending the newly established social order. At the same time, achieving the goal is the elimination of the CPSU from power, uniting various political entities into a single camp of democratic forces, contributed to the disintegration of the camp. The most obvious evidence of this process was the withdrawal of a number of political parties from the “Democratic Russia” bloc (November 1991, January, March 1992) 405.

As a result of the process of disengagement of former allies, two groups of parties and movements were formed, differing in their attitude to the existing government. Some of them (DR, V. Novodvorskaya’s faction in the DS, the Economic Freedom Party, the Movement of Democratic Reforms, etc.) took a pro-government position, supporting the side of the President of Russia in the conflict with the legislative bodies. This group of organizations welcomed the course towards the formation of strong presidential power and called for the final elimination of Soviet power in Russia406.

Another part of the former united camp of democratic forces found itself in opposition to the presidential course. These parties (RKhDD, KDP, DPR, SDPR, etc.), supporting the idea of ​​forming a society based on market relations, differed from the pro-government parties in assessing the methods and forms of market reforms, implementing

implemented by the presidential structure

The process of forming a government serving new social relations also changed the position of neo-communist organizations. If during the period of perestroika they were defenders of the existing government, state, law and order, the events of August 1991 turned them into consistent opponents of new social relations and the corresponding power. In the new conditions, this political camp becomes an anti-state force, opposing the “legal order.”

The neo-communist parties and movements that took shape on the ruins of the CPSU (VKPB, RCRP, Bolshevik Platform in the CPSU) declared their rejection of the new system. The program documents of these organizations recorded the ideas of restoring the Soviet state “as an organ of power of the working class acting in alliance with the collective farm peasantry”, resurrecting the leading role of the Marxist party over society as a whole and state structures.

ramie in particular

These facts allow us to conclude that as the new government was established, the camp of democratic forces and neo-communist organizations seemed to change places. A kind of confirmation of this thesis is the assessment given by the speaker of the Russian parliament R.I. Khasbulatov to the changes that occurred in the views on the power of the two opposing camps after August 1991. In his memoirs, he notes: “Convinced democrats evolved into fanatical Bolshevizan autocrats as soon as they approached power. And vice versa, former communists- holders of party posts became zealous democrats, being away

from this very power"

An analysis of the relationships between the institutions of power that took place in 1985-1993, as well as the views of political parties and organizations during this period on power, allows us to assert that during this period a transformation of power relations took place. If in 1985-1988. it was predominantly systemic in nature, in the sense that it did not destroy the existing relations between the main institutions of the power system, but only modified them in a certain way, then in 1988-1993. changes in power relations were of an essential nature: the place of the CPSU in the system of power and society as a whole changed qualitatively, the Communist Party gradually lost its role as superpower, and at the second stage of perestroika (1988-1991), two trends clearly emerged - self-elimination and the removal of party bodies from power.

The first of the above trends was associated with the reform of the political system, which was carried out after the 19th Party Conference and contributed to the transfer of power functions from the party to state, public and economic bodies. By implementing the resolutions of the XX Conference, party committees in the center and locally weakened control over state power and lost influence on other “drive belts” of their policies - the Komsomol, trade unions, and the administrative corps. An important influence on the development of this trend, as facts show, was the perestroika ideology of the CPSU, which created the necessary conditions to distance communist deputies from the implementation of the CPSU line in the Soviets.

At the same time, there is a tendency to eliminate the CPSU from power. Its development was associated with the process of delegitimization of the Communist Party as an institution of power, criticism of its past and present, as well as the legalization of non-communist organizations. With the arrival of the latter to the Soviets as a result of their victory in the 1990 elections, the Soviet structure, which was one of the system-forming elements, the conductor of the policy of the CPSU, began to turn into an instrument for the destruction of this system. It was the democratic composition of the Soviets that turned out to be the most consistent in upholding the slogan “All power to the Soviets.”

Processes of elimination and self-removal of the CPSU from power in 1988-1991. were accompanied by the destruction of the existing mechanism for exercising power. The consequence of this trend was the weakening of the Soviet structure, the ability of the Soviets to implement their power decisions, which, in turn, gave rise to the processes of atomization of the Soviet structure and the formation of alternative power institutions.

Consideration of the issue of the formation of alternative authorities gives grounds to assert that this trend, caused by the weakening of traditional power structures for Soviet society, was not leading in the process of transformation of power relations during the years of perestroika. This is indicated by the local nature of such attempts, as well as the relative alternativeness of the created authorities, manifested in the refusal to destroy old institutions of power, coexistence alongside them, their inclusion in the new structure of power, etc. At the same time, the existence of a tendency towards the creation of alternative authorities during the years of perestroika indicates the transitional nature of the processes that took place in power relations and the disintegration of a unified system of power.

An important role in the process of essential changes in power relations during the years of perestroika was played by the tendency to separate the functions of Soviet power. Appearing in 1988, this trend led to the creation of a system of separation of powers, which objectively worked to destroy the Soviets as a type of power. As a result of its action, there was a further weakening of party committees as government bodies due to the “flow” of power to separate executive, legislative, and judicial bodies. At the same time, the relationship between the new institutions of power and party committees was of a transitional nature, as indicated by the relationship between the structure of the CPSU and the institution of the President of the USSR in 1990-1991. Thus, in 1988-1991. the process of creating a system of separation of powers was not completed, as a result of which state power acquired a residual Soviet character410.

The process of reforming Soviet power continued in 1991-1993. At this time, the final separation of the branches of government took place. At the same time, the legislative branch of government partially continued to preserve its Soviet nature. This feature was a prerequisite for the confrontation between the executive and legislative structures, which had different abilities to carry out market transformations.

An analysis of the views of political parties and socio-political organizations suggests that in the period 1985-1993. Three political camps are clearly visible, whose views on power were essentially different from each other.

The camp of democratic forces, which during the years of perestroika included democratic organizations in opposition to the CPSU and the democratic wing of the CPSU, proceeded from the need to eliminate the power of the Communist Party over society. Representatives of this camp came out from the position of a radical reform of state power, which provided for the replacement of the Soviet system with a system characteristic of bourgeois-type societies. At the same time, for tactical reasons, the slogan “All power to the Soviets” was used as one of the steps aimed at gradually eliminating the CPSU and its committees from power.

The tactical nature of the camp of democratic forces defending the idea of ​​omnipotence of the Soviets was clearly manifested in 1991-1993, when some democratic organizations supported the policies of the President of Russia and came up with the idea of ​​​​destroying Soviet power. The other part of this camp, although it acted for tactical reasons on the side of the Soviets, did not intend to restore Soviet organization authorities.

In contrast to this camp, neo-communist organizations, which identified themselves during the years of perestroika as a conservative opposition to reforms, sought to preserve power functions in the hands of the CPSU and the Soviet character of state power. Obviously, this position turned them into 1991-1993. into a force resisting the establishment of a new state and social system in Russia.

In the context of the confrontation between the CPSU and the Soviets, the camp of democratic forces and neo-communists, the movement led during the years of perestroika by M.S. Gorbachev turned out to be some kind of third force. While promoting the process of eliminating the CPSU from power, the centrists simultaneously slowed it down, since they did not strive to destroy the structure of the CPSU, but to modernize it. Having initiated the process of reforming Soviet power, the centrist forces at the same time were not supporters of its complete elimination. In this way they prevented a return to previous relationships authorities and at the same time inhibited the formation of new ones.

1 Zinoviev A.A. The death of the "evil empire". (Essay on the Russian tragedy) // Sociological Research. 1994. No. 10. P.72.

As is known, the mechanism for exercising power through appropriate personnel policies began to take shape immediately after the Bolsheviks came to power and during the years civil war. L. Shapiro notes that by 1923 the foundation was laid for establishing party control over the life of the country. “The improved system of control over the distribution of personnel allowed the central apparatus to place loyal and carefully vetted people in key positions in all party organizations. Strict party discipline ensured both the subordination of appointed workers to the center and the subordination of ordinary members of local party organizations to the latter. Finally, the party established its dominance over state institutions.” (Shapiro L. Op. op. p. 369.)

Party cadres assigned to the relevant area of ​​work bore party responsibility for the assigned work and were obliged to implement party policy in their organizations.

Some authors rightly point out the stability of this system created in the 20s. “system of nomenklatura”, as well as its ability to regenerate, which was especially clearly manifested in extreme moments for society: during the years of repression and the Great Patriotic War. During these periods, despite the loss of personnel, control of the country was not lost; the power field was “quickly and efficiently assembled and repaired.” (Nefedov V.N. Regenerating abilities of the nomenclature mechanism // Gorky region in the Great Patriotic War: a look after 50 years. Materials of the scientific and practical conference on April 18-19, 1995, Nizhny Novgorod, 1995. 4.2. P. 50-52.)

3 Gorbachev M.S. Selected speeches and articles. M, 1987. T.2. P. 164.

4 Eklof V. Soviet Briefing: Gorbachev and the reform period. Boulder, S.Francisco and London: Westview Press, 1989. pp. 15-18.

At the same time, it should be noted that in the process of “consolidation of power” in the hands of the new General Secretary, Gorbachev’s maneuvering on the issue of personnel changes is noticeable. Having thrown a “touchstone” at the April plenum, M.S. Gorbachev, apparently, was forced to compromise, as evidenced by his speech at a meeting of the activists of the Leningrad party organization on May 17, 1985. In this speech, he drew attention to the fact that “there should be no persecution of personnel. It is unacceptable". (Gorbachev M.S. Selected speeches and articles. Vol. 2. P. 222.) And further: “The influx of new forces cannot be artificially restrained, but at the same time, if a person has the potential, he can work at full strength, he brings benefits , then he must work and receive support from us.” (Ibid.)

Despite these tactical maneuvers, the idea of ​​serious personnel changes in the party and state apparatus remained strategic. The validity of this conclusion is indicated by the memoirs of V.I. Vorotnikov, who at this stage was one of the Secretary General’s confidants. According to his memoirs, M.S. Gorbachev, in a conversation with him already in mid-June 1985, stated the need for a serious personnel shake-up, a reshuffling of personnel. (Vorotnikov V.A. And it was like this... From the diary of a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. M., 1995. P. 69.)

5 Gorbachev M.S. Selected speeches and articles. T.2. P.222-223.

7 GANI OPDPO, f. 100. op. 65, d.24, l.4.

8 Ibid. D.24, l.5.

9 Gorbachev M.S. Selected speeches and articles. M., 1987. T.4. P.316-317.

10 Ibid. P.320-321.

11 See: Democratization of Soviet society. M., 1989. pp.277-278; Gorbachev M.S. Selected speeches and articles. T.4. P.320.

12 Arguments and facts. 1987. No. 4.

13 Gorbachev M.S. Selected speeches and articles. T. 4. P. 320.

14 Arguments and facts. 1986. No. 15.

15 Law of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on a state enterprise (association). M., 1988. P. 15. (Hereinafter: Law of the USSR on a state enterprise (association).

16 Ibid. pp. 15-18.

17 Torkanovsky E. Industrial self-government: what’s on the way? // Communist. 1988. No. 12. P.56.

18 Arguments and facts. 1987. No. 4.

19 USSR Law on State Enterprises (Associations). pp. 15-16.

20 GANI OPDPO, f. 7755, op. 27. d. 14, l. 63.

22 GANI OPDPO, f. 7755, op. 40, d.79, l. 15.

24 Vorotnikov V.A. Decree. Op. P. 128.

Arguments and Facts. 1987.No. 4.

26 Gorbachev M.S. Selected speeches and articles. T.2. P. 130.

27 Ibid. P. 165.

28 Ibid. P. 327.

30 See: Ibid. P.7, 16, 83, 94, 119-120, 123-124.

31 Gorbachev M.S. Selected speeches and articles. M., 1987. T.Z. P. 19.

Materials of the XXVII Congress Communist Party Soviet Union. YL 1986. P.56.

