The final breakthrough of the blockade of Leningrad and the defeat of Army Group North was to be carried out by troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, as well as the 2nd Baltic Front of the army of Markian Popov.
In addition, the forces of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet and Long-Range Aviation under the command of Air Marshal Alexander Golovanov were involved in Operation January Thunder.
The Leningrad Front defended the Oranienbaum bridgehead, positions around Leningrad from the Gulf of Finland to the Neva, and along the southern coast of Lake Ladoga from Moskovskaya Dubrovka to Gontovaya Lipka.
The Leningrad Front included the 2nd Shock Army, the 42nd and 67th Armies and the 13th Air Army. Air support was provided by aircraft of the Leningrad Air Defense Army and Baltic Fleet aviation. In total, the troops of the Leningrad Front included 30 rifle divisions, 3 rifle and 4 tank brigades, 3 fortified areas and other formations with a total number of more than 417 thousand people. The offensive of the troops of the Leningrad Front was supported by units of the Baltic Fleet - about 90 thousand people.
The defensive positions of the Volkhov Front were located in the territory from Gontovaya Lipka to Lake Ilmen. It included units of the 59th, 8th and 54th armies, and the 14th Air Army. They consisted of 22 rifle divisions, 6 rifle and 4 tank brigades, 14 tank and self-propelled artillery regiments and battalions, 2 fortified areas, artillery, mortar and engineering units. The total number of troops on the Volkhov Front reached 260 thousand soldiers and officers.
The positions of the 2nd Baltic Front were located on the line from Lake Ilmen to Lake Neshchadra. It included units of the 6th, 10th Guards, 1st, 3rd Shock and 22nd Armies, 15th Air Army. The troops of the 2nd Baltic Front consisted of 45 rifle divisions, 3 rifle and 4 tank brigades, one fortified area, artillery and engineering units.
The total number of Soviet troops before the start of the “January Thunder” ranged from 900 thousand to 1 million 250 thousand people. Equipment: over 20 thousand guns and mortars, more than 1,500 tanks and self-propelled guns, 1,386 aircraft. Regular units of the Red Army were supported by partisan units. Only in the offensive positions of the Leningrad Front, 13 partisan brigades, with a total number of 35 thousand people, took part in the battles.
Hitler dreamed of sweeping Leningrad off the face of the earth. He realized that the city, which was the cradle of the revolution for the Soviet country, was of considerable importance in maintaining the morale of the Soviet state. He hoped to demoralize the country by destroying Leningrad. The Fuhrer was not interested in the military-industrial and cultural potential of the city. His goal was to force the population to leave the city, in the hope that the massive flow of refugees into the interior of the country to the east would cause discord and confusion in those cities where refugees would appear.
The blockade ring and the first attempts to break the siege
He managed to create a ring around the city. In this he was largely helped by Finnish troops, who closed the exit from the city to the north.
Since the autumn of 1941, the Soviet troops were faced with the task of breaking the blockade of the city at any cost. Attempts to open the ring and ensure communication between Leningrad and the rest of the country by land were made repeatedly.
Soviet troops carried out an offensive from the Sinyavinsk-Shlisselburg ledge along the southern coast of Ladoga. But the German occupiers managed to create powerful fortifications in this zone and the weakened, exhausted soldiers of the Soviet army were never able to move forward.
The Red Army troops concentrated on the left bank of the Neva on an elongated strip about 3 kilometers long and no more than a kilometer wide. This section of the front was called the Nevsky Piglet. The Germans spared no ammunition in shelling this area of land, and Soviet troops suffered numerous losses. In 2 years, the Soviet army lost 50 thousand soldiers on the Nevsky patch.
At the beginning of 1942, the front command attempted to liberate Leningrad from the siege ring with the forces of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts. However, the offensive movement of the Soviet troops was accompanied by huge losses, and ended in a crushing defeat of the 2nd Shock Army of the Volkhov Front.
The second attempt to break the blockade was called the Sinyavinsk operation. And although it did not achieve its goal, during this offensive operation the Reichstag’s “Northern Lights” plan, aimed at deepening the blockade, was thwarted.
In April-May 1942, the Germans tried to sink ships standing on the Neva. By the summer, the German command set as its goal to speed up military operations on the Leningrad Front and at the same time the bombing and artillery shelling of the city intensified.
To this end, the Germans deployed new artillery batteries equipped with heavy guns that fired at a distance of up to 25 km. The Nazis outlined several strategically important points in the city, which were fired on daily from these guns.
But Leningrad and its surroundings also managed to turn into a fortification area. Many engineering structures were created that made it possible to carry out a hidden regrouping of troops, bringing in reserves, and withdrawing soldiers from the front line. Thanks to these measures, the losses of Soviet troops decreased. Camouflage was organized, reconnaissance was streamlined.
