When did the policy of war communism begin? c) Liquidation of commodity-money relations

Have a good day everyone! In this post we will dwell on such an important topic as the policy of war communism - we will briefly analyze its key provisions. This topic is very difficult, but it is constantly tested in exams. Ignorance of concepts and terms related to this topic will inevitably entail a low grade with all the ensuing consequences.

The essence of the policy of war communism

The policy of war communism is a system of socio-economic measures that were implemented by Soviet leadership in and which was based on the key postulates of Marxist-Leninist ideology.

This policy consisted of three components: the Red Guard attack on capital, nationalization and confiscation of grain from the peasants.

One of these postulates states that it is an inevitable evil for the development of society and the state. It gives rise, firstly, to social inequality, and, secondly, to the exploitation of some classes by others. For example, if you own a lot of land, you will hire hired workers to cultivate it - and this is exploitation.

Another postulate of Marxist-Leninist theory says that money is evil. Money makes people be greedy and selfish. Therefore, money was simply eliminated, trade was prohibited, even simple barter - the exchange of goods for goods.

Red Guard attack on capital and nationalization

Therefore, the first component of the Red Guard's attack on capital was the nationalization of private banks and their subordination to the State Bank. The entire infrastructure was nationalized: communication lines, railways And so on. Worker control was also approved at factories. In addition, the decree on land abolished private ownership of land in the countryside and transferred it to the peasantry.

All foreign trade was monopolized so that citizens could not enrich themselves. Also, the entire river fleet became state property.

The second component of the policy under consideration was nationalization. On June 28, 1918, the Council of People's Commissars issued a Decree on the transfer of all industries into the hands of the state. What did all these measures mean for the owners of banks and factories?

Well, imagine - you are a foreign businessman. You have assets in Russia: a couple of steel production plants. October 1917 comes, and after some time the local Soviet government announces that your factories are state-owned. And you won't get a penny. She cannot buy these enterprises from you because she has no money. But it’s easy to appropriate. So how? Would you like this? No! And your government won't like it. Therefore, the response to such measures was the intervention of England, France, and Japan in Russia during the civil war.

Of course, some countries, for example Germany, began to buy shares from their businessmen in companies that the Soviet government decided to appropriate. This could have led to the intervention of this country in the process of nationalization. That is why the above-mentioned Decree of the Council of People's Commissars was adopted so hastily.

Food dictatorship

In order to supply cities and the army with food, the Soviet government introduced another measure of military communism - food dictatorship. Its essence was that now the state voluntarily and forcibly confiscated grain from the peasants.

It is clear that the latter will not hurt to hand over bread for free in the quantity required by the state. Therefore, the country's leadership continued the tsarist measure - surplus appropriation. Prodrazverstka is when the required amount of grain was distributed to the regions. And it doesn’t matter whether you have this bread or not, it will still be confiscated.

It is clear that the lion's share of bread went to wealthy peasants - kulaks. They definitely won’t hand over anything voluntarily. Therefore, the Bolsheviks acted very cunningly: they created committees of the poor (kombedas), which were entrusted with the responsibility of confiscating grain.

Well, look. Who is more on the tree: poor or rich? It’s clear - the poor. Are they jealous of their wealthy neighbors? Naturally! So let them confiscate their bread! Food detachments (food detachments) helped confiscate bread for the poor people. This is, in fact, how the policy of war communism took place.

To organize the material, use the table:

Post Scriptum: Dear school graduates and applicants! Of course, it is not possible to fully cover this topic in one post. Therefore, I recommend that you purchase my video course

In the view of the classics of orthodox Marxism, socialism as social order assumes complete destruction all commodity-money relations, since these relations are the breeding ground for the revival of capitalism. However, this relationship may not disappear until complete disappearance institute private property for all means of production and instruments of labor, but for the implementation of this the most important task a whole historical epoch is needed.

This fundamental position of Marxism found its visible embodiment in the economic policy of the Bolsheviks, which they began to pursue in December 1917, almost immediately after the capture of state power in the country. But, having quickly failed on the economic front, in March - April 1918 the leadership Bolshevik Party tried to return to Lenin’s “April Theses” and establish state capitalism in a country devastated by war and revolution. A large-scale Civil War and foreign intervention put an end to these utopian illusions of the Bolsheviks, forcing the top leadership of the party to return to the previous economic policy, which then received the very capacious and accurate name of the policy of “war communism.”

Enough for a long time many Soviet historians were confident that the very concept of military communism was first developed by V.I. Lenin in 1918. However, this statement is not entirely true, since he first used the very concept of “war communism” only in April 1921 in his famous article “On the Food Tax.” Moreover, as established by “late” Soviet historians (V. Buldakov, V. Kabanov, V. Bordyugov, V. Kozlov), this term was first introduced into scientific circulation by the famous Marxist theorist Alexander Bogdanov (Malinovsky) back in 1917.

In January 1918, returning to the study of this problem in his famous work “Questions of Socialism,” A.A. Bogdanov, having researched historical experience a number of bourgeois states during the First World War, equated the concepts of “war communism” and “war-style state capitalism.” In his opinion, there was a whole historical abyss between socialism and war communism, since “war communism” was a consequence of the regression of productive forces and epistemologically was a product of capitalism and a complete negation of socialism, and not its initial phase, as it seemed to the Bolsheviks themselves, first of all, “ left communists" during the Civil War.

The same opinion is now shared by many other scientists, in particular, Professor S.G. Kara-Murza, who argue convincingly that “war communism” as a special economic structure has nothing in common either with communist teaching, much less with Marxism. The very concept of “war communism” simply means that during a period of total devastation, society (society) is forced to transform into a community or commune, and nothing more. In modern historical science there are still several key issues related to the study of the history of war communism.

I. From what time should the policy of war communism begin?

A number of Russian and foreign historians (N. Sukhanov) believe that the policy of war communism was proclaimed almost immediately after the victory February Revolution, when the bourgeois Provisional Government, at the instigation of the first Minister of Agriculture, Cadet A.I. Shingarev, having issued the law “On the transfer of grain to the disposal of the state” (March 25, 1917), introduced a state monopoly on bread throughout the country and established fixed prices for grain.

Other historians (R. Danels, V. Buldakov, V. Kabanov) associate the approval of “war communism” with the famous decree of the Council of People’s Commissars and All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR“On the nationalization of large industry and railway transport enterprises,” which was published on June 28, 1918. According to V.V. Kabanova and V.P. Buldakov, the policy of military communism itself went through three main phases in its development: “nationalizing” (June 1918), “Kombedovsky” (July - December 1918) and “militaristic” (January 1920 - February 1921) .

Still others (E. Gimpelson) believe that the beginning of the policy of war communism should be considered May - June 1918, when the Council of People's Commissars and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR adopted two important decrees that marked the beginning of the food dictatorship in the country: “On the emergency powers of the People's Commissar for Food” ( May 13, 1918) and “On the Committees of the Village Poor” (June 11, 1918).