35 See: Ibid. P.56-57.

37 Thus, in the joint resolution of the CPSU Central Committee, the Supreme Council and the Council of Ministers of the USSR “On measures to further enhance the role and strengthen the responsibility of the Councils of People’s Deputies for accelerating socio-economic development in the light of the decisions of the XXVII Congress of the CPSU”, volume in 1986, the emphasis was placed on strengthening the role of local Councils as management bodies for the entire range of local economic issues, cultural issues, everyday life, and providing the population with goods and services. The document implied strengthening the positions of Councils at various levels in relation to enterprises located on their territory, but subordinate to the central authorities. The resolution encouraged the Soviets to organize on their territory the production of consumer goods, the development of the service sector, capital construction, social and industrial infrastructure.

The resolution of the CPSU Central Committee “On further improvement of the political leadership of the Soviets of People's Deputies” also reflected the new emphasis of the CPSU policy towards the Soviets. The Central Committee demanded that local party committees create conditions for a more complete implementation of the democratic principles of the activities of the Soviets, increasing the role of Soviet sessions, and eliminating over-organization and ostentation in their conduct. The sessions of the Councils were required to regularly review issues on the progress of implementation of the decisions that were previously made by the Councils.

38 Gorbachev M.S. Selected speeches and articles. T. 4. P. 349.

39 Ibid. P. 322.

44 Ibid. P. 104.

45 Ibid. pp. 104-105.

46 Ibid. P. 82.

48 Materials of the XIX All-Union Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, June 28 - July 1, 1988. M., 1988. P. 115.

49 Gorbachev M.S. Selected speeches and articles. M, 1989. T.6. P.358.

50 Materials of the XIX All-Union Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. P. 119.

51 Ibid. P. 115.

53 GANI OPDPO, f. 100, op. 66, no. 29. l. 14.

54 Ibid. Op. 66, no. 29, l. 1.

6 On the activities of the CPSU in the Councils of People's Deputies (based on sociological research) // GANI OPDPO, f. 105. Department of organizational and party work. Storage unit “List of communist deputies of the regional Council, plans of meetings and statements of the deputy group of communists, questionnaire “Deputies and the Party” (January-July 1991). 57 Ibid. F.231, op. 85, d.2, l.14 .

Arguments and Facts. 1990. No. 23.

61 Literary newspaper. 1990. 18 air.

63 Arguments and facts. 1990. No. 38.

66 GANIOPDPO, f.106, op. 72, d. 16, l.7.

67 Ibid. F.105, op. 353, d.4, l. 19.

68 Ibid. F.106, op. 72, d.16, l.9.

69 Ibid. L.7-8.

7 Ibid. F. 105. Department of organizational, party and personnel work. Unit hr. "Analytical data, certificates, information on the preparation and conduct of elections of people's deputies of the RSFSR and people's deputies of local Soviets." (January 5 - July 20, 1990).

71 Ibid. F. 106, op. 72, d.16, l.8.

72 Ibid. F.105. Department of organizational, party and personnel work. Storage unit “Recommendations, plans and other materials on the work of the regional Council of People’s Deputies, lists of deputy groups and their statements” (1990).

75 GANIOPDPO, f.106, op. 72, d.16, l.51.

76 The sum of answers to this question exceeds 100%. It is likely that respondents had the opportunity to choose several positions.

77 GANI OPD PO, f.106, op. 72, d. 16, l.9-10; see also: f. 1. op. 113, d.96, l. 49.

See, for example: Arguments and facts. 1990. No. 26, 34.

81 GANIOPDPO, f.105, op. 352, d. 13, l.5.

82 Ibid. F.105, op. 352, d.2, l.83-84.

83 Ibid. F.100, op. 66, d.1, l. 100.

84 Ibid. F. 105. Department of organizational and party work. Storage unit “List of communist deputies of the regional Council, plans of meetings and statement of the deputy group of communists, questionnaire “Deputies and the Party” (January-July 1991).

85 Ibid. F.106, op. 72, d.16, l.51.

86 Ibid. F.7755, op. 37, d.4, l.75.

88 Ibid. F.59, op. 79, d. 5, l.49.

90 GANI OPD PO, f. 105. Department of organizational and party work. Storage unit “List of communist deputies of the regional Council, plans of meetings and statements of the deputy group of communists, questionnaire “Deputies and the Party” (January-July 1991).

92 Ibid. F.231, op. 81, d.2, l. 148.

93 See, for example: Resolution of the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee “On the main directions of personnel policy of the CPSU in modern conditions and methods of its implementation” (GANI OPD PO, f.YuO, op. 67, d.5, l.30-33) , as well as the Resolution of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee “On the work of communists in the Soviets of People's Deputies” (Ibid. F. 106, op. 72, d. 16, l. 18-22).

94 GANI OPD PO, f.YuO, op. 67, no.5. l.ZZ.

95 XXVIII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, July 2-13, 1990: Verbatim report. M., 1991. T.1. P.583.

96 Ibid. P. 582.

97 Ibid. T.2. P.73-74.

98 GANI OPD PO, f. 106, op. 72, d.16, l.21.

99 See, for example: GANI OPD PO, f. 7755, op. 36, d. 1. l. 3,7,8; Right there. F.1996, op. 54, d. 1. l. 10-11: Same place. F. 958, op. 62, d.1, l.P; Literary newspaper. 1988. July 20, Oct 26; Arguments and Facts. 1989. No. 48.

100 Although the exit of leading officials from the CPSU took place (see: GANI OPD PO, f. 1, op. 113, d.96, l.49), its scale should not be exaggerated. Many leaders retained membership in the CPSU. Thus, according to the data of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, given in the resolution of April 29, 1991, the party continued to have 406 thousand heads of institutions and organizations, over 1.5 million employees of the administrative and managerial apparatus. (GANI OPD PO, f.YuO, op. 67, d.5, l.ZZ ob.)

101 See: GANI OPD PO, f. 105, op. 353, d.4, l. 4, 23.

102 News of the CPSU Central Committee. 1990. No. 12. P. 12-19.

104 Recommendations on the actions of party organizations in conditions of departitionization of collectives: Letter from the Secretariat of the Central Committee // GANI OPD PO, f. 105. Department of organizational and party work. Storage unit “Recommendations of the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee, the regional party committee on the actions of party organizations in the conditions of departitionization of collectives. Information from the district committee, district committees and city committees in the regional party committee on work under the conditions of the Decree of the President of the RSFSR on departition of July 20, 1991.” (July-August 1991).

105 GANI OPD PO, form 105, op. 353, d.4, l.24.

106 See, for example: Ibid. F.231, op. 85, d.6, l.24-26.

107 Ibid. F. 100. op. 67. d.Z. l.2.

110 GANI OPD PO, f.7755, op. 36, d.1, l. 128-129. See also, op. 40, no. 96,

GANIOPDPO, f. 1, op. 113, d.3, l.84.

112 Ibid.

113 Ibid. f. 100, op. 67, d.5, l.ZZ vol.

115 See: GANI OPDPO, f. 100, op. 67, d.5, l.ZZ vol.

116 GANI OPDPO, f.78, op. 69, no. 21. l. 19.

117 GANI OPD PO, f. 100, op. 66, d.6, l. 100.

120 Ibid. L 101.

121 Ibid. F.78, op. 65, d.2, l.28.

122 Ibid. F.1996, op. 62, d.Z, l.18-19.

123 See: Keizerov N.M. Doctrine of personalization of power // Sociological research. 1990. No. 3. P.79-80.

124 Arguments and facts. 1990. No. 23.

127 See: Arguments and facts. 1990. No. 23, 32; Is it true. 1990.12 Apr; Fatherland: West. Leningrad Russian patriotic movement "Fatherland". 1990. No. 2; Komsomolskaya Pravda 1990. May 15; Literary newspaper. 1990. April 25

128 Arguments and facts. 1990. No. 28, 38; Moscow news. 1990. Aug. 12, Sept. 30, Oct. 28; TVNZ. 1990. June 1; Panorama. Moscow independent newspaper. 1990. No. 8.

129 GANI OPD PO. f. 106, op. 70, d.2, l.31.

131 Ibid. L 36.

132 Ibid. F. 59, op. 79, d.8, l. 8.

133 Ibid. F. 1996, op. 63, d.31, l.6.

135 See: Ibid. L. 9-12.

136 Ibid. L 7.

139 GANI OPD PO, f. 105, op. 342, d.4, l. 10.

140 See: Ibid. F. 78, op. 60, no. 16, l. 63-64; Soviet Russia. 1988.24

141 Ibid. F. 78, op. 65, no. 11, l. 32.

143 Ibid. F. 106, op. 72, d.2, l. 24.

144 Ibid. L. 11.

146 See: Soviet Russia. 1988. February 24; TVNZ. 1988. April 27; Is it true. 1988. April 28

148 GANI OPD PO, f.620, op. 73, d.Z, l. 38.

149 Ibid. F. 78, op. 60, no. 16, l. 64.

152 Ibid. F. 100, op. 59, d.2, l. 1-2.

155 GANIOPDPO, f. 100, op. 59, d.2, l. 1.

156 Ibid. F.78, op. 60, no. 16, l. 63.

157 Ibid.

159 We agree with the opinion of V.S. Nechiporenko, who associated this trait with the characteristics of the avant-garde type of party. (See: Nechiporenko V.S. Avant-garde and parliamentary types of parties // Questions of the history of the CPSU. 1990. No. 9. P. 10.)

162 GANIOPDPO, f.78, op. 60, d.16, l.64.

165 See: Komsomolskaya Pravda. 1990. April 19; Literary newspaper. 1990. April 25, May 9; Is it true. 1990. April 12; Fatherland. 1990. No. 2; Work. 1991. April 10

166 GANIOPDPO, f.1, op. 113, d. 1, l. 102.

167 Communist. /Organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Armenia, the Supreme Council and the Council of Ministers of the Armenian SSR. 1989. December 2

169 See: Constitution and Laws of the USSR. P. 18.

173 Consent. / Sąjūdis organ. 1990. No. 32/54.

174 Express - chronicle. 1990. 13 Feb. No. 7 (132). See also: Daily Glasnost. 1990. 12 Feb. No. 137.

Arguments and Facts. 1989. No. 30.

See: Panorama. Independent Moscow newspaper. 1990. No. 8. 178 Kubas G.V. Working committees of Kuzbass // Sociological studies. 1990. No. 6. P.51. See also: Literary Russia. 1989. No. 38.

183 See: Moscow News. 1990. July 15; Literary newspaper. 1989.30 Aug; TVNZ. 1990. April 27

190 See: Kubas G.V. Decree. Op. P. 49.

192 See: Moscow News. 1990. July 22; Oleinik A. Give the country coal // Dialogue. 1991. No. 11. P.51.

198 Anti-market sentiments among miners were manifested, in particular, in a negative reaction to the existence of trade, intermediary and medical cooperatives. In a number of cases, miners demanded that these enterprises be closed. (See: Komsomolskaya Pravda 1989. August 19.)

This tendency manifested itself most clearly during the strike movement in the summer of 1990 - spring of 1991. During this period, workers' committees, as a rule, initiated the struggle against the monopoly of the CPSU, against the preservation of party committees at enterprises, for the departisanship of state and especially law enforcement agencies. An important aspect of this trend is the requirement to transfer the mines to the ownership of the republican authorities. (See: Moscow News. 1990. July 22; Arctic. / Organ of the Vorkuta city organization of the CPSU and the city Council of People's Deputies. 1990. July 13; Arguments and Facts. 1990. No. 38; Labor. 1991. April 10.)

200 By the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of January 12, 1989, a special form of governance was introduced in Nagorno-Karabakh. All power in the region was transferred to the hands of the Special Management Committee. The main goal of the committee was to normalize the situation in Karabakh and reduce tension between the warring parties. The Special Management Committee was given broad powers. He could suspend the activities of Soviets at any level in the region. By decision of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, the activities of the regional committee of the CPSU were also suspended, and its functions were transferred to the specified committee.

201 Materials of the Congress of Plenipotentiary Representatives of the Population of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region. Stepanakert, 1989. pp. 8-9.