Breaking the blockade
On the morning of January 12, 1943, artillery preparation began, which lasted 2 hours and 10 minutes, after which the 67th Army of the Leningrad Front and the 2nd Shock Army of the Volkhov Front launched a massive offensive. By the end of the day they had approached 3 km on each side. The next day, despite the stubborn confrontation of the Germans, the Red Army troops approached another 5-6 km. The distance was reduced by another 2 kilometers on January 14.
The Germans sought to hold the first and fifth workers' villages, strongholds on the flanks of the breakthrough, at any cost. They transferred reserve potential from ammunition and units here. The group located north of the villages tried to break through to its main forces.
On January 18, the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts closed in the area of workers' settlements, thereby depriving the German units of their strongholds. During the military operation, Shlisselburg and the entire southern coast of Lake Ladoga were cleared of Germans. Thanks to the broken corridor, land communication between the city and the country was resumed.
Attempts by the 67th and 2nd Shock armies to continue the offensive to the south were hampered by enemy forces, who regularly brought new forces into the Sinyavin area. This forced the Red Army troops to switch to defensive tactics.
On January 14, troops of the Leningrad, Volkhov and 2nd Baltic fronts launched an offensive planned by headquarters in the sector between Leningrad and Novgorod. The complete and final liberation of Leningrad from the blockade ring was carried out on January 21-25, when the armies of the Leningrad Front destroyed the Krasnoselsko-Ropshinsky fascist formation, and parts of the Volkhov Front liberated Novgorod. On January 27, the city celebrated its liberation with fireworks.
In memory of the breaking of the siege of Leningrad, the “Broken Ring” memorial was erected on the shore of Lake Ladoga.
There was a decisive change in the strategic situation on the Soviet-German front in favor of the Red Army. Under these conditions, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (SHC) decided to carry out an operation in January 1943 to break the blockade of Leningrad, codenamed “Iskra”. It involved troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, part of the forces of the Baltic Fleet and long-range aviation. By the beginning of the operation, the troops of the Leningrad Front with the main forces (42, 55 and 67 armies) defended Leningrad from the south and south-east at the line of Uritsk, Pushkin, south of Kolpino and further along the right bank of the Neva to Lake Ladoga (New Koshkino), and partly forces (23rd Army) covered the northern approaches to the city on the Karelian Isthmus. The troops of the Leningrad Front were separated from the troops of the Volkhov Front by a 15-kilometer corridor by the Shlisselburg-Sinyavinsky ledge, which closed the ring of the blockade of Leningrad from land. On the right wing of the Volkhov Front against the salient (from Lake Ladoga to the Kirov Railway) the 2nd Shock and 8th Armies were located.
The 18th Army (commanded by Colonel General G. Lindeman) of Army Group North, which had about 26 divisions, and on the Karelian Isthmus - more than 4 Finnish divisions, acted against the Soviet troops. The enemy had the strongest and densest grouping of troops in the Shlisselburg-Sinyavinsky ledge, where up to 5 fully equipped divisions, almost 700 guns and mortars, including six-barreled ones, up to 50 tanks and assault guns occupied the defense (History of the Second World War 1939-1945. - M.: Voenizdat, 1976. T. 6. P. 119). There were 4 divisions in the operational reserve. The actions of the troops were supported by aviation of the 1st Air Fleet.
The situation near Leningrad by January 1943
The enemy turned the Shlisselburg-Sinyavinsky ledge into a powerful field fortified area with an extensive system of engineering structures, anti-tank and anti-personnel obstacles, as well as continuous minefields. The basis of the defense was strong points and resistance centers created in areas accessible to the offensive and dominating the adjacent swampy and peat terrain. The troops' path was blocked by powerful bunkers and peat bogs, cut by deep ditches and covered with timber and earthen ramparts. The enemy used destroyed Soviet tanks, turning them into stationary firing points. They bordered the Sinyavinsky heights - the approaches, the base and the western slopes, as well as the Krugloya grove. Between strong points and resistance centers in difficult terrain, the enemy equipped one or two trenches for conducting an offensive.
The entire space was under flanking fire from neighboring strong points and resistance centers. In the depths of the ledge, strong points and resistance centers were also equipped, many of which were occupied by troops. The most heavily fortified line was the one that ran along the line Sinyavino, Rabochiy Poselok No. 1 and included two trenches. One trench was prepared for defense from the west, the second - from the east. In the area of the Kruglaya grove there were two earthen and wood ramparts 1-2 m wide and 1.5 m high, which were doused with water, which made them difficult to overcome. The shafts had embrasures for machine guns and guns.
Back on November 18, 1942, the commander of the Leningrad Front, the general, sent a report to the Supreme High Command Headquarters, in which it was proposed to carry out two operations east and west of Leningrad - Shlisselburg and Uritskaya with the aim of “lifting the blockade of Leningrad, ensuring the construction of a railway along the Ladoga Canal and thereby organizing normal communication Leningrad with the country, ensuring freedom of maneuver for the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts.
The Supreme Command headquarters, having considered this proposal, demanded that all attention be focused on breaking through the enemy defense in only one direction - the Shlisselburg direction, which would lead to the achievement of the goal by the shortest route.