The fourth group of historians (G. Bordyugov, V. Kozlov) is confident that after a “year-long period of trial and error,” the Bolsheviks, having issued the decree “On food distribution of grain grain and fodder” (January 11, 1919), made their final the choice in favor of surplus appropriation, which became the backbone of the entire policy of war communism in the country.

Finally, the fifth group of historians (S. Pavlyuchenkov) prefers not to name the specific date of the beginning of the policy of war communism and, referring to the well-known dialectical position of F. Engels, says that “absolutely sharp dividing lines are not compatible with the theory of development as such.” Although S.A. himself Pavlyuchenkov is inclined to begin the countdown of the policy of war communism with the beginning of the “Red Guard attack on capital,” that is, from December 1917.

II. Reasons for the policy of “war communism”.

In Soviet and partly Russian historiography (I. Berkhin, E. Gimpelson, G. Bordyugov, V. Kozlov, I. Ratkovsky), the policy of military communism has traditionally been reduced to a series of exclusively forced, purely economic measures caused by foreign intervention and the Civil War. Most Soviet historians strongly emphasized the smooth and gradual nature of the implementation of this economic policy.

In European historiography (L. Samueli) it has traditionally been argued that “war communism” was not so much determined by the hardships and deprivations of the Civil War and foreign intervention, but had a powerful ideological basis, going back to the ideas and works of K. Marx, F. Engels and K. Kautsky.

According to a number of modern historians (V. Buldakov, V. Kabanov), subjectively “war communism” was caused by the desire of the Bolsheviks to hold out until the start of the world proletarian revolution, and objectively this policy was supposed to solve the most important modernization task - to eliminate the gigantic gap between the economic structures of the industrial city and patriarchal village. Moreover, the policy of war communism was a direct continuation of the “Red Guard attack on capital”, since both of these political courses were related by the frantic pace of major economic events: the complete nationalization of banks, industrial and commercial enterprises, the displacement of state cooperation and the organization of a new system of public distribution through productive-consumer communes, an obvious tendency towards the naturalization of all economic relations within the country, etc.

Many authors are convinced that all the leaders and major theoreticians of the Bolshevik Party, including V.I. Lenin, L.D. Trotsky and N.I. Bukharin, viewed the policy of war communism as a high road leading directly to socialism. This concept of “Bolshevik utopianism” was presented especially clearly in the famous theoretical works of the “left communists,” who imposed on the party the model of “war communism” that it implemented in 1919–1920. In this case we are talking about two famous works by N.I. Bukharin “Program of the Bolshevik Communists” (1918) and “Economy of the Transition Period” (1920), as well as about the popular opus N.I. Bukharin and E.A. Preobrazhensky’s “The ABCs of Communism” (1920), which are now rightly called “literary monuments of the collective recklessness of the Bolsheviks.”

According to a number of modern scientists (Yu. Emelyanov), it was N.I. Bukharin in his famous work“Economy in Transition” (1920) derived from the practice of “war communism” an entire theory of revolutionary transformations, based on the universal law of the complete collapse of the bourgeois economy, industrial anarchy and concentrated violence, which will completely change the economic system of bourgeois society and build socialism on its ruins. Moreover, according to the firm conviction of this "the favorite of the whole party" And "the largest party theorist" as V.I. wrote about him Lenin, “proletarian coercion in all its forms, from executions to labor conscription, is, strange as it may seem, a method for developing communist humanity from the human material of the capitalist era.”

Finally, according to other modern scientists (S. Kara-Murza), “war communism” became an inevitable consequence of the catastrophic situation in the country’s national economy, and in this situation it played an extremely important role in saving the lives of millions of people from inevitable starvation. Moreover, all attempts to prove that the policy of war communism had doctrinal roots in Marxism are absolutely groundless, since only a handful of Bolshevik maximalists in the person of N.I. Bukharin and Co.

III. The problem of the results and consequences of the policy of “war communism”.

Almost all Soviet historians (I. Mints, V. Drobizhev, I. Brekhin, E. Gimpelson) not only idealized “war communism” in every possible way, but actually avoided any objective assessments of the main results and consequences of this destructive economic policy of the Bolsheviks during the Civil War . According to most modern authors (V. Buldakov, V. Kabanov), this idealization of “war communism” was largely due to the fact that this political course had a huge impact on the development of everything Soviet society, and also modeled and laid the foundations of the command-administrative system in the country, which finally took shape in the second half of the 1930s.

In Western historiography, there are still two main assessments of the results and consequences of the policy of war communism. One part of Sovietologists (G. Yaney, S. Malle) traditionally speaks of the unconditional collapse of the economic policy of war communism, which led to complete anarchy and the total collapse of the country's industrial and agricultural economy. Other Sovietologists (M. Levin), on the contrary, argue that the main results of the policy of war communism were etatization (a gigantic strengthening of the role of the state) and archaization of socio-economic relations.

As for the first conclusion of Professor M. Levin and his colleagues, there is indeed hardly any doubt that during the years of “war communism” there was a gigantic strengthening of the entire party-state apparatus of power in the center and locally. But what concerns the economic results of “war communism”, then the situation here was much more complicated, because:

On the one hand, “war communism” swept away all the previous remnants of the medieval system in the agricultural economy of the Russian village;

On the other hand, it is absolutely obvious that during the period of “war communism” there was a significant strengthening of the patriarchal peasant community, which allows us to talk about the real archaization of the country’s national economy.

According to a number of modern authors (V. Buldakov, V. Kabanov, S. Pavlyuchenkov), it would be a mistake to try to statistically determine the negative consequences of “war communism” for the country’s national economy. And the point is not only that these consequences cannot be separated from the consequences of the Civil War itself, but that the results of “war communism” have not a quantitative, but a qualitative expression, the essence of which lies in the very change in the socio-cultural stereotype of the country and its citizens.

According to other modern authors (S. Kara-Murza), “war communism” became a way of life and a way of thinking for the vast majority of Soviet people. And since it occurred at the initial stage of the formation of the Soviet state, at its “infancy,” it could not but have a huge impact on its entirety and became the main part of the very matrix on the basis of which the Soviet social system was reproduced.

IV. The problem of determining the main features of “war communism”.

a) the total destruction of private ownership of the means and instruments of production and the dominance of a single state form property throughout the country;

b) total liquidation of commodity-money relations, the monetary circulation system and the creation of an extremely rigid planned economic system in the country.

In the firm opinion of these scholars, the main elements of the policy of war communism were the Bolsheviks borrowed from the practical experience of the Kaiser’s Germany, where, starting from January 1915, the following actually existed:

a) state monopoly on essential food products and consumer goods;

b) their normalized distribution;

c) universal labor conscription;

d) fixed prices for main types of goods, products and services;

e) the allotment method of removing grain and other agricultural products from the agricultural sector of the country's economy.

Thus, the leaders of “Russian Jacobinism” made full use of the forms and methods of governing the country, which they borrowed from capitalism, which was in an extreme situation during the war.