202 Ibid. S. 3.

203 Ibid. P. 7.

204 Ibid. P. 9.

205 Ibid. S. 5.

206 See: Ibid. pp. 3,4,7, 10.

207 See: Ibid. C.4.

208 Ibid. S. 4.

209 Ibid. S. 3.

210 Ibid. S. 8.

211 Ibid. S. 5.

212 Materials of the XIX All-Union Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. M., 1988. P. 120.

213 Gorbachev M.S. Selected speeches and articles. T. 6. P. 360.

214 Materials of the XIX All-Union Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. P. 120.

215 Gorbachev M.S. Selected speeches and articles. T.6. P.359.

216 See: Manov G. Lenin: all power to the Soviets! // Socialist legality. 1989. No. 4. P. 3-6.

220 Gorbachev M.S. Selected speeches and articles. T. 6. P. 364.

222 Constitution and Laws of the USSR. P. 31.

Socialist legality. 1989. No. 10 P. 5.

Constitution and Laws of the USSR. P. 31.

Korelsky V.M. Power, democracy, perestroika. M., 1990. 226 Ibid. P. 51.

See: Barnashov A.M. The theory of separation of powers: formation, development, application. Tomsk, 1988.

228 Popov SI. Politics, economics, morality: Social and moral as-

229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240

aspects of perestroika. M., 1989. P. 148. Ibid. P. 150. Ibid. P. 149.

Gorbachev M.S. Selected speeches and articles. T. 6. P. 362. Popov SI. Decree. Op. P. 149. Marx K., Engels F. Soch. T. 17. P. 342. Right there. P.342-343.

Glasnost: pressing questions and necessary answers. M., 1989. P.7. Materials of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, February 5-7, 1990. M., 1990. P.367.

241 Vorotnikov V.I. Decree. Op. P.347.

244 See: V. Tsybukh. We need a president // Komsomolskaya Pravda. 1990.20 Feb; Your attitude to the idea of ​​establishing presidential power in the USSR // Interlocutor. 1990. No. 10; A word about the presidency // Pravda. 1990. February 26; The President in the USSR: points of view // Arguments and Facts. 1990. No. 9.; Presidential power // Pravda. 1990. March 10; Tumanov V. New State Institute // Abroad. 1990. No. 10.

251 Ibid.

254 Constitution of the Russian Federation. M., 1993. Art. 97. clause 3.

Vorotnikov V.I. Decree. Op. P.375.

260 Ibid. P. 370.

261 Ibid. P. 290.

262 The desire to endow presidential power with an appropriate structure is noticeable in speeches at the 28th Congress of the CPSU. Thus, the first secretary of the Leningrad regional committee of the CPSU B. Gidaspov noted: “The created Presidential Council is the headquarters of advisers to the head of state. But there is no clear system for implementing the decisions he has developed on the ground. As a result, the mechanism ended up without a drive belt. Isn’t this one of the reasons for the state of our society, in which control over the implementation of laws has been largely lost, many levers of state administration have been lost? ... Maybe we should start by establishing local representation of the President of the USSR in the person of his plenipotentiary representatives, endowed with special prerogatives by law... One thing is indisputable, we need to think through and develop a mechanism for the implementation of the presidential authorities, otherwise we will not be able to overcome the emerging chaos.” (XXVIII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. M., 1990. T. 1. P. 318.)

265 GANI OPD PO, f. 105. General department. Secret sector. Storage unit “Resolutions, letters of the CPSU Central Committee on issues of organizational and political work, sent to city committees, district committees of the CPSU” (January 16-December 5, 1990).

266 Ibid.

270 GANI OPD PO, f. 105. General department. Secret sector. Storage unit “Resolutions, letters of the CPSU Central Committee on issues of organizational and political work, sent to city committees, district committees of the CPSU” (January 16-December 5, 1990).

273 Ibid. F. 7755, op. 37, d.4, l.95.

Moscow news. 1990. No. 30.

277 Russia: the drama of change. M., 1994. P. 15. See also: Pilar B. Impossible Russia. Boris Yeltsin, provincial in the Kremlin //Ural. 1994. No. 4. P. 209.

278 Popov G.Kh. Prospects and realities // Ogonyok. 1990. No. 51. P. 5.

See: Zevelev A, Pavlov Yu. Divided power. 14 days and nights of the civil war in Moscow in the fall of 1993. M., 1995; Khasbulatov R.I. The great Russian tragedy. M., 1994. T. 1, 2, Ogonyok. 1993. No. 3. P. 4.

284 See: Khasbulatov R.I. Decree. Op. T. 1. P. 221 - 239; Zevelev A., Pavlov Yu. Decree. Op. P. 52; Mironov V.A. Russian state construction in the post-Union period (1991 - 1994) // Centaur. 1994. No. 3. P. 3 - 13.

285 Danilov A.A., Dubrovsky M.L. Political parties and movements at the present stage (Russia, Ukraine). Kharkov, 1991. P. 4.

286 Panorama. Independent Moscow newspaper. 1990. No. 8.

287 On the position of the monarchical and “new right” see: Solovey V. Modern Russian nationalism: ideological and political classification // Social sciences and modernity. 1992. No. 2. P. 119-129; Christian parties and amateur associations: Sat. materials and documents. M., 1990.

288 Danilov A.A., Dubrovsky M.L. Decree. Op. P. 39.

289 Our Fatherland. (Experience in Political History). M., 1991. Part I. P. 569-570.

291 According to the editor of the collection of selected articles and speeches N. Andreeva, her letter was reprinted by 937 republican, regional, city and industry publications, not counting factory large-circulation newspapers and newspapers of military formations. (Andreeva N. Op. op. p. 19).

292 Eklof V. Op. sit. R. 13-36.

293 See: Berezovsky V.N. Mass political movement in the Russian Federation. The end of the 80s - the beginning of the 90s: stages of development // History of political parties in the university course of political history. Problems of theory, methodology, techniques: Abstract. report and messages. June 1991 M., 1991. Issue. 2. P. 58 - 60; Chumachenko V.A. Opposition movements and parties in Ukraine: features of formation and activity // Ibid. pp. 61 - 63.

294 See: Danilov A.A., Dubrovsky M.L. Decree. Op.

295 Social Democratic Party of the Russian Federation. Quick reference / Comp. YES. Pankin. M.; Petrozavodsk, 1991. P.28-39.

296 Pavlov V. What is behind the slogans of sovereignty? // Informals: who are they? Where is the name? M., 1990. P. 91-111.

297 See: Informal Russia: On “informal” politicized movements and groups in the RSFSR (reference book experience). M., 1990; Danilov A.A., Dubrovsky M.L. Decree. op.; Parties and political blocs in Russia. M., 1993. Issue 1.

From this point of view, an important role was played by the norm of the Charter of “Democratic Russia”, which provided for both collective and individual membership in the movement. The appeal of the organizing committee for the creation of the movement stated: “within the framework of this movement, all formed or unformed party and similar structures will be preserved, complete independence in ideology and tactics will be guaranteed (including at this stage, for a significant part of the participants in the movement, non-partyism may become an alternative )". (Ogonek. 1990. No. 38. S.Z.) This norm of the charter, on the one hand, took into account the peculiarity of the current state of Soviet society, when the circle of people who shared anti-communist ideas was wider than the one that political parties included. On the other hand, highlighting the fight against the CPSU as the main goal without interfering in the internal affairs of the parties included in the movement made “Democratic Russia” acceptable to party organizations.

SelyuninV. Crisis of thought? //Banner. 1989. No. 1.1. See: True. 1990. June 13. GANI OPD PO, f. 100, op. 67, d.5, l.63. Arguments and Facts. 1990. No. 26. Ibid. No. 25.

GANI OPD PO, f. 100, op. 67, d.5, l. 63.

300 301 302 303 304 305 306

307 Ibid. F. 105. Ideological department. Unit hr. “Responses to publications in newspapers and leaflets distributed with anti-Soviet and anti-communist content. Information about the conference of the movement "Democratic Russia", analysis of the declaration, program, Charter of the Democratic Union" (November 6-18, 1990).

308 Ibid. F. 7755, op. 37, d.32, l.2.

TVNZ. 1990. May 12. GANIOPDPO, f. 1, op. 113, d. 122, l. 110-g. Is it true. 1990. March 3. G ANI OPDPO, f. 59, op. 79, d. 4, l. 50. Light. 1990. No. 38. S.Z.

309 Ibid. F. 105. Ideological department. Unit hr. “Information about the All-Russian meeting of democratic forces with B.N. Yeltsin" (March 9, 1991).

310 311 312 313 314 315 316

317 Thus, the welcoming telegram of the All-Union Conference of Representatives of Democratic Movements in the CPSU, held in mid-October 1990, sent to the Founding Congress of the Republican Party of Russia, which gathered representatives of the Democratic Party outside the CPSU, was not read out at the congress and was sent back . (GANI OPD PO, f. 100, op. 66, d.7, l.87.)

318 Parties and political blocs in Russia. Vol. 1. P.20.

319 GANI OPD PO, f. 155, op. 1, d.1, l.42; Social Democratic Party of the Russian Federation. Quick reference. P. 26; Constitutional Democratic Party (People's Freedom Party). Perm, 1991. P.22.

320 GANI OPDPO, f. 105. Ideological department. Storage unit “Responses to publications in newspapers and leaflets distributed with anti-Soviet and anti-communist content. Information about the conference of the movement “Democratic Russia”, analysis of the declaration, program, Charter of the Democratic Union” (November 6-18, 1990).

321 The formation of a multi-party system in the USSR: political parties and movements, their place and role in the life of Soviet society. M., 1991. P.53. See also: Consent. Publication of the Lithuanian Perestroika Movement. 1989. No. 9. June 12.

324 325 326 327 328 329 330

322 Murashov A. Interregional deputy group // Ogonyok. 1990. No. 32.

Daily publicity. 1990. 9 Feb. Panorama. Independent Moscow newspaper. 1990. No. 8. Ogonyok. 1990. No. 40. P. 29. See: Panorama. 1990. No. 8. GANIOPDPO, f. 100, op. 66, d.6, l. 112. Ibid. L. 113. Ibid.

331 See: GANI OPD PO, f. 231, op. 81, d.58, l. 9; Arguments and Facts. 1989. No. 21; Ogonyok. 1990. No. 6. P. 17 - 18.

332 GANI OPD PO, f. 7755, op. 37, d. 32, l. 10-11; F.105. Department of organizational, party and personnel work. Unit hr. “Speeches, resolutions adopted at rallies in Perm” (February 18-August 1, 1990).

About the meeting of the “Democratic Russia” movement in Izhevsk, Ural-Volga region, May 17-18, 1990 //GANI OPD PA. Ideological department. Unit hr. “Responses to publications in newspapers and leaflets distributed with anti-Soviet and anti-communist content. Information about the conference of the movement "Democratic Russia", analysis of the declaration, program, Charter of the Democratic Union" (November 6-18, 1990).

337 Appeal from the Organizing Committee for the creation of the movement “Democratic Russia” // Ogonyok. 1990. No. 38. S.Z.

338 News of the CPSU Central Committee. 1990. No. 12. P. 106. Ibid. Right there.

Appeal of the Founding Congress of the “Democratic Russia” movement to the democratic factions in the Soviets // GANI OPD PO, f. 105. General department. Secret sector. Storage unit “Orientation of the CPSU Central Committee “Development of events in Eastern Europe and world politics.” Materials on the work of opposition parties and movements, towards the creation of the Communist Party of the RSFSR." (March 11-November 2, 1990).

342 On January 26 - 27, 1991, the founding conference of the “Democratic Congress” took place in Kharkov. Representatives of 47 parties and movements from 10 republics of the USSR took part in its work. The main organizers of the conference were “Democratic Russia”, Rukh, and the Popular Front of Belarus.

343 GANI OPD PO, f. 100, op. 66, d. 62, l. 25.

344 Ibid. L. 25-26. In the appeal of the founders of the Democratic Congress coalition to the Supreme Councils of the republics, deputies were called upon to assert the “real sovereignty of the republics” by concluding bi- and multilateral treaties. “This will make it possible to abolish the legal basis of the existing union center, its statehood,” the appeal stated. “As long as the USSR is a state, our republics are not states...” (GANI OPD PO, f. 105. Ideological department. Item. “Information about the Founding Conference of the political bloc “Democratic Congress” (Central Committee)" (11 February 1991).