On November 22, the commander of the Leningrad Front presented a revised operation plan to the Supreme Command Headquarters. It provided for counter strikes - Leningradsky from the west, Volkhovsky - from the east in the general direction of Sinyavino. Headquarters approved the presented plan on December 2. The coordination of the actions of both fronts was entrusted to the Marshal of the Soviet Union. Operation readiness - by January 1, 1943.
Specific tasks for the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts were defined in Directive No. 170703 of the Supreme Command Headquarters dated December 8, 1942. It demanded, through the joint efforts of the two fronts, to defeat the enemy grouping in the area of Lipka, Gaitolovo, Moscow Dubrovka, Shlisselburg and, thus, “break the siege of the mountains. Leningrad, complete the operation by the end of January 1943.” After this, moving on to a strong defense at the turn of the river. Moika, village Mikhailovsky, Tortolovo, ensure communications of the Leningrad Front and give the troops a 10-day rest. In the first half of February, it was prescribed to prepare and carry out an operation to defeat the enemy in the Mga area and clear the Kirov railway with access to the Voronovo, Sigolovo, Voitolovo, Voskresenskoye line. At the end of the Mginsk operation, the troops were to be transferred to winter quarters (Russian archive: Great Patriotic: Supreme Command Headquarters: Documents and materials: 1942. T. 16(5-2). - M.: TERRA, 1996. P. 464).
To carry out the operation, two shock groups were created: on the Volkhov Front - the 2nd Shock Army of the Lieutenant General, on the Leningrad Front - the 67th Army of the Major General. The strike group of the Leningrad Front had to cross the Neva along the ice, break through the defenses in the Moskovskaya Dubrovka, Shlisselburg sector, defeat the enemy dug in here, connect with the troops of the Volkhov Front and restore Leningrad’s connection with the mainland. In the future, it was planned that the formations of the 67th Army would reach the river line. Washing. The strike group of the Volkhov Front was supposed to break through the defenses in the Lipka, Gaitolovo sector (12 km wide) and, delivering the main blow to Sinyavino, capture the line of Rabochiy Poselok No. 1, Sinyavino, defeat the Sinyavino-Shlisselburg enemy group and join forces with the troops of the Leningrad Front. Securing the left flank of the 2nd Shock Army was entrusted to the General's 8th Army, which with its right-flank formations was supposed to advance in the direction of Tortolovo, the village. Mikhailovsky. Air support and cover for the troops was provided by the 13th and 14th Air Armies of the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts and the aviation of the Baltic Fleet (about 900 aircraft in total). Long-range aviation, coastal and naval artillery of the fleet (88 guns) were also involved in the operation.
The conduct of the operation of the strike group of the Volkhov Front, by decision of the Supreme High Command Headquarters, was entrusted to the commander of the 2nd Shock Army under the direct supervision of the deputy front commander, Lieutenant General. The operation of the strike group of the Leningrad Front was to be carried out by the commander of the 67th Army under the direct supervision of the front commander, Lieutenant General L.A. Govorova.
In preparation for the operation, the commanders of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, using their reserves and regroupings of formations from other directions, significantly strengthened the 67th and 2nd shock armies, decisively concentrating forces in the breakthrough areas. Soviet troops outnumbered the enemy here in infantry by 4.5 times, in artillery by 6-7 times, in tanks by 10 times, and in aircraft by 2 times. In the 67th Army, 1909 guns and mortars of 76 mm or more caliber were concentrated on a 13-kilometer breakthrough section, which made it possible to increase the artillery density to 146 guns and mortars per 1 km of front (Great Patriotic War. 1941-1945. Military-historical essays. Book two. P. 200). On the Volkhov Front, in the direction of the main attack in the breakthrough area of the 327th Infantry Division (width 1.5 km), the density of guns and mortars per 1 km of the front was 365 units, in the breakthrough area of the 376th Infantry Division (width 2 km) - 183, and in the auxiliary direction - 101 guns and mortars on 1 km of the front (Second shock in the battle for Leningrad / Compiled by V.A. Kuznetsov - L.: Lenizdat, 1983. P. 164).
Artillery preparation for the attack was planned to last 2 hours 20 minutes, support for the attack was planned using the method of a barrage of fire to a depth of 1 km, and then the method of sequential concentration of fire. In addition, it was planned to place barrage fire 200-250 m from the first enemy position when the attacking troops entered the ice. All tank units (on the Leningrad Front - 222 tanks and 37 armored vehicles, on the Volkhov Front - 217 tanks) were planned to be used for direct support of the infantry. For air defense (air defense) of the strike groups, the following were involved: on the Volkhov front - three anti-aircraft artillery divisions, six separate anti-aircraft divisions and two separate anti-aircraft railway batteries; on the Leningrad front - an anti-aircraft artillery division, an air defense regiment, six separate anti-aircraft artillery divisions, two separate anti-aircraft railway batteries, as well as four anti-aircraft artillery and four fighter aviation regiments from the Leningrad Air Defense Army.