The most visible evidence of this conclusion is the famous “Draft Party Program” written by V.I. Lenin in March 1918, which contained main features of the future policy of war communism:

a) the destruction of parliamentarism and the unification of the legislative and executive branches of government in Councils of all levels;

b) socialist organization of production on a national scale;

c) management of the production process through trade unions and factory committees, which are under the control of Soviet authorities;

d) state monopoly of trade, and then its complete replacement systematically organized distribution, which will be carried out by unions of commercial and industrial employees;

e) forced unification of the entire population of the country into consumer-production communes;

f) organizing competition between these communes for a steady increase in labor productivity, organization, discipline, etc.

The fact that the leadership of the Bolshevik Party turned the organizational forms of the German bourgeois economy into the main instrument for establishing the proletarian dictatorship was directly written by the Bolsheviks themselves, in particular by Yuri Zalmanovich Larin (Lurie), who in 1928 published his work “Wartime State Capitalism in Germany” (1914―1918)". Moreover, a number of modern historians (S. Pavlyuchenkov) argue that “war communism” was a Russian model of German military socialism or state capitalism. Therefore, in a certain sense, “war communism” was a pure analogue of the “Westernism” traditional in the Russian political environment, only with the significant difference that the Bolsheviks managed to tightly envelop this political course in the veil of communist phraseology.

In Soviet historiography (V. Vinogradov, I. Brekhin, E. Gimpelson, V. Dmitrenko), the entire essence of the policy of war communism was traditionally reduced only to the main economic measures carried out by the Bolshevik Party in 1918–1920.

A number of modern authors (V. Buldakov, V. Kabanov, V. Bordyugov, V. Kozlov, S. Pavlyuchenkov, E. Gimpelson) pay special attention to the fact that a radical change in economic and social relations was accompanied by radical political reform and the establishment of a one-party dictatorship in country.

Other modern scientists (S. Kara-Murza) believe that the main feature of “war communism” was the shift of the center of gravity of economic policy from the production of goods and services to their equal distribution. It is no coincidence that L.D. Trotsky, speaking about the policy of war communism, frankly wrote that “We nationalized the disorganized economy of the bourgeoisie and established a regime of “consumer communism” in the most acute period of the struggle against the class enemy.” All other signs of “war communism”, such as: the famous surplus appropriation system, the state monopoly in the field of industrial production and banking services, the elimination of commodity-money relations, universal labor conscription and the militarization of the country’s national economy - were structural features of the military-communist system, which in specific historical conditions, it was characteristic of the Great French Revolution (1789–1799), and of the Kaiser’s Germany (1915–1918), and of Russia during the Civil War (1918–1920).

2. Main features of the policy of “war communism”

According to the overwhelming majority of historians, the main features of the policy of war communism, which were finally formulated in March 1919 at the VIII Congress of the RCP (b), were:

a) The policy of “food dictatorship” and surplus appropriation

According to a number of modern authors (V. Bordyugov, V. Kozlov), the Bolsheviks did not immediately come to the idea of ​​surplus appropriation, and initially intended to create state system grain procurements based on traditional market mechanisms, in particular, through a significant increase in prices for grain and other agricultural products. In April 1918, in his report “On the Immediate Tasks of Soviet Power,” V.I. Lenin directly stated that the Soviet government would pursue the previous food policy in accordance with the economic course, the contours of which were determined in March 1918. In other words, it was about preserving the grain monopoly, fixed grain prices and the traditional system of commodity exchange that had long existed between the city and the village. However, already in May 1918, due to a sharp aggravation of the military-political situation in the main grain-producing regions of the country (Kuban, Don, Little Russia), the position of the country's top political leadership changed radically.

At the beginning of May 1918, according to the report of the People's Commissar of Food A.D. Tsyurupa, members of the Soviet government for the first time discussed the draft decree on the introduction food dictatorship in the country. And although a number of members of the Central Committee and the leadership of the Supreme Economic Council, in particular L.B. Kamenev, A.I. Rykov and Yu.Z. Larin, opposed this decree, on May 13 it was approved by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR and was formalized in the form of a special decree “On granting the People's Commissar of Food emergency powers to combat the rural bourgeoisie.” In mid-May 1918, a new decree of the Council of People's Commissars and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee “On the organization of food detachments” was adopted, which, together with the committees of the poor, were to become the main instrument for knocking out scarce food resources from tens of millions of peasant farms in the country.

At the same time, in furtherance of this decree, the Council of People's Commissars and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR adopt Decree “On the reorganization of the People’s Commissariat of Food of the RSFSR and local food authorities”, in accordance with which a complete structural restructuring of this department of the country was carried out in the center and locally. In particular, this decree, which was quite rightly dubbed “the bankruptcy of the idea of ​​local Soviets”:

a) established the direct subordination of all provincial and district food structures not to local Soviet authorities, but to the People’s Commissariat of Food of the RSFSR;

b) determined that within the framework of this People's Commissariat it would be created special management food army, which will be responsible for the implementation of the state grain procurement plan throughout the country.

Contrary to traditional opinion, the very idea of ​​​​food detachments was not an invention of the Bolsheviks and the palm here should still be given to the Februaryists, so “dear to the hearts” of our liberals (A. Yakovlev, E. Gaidar). Back on March 25, 1917, the Provisional Government, having issued the law “On the transfer of grain to the disposal of the state,” introduced a state monopoly on bread throughout the country. But since the plan for state grain procurements was carried out very poorly, in August 1917, in order to carry out forced requisitions of food and fodder from the marching units of the active army and rear garrisons, special military detachments began to be formed, which became the prototype of those very Bolshevik food detachments that arose during the Civil War.

The activities of food brigades still evoke absolutely polar opinions.

Some historians (V. Kabanov, V. Brovkin) believe that, in fulfilling grain procurement plans, the majority of food detachments were engaged in the wholesale plunder of all peasant farms, regardless of their social affiliation.

Other historians (G. Bordyugov, V. Kozlov, S. Kara-Murza) argue that, contrary to popular speculation and legends, food detachments, having declared crusade to the village for bread, did not engage in robbery of peasant farms, but achieved tangible results precisely where they obtained bread through traditional barter.

After the start of the frontal Civil War and foreign intervention, the Council of People's Commissars and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR adopted on June 11, 1918 the famous decree “On the organization and supply of committees of the rural poor,” or kombedahs, which a number of modern authors (N. Dementyev, I. Dolutsky) called the trigger mechanism of the Civil War war.

For the first time, the idea of ​​​​organizing the Committee of Poor People was heard at a meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee in May 1918 from the mouth of its chairman Ya.M. Sverdlov, who motivated the need to create them to incite "second social war" in the countryside and a merciless struggle against the class enemy in the person of the rural bourgeois - the village “bloodsucker and world-eater” - kulak. Therefore, the process of organizing committees of poor people, which V.I. Lenin regarded it as the greatest step socialist revolution in the villages, went at a rapid pace, and by September 1918, more than 30 thousand committees of poor people had been created throughout the country, the backbone of which was the village youth.

The main task of the poor committees was not only the fight for bread, but also the crushing of the volost and district bodies of Soviet power, which consisted of the wealthy strata of the Russian peasantry and could not be bodies of the proletarian dictatorship on the ground. Thus, their creation not only became the trigger for the Civil War, but also led to the virtual destruction of Soviet power in the countryside.