345 A number of collective members of “DemRussia” - RKhDD, KDP (PNS) and partly the Democratic Party of Russia expressed disagreement with the policies of the movement’s leadership. The main thesis of the opposition to the official course of the “DR” was as follows:

“The fight against the communist regime, which is devastating our homeland, should not mean a fight against the state as such. We want a change of the communist regime, and not the destruction of statehood, because we realize that both the right and the left will die under its rubble.” (The Way. /Newspaper of the Russian Christian Democratic Movement. 1991. No. 4/7. P.5)

In accordance with these views, these political parties, without breaking with “Democratic Russia”, created a constructive democratic bloc “People’s Consent”, defining its goal as the fight against the monopoly of the CPSU, on the one hand, and against the “left-radical element of collapse” represented by part “DR”, - on the other. (Put. 1991. No. 4/7. See also: Constitutional Democratic Party (People's Freedom Party). pp. 30 - 32.)

Later, at the Second Congress of the Democratic Russia movement (November 1991), these parties will leave the movement. One of the reasons for this step was disagreement with the leadership of the movement, which combined the course of fighting against the CPSU with the fight for the destruction of the union state. (See: GANIOPDPO, f. 155, op. 1, d. 2, l. 7-11.)

Popov G.Kh. Prospects and realities. On the strategy and tactics of democratic forces at the present stage // Ogonyok. 1990. No. 51. P.5.

It should be borne in mind that this process proceeded unevenly in different regions of the Soviet Union. In the Baltic republics, for example, the transition to a different system of government was quite rapid as a result of the republics returning to the constitutions that existed in the interwar period.

353 See: Popov G.Kh. Second Congress // Ogonyok. 1989. No. 50. P.5.

354 At the III Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, the MDG opposed the introduction of the post of President of the USSR. The Interregional Group of Deputies took this step only for tactical reasons. Without fundamentally objecting to the very institution of the presidency, the MDG protested against the desire to establish a new post without agreement with the new republican authorities elected in the spring of 1990. It was proposed to consider the issue of creating the institution of the presidency in conjunction with the new union treaty. (See: Murashov A. Op. op. p. 8.).

A negative reaction from representatives of the democratic camp at the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR was caused by the idea of ​​​​introducing a post by decision of the Congress and at the same time electing the first President of the USSR (Pravda. 1990. March 13; Literaturnaya Gazeta. 1990. March 14.) The dissatisfaction of the MDG was also caused by the fact that the only real contender for the post was M.S. Gorbachev (Literary newspaper. 1990. March 14; Interlocutor: Weekly illustrated supplement to Komsomolskaya Pravda. 1990.

No. 10.). There was also a demand to strengthen legislative branch before the presidency is introduced. (Arguments and Facts. 1990. No. 9.) All arguments taken together predetermined the MDG’s opposition to the decision to introduce the post of President of the USSR.

355 It should be emphasized that not all members of “DemRussia” unconditionally supported the move to introduce the post of President of Russia. Thus, the Russian Christian Democratic Movement, having outlined in its program documents a position of non-decision on the issue of the future state structure of Russia, made a statement noting that the Russian Christian Democratic Movement supports the establishment of this post and the candidacy of B.N. Yeltsin only for tactical reasons as a step “in the fight for the interests of Russia” (GANI OPDPO, f. 155, on. 1, d.2, l.4.)

356 Arguments and facts. 1990. No. 47.

357 About the meeting of the “Democratic Russia” movement in Izhevsk, Ural-Volga region, May 17-18, 1990 // GANI OPD PO, f. 105. Ideological department. Storage unit “Responses to publications in newspapers and leaflets distributed with anti-Soviet and anti-communist content. Information about the conference of the movement "Democratic Russia", analysis of the declaration, program, Charter of the Democratic Union."

359 Report on the State Congress of the RDF // GANI OPDPO, f. 105. Ideological department. Storage unit “Program of Action-90 of the Russian Democratic Forum. Information about the IV Congress of the Russian Democratic Forum" (July 31-October 2, 1990).

361 What to do? /Publishing OFT Russia. 1990. No. 5; Andreeva N.A. Ungifted principles, or a short course in the history of perestroika. Leningrad, 1992. P. 148; GANI OPDPO, f. 105. Ideological department. Storage unit “Moscow Declaration of the Movement for the Re-establishment of the Russian Communist Party within the CPSU, Adopted by the Extraordinary Conference of Communists of Moscow and the Moscow Region” (March 24, 1990).

363 See: Andreeva N.A. Decree. Op. pp. 193 - 194.

364 Ibid. P. 101.

365 GANI OPDPO, f. 105. Ideological department. Storage unit “Charter of the United Front of Workers of the USSR. "What to do?" - publication of the United Front of Workers" (1990); f. 100, op. 67, no. 5, l. 60; f. 106, op. 70, no. 2, l. 89; Korelsky V.M. Decree. Op. P. 69; Kerimov YES. and others. Democratization of Soviet society: Textbook. allowance. M., 1989. P. 114; Arguments and Facts. 1989.№ 14, 21; Literary newspaper. 1989. March 29; 1990. 21 Feb.; Is it true. 1990. February 26, May 22.

Popov M. Can an intellectual represent workers’ councils // Rodina. 1990. No. 2. P. 75.

367 GANI OPD PO, f. 105. Ideological department. Storage unit “Charter of the United Front of Workers of the USSR. "What to do?" - publication of the United Front of Workers" (1990).

Materials of the Moscow meeting of the Second Initiative Congress of Communists of Russia June 29 - 30, 1991 M. 1991. pp. 35 - 37. Next: Materials of the Moscow meeting of the II Initiative Congress.

369 Initiative communist program of action “Towards the revival of Soviet socialist Russia!” // GANI OPD PO, op. 105. Ideological department. Storage unit “Theses of the Leningrad Initiative Committee for the preparation of the Founding Congress of the Russian Communist Party within the CPSU; theses for the pre-congress discussion. Resolutions and statements of the first and second stages of the Initiative Congress of the Russian Communist Party within the CPSU" (February 14-November 12, 1990).

370 Materials of the Moscow meeting of the II Initiative Congress. P. 33.

Andreeva N. Decree. Op. P. 101.

372 GANI OPD PO, op. 105. Ideological department. Storage unit “Theses of the Leningrad Initiative Committee for the preparation of the Founding Congress of the Russian Communist Party within the CPSU; theses for the pre-congress discussion. Resolutions and statements of the I and II stages of the Initiative Congress of the Russian Communist Party within the CPSU" (February 14-November 12, 1990).

Materials of the Moscow meeting of the II Initiative Congress. pp. 35 - 36.

376 See: What to do? /Publishing OFT Russia. 1990. No. 5.

378 Materials of the Moscow meeting of the II Initiative Congress. P. 36.

379 Ibid. P. 37.

381 G.H. Popov, analyzing the activities of the Soviets under the leadership of democrats, noted their ineffectiveness and inability to implement their power decisions without the support of party bodies. “Both under the CPSU and under the democrats, the Soviets remain what they have been for seventy years - a decoration, not at all set up for independent life. But under the CPSU, behind the decorations stood the real administrative power of the party, and the decorations moved, did something. And under the democrats, there is no strong administrative hierarchy behind the Soviets - the decorations, and the movement of the decorations themselves does not give anything, without turning into actions of district committees, party committees, the prosecutor's office, etc. " (Ogonek. 1990. No. 51. P.5.)

Materials of the Second Interregional Conference of Supporters of the Bolshevik Platform in the CPSU. M, 1992. P.32.

383 Ibid. P. 32.

384 Ibid. P. 34.

385 Thus, speaking at the All-Union Conference of Supporters of the Bolshevik Platform on July 13, 1991 in Minsk, N. Andreeva expressed the idea of ​​​​the possibility “for tactical reasons” to support the draft CPSU Program developed by the Initiative Congress and refuse to create own. (Andreeva N. Op. op. pp. 194 - 195.)

386 As N. Andreeva noted, “if the counter-revolutionary process is gaining strength, then this state form can only be filled with anti-communist... content. Even if the president is the “leader” of the CPSU... presidential power marked the beginning of the end of Soviet power or the de-Sovietization of the political system.” (Andreeva N. Op. op. pp. 165, 101, 102, 122, 149.)

390 GANI OPD PO, f. 1, op. 113, d. 123, l.Z; Materials of the XXVIII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. M., 1990. P. 69.

392 Ibid. P. 10.

393 Eklof.B. Op.sit. R. 34.

394 Materials of the XIX All-Union Party Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union P. 115.

395 Ibid. P. 115.

Materials of the XXVIII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. P. 47.

398 GANI OPD PO, f. 105. General department. Secret sector. Storage unit “Resolutions, letters of the CPSU Central Committee on issues of organizational and political work, sent to city committees, district committees of the CPSU” (January 16-December 5, 1990).

401 Materials of the XXVIII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. P. 46.

402 GANI OPD PO, op. 231, op. 85, no. 62. l.7.

404 See: Materials of the Moscow meeting of the II Initiative Congress. P. 33.

405 GANI OPD PO, f. 155, op. 1, d. 2, l. 7-11; Parties and political blocs in Russia. Vol. 1. pp. 173 - 174.

406 Parties and political blocs in Russia. pp. 65-67; 176-178.

407 GANI OPD PA, f. 155, op. 1, d. 2 l. 12.16-17: building 7. l. 3; d. 11, l. 15-16; d. 4, l. 1 rev; Path. /RKhDD body. 1992. No. 7/20. S. 3; Revival of Russia. Christian democracy and enlightened patriotism: Sat. mater, and RKhDD documents. M., 1993. S. 16-24, 68-79.

See: Unity. / Organ of the All-Russian Communist Party of Belarus. 1991. Dec., No. 29; People's truth. Russian socio-political newspaper. 1992. September 3; Andreeva N. Decree. Op. pp. 217-239; Legal newspaper. 1992. No. 11 (29); Parties and political blocs in Russia. Vol. 1. P. 115 - 125; Materials of the Second Interregional Conference of Supporters of the Bolshevik Platform in the CPSU. M., 1992.

409 Khasbulatov R.I. Decree. Op. T. 2. P. 226.

410 See: Suslov M.G. The Party and the Soviets, or why under the slogan “All power to the Soviets” Soviet power will be liquidated // Comrade: Organ of the Bereznikovsky CPSU Civil Code. 1991. No. 9-11.

The diversity of opinions and the social and class forces “superimposed” on them gave rise to various political parties and movements. Particularly productive in in this regard was the twentieth century. It was in the twentieth century. political pluralism and multi-party systems are represented very, very widely - from misanthropic and dictatorial, respectively, views and parties, to liberal and democratic ones.

The problem of political pluralism and multi-party system is also interesting for us in the process of establishing a democratic society.

The term “political pluralism” was introduced into the socio-political lexicon by the English sociologist, leader and ideologist of the Labor Party G. Laspi. His views were reflected within the framework of the social democratic model of social structure, where pluralism acts as the principle of functioning of the political system.

What meaning did G. Laspi put into the concept of “pluralism”?

1. Pluralism - plurality of opinions ( lat. pluralis-plural) or at the same time its manifestation in economics, politics, ideology.
2. The establishment of political pluralism in society is the result of real political struggle.
3. Political pluralism in most developed countries acts as a means of reducing social tension.
4. Political pluralism reflects the complex structure of society.
5. Political pluralism shows the degree of either opposition or consolidation.

In modern sociology, pluralism as a methodological orientation is represented in a number of concepts: in the so-called factor theory; the theory of political pluralism, which interprets the mechanism of political power as confrontation and balance between groups. A number of ideologists of “right” and “left” positivism argue that pluralism is permissible within Marxism, and it is expressed in its various interpretations, in the existence of many “models” of socialism. Pluralism is also manifested in the absolutization and universalization of the socio-political structures of Western “pluralistic” democracy.

First of all, the term “political pluralism” means the diversity of views, approaches, concepts and activities of classes, parties and government.