Throughout December, the troops of the 2nd Shock and 67th armies were intensively preparing for the upcoming operation. All formations were equipped with personnel, military equipment and weapons. The troops accumulated from 2 to 5 rounds of ammunition, depending on the gun and mortar systems. Engineering units built 20 km of column tracks in the military rear, strengthened bridges and built new ones, and made passages in minefields (one per company). Particular attention was paid to the training of troops, commanders and staffs. Under the leadership of the army commanders, training camps and command and staff games were held. For each division in the rear, a terrain similar to that where the defense was to be broken through was selected. Here, training fields and towns were set up similar to enemy strongholds, where units and units learned to storm fortified positions and conduct offensive battles in the forest. Finally, live-fire exercises took place. The maps were carefully refined using aerial photography. All commanders, including companies and batteries, received photographic diagrams and corrected maps. In the divisions and units allocated for the breakthrough, assault detachments and barrier groups were created to make passages and destroy the most durable defensive structures.
Great importance was attached to operational camouflage. The regrouping of troops was carried out exclusively at night or in bad weather. For reconnaissance in force and night searches, only those units and units that were in direct contact with the enemy were involved. To hide preparations for a breakthrough from him, reconnaissance activities were intensified along the entire front, right up to Novgorod. A limited number of people participated in the development of the operation plan. All these measures played their role. The enemy only managed to establish shortly before the start of the operation that the troops were preparing for an attack, but he was unable to determine the time and force of the attack. The commander of the 26th Army Corps, General Leiser, taking this into account, proposed to the commander of the 18th Army, General Lindemann, to withdraw troops from Shlisselburg (Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg. Stuttgart, 1990. Bd. 6. S. 1091). However, he rejected this proposal.
The commanders of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, having analyzed the work done, came to the conclusion that the troops would be ready for the offensive by the deadline - January 1, 1943. Despite this, on December 27, 1942, they asked to set the start of the offensive between 10 - 12 January. The motivation was as follows: extremely unfavorable weather conditions, characterized by a prolonged thaw and, in connection with this, completely insufficient stability of the ice cover on the Neva and poor passability of the swamps.
At the beginning of January 1943, a joint meeting of the military councils of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts took place. It clarified the issues of interaction between front troops in the operation, the simultaneity of occupying the starting position, the beginning of artillery and aviation preparation, the time of attack of infantry and tanks, the conditional line of meeting of front troops - Workers' settlements No. 2 and 6, etc. At the same time, mutual identification signals were established for meeting, and it was also agreed that if the troops of one of the fronts, having reached the intended line, do not meet the troops of the other front, then they will continue the offensive until the actual meeting.
On January 6, the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Marshal K.E. Voroshilov reported to I.V. Stalin that “by all indications, the enemy is not yet aware of Iskra” (quoted from: Leningrad survived and won. - M., 2004. P. 136.). Such an optimistic assurance alarmed the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. He called the headquarters of the Voronezh Front, where the army general was at that time and said: “Voroshilov is in Leningrad as a representative of Headquarters. The State Defense Committee believes that you also need to go there. It is necessary to see on the spot whether everything has been done to ensure that Operation Iskra is successful” (quoted from: Zhukov G.K. Memoirs and Reflections. - M., 1992. T. 2. P. 197.).
On January 10, Army General G.K. Zhukov arrived at the headquarters of the Volkhov Front, and then got acquainted with the state of affairs in the 2nd shock and 8th armies. In the evening, Georgy Konstantinovich reports to the Supreme Command Headquarters: “Today I was at the command post of Romanovsky and Starikov, with whom I discussed in detail the situation and the decisions made. I also discussed the situation with the commander of the 128th Infantry Division and his decision to fight.
The main shortcomings in the decisions and support of the operation are:
- The divisions advancing in the general direction of Rabochiy Settlement No. 8, bypassing the Sinyavinsky resistance center, did not have tanks, and there was insufficient firepower concentrated at the Rabochiy Poselok No. 8 strong point. The lack of tanks and insufficient firepower did not guarantee a breakthrough.
- Interaction at the junctions of the army, formations and units has been poorly developed.
- The location of the divisional reserves in the battle formations was too close, and in essence the reserves turned into second echelons, canceled by your order. Their distance from the 1st echelon by 1-1.5 km could lead to large losses.
- 4. In addition, a number of minor tactical and technical shortcomings were discovered.
- 5. Comprehensive instructions were given to Afanasyev (pseudonym of K.A. Meretskov - Author) and commanders regarding all discovered shortcomings" (quoted from: Leningrad survived and won. P. 136).
Army General Zhukov asked to urgently send an aeronautical balloon detachment, one or two flights of spotter aircraft to the front, and additionally release the following amount of ammunition: 122-mm howitzer - 20 thousand; 152-mm cannon-howitzers - 15 thousand; 120 mm min - 60 thousand; M-30 shells - 1.5 thousand, M-20 - 3 thousand, M-13 - 3.5 thousand.