In addition, as a number of authors (V. Kabanov) noted, the Pobedy Committees, having failed to fulfill their historical mission, gave a powerful impetus to chaos, devastation and impoverishment of the Russian countryside.

In August 1918, the Council of People's Commissars and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR adopted a package of new regulations, which marked the creation of a whole system of emergency measures to confiscate grain in favor of the state, including the decrees “On the involvement of workers’ organizations in the procurement of grain”, “On the organization of harvesting and -requisition detachments”, “Regulations on barrage requisition food detachments”, etc.

The crusade against the kulak and the village world-eater, announced by this decree, was greeted with delight not only by the rural poor, but also by the overwhelming mass of the average Russian peasantry, whose number made up more than 65% of the country’s total rural population. The mutual attraction between the Bolsheviks and the middle peasantry, which arose at the turn of 1918–1919, predetermined the fate of the poor committees. Already in November 1918, at the VI All-Russian Congress of Soviets, under pressure from the communist faction itself, which was then headed by L.B. Kamenev, a decision was made to restore a uniform system of Soviet government bodies at all levels, which, in essence, meant the liquidation of the Pobedy Committees.

In December 1918, the First All-Russian Congress of Land Departments, Communes and Committees of Poor People adopted a resolution “On the collectivization of agriculture,” which clearly outlined a new course for the socialization of individual peasant farms and their transfer to large-scale agricultural production built on socialist principles. This resolution, as suggested by V.I. Lenin and People's Commissar of Agriculture S.P. Sereda was met with hostility by the overwhelming mass of the multi-million Russian peasantry. This situation forced the Bolsheviks to again change the principles of food policy and, on January 11, 1919, issue the famous decree “On food distribution of grain grain and fodder.”

Contrary to traditional public opinion, surplus appropriation in Russia was introduced not by the Bolsheviks, but by the tsarist government of A.F. Trepov, which in November 1916, at the suggestion of the then Minister of Agriculture A.A. Rittich issued a special resolution on this issue. Although, of course, the surplus appropriation system of 1919 differed significantly from the surplus appropriation system of 1916.

According to a number of modern authors (S. Pavlyuchenkov, V. Bordyugov, V. Kozlov), contrary to the prevailing stereotype, surplus appropriation was not a tightening of the food dictatorship in the country, but its formal weakening, since it contained a very important element: the initially specified amount of state needs for bread and fodder In addition, as shown by Professor S.G. Kara-Murza, the scale of the Bolshevik allocation was approximately 260 million poods, while the tsarist allocation was more than 300 million poods of grain per year.

At the same time, the surplus appropriation plan itself proceeded not from the real capabilities of peasant farms, but from state needs, since, in accordance with this decree:

The entire amount of grain, fodder and other agricultural products that the state needed to supply the Red Army and cities was distributed among all grain-producing provinces of the country;

In all peasant farms that fell under the surplus appropriation molokh, a minimum amount of food, fodder and seed grain and other agricultural products remained, and all other surpluses were subject to complete requisition in favor of the state.

On February 14, 1919, the regulation of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR “On socialist land management and on measures for the transition to socialist agriculture” was published, but this decree no longer had fundamental significance, since the bulk of the Russian peasantry, having rejected the collective “commune”, compromised with the Bolsheviks, agreeing with temporary food appropriation, which was considered the lesser evil. Thus, by the spring of 1919, from the list of all Bolshevik decrees on the agrarian issue, only the decree “On surplus appropriation” was preserved, which became the supporting frame for the entire policy of war communism in the country.

Continuing the search for mechanisms capable of forcing a significant part of the Russian peasantry to voluntarily hand over food to the state Agriculture and crafts, the Council of People's Commissars and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR issue new decrees “On benefits for collecting taxes in kind” (April 1919) and “On compulsory exchange of goods” (August 1919). They didn't have special success from the peasants, and already in November 1919, by decision of the government, new allocations were introduced on the territory of the country - potato, wood, fuel and horse-drawn.

According to a number of authoritative scientists (L. Lee, S. Kara-Murza), only the Bolsheviks were able to create a workable food requisitioning and supply apparatus, which saved tens of millions of people in the country from starvation.

b) Policy of total nationalization

To implement this historical task, which was a direct continuation of the “Red Guard attack on capital”, the Council of People’s Commissars and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR issued a number of important decrees, including “On the nationalization of foreign trade” (April 1918), “On the nationalization of large industry and railway transport enterprises” (June 1918) and “On establishing a state monopoly on domestic trade” (November 1918). In August 1918, a decree was adopted that created unprecedented benefits for all state industrial enterprises, since they were exempt from the so-called “indemnity” - emergency state taxes and all municipal fees.

In January 1919, the Central Committee of the RCP (b), in its “Circular Letter” addressed to all party committees, directly stated that at the moment the main source of income of the Soviet state should be "nationalized industry and state agriculture." In February 1919, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee called on the Supreme Economic Council of the RSFSR to accelerate the further restructuring of the country’s economic life on a socialist basis, which actually launched a new stage of the proletarian state’s offensive against “medium private business” enterprises that had retained their independence, the authorized capital of which did not exceed 500 thousand rubles. In April 1919, a new decree of the Council of People's Commissars and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR “On the Handicraft and Craft Industry” was issued, according to which these enterprises were not subject to total confiscation, nationalization and municipalization, with the exception of special cases according to a special resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council of the RSFSR.

However, already in the fall of 1920, a new wave of nationalization began, which mercilessly hit small industrial production, that is, all handicrafts and handicrafts, into whose orbit millions of Soviet citizens were drawn. In particular, in November 1920, the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council, headed by A.I. Rykov adopted a decree “On the nationalization of small industry”, under which 20 thousand handicraft and craft enterprises in the country fell. According to historians (G. Bordyugov, V. Kozlov, I. Ratkovsky, M. Khodyakov), by the end of 1920 the state concentrated in its hands 38 thousand industrial enterprises, of which more than 65% were handicraft and craft workshops.

c) Liquidation of commodity-money relations

Initially, the country's top political leadership tried to establish normal trade exchange in the country, issuing in March 1918 a special decree of the Council of People's Commissars and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR "On the organization of trade exchange between city and countryside." However, already in May 1918, a similar special instruction from the People's Commissariat of Food of the RSFSR (A.D. Tsyurupa) to this decree de facto abolished it.

In August 1918, at the height of a new procurement campaign, having issued a whole package of decrees and tripling fixed prices for grain, the Soviet government again tried to organize normal commodity exchange. The volost committees of poor people and councils of deputies, having monopolized in their hands the distribution of industrial goods in the countryside, almost immediately buried this good idea, causing general anger among the multi-million Russian peasantry against the Bolsheviks.