Political pluralism in society is determined primarily by different forms of property, behind which there are different classes and social strata. And the more forms of property there are in a society, the more complex its social-class structure, that is, it is represented by a larger number of classes and social groups.

It is quite natural that each class or social layer, in addition to those common to the whole society, has its own specific interests. The latter are reflected in the views, ideas and concepts that determine various ways and directions for achieving goals, and therefore imply certain policies.

In conditions of political pluralism, those views and policies take place that meet the goals and interests of the social forces in power or striving for it. Through the struggle of views and ideas, political pluralism eliminates stagnation both in the theory of politics and in political practice.

In most developed countries of the modern world, political pluralism has developed, which can be divided into three groups:

1. Political pluralism in general in human civilization. It manifests itself:

• in a wide range political ideas in various states;
• diversity of policy directions;
• pluralism of approaches and political actions within international political organizations and movements (both interstate and non-state).

Pluralism in society (in the state).

It exists in the form:

• ideas, views of dominant and non-dominant classes or social forces, both in and out of power (the latter often have national or religious overtones);
• ideas and views of political associations and movements, parties, reflecting the common interests of various social forces (for example, political blocs within the ruling coalition);
• differences in organizational principles of construction.

Pluralism in political parties, movements and associations. Pluralism in the form of differences:

• in the platform of political factions within the party;
• political policy in determining the directions and methods of achieving the same goal (for example, political and socialist, growing from the same root, in achieving the ideal of freedom, equality, justice).

Naturally, these problems of political pluralism concern us all. The process of its formation is underway, a complex, contradictory and painful process.

In our society, a wide range of ideas and theories, political movements have appeared, including on issues of the country’s state structure: communist (represented by orthodox communists and communist reformers), social democratic, liberal bourgeois, monarchical, openly pro-fascist, etc. . At the same time, it must be stated that almost all of these ideas and theories were supplemented with nationalistic and religious shades. XX century - the age of nationalism played its role and had its influence in our country at its very end.

Thus, political pluralism was seen as an antidote, as a means of overcoming the prevailing totalitarianism. But at the same time, our pluralism at the beginning of its formation had one interesting feature: it arose within the framework of a long-established system that established the dominant principle, the principle of unity of command, identical views, approaches and actions. The system appeared in political pluralism in two aspects:

1. Complete rejection of theoretical views that differ from one’s own (of a given party or political movement).
2. The desire of the leaders of political parties and movements to impose on their supporters a monistic view on political issues.

And there followed a whole chain of splits within political parties and movements, the expulsion of dissidents, etc. In this regard, the fact that political parties and movements were small in number also played a role.

These are basically the content of political pluralism and the milestones of its formation in our society in modern conditions. In society, as a rule, there is not only political pluralism, but also many parties.

We have already noted that political pluralism - the diversity of political theories and views, relationships and organizations - has rapidly emerged on the surface of public life. They influence the activities of government bodies, the economy and social processes, and relations between nations. But their influence is extremely insignificant and contradictory.

The social forces of society are interested in their influence on political life. First of all, they exercise their influence through ideology as a system of ideas and views: political, legal, philosophical, governmental, religious, aesthetic, expressing the interests of classes and social groups. But influence alone in the form of ideology on public life is clearly not enough. The influence also comes in the form of the functioning of political parties and movements.

Parties, like the state, are the most important institution of the political system of society. They are directly related to the interests of social groups, classes, strata, ethnic or religious entities and, in essence, act as intermediaries between them and the state authorities, ensuring the conjugation of their interests with the state ones. Along with political parties, public organizations and movements function in society, which, like parties, express certain interests of various social groups and strata.

The term "party" means a part, a group. There are three main points of view in understanding the essence of a political party.

Proponents of the first point of view argue that political parties are a group of people who adhere to the same ideological doctrine.

The second point of view treats a political party as a spokesman for the interests of a certain class.

In this case, two concepts can be distinguished. According to the first concept (the point of view of Marxism), the party is a form of socio-political existence of the proletariat as an entity at the highest stage of its development. The second concept, developed by V.I. Lenin, considers the party as the vanguard of the proletariat.

Representatives of the third point of view adhere to the institutional concept of the party. Without denying the importance and significance of all three points of view, it should be borne in mind that they all complement each other and contribute to revealing the essence of a political party.

What is a political party, what is its essence, classification and what functions does it perform in the life of society?

Political Party

Political Party- is a voluntary union on an ideological basis, aimed at gaining state power or participating in power at the state level. Moreover, power itself for this union turns out to be an instrument for implementing the political programs of large social groups.

A political party is a political organization that expresses the general, fundamental interests of a particular class or social layer and directs its political activities.

Political parties are relatively young institutions in public life. They arose in the sphere of European culture and then spread to other regions of the modern world. There are three stages in their genesis: aristocratic groups; political clubs; mass parties. In reality, only two English parties went through all stages: the liberal (Whigs) and the conservative (Tory). Most of the parties arose in the form of mass organizations.

Mass political parties in Europe began to form in the second half of the 19th century. Two main reasons that led to their emergence: the expansion of suffrage, which contributed to the growth of the influence of parties in society, and the organizational development of the working class, which created party organizations, and this, in turn, stimulated the development of groups and clubs into mass political parties.

The first mass political party was founded in 1861, liberal party in England. In 1869 the first mass workers' party- General German Workers' Union, founded by F. Lassalle. By the end of the 19th century, mass parties (mainly social democratic) were formed in most countries of Western Europe. Already before the First World War, some parties reached a fairly high level of mass participation. Thus, in 1913, the Social Democratic Party in Germany numbered 983 thousand people, and more than 4.4 million voters voted for them in the elections. At the end of the 19th - beginning of the 20th centuries. mass parties appeared in our country.

Political parties have existed in society for many, many years and have accumulated extensive experience in political activity and struggle.

They are armed with various ideological concepts and express the interests of various social forces. Political parties came to power, lost it and left the political arena, leaving a certain mark on the life of society. The experience of a party in the political arena allows us to classify political parties.

In political science, there are many criteria that can be used to classify political parties. The most important of them are the following:

• clarifying the question: Who benefits from the policy of this or that party, whose interests does it express?
• the content of the party's political activities.

Based on these criteria, all parties can be divided into the following groups:

I. Parties whose ideology, program and policies are aimed at establishing and improving capitalism. These parties, naturally, are not homogeneous. Among them there are right-wing conservative, centrist and liberal-reformist ones. These parties express the interests of not only the bourgeoisie, but also other sectors of society, which allows them to expand their social base.

II. Parties of socialist choice, defending and expressing the interests of workers, mainly representatives of wage labor. These are socialist, social democratic, communist, labor parties. The general goals of their programs boil down to the following: achieving freedom and equality in society, creating social guarantees for workers, establishing elements of social justice in society, protecting employees from social oppression and exploitation. This group is also not homogeneous. We can distinguish right-wing, centrist and left-radical parties. This classification is rather arbitrary, since some parties occupy intermediate positions and are difficult to attribute to one movement or another.

III. Petty-bourgeois parties, designed to protect the interests of mainly small owners and the middle strata. These parties retain significant influence on the political life of developing and developed countries. Many petty-bourgeois parties are in alliance with liberal-bourgeois parties and parties of socialist choice.

IV. Parties whose ideology, policies and practices have a national-democratic overtones. They arise on the basis of the growth of national self-awareness of peoples. This is exactly how, for example, the Welsh and Scottish parties in Great Britain, the Indian National Congress in India, etc. arose. The social base of these parties is heterogeneous. Consequently, the ideological orientation and political position of such parties largely depend on representatives of the party leadership.

V. Parties that focus on believers and various religious teachings. Their software platforms are very diverse in their socio-economic and ideological content, and sometimes contradictory. But they are all actively fighting to strengthen the position of religion in society, including at the religious and global levels. The programs of such parties quite strongly represent universal human values, ideas of goodness and justice, and mercy. Naturally, all this attracts quite a large number of people to these parties.

But here is the classification of parties according to functional and organizational differences proposed by the American psychologist Cohn:

1. Election party. This type of party is characteristic of the US political system. Republican and democratic party They do not have permanent membership and a large professional apparatus. The party's finances consist of proceeds from the election campaign fund. Candidates for the presidency of the country are selected from the lists of one party or another. Every person, and especially a politician, can independently classify himself as a Republican or a Democrat. The work of the party is revived only during the election campaign.
2. Parliamentary parties. This type of party is common in most Western countries. Parliamentary parties have an organizational structure, permanent membership and funds coming from members, economic activity and income from business circles. The main thing in the activities of this type of parties is to win seats in parliament in order to defend the interests of those social forces that support them.

They perform the following functions: development of election campaign strategy; studying public opinion; selection and nomination of candidates; control over the activities of deputies, etc.

3. The party is the vanguard of society. This type of party has become widespread in socialist countries. In this case, the party claims full power, exercised as if in the interests of the entire people. In fact, this leads to the monopolization of power, the imposition of a common ideology without taking into account the specific interests of various social groups, the total nationalization of society, and the suppression of dissent.
4. Party-community, or party-club,- a mass organization that unites citizens not so much by adherence to any political platform, but by common interests and cultural needs. People join such a party to satisfy the need for communication. This also includes parties like the “greens”.

A party of any type performs specific functions depending on what tasks it solves at a given stage of social development.

1. The function of socio-political education and unity of citizens based on the commonality of their specific interests.
2. Explaining the proposed platform of action to the broad masses of the current situation, organizing broad support for its demands from the population, caring about expanding the social base of party politics. For these purposes, the party establishes interaction with professional, economic, cultural, educational and other public organizations and institutions.
3. Preparation and conduct of election campaigns for supreme and local authorities, promotion of their representatives in them, organization of control over their parliamentary activities. Thanks to this important function, parties in countries with democratic regimes act as the main organizers of the preservation of existing government power or its replacement. They are the ones who create the conditions for a peaceful change of government.
4. The party also performs the function of forming party factions in parliament, which serve as a link between the party and the authorities, the main lever of direct party influence on the political system and politics both in the center and locally. Through factions, the party comes up with various legislative initiatives. In parliamentary factions, as a rule, high discipline should reign, which obliges deputies - members of a given party to act as a united front when discussing and adopting various bills.
5. An important function of the party is to develop principles and forms of relations with other political parties, taking into account their social orientation - cooperation, partnership, the formation of an electoral bloc of factions in parliament and adherence to principles in action tactics.
6. One of the functions of the party is to organize various kinds of opposition to government bodies, pressure on them, and counteract the policies of the authorities that contradict the interests of the social strata whose interests and rights this party expresses. Here we are talking about the function of a party that has lost the struggle for power.

These are the most general functions of parties, which make it possible to substantively judge their place and role in the political life of society and the mechanism of power.

Most modern countries have a multi-party system. The party system is a mechanism of struggle or cooperation between parties seeking to achieve the goals and objectives set for them. At the same time, the party system includes those parties that have actually accepted and adhere to in their activities the general principles, the “rules of the game” that are mandatory within the framework of this system. Acceptance and adherence to the principles does not necessarily mean unconditional approval. Within party systems there are Various types party structures. In turn, the party structure is a kind of union of interaction and struggle between parties capable of independent or coalition exercise of power in the state.

IN modern political science There are four main types of systems: bourgeois-democratic; fascist; authoritarian; socialist. It is possible to identify transitional party systems.

Such transitional systems are formed and function in a limited time, in conditions of a threat to the political independence of the country.

An example is the coalition during the Second World War of two traditionally opposing parties in Great Britain - Labor and Conservatives, or the formation of broad democratic fronts focused on the destruction of dictatorial regimes.

Main types of party systems

1. Bourgeois-democratic party system.

Formed in Europe and North America in connection with the increasing role of parliamentary elections, it became a source of obtaining state power. At the same time, such a system is guided in its activities by the following principles:

• legal struggle for power;
• the source of power is general elections;
• power is exercised by a party or group of parties that secures the support of a parliamentary majority;
• there is constant legal opposition to the ruling party;
• There is agreement among all parties in the party system regarding adherence to principles.