By order of Stalin, the front commanders immediately began to eliminate the shortcomings identified by Zhukov and once again worked out in detail the plan for the upcoming operation. However, it was not possible to completely eliminate all the shortcomings.
By the time the offensive began, the weather had deteriorated. Low clouds hung over the ground, and at times it snowed thickly. On the night of January 12, a combined group of night bombers carried out a massive raid on enemy artillery positions and headquarters in the breakthrough zone. At 9:30 a.m. artillery preparation began. 40 minutes before the start of the attack, attack aircraft in groups of six to eight aircraft struck enemy strongholds and batteries. At the end of the artillery preparation, the infantry, accompanied by a barrage of fire in the direction of the main attack and a consistent concentration of fire in auxiliary directions, moved to attack enemy positions. Despite the powerful artillery preparation, the enemy retained a lot of firepower and manpower. As a result, he put up fierce resistance.
Aviation of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, despite the low clouds, delivered continuous attacks on concentrations of enemy troops. In the offensive zone of the 67th Army, the greatest success was achieved by the general's 136th Infantry Division, which advanced in the Maryino area. Its units, having crossed the ice of the Neva, captured the first enemy trenches and began to move deeper into their defenses. The colonel's 268th Rifle Division also operated successfully, which also reached the left bank of the Neva and drove the enemy out of the 2nd Gorodok. However, on the right flank of the 67th Army, the enemy managed to stop the 45th Guards Rifle Division with dense artillery and mortar fire. A difficult situation developed on the left flank of the army, where the 86th Infantry Division was advancing. One of its regiments crossed the Neva, while the other two lay under enemy fire on the ice of the river. Units of the division, having suffered heavy losses, nevertheless managed to cross the Neva in the second half of the day on the site of the neighboring 136th Infantry Division and develop an offensive against Rabochiy Poselok No. 2. By the end of the day, the troops of the 67th Army managed to wedge deep into the enemy’s defenses up to 3 km.
B.V. Kotik, N.M. Kutuzov, V.I. Seleznev, L.V. Kabachek, Yu.A. Garikov, K.G. Molteninov, F.V. Savostyanov. Diorama of the museum-reserve “Breaking the Siege of Leningrad”, dedicated to the turning point in the history of the defense of Leningrad (the fifth attempt to break the blockade in 1.5 years) - Operation Iskra. Kirovsk, Kirovsky district, Leningrad region.
On the Volkhov Front, the advance of units of the 2nd Shock Army was slow and uneven. At the same time, the right-flank formations of the 8th Army also went on the offensive. By the end of the day, the troops of the 2nd Shock Army had advanced 2, and in some places 3 km, breaking through the first enemy position north and south of Rabochiy Poselok No. 8. Units of the 327th Infantry Division, after a stubborn battle, captured a heavily fortified resistance center - the Kruglaya Grove. To the right of the 327th Infantry Division, between the Kruglaya Grove and Rabochy Poselok No. 8, the 256th Infantry Division was advancing. The 372nd Infantry Division advanced directly to Rabochiy Poselok No. 8 and captured three trenches.
The enemy, trying to prevent a breakthrough of the defense, took measures to strengthen it. On January 13, units of the 61st, 69th and 5th Infantry Divisions were transferred to the area north of Sinyavino. In the area of Moscow Dubrovka, the enemy command carried out several counterattacks with the goal of breaking through to the Neva and cutting off the advancing group of the 67th Army. Fierce fighting continued in the army zone all day, as a result of which units of the 268th Infantry Division, which suffered heavy losses, were forced to retreat 1.5-2 km.
In the zone of the 2nd Shock Army, General Romanovsky on the morning of January 13 brought the 18th and 71st rifle divisions and the 98th tank brigade into battle from the second echelon. Units of this brigade broke through to the southern outskirts of Rabochy Poselok No. 5, but suffered significant losses, as they had to act in full view of the defending enemy.
Breaking the blockade of Leningrad. The Volkhov Front is advancing
On the morning of January 14, the commander of the 67th Army, General Dukhanov, introduced his second echelon into the battle, which was given the task of increasing the strike force of the formations advancing towards the troops of the Volkhov Front - on Rabochye Poselki No. 1 and No. 5. The heaviest battles took place in the Shlisselburg area, where the parts of the 86th Infantry Division Colonel and units of the 34th Separate Ski Brigade Lieutenant Colonel. This brigade managed to occupy the eastern part of the city, reach the Staro-Ladoga Canal and cut off the enemy’s escape route from Shlisselburg. Formations of the 2nd Shock Army completely blocked the enemy in Rabochy Poselok No. 8, reached the line of Rabochy Poselki No. 4 and No. 5, captured Podgornaya station and continued attacks southwest of the Krugloya Grove. By the end of the day on January 14, the troops of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts were only two kilometers from each other. The enemy units defending Lipki and Shlisselburg found themselves essentially isolated from their forces located in the areas of the 1st and 2nd Gorodki, Sinyavin and in the forest southeast of it.