Under these conditions, the country's top political leadership authorized the transition to barter trade, or direct product exchange. Moreover, on November 21, 1918, the Council of People's Commissars and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR adopted the famous decree “On organizing the supply of the population with all products and items of personal consumption and household”, according to which the entire population of the country was assigned to the “Unified Consumer Societies”, through which they began to receive all food and industrial rations. According to a number of historians (S. Pavlyuchenkov), this decree, in fact, completed the legislative formalization of the entire military-communist system, the building of which would be brought to barracks perfection until the beginning of 1921. Thus, policy of "war communism" with the adoption of this decree it became system of "war communism".

In December 1918, the Second All-Russian Congress of Economic Councils called on the People's Commissar of Finance N.N. Krestinsky to take immediate measures to curtail monetary circulation throughout the country, but the leadership of the country’s financial department and the People’s Bank of the RSFSR (G.L. Pyatakov, Ya.S. Ganetsky) avoided making this decision.

Until the end of 1918 - beginning of 1919. The Soviet political leadership was still trying to restrain itself from a complete turn towards the total socialization of the entire economic life of the country and the replacement of commodity-money relations with the naturalization of exchange. In particular, the communist faction of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, which was headed by the leader of the moderate Bolsheviks L.B. Kamenev, playing the role of informal opposition to the government, created special commission, which at the beginning of 1919 prepared a draft decree “On the restoration of free trade.” This project met with stiff resistance from all members of the Council of People's Commissars, including V.I. Lenin and L.D. Trotsky.

In March 1919, a new decree of the Council of People's Commissars and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR “On Consumer Communes” was issued, according to which the entire system of consumer cooperation with one stroke of the pen turned into a purely state institution, and the ideas of free trade were finally put to death. And at the beginning of May 1919, a “Circular Letter” was issued by the Council of People’s Commissars of the RSFSR, in which all government departments of the country were asked to switch to new system settlements among themselves, that is, traditional cash payments are recorded only in the “accounting books,” avoiding, if possible, cash transactions among themselves.

For the time being, V.I. Lenin still remained a realist on the issue of the abolition of money and monetary circulation within the country, so in December 1919 he suspended the introduction of a draft resolution on the destruction of banknotes throughout the country, which the delegates of the VII were supposed to adopt All-Russian Congress Soviets. However, already in January 1920, by decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR, the country's only credit and emission center, the People's Bank of the RSFSR, was abolished.

According to the majority of Russian historians (G. Bordyugov, V. Buldakov, M. Gorinov, V. Kabanov, V. Kozlov, S. Pavlyuchenkov), a new major and final stage in the development of the military-communist system was the IX Congress of the RCP(b), held in March - April 1920. At this party congress, the entire top political leadership of the country quite consciously decided to continue the policy of war communism and build socialism in the country as soon as possible.

In the spirit of these decisions, in May - June 1920, almost complete naturalization took place wages the overwhelming majority of workers and employees of the country, which N.I. Bukharin (“Program of the Communist-Bolsheviks”) and E.A. Shefler (“Naturalization of wages”) back in 1918 considered the most important condition “building a communist cashless economy in the country.” As a result, by the end of 1920, the natural part of the average monthly wage in the country amounted to almost 93%, and cash payments for housing, all utilities, public transport, medicines and consumer goods were completely abolished. In December 1920, the Council of People's Commissars and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR adopted a number of important decrees in this regard - “On free holidays to the population food products”, “On the free supply of consumer goods to the population”, “On the abolition of cash payments for the use of mail, telegraph, telephone and radiotelegraph”, “On the abolition of fees for medicines dispensed from pharmacies”, etc.

Then V.I. Lenin drew up a draft resolution for the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR “On the abolition of cash taxes and the transformation of surplus appropriation into a tax in kind,” in which he directly wrote that “The transition from money to non-monetary product exchange is indisputable and is only a matter of time.”

d) Militarization of the country's national economy and the creation of labor armies

Their opponents (V. Buldakov, V. Kabanov) deny this fact and believe that the entire top political leadership, including V.I. himself, were supporters of the militarization of the country’s national economy. Lenin, as clearly evidenced by the theses of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) “On the mobilization of the industrial proletariat, labor conscription, militarization of the economy and the use of military units for economic needs,” which were published in Pravda on January 22, 1920.

These ideas contained in the theses of the Central Committee, L.D. Trotsky not only supported, but also creatively developed in his famous speech at the IX Congress of the RCP (b), held in March - April 1920. The overwhelming majority of the delegates of this party forum, despite the sharp criticism of the Trotskyist economic platform from A.I. Rykova, D.B. Ryazanova, V.P. Milyutin and V.P. Nogina, they supported her. This was not at all about temporary measures caused by the Civil War and foreign intervention, but about a long-term political course that would lead to socialism. This was clearly evidenced by all the decisions made at the congress, including its resolution “On the transition to a police system in the country.”

The process of militarization of the country's national economy, which began at the end of 1918, proceeded quite quickly, but gradually and reached its apogee only in 1920, when War Communism entered its final, “militaristic” phase.

In December 1918, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR approved the “Code of Labor Laws,” according to which universal labor conscription was introduced throughout the country for citizens over 16 years of age.

In April 1919 they published two resolutions of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR, according to which:

a) universal labor conscription was introduced for all able-bodied citizens aged 16 to 58 years;

b) special forced labor camps were created for those workers and government employees who voluntarily switched to another job.

The strictest control over compliance with labor conscription was initially entrusted to the bodies of the Cheka (F.E. Dzerzhinsky), and then to the Main Committee for General Labor Conscription (L.D. Trotsky). In June 1919, the previously existing labor market department of the People's Commissariat of Labor was transformed into a department for accounting and distribution of labor, which eloquently spoke for itself: now a whole system of forced labor was created in the country, which became the prototype of the notorious labor armies.

In November 1919, the Council of People's Commissars and the STO of the RSFSR adopted the provisions “On Workers' Disciplinary Courts” and “On the Militarization government agencies and enterprises,” according to which the administration and trade union committees of factories, factories and institutions were given full right not only to dismiss workers from enterprises, but also to send them to concentration labor camps. In January 1920, the Council of People's Commissars and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR adopted a decree “On the procedure for universal labor service,” which provided for the involvement of all able-bodied citizens in performing various public works necessary to maintain the country's municipal and road infrastructure in proper order.

Finally, in February - March 1920, by decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) and the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR, the creation of the notorious labor armies began, the main ideologist of which was L.D. Trotsky. In his note “Immediate tasks of economic development” (February 1920), he came up with the idea of ​​​​creating provincial, district and volost labor armies, built according to the type of Arakcheevsky military settlements. Moreover, in February 1920, by the decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR L.D. Trotsky was appointed chairman of the interdepartmental commission on issues of labor conscription, which included almost all the heads of the central people's commissariats and departments of the country: A.I. Rykov, M.P. Tomsky, F.E. Dzerzhinsky, V.V. Schmidt, A.D. Tsyurupa, S.P. Sereda and L.B. Krasin. A special place in the work of this commission was occupied by the issues of recruiting labor armies, which were to become the main instrument for building socialism in the country.

e) Total centralization of management of the country's national economy

In April 1918, Alexey Ivanovich Rykov became the head of the Supreme Council of the National Economy, under whose leadership its structure was finally created, which lasted throughout the entire period of war communism. Initially, the structure of the Supreme Economic Council included: the Supreme Council of Workers' Control, industry departments, a commission of economic people's commissariats and a group of economic experts, consisting mainly of bourgeois specialists. The leading element of this body was the Bureau of the Supreme Economic Council, which included all the heads of departments and the expert group, as well as representatives of the four economic people's commissariats - finance, industry and trade, agriculture and labor.