In the bourgeois-democratic system, many types of party coalitions have formed as an expression of various institutionalized modes of cooperation and struggle between parties capable of taking part in the exercise of state power.

The following types of party coalitions can be distinguished: multi-party; bipartisan; modified bipartisan; two-block, etc.

In a multi-party coalition, none of the parties serving in parliament is able to govern independently. In this case, ruling coalitions are created to ensure a majority in parliament. This coalition is ineffective, because very often there are crises of the executive branch, resignation of parliament, heads of state, etc. Western political scientists believe that a two-party coalition is ideal. There are two strong parties in it that are capable of taking power and exercising it independently. One of them wins the majority of seats in parliament. The other one becomes in opposition. The strength of the two-party system is facilitated by the majoritarian law on elections in single-member constituencies, which favors a strong party and ensures that the number of seats a party receives in parliament gives it the opportunity to form a government and seize power structures. A kind of bipartisanship occurs, for example, in the United States, where Republicans and Democrats are fighting for power at all levels.

The modified two-party coalition resembles the classic two-party system in that there are two strong parties in society that are capable of forming a government and competing with each other. However, none of them has an absolute majority in parliament, and in order to create a government, one of the parties must enter into a coalition with a third party, significantly smaller in the number of supporters who vote for this party in the elections. An example of such a coalition is the political system in Germany, where the role of “regulator” is played by the Free Democrats party.

In a two-bloc coalition, two blocs or two party alliances fight for power. Two-bloc structure is characteristic of political systems with a clearly expressed ideological differentiation of society.

Since two-blocism results from compromises between the parties included in each bloc, it presupposes competition between them outside the electoral period and does not lead to two-partyism.

The most typical two-bloc system is for France, where before the presidential, parliamentary and cantonal elections two party blocs are formed: the left, which includes socialists, communists, left-wing radicals, and the right, which includes Gaullists, Giscardists, etc.

Fascist party system. This type in its classic version was created by the Hitler regime. This type of party system is characterized by the following features:

• there is only one legal party - the fascist one;
• the party leads the state, is an effective factor of change in society, playing the role of a leading and dominant force;
• the party apparatus is closely connected with the state apparatus, party leaders at various levels perform state functions;
• the party and the state are organized on hierarchical-leader principles.

The emergence of a fascist party system is associated with a crisis in the democratic methods of exercising power, and the direct cause of the coup is often a radical increase in the influence of left-wing revolutionary forces. And although there are currently no such systems in the world, they may well arise, especially in countries with a low level of democratic development, where there is a difficult economic situation, a low standard of living of the population and an undeveloped multi-party system.

It should be noted that in everyday understanding, an authoritarian party system is often identified with a fascist one. However, there are significant differences between these systems that cannot be ignored in political science analysis.

Authoritarian party system. In this system, the dominant factor is the state. The ruling party is actually a broad social movement that organizes mass support for the policies of the governing bodies of the state. The party itself is created by the leadership of the state with the aim of expanding the social basis of governance and plays a secondary role in the process of exercising power. The party elite is not the elite of political power, since the latter is formed by the leaders of the central apparatus of the state. In such a society, as a rare exception, the existence of other parties in the form of, for example, the National Front is allowed. These parties have a limited sphere of freedom, their classic functions are usually limited by law prohibiting alternative elections, opposition propaganda, etc.

An authoritarian system can serve a variety of purposes: the desire to stabilize the executive branch; the need for centralized exercise of power in conditions of external threat or internal anarchy; stimulating the development of nationalism.

Socialist party system. At present, when in most socialist countries the authoritarian system has collapsed and social guidelines are changing, it is necessary to note some features of this party system. The socialist party system is generally one-party. The ruling party in it is completely fused with state power and completely replaces it. Under this system, dissent is not allowed, democratic freedoms are limited, and political pluralism is completely absent. The party leadership merges with the state, and all threads of social control flow into the central party body. The party apparatus controls everything personnel appointments, a nomenclature is emerging in society, which replaces the legislative, executive and judicial powers.

For the founding of political parties and movements there must be appropriate conditions:

1. Radical changes in the development of society, its economic, political and spiritual spheres, social and class structure. The diversity of forms of ownership and, as a consequence, the differentiation of the social-class structure, the destruction of control over minds is a fait accompli.
2. Formation of new social layers and groups with specific interests. In real life, entrepreneurs, farmers, tenants, etc. have already appeared.
3. Development of democracy and political culture of society.

“Special” reasons can also push the process of formation of parties and movements:

• aggravation of the contradiction between the majority of workers and official socio-political and economic institutions;
• deepening crisis of the economy and power, deterioration of the financial situation of the majority of the population, increase in crime, aggravation of interethnic relations;
• acute crisis in newly formed structures;
• the development of democracy, openness, pluralism of opinions, and as a consequence of this, the desire of people for self-realization, self-affirmation, and active participation in political life.

The above reasons indicate that a corresponding situation has developed in the country, socio-economic, political and spiritual prerequisites have been formed for the rapid development of politicized groups, clubs, associations, movements and political parties.

Previously informal political parties today actively participate in political life in different ways, specifically reflecting the processes taking place in society. The ambiguity of the reasons for the emergence of political formations and the diversity in the social and class orientation of their platforms and actions have determined the diversity of the multi-party system in the country. Nevertheless, the past tense already allows us to identify the main trends in the development of political associations at the present stage:

• There is a quantitative growth of political associations, the number of their members is increasing, and the geography of their activities is gradually expanding;
• there is a clear tendency for new parties and associations to be increasingly drawn into the struggle for power in central and local bodies;
• new associations and parties are increasing their efforts to use the media in political struggle;
• a stable trend in the development of political parties and associations is the formation of opposition structures in the political system of society;
• The evolution of most new political associations and parties towards liberal-democratic and liberal-bourgeois views is clearly visible. The term “socialism” has practically disappeared from the documents of all these parties. Although it remained with similar parties in Sweden, Finland, Australia, etc.;
• development of interest in political forces, parties, in the political power of new social forces: entrepreneurs, cooperators, farmers. The logic is simple and as old as time - to consolidate the economic position in society in all power structures, in the political system of society;
• strengthening contradictions in established parties and movements.

Practice shows that it is possible to determine not only the main trends in the development of political parties and movements, but also to present their typology, which naturally differs from that proposed by Kohn.

The question of the typology of political parties and movements is not only theoretical, but also practical. It is very complex, because parties and political movements are represented by a wide range of social forces, political ideas, and the practice of real actions.

Typology of political parties and movements

1. Parties, associations and movements of socialist orientation:

• there are still currents that advocate the renewal of socialism based on Marxist-Leninist theory and on the basis of socialist choice;
• parties and movements of a social democratic nature, focusing on programs and ideology close to the guidelines of the party of socialist internationalism, but with certain differences.

In parties with a socialist orientation, one can distinguish right and left flanks.

The left flank of social democratic parties places the main emphasis in their work on the intelligentsia, workers and employees, who see in social democracy a force opposing the command-administrative system and capable of leading the transition to a democratic, prosperous society.

The right flank of the social democratic parties mainly sees its support in the technocratic layers of the intelligentsia, partly among cooperators and entrepreneurs.

Their policy is usually anti-communist in nature, aimed at a constitutional change in the existing system towards free enterprise and unlimited market relations;

• associations with conservative-traditional platforms. Their social base is dogmatic intellectuals, bureaucracy, and managers who are unable to change their activities.

They advocate the restoration of the previous model of society with a modernized command-administrative system.

Parties and associations of a private capitalist orientation or a liberal-democratic orientation.

Their socio-political attitudes are made up of layers interested in the capitalist reorganization of society: part of the technocracy and bureaucracy holding positions in administrative financial, economic and economic bodies; part of the intelligentsia, which expects to turn its monopoly on high qualifications and talent into capital that brings extremely high profits.

Parties and political associations focused on realizing and protecting the interests of certain social groups and strata.

Parties emerged that claimed to defend the interests of workers. Parties and associations are being formed to defend the interests of the peasantry. Politicized amateur associations have been created that defend socio-economic and political rights and the interests of women, military personnel and their families.

Parties, fronts, movements, the practical actions of which have a nationalistic overtones.

They arose and are strengthening their influence on the basis of the growth of the national consciousness of the people, mass dissatisfaction of the population with national-economic problems, and the command-administrative model of interethnic relations. They have a very complex and variegated mosaic of views and platforms.

New parties, all kinds of politicized organizations and movements have introduced into the social life of the country an unprecedented diversity of views, platforms, approaches to overcoming the crisis of society, a variety of organizational platforms and methods of social action.

A multi-party system in our society is considered by some political scientists as an approach to the ideal of a society devoid of the attributes of domination of some groups of people or classes over others. In socio-political terms, a multi-party system is really intended to ensure competition, rivalry between parties and political groups, promoting the constant modernization of both the political parties themselves and society as a whole. But a number of negative factors generated by a multi-party system should also be taken into account.

This is, first of all, the desire of individual party leaders to sometimes artificially inflame, incite antagonisms and contradictions in society in the interests of the struggle for power, to delay the solution of pressing problems in society, guided by the formula “the worse for the ruling party, the better for the opposition.”

Historical experience and social practice countries with highly developed economies and stable democratic traditions indicate the effectiveness of the two-party system. Parties of lesser influence in such political systems are considered as “pressure parties”, providing a mechanism for the functioning of the political market. The trend in the development of political life indicates that there is a need to master the experience and culture of inter-party relations, the experience of the behavior of parties in the political system depending on changes in internal and international relations. In a political system, the activities and interaction of its member organizations are regulated by socio-political and legal norms contained in the acts of public organizations, political parties, and socio-political movements.

Such norms include: traditions, morality, ethics of political life. A special place in the system of these norms is occupied by law, which mainly serves as a normative regulator of all social relations, the basis for the functioning of state and public organizations and the development of the entire political system. It should be noted that the party systems of some states are transitional in nature. Because of this, they are difficult to typologize. At the same time, their party systems are largely characterized by those features that are inherent in traditionally established types of party systems.

Public organizations

An integral part of any political system of society are public organizations. In political science, the term “social group” refers to a group or association of people who strive to realize their goals in an organized way. When determining a public organization, the following are taken into account:

• a system of connections and interests that unites members of a certain community;
• ways to create an internal organizational structure (formal or informal) for a given group;
• ways of developing and making decisions to achieve the common goals of its members.

Thus, the starting point for any organization is a system of elements social connection, ensuring the unity and functioning of a social group.

Public organizations have an active influence on the political life of society. It manifests itself:

• in participation in the formation of government bodies;
• in the implementation of legislative initiatives;
• in the development of decisions of public authorities and management;
• in protecting the legitimate interests of its members in state and public authorities.

Types of public organizations:

1. Organizations that coordinate their goals with the activities of the state apparatus on the basis of partnership and within the framework defined by law. These should include trade unions, youth, women's, veterans and other organizations.
2. Public organizations whose activities are influenced by the state (cooperative organizations and various partnerships).
3. Social movements that arose based on ideas national revival(movements, fronts, associations).
4. Organizations to which the state leaves freedom of development and activity in accordance with their purpose, taking care that their activities are not illegal (creative unions, religious movements, etc.).

The most massive public organizations are trade unions. Covering the entire mass of workers, employees, co-operators, trade unions are formed according to the sectoral principle, which reflects not only the specifics of the trade union, but also the way of life different layers of the working masses.

However, the activities of various trade union associations have something in common: they are called upon to represent the interests of workers and employees in the field of work, everyday life, culture, and take part in ensuring the protection of people's health.

Youth organizations are also experiencing new times. They are currently undergoing complex processes caused by deformations accumulated over many years.

Particularly noteworthy is the role of cooperation in the life of society. The cooperative movement reflects the deep collectivist tradition of our people. There are quite a lot of negative trends in this movement today. And therefore it is vitally necessary to streamline the legal, organizational and economic fundamentals cooperative movement.