By decision of the commander of the 2nd Shock Army, General Romanovsky, measures were taken to expand the breakthrough towards the flanks. The 128th Infantry Division and the 12th Ski Brigade, having made a roundabout maneuver along Lake Ladoga to the rear of the enemy defending Lipki, completed the encirclement of his units and then destroyed them. The 372nd Rifle Division, with the support of the 122nd Tank Brigade, occupied Rabochy Poselok No. 8 on January 15 and reached Rabochiy Poselok No. 1 by January 17. By this time, the Sinyavino station had been liberated, which significantly worsened the enemy’s position in the area of Rabochiy Poselok No. 5. By the end of the day, the 18th Infantry Division, supported by the 16th Tank Brigade, reached its outskirts.
The enemy, trying to prevent the connection of units of the 67th and 2nd Shock Armies, hastily transferred the 21st Infantry Division and the SS Polizei Division from the south, which immediately entered the battle. However, the enemy failed to stop the Soviet troops. On the morning of January 18, the 136th Rifle Division and the 61st Tank Brigade of the Leningrad Front broke into Rabochiy Poselok No. 5 from the west, linking up with units of the 18th Rifle Division of the 2nd Shock Army. In the area of Rabochiy Poselok No. 1, units of the 123rd Infantry Brigade of the Leningrad Front joined forces with units of the 372nd Infantry Division of the Volkhov Front. On the same day, units of the 86th Infantry Division and the 34th Separate Ski Brigade liberated Shlisselburg and cleared the entire southern coast of Lake Ladoga from the enemy.
Act on the unification of troops of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts
A corridor cut along the bank of the Neva, 8-11 km wide, restored direct land connections between Leningrad and the country. “I saw,” recalled Marshal G.K. Zhukov, - with what joy the soldiers of the fronts that broke the blockade rushed towards each other. Not paying attention to the enemy’s artillery shelling from the Sinyavinsky Heights, the soldiers hugged each other tightly like brothers. It was truly a hard-won joy!” (quoted from: Zhukov G.K. Memories and Reflections. In 3 vols. T. 2. P. 196).
Breaking the blockade of Leningrad. Meeting of troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts at Ropsha
On January 18, the State Defense Committee decided to build a railway south of Lake Ladoga. In just 19 days, a 33 km long railway line was built from the Polyana station of the Oktyabrskaya Railway to Shlisselburg. In the city area, under conditions of constant enemy air raids, railway troops and special formations of the People's Commissariat of Railways launched the construction of a temporary railway bridge 845 m long. Already on February 7, the first train arrived in Leningrad. The supply of electricity to the city was increased, water appeared, and the standards for the distribution of bread and other products were increased.
Meanwhile, the shock groups of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts continued their offensive. The left flank and center of the operational formation of the 2nd Shock Army was turned to the southwest - to the Sinyavinsky Heights, and parts of the right flank, together with the troops of the 67th Army of the Leningrad Front, continued to finish off the enemy in Rabochye Poselki and on the coast of Lake Ladoga. On January 20, Army General Zhukov reported to Stalin:
- Today I returned from Leningrad, where, together with Leonidov (pseudonym of L.A. Govorov - Author), Efremov, Petrov and Afanasyev, I worked out an operation plan to clear the river from the enemy. Neva and Kirov railway. According to preliminary calculations, the operation will begin on January 26. By this time we plan to finish with the enemy in the Sinyavino area and reach the river. Mga. I will report a detailed plan of action to you upon arrival in Moscow.
- After the breakthrough, Leonidov's and Afanasyev's units gained a foothold on the occupied lines, regrouped in a southerly direction, and from 12 o'clock on January 20 began an offensive to the south.
- To carry out the operation, Leonidov and Afanasyev need ammunition. I ask you to oblige Yakovlev to urgently supply the fronts with mines and shells in quantities according to my instructions” (quoted from: Leningrad survived and won. P. 138).
However, the further offensive of the troops of the 67th and 2nd Shock Armies to the south, towards Mga, did not develop. From January 19 to 30, the enemy transferred units of 5 divisions and a large amount of artillery to the Sinyavino area, which allowed him to hold the Sinyavino Heights.
To exclude possible attempts by the enemy to restore the blockade, the troops of the 67th and 2nd Shock Armies on January 30 went over to the defensive at the line north and east of the 2nd Gorodok, south of Rabochiy Poselok No. 6 and north of Sinyavino, west of Gontovaya Lipka and east of Gaitolovo. The troops of the 67th Army continued to hold a small bridgehead on the left bank of the Neva in the area of Moscow Dubrovka.