From now on The Supreme Economic Council of the RSFSR, as the main economic department of the country, coordinated and directed the work:

1) all economic people's commissariats - industry and trade (L.B. Krasin), finance (N.N. Krestinsky), agriculture (S.P. Sereda) and food (A.D. Tsyurupa);

2) special meetings on fuel and metallurgy;

3) workers' control bodies and trade unions.

Within the competence of the Supreme Economic Council and its local bodies, that is, regional, provincial and district economic councils, included:

Confiscation (free seizure), requisition (seizure at fixed prices) and sequestration (deprivation of the right to dispose) of industrial enterprises, institutions and individuals;

Carrying out forced syndication of industrial production and trade sectors that have retained their economic independence.

By the end of 1918, when the third stage of nationalization was completed, an extremely rigid system of economic management had developed in the country, which received a very capacious and precise name - “Glavkizm”. According to a number of historians (V. Buldakov, V. Kabanov), it was this “Glavkism”, which was based on the idea of ​​​​transforming state capitalism into a real mechanism of planned leadership national economy country under the state dictatorship of the proletariat, and became the apotheosis of “war communism”.

By the beginning of 1919, all industry departments, transformed into the Main Directorates of the Supreme Economic Council, endowed with economic and administrative functions, completely covered the entire range of issues related to the organization of planning, supply, distribution of orders and sales of finished products of the majority of industrial, commercial and cooperative enterprises in the country . By the summer of 1920, within the framework of the Supreme Economic Council, 49 branch departments had been created - Glavtorf, Glavtop, Glavkozha, Glavzerno, Glavstarch, Glavtrud, Glavkustprom, Tsentrokhladoboynya and others, in the depths of which there were hundreds of production and functional departments. These headquarters and their branch departments carried out direct control all state enterprises of the country, regulated relations with small, handicraft and cooperative industries, coordinated the activities of related industries of industrial production and supply, and distributed orders and finished products. It became quite obvious that a whole series of vertical economic associations (monopolies) isolated from each other had arisen, the relationship between which depended solely on the will of the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council and its leader. In addition, within the framework of the Supreme Economic Council itself there were many functional bodies, in particular the financial-economic, financial-accounting and scientific-technical departments, the Central Production Commission and the Bureau for the Accounting of Technical Forces, which completed the entire framework of the system of total bureaucracy that struck the country towards the end Civil War.

During the Civil War, a number of the most important functions previously belonging to the Supreme Economic Council were transferred to various emergency commissions, in particular the Extraordinary Commission for Supply of the Red Army (Chrezkomsnab), the Extraordinary Authorized Defense Council for Supply of the Red Army (Chusosnabarm), the Central Council for Military Procurement (Tsentrovoenzag), Council for the Military Industry (Promvoensovet), etc.

f) Creation of a one-party political system

According to many modern historians (W. Rosenberg, A. Rabinovich, V. Buldakov, V. Kabanov, S. Pavlyuchenkov), the term “Soviet power”, which came into historical science from the field of party propaganda, in no case can claim to adequately reflect the structure of political power that was established in the country during the Civil War.

According to the same historians, the actual abandonment of the Soviet system of government of the country occurred in the spring of 1918, and from that time the process of creating an alternative apparatus of state power through party channels began. This process, first of all, was expressed in the widespread creation of Bolshevik party committees in all volosts, districts and provinces of the country, which, together with the committees and bodies of the Cheka completely disorganized the activities of Soviets at all levels, turning them into appendages of party administrative bodies of power.

In November 1918, a timid attempt was made to restore the role of Soviet authorities in the center and locally. In particular, at the VI All-Russian Congress of Soviets, decisions were made to restore a unified system of Soviet authorities at all levels, to strictly observe and strictly implement all decrees issued by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR, which in March 1919, after the death of Ya.M. Sverdlov was headed by Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin, but these good wishes remained on paper.

In connection with the assumption of the functions of the highest government administration of the country, the Central Committee RKP(b). In March 1919, by decision of the VIII Congress of the RCP (b) and in pursuance of its resolution “On the organizational issue,” several permanent working bodies were created within the Central Committee, which V.I. Lenin in his famous work “The Infantile Disease of “Leftism” in Communism” called the real party oligarchy - the Political Bureau, the Organizational Bureau and the Secretariat of the Central Committee. At the organizational Plenum of the Central Committee, which took place on March 25, 1919, the personal composition of these highest party bodies was approved for the first time. Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee, which was charged with the right “make decisions on all urgent matters” included five members - V.I. Lenin, L.D. Trotsky, I.V. Stalin, L.B. Kamenev and N.N. Krestinsky and three candidate members - G.E. Zinoviev, N.I. Bukharin and M.I. Kalinin. Member of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee, which was supposed to “to direct all organizational work of the party”, five members also included - I.V. Stalin, N.N. Krestinsky, L.P. Serebryakov, A.G. Beloborodov and E.D. Stasova and one candidate member - M.K. Muranov. The Secretariat of the Central Committee, which at that time was responsible for all the technical preparation of the meetings of the Politburo and the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee, included one executive secretary of the Central Committee, E.D. Stasov and five technical secretaries from among experienced party workers.

After the appointment of I.V. Stalin Secretary General Central Committee of the RCP (b), it is these party bodies, especially the Politburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee, that will become the real bodies of the highest state power in the country, which will retain their enormous powers until the XIX Party Conference (1988) and the XXVIII Congress of the CPSU (1990).

At the end of 1919, broad opposition to administrative centralism also arose within the party itself, led by the “decists” led by T.V. Sapronov. At the VIII Conference of the RCP(b), held in December 1919, he spoke with the so-called platform of “democratic centralism” against the official party platform, which was represented by M.F. Vladimirsky and N.N. Krestinsky. The “decists” platform, which was actively supported by the majority of delegates at the party conference, provided for a partial return to the Soviet government agencies real power at the local level and limiting arbitrariness on the part of party committees at all levels and central government agencies and departments of the country. This platform was also supported at the VII All-Russian Congress of Soviets (December 1919), where the main struggle unfolded against supporters of “bureaucratic centralism.” In accordance with the decisions of the congress, the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee tried to become a real body of state power in the country and at the end of December 1919 created a number of working commissions to develop the foundations of a new economic policy, one of which was headed by N.I. Bukharin. However, already in mid-January 1920, at his suggestion, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) proposed to the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee to abolish this commission and henceforth not to show unnecessary independence in these matters, but to coordinate them with the Central Committee. Thus, the course of the VII All-Russian Congress of Soviets to revive the organs of Soviet power in the center and locally was a complete fiasco.