The life activity of the citizens of our country is not limited only to the named organizations. For example, the Union of Scientific and Engineering Societies is a mass organization of workers that reflects the human need for creative work. Today there are about three thousand socio-political groups and associations operating in our country. Among them are popular fronts, clubs, associations, societies, and associations. Popular fronts and movements are a broad association of political groups and unions that act on a generally democratic, and sometimes on a national democratic platform. After a long break, a new type of organization is beginning to operate in the country. These are various kinds of human rights organizations to protect the professional interests and rights of citizens, as well as strictly political or pro-party organizations, which are a stepping stone to civil society.

conclusions

1. Political pluralism is an integral attribute of our life. It assumes a plurality of opinions and approaches to solving complex problems of modern social life.
2. Political parties and party systems are the most important mechanism of political power in society, a spokesman for the interests of various social groups, layers and classes. The functioning of multi-party systems is a guarantor of the stability of society and its advancement along the path to the modern civilized world.
3. Public organizations and movements, their activities are an integral part of the political life of society, a factor in ensuring social stability, the development of democratic principles, publicity, without which it is impossible to build a modern democratic society.

socio-psychological aspect) (from the Latin pluralis - plurality) - the manifestation in activity and communication of a wide range of opinions, orientations, multivariate assessments expressed by individuals regarding situations that are significant to them. In P. the social activity of the individual is manifested, his need to defend his own positions, the ability to reflect, and tolerance for the opinions of others. P. is an important characteristic of constructive communication and effective interpersonal interaction. Being an integral condition of openness, democratization and new thinking, P. Is an important phenomenon of POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY. P. Incompatible with dogmatism, totalitarian thinking and authoritarian leadership.

Excellent definition

Incomplete definition ↓

PLURALISM

from the Latin pluralis - multiple) is a political science term meaning the diversity of interests, views, positions, parties, social forces, openly manifested in Western pluralistic democracy. The most significant are: pluralism of opinions (ideological pluralism) and political pluralism, related to each other, but by no means identical.

Pluralism of opinions, freedom of thought, the right to dissent - all these are almost identical designations of one of the most important, and at the same time the most elementary rights or freedom of a modern person - the right to think as you see fit, to freely judge everything that life confronts you with. For citizens of a democratic society (whether we are talking about the West or the East), who have long had this right, there is no particular problem here. The situation is different with our citizens. For many decades they were deprived or almost deprived of this right.

The party-state bureaucracy that stood at the helm of power, fearing for its power that had been usurped from the working class under I. Stalin, was afraid of both dissent and political pluralism. Without really understanding their differences, the nomenklatura intuitively understood that any pluralism - be it ideological or political - threatened its monopoly on usurped power. After all, without ideological pluralism it was impossible to even raise the question: who owns power and does it belong to the people? And without political pluralism, it is impossible to fight for the return of this power to the people. The principle of nomenclature: “The fewer opinions you have, the more like-minded people.” The bureaucracy and its ideologists have created entire volumes of pseudo-arguments, ranging from “lack of ideas and ideological capitulation” to “political supra-classism and omnivorousness” in order, waving these red rags, to brand and ban ideological and political pluralism as the most dangerous “anti-socialist invention of the bourgeoisie”, as something alien to scientific certainty.

If we link pluralism as diversity with the political and ideological life of society, then it must be said that apart from the concept itself, there is no pluralism at all, but there is candy pluralism, be it in the sphere of ideas, opinions or the sphere of interests, politics.

Ideological pluralism or pluralism of opinions is an eternal, natural form of human diversity of thought, without which the progressive development of humanity itself is impossible. In each field and in any sphere, each person, being unique in his own way, has his own level of knowledge and unique experience, people do not have the same mental abilities, and therefore at every given moment everyone has his own opinion, his own judgment on this or that issue, different everything or anything from the opinions of others. This is natural dissent, and its results are humanity's greatest asset, its everyday mental fund, its inexhaustible reservoir of knowledge.

Political pluralism is a product of a socially divided society, its political relations, a condition for its progress. The essence of this phenomenon lies in the objective determination of the differences in the interests of different social groups, classes, layers, and, consequently, in the diversity of these interests and the forms of their expression in the political sphere. Pluralism of interests in a class society cannot be eliminated if, even for one reason or another of a subjective nature, the difference in interests is ignored and no official, legally recognized forms of their expression and protection are allowed.

Both pluralisms differ from each other both in time and conditions of their existence, and in subject matter; they have as their content different elements of social life, its various aspects. But there is a difference not only this, but also a state-legal one.

Ideological pluralism as a personal property is not legally subject to jurisdiction in rule of law. Today, in no civilized society are they judged or punished for differences of opinion, for an opinion that does not coincide with the official one, i.e. for dissent. Such an opinion is a matter of everyone’s convictions, his personal property, which cannot be subject to prohibition or forcible change. It was precisely this elementary democratic principle that the party-state bureaucracy, which tried to extend its power even to the thoughts of people, never understood or recognized. This was the case under Stalin, and under N. Khrushchev, and under L. Brezhnev, and under K. Chernenko, although the bureaucrats applied different measures at different stages. In contrast to the difference of opinions, political pluralism as a difference of interests and forms of their expression and protection is not always beyond jurisdiction. Today, any civilized state that protects the form of human society chosen by its citizens resorts to measures and actions to protect against disintegration and violent destruction of the chosen, constitutionally enshrined socio-political forms, and punishes those who violate the law. And this happens where and when dissent and differences of opinion are accompanied by actions or turn into actions that are contrary to the law. If, for example, political pluralism as an objectively determined difference of interests and political positions is institutionalized and actually expressed, and this process is associated with unauthorized organizations and unconstitutional actions, then it is prosecuted by law (in this illegal expression).

The direct connection between ideological and political pluralism cannot be denied. After all, divergent interests give rise to the most acute ideological disputes and ideological differences of opinion, and this, in turn, leads to political pluralism, which strives to take shape, be expressed, and be realized in an appropriate way. And yet, there is a fine line separating one from the other, the permitted from the unacceptable, the legal from the legal, which some leaders do not notice, or even do not understand. It is unacceptable not to see this line. Life moves forward, general and political culture grows, and with it, yesterday’s “downtrodden” citizens today become political activists and leaders who sensitively capture what until recently seemed invisible, which, in the conditions of the politicization of society and the electrification of citizens, leads to the fact that citizens They react sharply to any undemocratic behavior, to any injustice.

All this suggests that the more vibrant, diverse, and pluralistic the political life of a society is, the more acutely it demands from those in power thoughtful, balanced reactions to both the diversity of opinions and political pluralism, which is increasingly being expressed in its developed form - a multi-party system.

Pluralism. Another school of political scientists - the pluralists - argues that government in America is not exercised by a single elite group, but by several, that is, by many such specialized and competing groups. Attribution to these influential groups depends on the passage of time and prevailing circumstances. Opposing business interests and union leaders, for example, may unite to jointly support high tariffs on foreign goods, but oppose each other on the issue of wage controls and not participate at all in disputes over school busing. Competition between multiple groups prevents other individuals or groups from gaining control of the political system. Pluralists believe that political decisions are the result of bargaining and competition between groups. According to this view, the government serves as an arbiter, ensuring that different interest groups adhere to the “rules of the game.”

Robert Dahl, among others, argues that such a pluralistic system is truly democratic in the sense that individuals and minorities have the opportunity to influence decision-making through participation in elections and interest groups. No one public figure cannot afford to ignore its voters. If people who have their own definite position on some candy issue unite in a group and openly declare their opinion, and if their point of view is considered legitimate by the majority of voters, their representatives in government will certainly react. In the American political system, Dahl writes, "all active and legitimate groups of the population can make themselves heard at a certain, decisive stage of decision-making." Thus, pluralists believe that government in America is exercised by many groups controlling each other through a process of open competition.

Who rules America? Neither elitists nor pluralists agree with the traditional portrayal of America as a populist democracy run by the common man. Proponents of both movements agree that political decisions are not made by the average American, but small group people, as a rule, are quite wealthy and have good education and connections. However, elitists and pluralists differ sharply on the issue of elite cohesion and popular participation in elections and interest groups. Elitists believe that "the people at the top" work together and that elections and interest groups are largely symbolic. Pluralists argue that those in power are highly competitive and that elections and interest groups give the middle class access to the system.

Pluralists often point to the New Deal as evidence that people can influence government. Proponents of elitism do not agree with them. Roosevelt himself came from the upper classes. He saw that the "rugged individualism" of the early capitalists had failed in the years Great Depression, and realized that the elite could better reflect the opinions of the entire society if they took its ruling position. The New Deal was based on the strengthening of the principle of "position obliges," and the new approaches associated with it led directly to greater American participation in international affairs as a bulwark of democracy and, indirectly, to an increase in military power.

Proponents of pluralism insist that certain groups of people can still influence the activities of governments and corporations. If the president or mayor appoints individuals who have compromised themselves to a government agency, voters will vote against him in the elections. Likewise, people may refuse to buy cars that do not meet safety standards or support congressional lobbying groups in various ways. Proponents of elitism believe that public pressure - through participation in elections or influencing certain vested interests - has little effect on those in power.

Pluralistic point of view. The pluralist view of America is largely based on Madison's understanding of democracy. Madison believed that power corrupts people and that government officials tend to usurp power if there is no a certain system restrictions on their powers. “One ambition must neutralize another ambition,” wrote Madison. The constitutional system of separation of legislative executive and judicial powers developed by him and his followers is designed to limit the power of individuals and their ability to act in favor of those whose interests they represent. Madison also believed that class conflict in society was inevitable and had the potential to be destructive: “Properties and the have-nots will always form interest groups in society.” At any moment, the poor majority can rebel, thus threatening the possessing minority. Through rather complex evidence, Madison came to the conclusion that in order to protect the minority, it was necessary to extend the right of suffrage to the entire population of the country. The dissimilarity of the layers of American society, he believed, would not allow the majority to usurp power. "Get the people more actively involved in political life, and you will get more political parties and interests, while greatly reducing the possibility that the majority of the population will have a general urge to infringe on the rights of other citizens, and if such an urge does arise, then those whom it unites will not feel their sipa and will not be able to act in harmony with each other."

Robert Dahl, in his book An Introduction to Democracy, argues that America does indeed rely on a system of checks and balances, although this does not happen exactly as Madison predicted. The framers of the Constitution intended that the House of Representatives would be the body expressing the will of the people, the body of radical, populist thinking, and that the president's veto power would limit the power of the House of Representatives. According to Dahl, the opposite is true.

The President determines the country's political course, he creates new laws, and he also acts as the representative of the national majority, while the work of Congress increasingly resembles a veto over the decisions of the President - a veto that is imposed to protect the interests of those groups whose privileges are compromised. threat to the course pursued by the president.

Decentralized power. Pluralists believe that there is strong evidence that there is significant disagreement and even competition between powerful individuals and groups, both in government and in the private sector of the economy. Congress sometimes rejects the president's nominees for top government positions and some of his legislative projects.

Accountability to voters. Pluralists categorically reject the idea that elections are merely a “symbolic act.” All elected officials must periodically meet with their constituents, which has a real influence both on their political decisions and on their personal behavior in their office. Dahl writes: “In making decisions about whether to approve or reject a policy, elected officials are constantly mindful of the real or imagined preferences given to them by their constituents.”

Why are many Americans so apathetic? According to pluralists, not voting is primarily an expression of “tacit consent” rather than a sign of disillusionment with the political system. And although some small groups of people may be prevented from voting, the majority of those who refuse to vote are simply more occupied with their home, family and work affairs than with politics. And only when a threat to their well-being is created (for example, unemployment), politically passive citizens form interest groups and come to vote; otherwise, they leave decisions to the discretion of experts. Thus, elections can be defined as a combination of the expression of the will of the minority concerned and the tacit consent of the majority. Voting and non-voting citizens influence those who make political decisions, even if they do not have direct control over them.

Excellent definition

Incomplete definition ↓

The world of political parties is diverse and changeable: some of them dominate the political scene, others only indicate their presence on it; Some parties include millions of citizens in their ranks, others are content with a few thousand members. No typology can exhaust all the richness of this phenomenon. However, understanding the nature of parties led to attempts to classify and systematize them. The transition from descriptiveness to the level of theoretical generalizations made it possible to penetrate deeper into the nature of parties and identify their most characteristic features.