Breaking the blockade of Leningrad. January 1943
The breaking of the blockade of Leningrad was a turning point in the battle for the city on the Neva. With the completion of Operation Iskra, the initiative to conduct combat operations near Leningrad finally passed to the Soviet troops. The position of the city, the Leningrad Front and the Baltic Fleet improved dramatically. The threat of a connection between the Wehrmacht and Finnish troops was eliminated. The victory at Leningrad was highly praised by the allies of the Soviet Union. US President F. Roosevelt, on behalf of his people, sent a special letter to Leningrad “... in memory of its valiant warriors and its faithful men, women and children, who, being isolated by the invader from the rest of their people and despite constant bombing and untold suffering from cold, hunger and disease, successfully defended their beloved city during the critical period from September 8, 1941 to January 18, 1943 and thereby symbolized the undaunted spirit of the peoples of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and all the peoples of the world resisting the forces of aggression" (quoted in: Leningrad twice awarded. - L., 1945. P. 40).
Certificate of Leningrad from US President Franklin D. Roosevelt
The breakthrough of the siege of Leningrad demonstrated the increased level of military art of the Red Army. For the first time in the history of modern wars, the enemy, who had been blockading the largest city for a long time, was defeated near Leningrad, with an attack from the outside combined with a powerful blow from the besieged city. During Operation Iskra, 7 enemy divisions were destroyed. Its losses amounted to over 13 thousand people, and together with the wounded and missing - almost 30 thousand.
Captured German soldiers on the streets of Leningrad. 1943
Despite the fact that during Operation Iskra the enemy was driven back 10-12 km from the southern coast of Lake Ladoga, Leningrad still remained a front-line city. The victory was achieved at a high price. The losses of troops of the 67th and 13th air armies of the Leningrad Front amounted to almost 41.2 thousand people, including 12.3 thousand irrevocably, and the Volkhov Front (2nd shock, 8th, 14th air armies ) respectively - 73.8 thousand and 21.6 thousand people (Russia and the USSR in the wars of the 20th century: Statistical research. - M.: OLMA-PRESS, 2001. P. 283).
During the operation, Soviet troops gained significant experience in organizing and conducting an offensive in conditions of harsh snowy winters and wooded and swampy terrain and in breaking through heavily fortified enemy defenses. Experience has shown the need for careful planning of an artillery offensive and the movement of artillery during the battle, the implementation of bold and rapid artillery maneuvers and the widespread use of massive fire during the offensive, the allocation of guns, including large calibers, for direct fire at enemy fire weapons and defensive structures .
Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin, in an order dated January 25, 1943, thanked the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts for the successful military operations to break the blockade of Leningrad and congratulated them on their victory over the enemy. For the courage and heroism of the personnel, the 136th (commander Major General N.P. Simonyak) and 327th (commander Colonel) rifle divisions were transformed, respectively, into the 63rd and 64th Guards Rifle Divisions, 61st Tank Brigade (commander colonel) - to the 30th Guards Tank Brigade. About 19 thousand soldiers of the Leningrad, Volkhov fronts and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet were awarded orders and medals, and 25 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
Monument “Broken Ring” of the Green Belt of Glory of the Defenders of Leningrad. Authors of the memorial: the author of the idea of the monument, sculptor K.M. Simun, architect V.G. Filippov, design engineer I.A. Rybin. Opened October 29, 1966
Vladimir Daines, Candidate of Historical Sciences,
Professor of the Academy of Military Sciences, Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences, Reserve Colonel
Even before the German encirclement ring closed around Leningrad, the Soviet Headquarters of the Supreme High Command set the task of the 54th separate army to go on the offensive south of Lake Ladoga in the direction of the Mga station and restore the railway connection between Leningrad and the “Big Land”. While the army was concentrating, the Germans managed to capture Shlisselburg. The army's task now was to break the siege of Leningrad. On September 10, the offensive began. In the first two days, units of the 54th Army achieved some tactical successes, but already on September 12, the Germans launched powerful counterattacks and threw it back almost to its original positions.
In the following days, the 54th Army, prompted by Headquarters and the commander of the Leningrad Front G.K. Zhukov, repeatedly resumed attacks. The direction of the main attack changed several times (to Shlisselburg, then to Sinyavino). But there was no significant progress. On September 24, Headquarters assigned the commander of the 54th Army, Marshal G.I. Kulik is personally responsible for the success of the operation. But on September 26, the operation had to be stopped. Kulik was dismissed from office.
The commander of the Leningrad Front, Zhukov, believed that he could not advance with sufficient forces towards Kulik, as he was afraid of weakening the front forces that directly defended Leningrad. However, he tried with limited forces to make a hole in the German defenses. Parts of the troops of the Neva Operational Group (NOG) managed, at the cost of heavy losses, to capture and hold a small bridgehead on the banks of the Neva in the Moscow Dubrovka area, later known as the “Nevsky Piglet”.
The siege of Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) began on September 8, 1941. The city was surrounded by German, Finnish and Spanish troops, supported by volunteers from Europe, Italy and North Africa. Leningrad was not ready for a long siege - the city did not have sufficient supplies of food and fuel.
Lake Ladoga remained the only route of communication with Leningrad, but the capacity of this transport route, the famous “Road of Life,” was not enough to satisfy the needs of the city.