According to the majority of modern historians (G. Bordyugov, V. Kozlov, A. Sokolov, N. Simonov), by the end of the Civil War, the bodies of Soviet power were not only affected by the diseases of bureaucracy, but actually ceased to exist as a system of state power in the country. The documents of the VIII All-Russian Congress of Soviets (December 1920) directly stated that the Soviet system is degrading into a purely bureaucratic, apparatus structure, when the real local authorities become not the Soviets, but their executive committees and presidiums of executive committees, main role which are played by party secretaries who have completely taken over the functions of local Soviet authorities. It is no coincidence that already in the summer of 1921, in his famous work “On political strategy and the tactics of Russian communists" I.V. Stalin wrote extremely frankly that the Bolshevik Party is the very “Order of the Sword Bearers” that

“inspires and directs the activities of all bodies of the Soviet state in the center and locally.”

3. Anti-Bolshevik uprisings of 1920–1921.

The policy of war communism became the cause of a huge number of peasant uprisings and rebellions, among which the following were particularly widespread: The uprising of the peasants of the Tambov and Voronezh provinces, which was led by Kirsanovsky district police Alexander Sergeevich Antonov. In November 1920, under his leadership, the Tambov partisan army was created, the number of which amounted to more than 50 thousand people. In November 1920 - April 1921, units of the regular army, police and the Cheka were unable to destroy this powerful center of popular resistance. Then, at the end of April 1921, by decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee, the “Plenipotentiary Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee to combat banditry in the Tambov province” was created, headed by V.A. Antonov-Ovseenko and the new commander of the Tambov Military District, M.N. Tukhachevsky, who especially distinguished himself during the suppression of the Kronstadt rebellion. In May - July 1921, units and formations of the Red Army, using all means, including mass terror, the institution of hostages and poisonous gases, literally drowned the Tambov popular uprising in blood, destroying several tens of thousands of Voronezh and Tambov peasants.

An uprising of the peasants of the Southern and Left Bank of New Russia, which was led by the ideological anarchist Nestor Ivanovich Makhno. In February 1921, by decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b)U, the “Permanent Conference on Combating Banditry” was created, headed by the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR Kh.G. Rakovsky, who entrusted the defeat of the troops of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army to N.I. Makhno on the Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Soviet troops M.V. Frunze. In May - August 1921, units and formations of the Soviet army in the most difficult bloody battles defeated the peasant uprising in Ukraine and destroyed one of the most dangerous centers of the new Civil War in the country.

But, of course, the most dangerous and significant signal for the Bolsheviks was the famous Kronstadt rebellion. The background to these dramatic events was as follows: at the beginning of February 1921, in the northern capital, where mass protests by workers of the largest St. Petersburg enterprises (Putilovsky, Nevsky and Sestroretsky factories) closed by decision of the Soviet government took place, martial law was introduced and a city Defense Committee was created, which was headed by the leader of St. Petersburg communists G.E. Zinoviev. In response to this government decision, on February 28, 1921, the sailors of two battleships of the Baltic Fleet, Petropavlovsk and Sevastopol, adopted a tough petition in which they opposed the Bolshevik omnipotence in the Soviets and for the revival of the bright ideals of October, desecrated by the Bolsheviks.

On March 1, 1921, during a meeting of thousands of soldiers and sailors of the Kronstadt naval garrison, it was decided to create a Provisional Revolutionary Committee, headed by Sergei Mikhailovich Petrichenko and the former tsarist general Arseniy Romanovich Kozlovsky. All attempts by the head of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee to reason with the rebellious sailors were unsuccessful, and the All-Russian headman M.I. Kalinin went home “without a sip.”

In this situation, units of the 7th Army of the Red Army, led by the favorite L.D., were urgently transferred to Petrograd. Trotsky and the future Soviet marshal M.N. Tukhachevsky. On March 8 and 17, 1921, during two bloody assaults, the Kronstadt Fortress was taken: some of the participants in this rebellion managed to retreat to the territory of Finland, but a significant part of the rebels were arrested. Most of them met a tragic fate: 6,500 sailors were sentenced to different deadlines imprisonment, and more than 2,000 rebels were executed by verdicts of the revolutionary tribunals.

In Soviet historiography (O. Leonidov, S. Semanov, Yu. Shchetinov), the Kronstadt rebellion was traditionally regarded as an “anti-Soviet conspiracy”, which was inspired by “the undead White Guard and agents of foreign intelligence services.”

At the moment, such assessments of the Kronstadt events are a thing of the past, and most modern authors (A. Novikov, P. Evrich) say that the uprising of the combat units of the Red Army was caused purely objective reasons the economic state of the country in which it found itself after the end of the Civil War and foreign intervention.

The Bolsheviks began to implement their boldest ideas. Against the backdrop of civil war and depletion of strategic resources, the new government took emergency measures to ensure its continued existence. These measures were called war communism. Prerequisites new policy In October 1917, they took power in Petrograd into their own hands and destroyed the highest government bodies previous government. The ideas of the Bolsheviks were in little agreement with the usual course of Russian life.

Even before coming to power, they pointed out the depravity of the banking system and large private property. Having seized power, the government was forced to requisition funds to maintain its power. The legislative foundations for the policy of war communism were laid in December 1917. Several decrees of the Council of People's Commissars established the government's monopoly in strategically important areas life. The decrees of the Council of People's Commissars in the territory controlled by the Bolsheviks were carried out immediately.

Creation of state monopolies

At the beginning of December 1917, the Council of People's Commissars nationalized all banks. This nationalization took place in two stages: first, land banks were declared state property, and two weeks later the entire banking business was declared a state monopoly. The nationalization of banks implied not only the confiscation of assets from bankers, but also the confiscation of large deposits of more than 5,000 rubles. Smaller deposits remained the property of depositors for some time, but the government set a limit for withdrawing money from accounts: no more than 500 rubles per month.

Because of this limit, a significant part of small deposits was destroyed by inflation. At the same time, the Council of People's Commissars declared industrial enterprises state property. The former owners and administrators were declared enemies of the revolution. Formally management production process was entrusted to the workers' trade unions, but in fact, from the very first days, a centralized management system was created, subordinate to the Petrograd government. Another monopoly of the Soviet state was the monopoly on foreign trade, introduced in April 1918.

The government nationalized the merchant fleet and created a special body that controlled trade with foreigners - Vneshtorg. All transactions with foreign clients were now carried out through this body. Establishment of labor conscription The Soviet government implemented in a special way the right to work declared in the first decrees. The Labor Code adopted in December 1918 turned this right into an obligation. Ore duty was imposed on every citizen of Soviet Russia. At the same time, the militarization of production was proclaimed. With the reduction in the intensity of military clashes, armed units were transformed into labor armies.

War communism in the countryside. Prodrazvyorstka

The apotheosis of war communism was the policy of “extracting surpluses” from the peasants, which went down in history under the name of surplus appropriation. The right of the state to confiscate all grain from peasants, except for sowing and necessary for food, was legislated. The state purchased these “surpluses” at its own reduced prices. Locally, the surplus appropriation system turned into outright robbery of the peasants. The forcible seizure of food was accompanied by terror. The peasants who resisted suffered heavy punishments, including execution.