In political science, there are various systems for classifying parties. Various factors are used as the basis for typologization - functions, ideology, social base, methods of activity, etc. Thus, supporters of the institutional approach use the organizational criterion; for the liberal tradition, the main thing is classification in terms of the nature of the ideological connection; Marxists assign the main role in classification to the class criterion.

Not all typologies, however, have the same cognitive value, but they reflect different aspects of political reality and help determine the nature, place and role of specific parties in the political life of society. Based on this, the whole variety of classifications of political parties can be presented in the following schematic form:

Typology of political parties

Grounds	kinds
Organizational structure	Personnel Massive Registered (with fixed membership) Unregistered (with free membership) Centralized Decentralized
Activity environment	Monomedium General Intermediate
Ideological orientation	- "Left" - “Centrist” - "Right" Revolutionary (radical) Reformist (moderate) Conservative Reactionary
Role in the political system	Ruling Opposition Parliamentary - "Avant-garde"
Influence in Parliament	Majority (majority) With a majoritarian vocation Dominant Minority (minority)
Representation interests	Class Social groups, layers Superclass With an uncertain social appearance
Type of party leadership	Collegial leadership Leader's

Using this table, we will reveal in more detail the most important classifications:

In political science, the generally accepted and most productive classification of political parties by Maurice Duverger is based on differences in the structure of parties and the organization of their internal life.

In the course work, we have already touched on the structure of parties, considering its main levels, and here it only remains to add that the structure is a kind of synthetic component, influenced by a significant number of factors (ideology, goals, social base, etc.). At the same time, it is precisely this that contributes to the party’s adaptation to changing conditions and acts as a necessary element for the survival of parties in the political struggle.

Among the structural characteristics, Duverger identified: the general organizational structure, the membership system, leadership bodies, as well as the types of connections connecting citizens with the party. Based on these variables, he proposed dividing parties into two main types - “cadre” and “mass”.

Personnel parties - represent an association of so-called “notables”, that is, persons of authority in society, skillful organizers of election campaigns. Their goal is to prepare for the elections, conduct them and maintain contact with the candidates. First of all, these are influential notables, whose names and prestige serve as a kind of guarantee for the candidate and provide him with votes; these are, further, technical notables who master the art of manipulating voters and organizing a campaign; finally, these are financial notables - components of the main engine, the engine of the struggle. Essentially, cadre parties are parties of activists or functionaries with a small number of ordinary members and an amorphous organized structure. As a result, the very entry into them has the meaning of a kind of deeply individual act, conditioned by the abilities or special position of a person, his strictly determined personal qualities. This is an act available to a select few; it is based on strict and closed internal selection. If we consider a party member to be someone who signs an application for admission to the party and subsequently regularly pays dues, then cadre parties do not have members. True, it is worth making a reservation here, since cadre parties, in imitation of mass ones, sometimes open access to ordinary adherents. The phenomenon is quite common - in its pure form, cadre parties are quite rare. Other parties are close to similar practices, but their external form can be misleading. But the main thing is not to limit ourselves to either the official clauses of the charters or the declarations of leaders. A fairly reliable criterion here is the absence of a registration system or regular collection of contributions.

The main structural element of cadre parties are committees . They are created on a territorial basis, and their numbers are usually small. The committees have a permanent composition of close-knit activists who have the skills to work among the population. The organization of election campaigns falls on their shoulders. Members of the committees select candidates for elections to government bodies, study public opinion, the interests and sympathies of voters, their expectations and demands, and help leaders in shaping the program. It should be noted that ideological issues concern activists insofar as they can help their candidates. The activities of committees usually have, as they say, a “seasonal” nature: it concentrates and intensifies around a candidate for an elected post, on the eve of and during the election campaign for parliament or local authorities, and fades out after its end.

Examples of personnel parties include the European liberal and conservative parties, as well as the US Republican and Democratic parties.

Mass parties– are characterized by a large number of members, closer and constant communication of their members, and a centralized hierarchical organizational structure. In order to fully understand the essence of mass parties, let us take, for example, the French Socialist Party. Recruiting new members is its main task, both from a political and financial point of view, since it, first of all, seeks to give political education to the working class, to identify from its midst an elite capable of taking power and running the country into its own hands. And this means that its members constitute the very matter of the party, the substance of its activities - without them it would resemble a teacher without students. From a financial point of view, the French Socialist Party also relies heavily on contributions from its members. With their help, she collects funds necessary for political education and daily work, and finances elections with them. Here the financial aspect is joined by the political aspect. This last aspect The problem is the main one, since any election campaign requires large expenses. The technology of mass parties replaces the capitalist method of financing elections with a democratic one. Instead of turning to several private donors to cover the cost of election campaign, mass parties distribute the burden of costs among as many members as possible, so that each member receives a small amount. Thus, what cadre parties achieve with “quality,” mass parties achieve with “quantity.”

Primary organizations of mass parties are built on both territorial and production principles, but unlike committees, they are open to new members. Moreover, they are interested in replenishing their ranks.

The increase in the number of party members and the need to deal with financial issues led to the formation of relevant bodies within the structure of mass parties, seeking to spread their influence and keeping records and control over the expenditure of financial resources. A complex internal, hierarchical structure, subordination of primary organizations, and a cumbersome management system arises.

M. Duverger identified three types of mass parties: socialist, communist and fascist.

Socialist parties

The primary organizations of socialist parties are local sections of several hundred people. They unite into a federation. The party turns into a kind of state apparatus with a separation of powers, where legislative power belongs to the congress (or national council), executive power belongs to the executive committee (or national secretariat), and legal power is exercised by a control commission.

Communist parties

Communist parties create their primary organizations (cells) at their place of work. They are more uniform and limited in size. This allows them to control their social composition, regulate numbers and establish strict party discipline. The organizational principle of parties is “democratic centralism”. In practice, a hierarchical and centralized organization significantly limits democracy. Elections of leaders turn into a formality, since their selection, as well as decision-making, is carried out by the centralized leadership of the parties.

Fascist parties.

They have many similarities with communist ones: vertical connections, centralization of power, rigid structure, etc. However, fascist parties differ from communist parties in social composition, doctrine and philosophy. Emerging from paramilitary forces, they ultimately cultivate brutality and violence based on the superiority of one nation over another. The primary organization of fascist parties is an assault detachment numbering from 4 to 12 people. Being part of a larger group, assault troops create a party pyramid similar to a cadre party.

This classification of parties into personnel And massive, proposed by a French political scientist M. Duverger, to a certain extent, is outdated today, since it does not allow for the existence of parties of an intermediate type. In the 60s of the 20th century, parties appeared that did not fit into this typology and at the same time combined the features of both cadre and mass parties. Then authoritative political scientists - LaPalombara, J. Sartori, without rejecting M. Duverger’s scheme, they proposed to supplement it by identifying a third type of parties - “parties of voters.” These parties, not being mass ones, focused on uniting the maximum number of voters of the most diverse social backgrounds around their program to solve the main issues of the current moment. Later such parties were called “universal”. In recent years, this type of party has become the most dynamically developing in Europe and America. This is largely due to the weakening of ideological differences and the growing interest of citizens in universal, human values. Many political scientists believe that universal parties have a future in a post-industrial society.

In addition to this classification, traditional in political science is also the division of political parties, depending on their place and role in the political system. The following types of parties are distinguished here: ruling,oppositional,parliamentary, And "avant-garde".

Ruling the parties that won the elections and (most importantly) formed the government are considered. The ruling party (or a party coalition of several parties united into a single bloc) pursues its own political course through “its” prime minister and members of the cabinet. As a rule, this is only possible in a parliamentary republic, while a presidential republic can be led by a president representing a minority party in parliament. And in this case, even victory in the elections does not provide the leading political party with the status of ruling (For example, the success of the LDPR in 1993, or the Communist Party of the Russian Federation in 1995 in the elections did not give them the opportunity to form the government of Russia in a presidential republic). Therefore, the main feature of the ruling party is the ability to independently form a government.

Oppositional parties are those that are deprived of a real opportunity to influence the formation of the government and are in obvious opposition to the policies of the current government. Their main goal is to gain power in the next elections and change the existing government. To do this, they actively use criticism of the existing government for its mistakes, strict control over the actions of the authorities, checked for compliance with the constitution and laws, and proposals to society for alternative projects for the development of the country.

Parliamentary parties – these are parties operating in competitive political systems. They set themselves the task of conquering state power, by obtaining a majority in government structures, through winning elections. In parties of this type, there are two organizational centers: the chairman of the party and its leader. The chairman is actually a manager, the head of the party machine: he coordinates the activities of regional branches, organizes election campaigns, and maintains party documentation. The leader is the personification of the party's political image and is elected at annual party conferences. In some batches these two centers may be combined. The party discipline of parliamentary parties differs significantly from the disciplines of parties of other types: there is no principle of subordination of the minority to the majority, that is, the organizational center actually does not have the levers to ensure unanimity in the party. This gives rise to great looseness of the organization, a significant number of factions, and constant discussions.

"Vanguard" parties – their distinctive features are: centralism, strict subordination, unquestioning submission to the decisions of higher authorities. Moreover, these features are inherent in vanguard parties not only during the struggle for power, but also in the case when power is in their hands. Such parties, under certain conditions, degenerate into totalitarian parties. Members of totalitarian parties obey one idea, which, as a rule, becomes personified over time, that is, the party leader, as the main bearer of the idea, becomes the highest authority of the party. Such parties are always revolutionary. A classic example of a vanguard party can be considered the Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP), which later turned into the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

A significant place in the political science literature is occupied by the classification of parties according to the criterion of their operating environment. From the point of view of this criterion, three types of parties are distinguished:

Monomedium– i.e. limited to activities in one social environment, the one whose interests they represent (in the sphere of politics).

General- oriented towards a general social or national environment and not limited to the desire to gain influence in any one environment (class, social group etc.)

Intermediate– concentrating their activities primarily in one environment, but not refusing to seek support and influence in other communities.

In a multi-party system, each party represents more or less clearly defined ideological, political or ideological positions. The spectrum of these positions extends from the extreme “right” to the extreme “left”. The remaining parties occupy an intermediate position between these two poles. In this regard, today the classification of political parties based on their ideological orientation is widely used. As a rule, in multi-party parliaments, seats are arranged in the shape of a semicircle, where, following the tradition of the French Revolution, representatives of conservative and right-wing parties are seated on the right side of the presiding officer, parties close to them in spirit are further to the left, moderate parties are in the center and further at the very end - representatives of radical left parties. According to classical terminology, the so-called “ left" parties, predominantly, profess socialist, communist values ​​and, accordingly, radical revolutionary methods for achieving them. " Rights", on the contrary, they are mainly focused on conservative bourgeois values, the stability of the political system, the denial of communist ideals and revolutionary methods of reorganizing society. " Centrists" while, very extensive and diverse in composition, they represent moderate political forces that do not strive for drastic changes in society, preferring reformative, evolutionary paths of development in order to improve the well-being of members of society. Compromise, cooperation, an attempt to take into account various public interests as much as possible is the core of their everyday policy.

This grouping of political parties along the lines of “right” - “centrist” - “left”, based on positions and attitudes on socio-economic and political problems, is associated with a significant degree of simplification of the real state of affairs in society. Therefore, in addition to it, it is customary to distinguish between revolutionary, reformist, conservative and reactionary types of parties on an ideological basis.

Revolutionary– strive for a qualitative restructuring of social life.

Reformist– focused on significant quantitative transformations of society, but without violating its basic structure.

Conservative– strive for stable preservation of the basic characteristics of contemporary social reality.

Reactionary– their main goal is a partial or complete return to the characteristics of the previous stage of the current socio-economic formation.

So, having examined the most important classifications, we can conclude that it is possible to correctly assess political parties, their activities and place in the political system only from a unifying position, since no typology or fixed scheme, taken separately, will ever exhaust the entire diversity of this phenomenon. Consequently, only an analysis taking into account all classifications and consideration of parties from different angles can ultimately lead to an objective assessment.