Terrible times came in Leningrad - people were dying of hunger and dystrophy, there was no hot water, rats were destroying food supplies and spreading infections, transport was at a standstill, and there was not enough medicine for the sick.
Due to frosty winters, water pipes froze and houses were left without water. There was a catastrophic shortage of fuel. There was no time to bury people - and the corpses lay right on the street.
At the very beginning of the blockade, the Badayevsky warehouses, where the city’s food supplies were stored, burned down. Residents of Leningrad, cut off from the rest of the world by German troops, could only count on a modest ration, consisting of practically nothing but bread, which was issued by ration cards. During the 872 days of the siege, more than a million people died, mostly from starvation.
Attempts to break the blockade were made several times.
In the fall of 1941, the 1st and 2nd Sinyavinsky operations were carried out, but both of them ended in failure and heavy losses. Two more operations were carried out in 1942, but they were also unsuccessful.
At the end of 1942, the military council of the Leningrad Front prepared plans for two offensive operations - Shlisselburg and Uritsk. The first was planned to take place in early December, and its tasks included lifting the blockade and building a railway. The Shlisselburg-Sinyavinsky ledge, turned by the enemy into a powerful fortified area, closed the blockade ring from land and separated the two Soviet fronts with a 15-kilometer corridor. During the Uritsk operation it was supposed to restore land communications with the Oranienbaum bridgehead, an area on the southern coast of the Gulf of Finland.
In the end, it was decided to abandon the Uritsky operation, and the Shlisselburg operation was renamed by Stalin as Operation Iskra - it was scheduled for early January 1943.
“By joint efforts of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts, defeat the enemy grouping in the area of Lipka, Gaitolovo, Moscow Dubrovka, Shlisselburg and, thus, break the siege of the mountains. Leningrad, complete the operation by the end of January 1943,”
In the first half of February 1943, it was planned to prepare and carry out an operation to defeat the enemy in the area of the village of Mga and clear the Kirov railway.
Preparation for the operation and training of troops lasted almost a month.
“The operation was going to be difficult... The army troops had to overcome a wide water barrier before contacting the enemy, then break through the strong enemy positional defense, which had been created and improved for about 16 months,” recalled the commander of the 67th Army, Mikhail Dukhanov. “In addition, we had to launch a frontal attack, since the conditions of the situation precluded maneuver. Taking into account all these circumstances, when preparing the operation, we paid a lot of attention to training troops to skillfully and quickly cross a wide water barrier in winter conditions and break through the enemy’s strong defenses.”
In total, more than 300 thousand soldiers, almost 5,000 guns and mortars, more than 600 tanks and 809 aircraft were involved in the operation. On the invaders' side - only about 60 thousand soldiers, 700 guns and mortars, about 50 tanks and self-propelled guns, 200 aircraft.
The start of the operation was postponed until January 12 - the rivers had not yet frozen sufficiently.
Troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts launched counter strikes in the direction of the village of Sinyavino. By evening they had advanced three kilometers towards each other from the east and west. By the end of the next day, despite enemy resistance, the distance between the armies was reduced to 5 km, and a day later - to two.
The enemy hastily transferred troops from other sectors of the front to strong points on the flanks of the breakthrough. Fierce fighting took place on the approaches to Shlisselburg. By the evening of January 15, Soviet troops made their way to the outskirts of the city.
By January 18, the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts were as close as possible to each other. In the villages near Shlisselburg they attacked the enemy over and over again.
On the morning of January 18, troops of the Leningrad Front stormed Workers' Village No. 5. A rifle division of the Volkhov Front made its way there from the east.
The fighters met. The blockade was broken.
The operation ended on January 30 - a corridor 8-11 km wide was formed along the banks of the Neva, which made it possible to restore Leningrad's land connection with the country.
The siege of Leningrad ended on January 27, 1944 - then the Red Army, with the help of Kronstadt artillery, forced the Nazis to retreat. On that day, fireworks rang out in the city, and all residents left their homes to celebrate the end of the siege. The symbol of victory was the lines of the Soviet poetess Vera Inber: “Glory to you, great city, / Which united the front and rear, / Which / Withstood unprecedented difficulties. Fought. Won".
In the Kirov district of the Leningrad region, in honor of the 75th anniversary of the breaking of the blockade, it is planned to open a panorama museum. In the first hall of the museum you can watch a video chronicle of attempts to break the blockade by Soviet troops and an animated film about the tragic days of the blockade. In the second hall with an area of 500 sq. m. there is a three-dimensional panorama that recreates as accurately as possible an episode of the decisive battle of Operation Iskra on January 13 on the Nevsky Patch near the village of Arbuzovo.
The technical opening of the new pavilion will take place on Thursday, January 18, on the 75th anniversary of the breaking of the siege of Leningrad. From January 27, the exhibition will be open to visitors.
On January 18, on Fontanka embankment, 21, the “Candle of Memory” event will take place - at 17:00 candles will be lit here in memory of the victims of the siege.
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