Results of War Communism

The forceful seizure of means of production and strategically important goods allowed the Soviet government to strengthen its position and win strategic victories in the Civil War. But in the long term, War Communism was futile. He destroyed industrial ties and turned the broad masses of the population against the government. In 1921, the policy of War Communism was officially ended and replaced by the New Economic Policy ().

In order to responsibly understand what the policy of war communism was, let us briefly consider the public mood during the turbulent years of the Civil War, as well as the position of the Bolshevik Party during this period (its

participation in the war and government policy).

The years 1917-1921 were the most difficult period in the history of our fatherland. They were made that way by bloody wars with many warring parties and the most difficult geopolitical situation

communism: briefly about the position of the CPSU (b)

During this difficult time, in various parts of the former empire, many claimants fought for every piece of its land. German army; local national forces who tried to create their own states on the fragments of the empire (for example, the formation of the UPR); local popular associations commanded by regional authorities; the Poles who invaded Ukrainian territories in 1919; White Guard counter-revolutionaries; Entente formations allied to the latter; and, finally, the Bolshevik units. Under these conditions, an absolutely necessary guarantee of victory was the complete concentration of forces and the mobilization of all available resources for the military defeat of all opponents. Actually, this mobilization on the part of the communists was war communism, carried out by the leadership of the CPSU (b) from the first months of 1918 to March 1921.

Politics briefly about the essence of the regime

During its implementation, the mentioned policy caused many conflicting assessments. Its main points were the following measures:

Nationalization of the entire complex of industry and the country's banking system;

State monopolization of foreign trade;

Forced labor service for the entire population capable of working;

Food dictatorship. It was this point that became the most hated by the peasants, since part of the grain was forcibly confiscated in favor of the soldiers and the starving city. The surplus appropriation system is often held up today as an example of the atrocities of the Bolsheviks, but it should be noted that with its help the workers in the cities were significantly smoothed out.

The politics of war communism: briefly about the reaction of the population

Frankly speaking, war communism was a forceful way of forcing the masses to increase the intensity of work for the victory of the Bolsheviks. As already mentioned, the bulk of the discontent in Russia, a peasant country at that time, was caused by food appropriation. However, in fairness, it must be said that the White Guards also used the same technique. It logically followed from the state of affairs in the country, since the First World War and the Civil War completely destroyed the traditional trade ties between the village and the city. This led to the deplorable state of many industrial enterprises. At the same time, there was dissatisfaction with the policies of war communism in the cities. Here, instead of the expected increase in labor productivity and economic revival, on the contrary, there was a weakening of discipline at enterprises. The replacement of old personnel with new ones (who were communists, but not always qualified managers) led to a noticeable decline in industry and a decline in economic indicators.

Despite all the difficulties, the policy of war communism still fulfilled its intended role. Although not always successful, the Bolsheviks were able to gather all their forces against the counter-revolution and survive the battles. At the same time, it caused popular uprisings and seriously undermined the authority of the CPSU (b) among the peasantry. The last such mass uprising was the Kronstadt one, which took place in the spring of 1921. As a result, Lenin initiated the transition to the so-called 1921, which helped restore the national economy in the shortest possible time.

50. The policy of “war communism” essence, results.

“War communism” is the economic policy of the state in conditions of economic ruin and civil war, the mobilization of all forces and resources for the defense of the country.

The Civil War confronted the Bolsheviks with the task of creating a huge army, maximum mobilization of all resources, and hence maximum centralization of power and subordination of all spheres of state activity.

As a result, the policy of “war communism” pursued by the Bolsheviks in 1918-1920 was based, on the one hand, on the experience of state regulation of economic relations during the First World War, because there was devastation in the country; on the other hand, on utopian ideas about the possibility of a direct transition to marketless socialism, which ultimately led to accelerating the pace of socio-economic transformations in the country during the Civil War.

Basic elements of the policy of "war communism"

The policy of “war communism” included a set of measures that affected the economic and socio-political spheres. The main thing was: the nationalization of all means of production, the introduction of centralized management, equal distribution of products, forced labor and the political dictatorship of the Bolshevik Party.

In the field of economics: the accelerated nationalization of large and medium-sized enterprises was prescribed. Accelerating the nationalization of all industries. By the end of 1920, 80% of large and medium-sized enterprises, which employed 70% of the employed workers, were nationalized.

In subsequent years, nationalization was extended to small businesses, which led to the elimination of private ownership in industry. A state monopoly of foreign trade was established.

In November 1920, the Supreme Economic Council decided to nationalize all industry, including small industry.

In 1918, the transition from individual forms of farming to partnerships was proclaimed. Recognized a) state - Soviet economy;

b) production communes;

c) partnerships for joint cultivation of land.

The policy of “war communism” led to the destruction of commodity-money relations. The sale of food and industrial goods was limited; they were distributed by the state in the form of wages in kind. An equalization system of wages among workers was introduced. This gave them the illusion of social equality. The failure of this policy was manifested in the formation of a “black market” and the flourishing of speculation.

In the social sphere The policy of “war communism” was based on the principle “He who does not work, neither shall he eat.” Labor conscription was introduced for representatives of the former exploiting classes, and in 1920 - universal labor conscription.

Forced mobilization of labor resources was carried out with the help of labor armies sent to restore transport, construction work, etc. Naturalization of wages led to the free provision of housing, utilities, transport, postal and telegraph services. In the political sphere The undivided dictatorship of the RCP(b) was established. The Bolshevik Party has ceased to be purely political organization

, its apparatus gradually merged with government structures. It determined the political, ideological, economic and cultural situation in the country, even the personal life of citizens.

The activities of other political parties that fought against the dictatorship of the Bolsheviks (cadets, mensheviks, socialist revolutionaries) were prohibited. Some prominent public figures emigrated, others were repressed. The activities of the Soviets acquired a formal character, since they only carried out the instructions of the Bolshevik party bodies. The trade unions, which were placed under party and state control, lost their independence. The proclaimed freedom of speech and press was not respected. Almost all non-Bolshevik press outlets were closed. The assassination attempts on Lenin and the murder of Uritsky prompted the decree on the “Red Terror”. In the spiritual realm

– the establishment of Marxism as the dominant ideology, the formation of faith in the omnipotence of violence, the establishment of morality that justifies any actions in the interests of the revolution.

The results of the policy of "war communism".

As a result of the policy of “war communism,” socio-economic conditions were created for the victory of the Soviet Republic over the interventionists and White Guards.

The surplus appropriation system led to a reduction in plantings and the gross harvest of major agricultural crops. In 1920-1921 famine broke out in the country.

The reluctance to tolerate surplus appropriation led to the creation of rebel pockets. A rebellion broke out in Kronstadt, during which political slogans were put forward (“Power to the Soviets, not parties!”, “Soviets without the Bolsheviks!”).