How China helped dushmans during the Afghan war. Foreign assistance to the Afghan mujahideen

“It seems that everything has been written in Russia about the war in Afghanistan. Except for one thing - about China’s participation in the war against the USSR on the territory of Afghanistan,” writes Pavel Pryanikov in the telegram channel Interpreter. “This is simply a fact of silence in our new history. Little by little they talk about this, but without the full picture.

And the picture is that in the first half of the war, until about 1985, the brunt of the war in Afghanistan against the USSR was borne by the Chinese, as well as Egypt, Iran and Saudi Arabia. At this stage, the United States was afraid to supply weapons with its own markings, so that the USSR would not make a claim on them, and in order to frame the war as an intraregional conflict. And American funding for the war in Afghanistan was minimal. For example, financial assistance to the Mujahideen from the United States in 1981-83 was at the level of $20-40 million per year.

But S. Arabia then allocated $200-300 million a year, and with this money weapons were purchased in China - mainly Soviet analogues (AK-47 assault rifles and other small arms, and even our Katyushas and surface-to-air missiles " - a replica of our "Strela-2"). And in Egypt, in general, the remains of Soviet weapons were purchased, which the USSR supplied there while it was friends with this country.

In 1983, China supplied the Mujahideen with 40 thousand tons of weapons and ammunition, and in 1985 - already 70 thousand tons. Largely thanks to the Chinese, the forces opposing the Soviet troops regularly and in sufficient quantities received not only small arms and grenades, but also the latest communications equipment, night sights, grenade launchers, anti-tank mines, 122 mm howitzers and even rocket launchers with a firing range of up to 15 kilometers .

The Afghan war then is an armed conflict not so much of the USSR and the local mujahideen, it is a war between the Soviet Union on the one hand and the unofficial alliance of China, Arab countries and the United States on the other.

There are also statistics on military advisers who trained the Mujahideen, and the leader here is not the USA at all: China - 844 advisers. France - 619, and only then by a wide margin the USA - 289 advisers.

The American Stingers, which greatly changed the course of the war, went to Afghanistan only in August-September 1986, at which time American funding for the Mujahideen increased significantly - to $600-700 million a year.And so - the Chinese, Saudis and Iranians bore the brunt of the first stage of the war against the USSR in Afghanistan.By the way, the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan began due to the fear that Amin in September 1979 decided to conclude a friendly and military alliance with China.

The topic of confrontation between the USSR and China in the 1960-1980s is generally almost taboo in Russian modern history."

It is generally accepted that the fatal war in Afghanistan of 1979-1989 was a local conflict between mujahideen revolutionaries and the official authorities of the country, which were openly supported by the Soviet leadership. However, judging by the number of parties involved in the showdown, this war may well be considered a world war. Various extremists, for example, Egyptian and Chinese, and entire states—about 55 countries in total—made their contribution to the fight in one way or another.

A schism within a schism

It would not be an exaggeration to say that during the war in Afghanistan the world was split into two camps. But the reason for this was not even the fighting itself - initially few people paid attention to the internal squabbles that had been going on since 1973.

The “red rag” was the entry of Soviet troops into the country. Moscow's decision divided the world community into those who considered it an invasion of a sovereign country, and those who appreciated the support of a friendly regime. Moreover, not everyone in the socialist camp reacted with understanding to such a struggle for ideology. The intentions of the Union were condemned in Yugoslavia and Romania, but the reaction of the Celestial Empire was harshest of all.

In particular, China perceived the direct participation of the USSR in the Afghan War as aggression against an independent state. In response, one of Beijing's first steps was to boycott the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow. But the PRC, of ​​course, did not limit itself to this.

Made in China

Political statements were not enough for the Chinese to express their position. As a result, Beijing supported the Mujahideen not only verbally, but also militarily.

According to media reports, more than 840 specialists from the Middle Kingdom were training Afghan rebels. Moreover, China began to supply the Mujahideen with weapons: first with licensed Kalashnikov assault rifles and grenades, then with 122-mm howitzers, rocket launchers and rockets for them.

In total, according to various information, more than 100 thousand tons of weapons were supplied to the Mujahideen from the PRC. Moreover, if in 1981 the Chinese sent 10 tons, then by 1985 - about 70 tons.

For the sake of the situation

Why China took such a step is easy to understand by looking at the foreign policy of the Celestial Empire at that time. Back in the 1950s, relations between Moscow and Beijing worsened. At first, the confrontation caused by de-Stalinization in the USSR and the course taken by Nikita Khrushchev towards “peaceful coexistence” with capitalist countries was ideological in nature. However, at its peak, the situation reached a military clash on Damansky Island in 1969.

By the 1980s, tensions between the countries had subsided a little, but not so much that China missed the opportunity for confrontation. In addition, Beijing had an excellent opportunity, through the wrong hands, but with Chinese weapons, to strengthen its positions on the southern borders of the Soviet Union.

The Chinese also had other factors that pushed them to participate in the Afghan conflict. By the beginning of the war, the PRC had already ceased to be a champion of the idea of ​​“Lenin’s sword.” Shortly before the entry of Soviet troops, Beijing began to move closer to Washington - at the end of 1978, a communique was signed between China and the United States on the establishment of diplomatic relations, after which the White House officially recognized the republic.

Today, it is the States that are considered the main sponsor of the Mujahideen. However, at the first stage of the war in Afghanistan, Washington was by no means eager to advertise its assistance, trying to frame what was happening as an intraregional conflict. At the same time, the United States managed to put the burden of support on its allies: long-standing Saudi Arabia and new one China. The Saudis initially allocated 200-300 million dollars a year for the war, and almost all of this money went to pay for weapons purchased from the Chinese.

So, on top of everything else, Beijing also managed to earn extra money from the war in Afghanistan. And fortunately for him, this had no consequences. Moreover, it was the end of the conflict that marked the beginning of the restoration of relations between the USSR and China. Even then, the role of the Middle Kingdom in the Afghan War began to be hushed up, and today, when the PRC is considered almost the most important strategic partner of Russia, almost no one remembers this at all.

In 2013, there will be big changes in Afghanistan associated with the withdrawal of foreign ISAF troops and the presidential elections in which Hamid Karzai will not stand as a candidate. A lot will change in the country in just a few months: the government, public sentiment, political conditions, the military-political situation. These changes raise certain concerns, since we are talking about a country in which security and stability have not yet been fully strengthened.

In principle, in general terms, almost all of this country’s main partners expressed their position on Afghanistan after the presidential elections and the withdrawal of foreign troops, the essence of which is that assistance in strengthening security will be provided even after the withdrawal of troops. More recently, through a group of experts, China expressed its position, in its typical form of a quiet but very weighty word.

Chinese definition

The Chinese approach differs significantly from popular assessments of the situation in Afghanistan, and the opinion of a group of Chinese experts fully confirms this. If in Western countries the military operation in Afghanistan is considered a fight against terrorism, then in China it is called a war, and one started by the United States. This war was not successful and was a complete failure politically. The coalition forces cannot win the war, but they cannot remain in the country any longer, and that is the only reason they are forced to leave in 2014, according to China.

Chinese experts do not see prospects for the continued presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan. If the United States tries to stay in Afghanistan for a long time, this will lead to “confusion,” which in the specific Chinese interpretation means: political instability, a sharp drop in the rate of economic development, increased drug production, a decline in the authority of the central government and the creation of “enclaves” of local government, as well as the strengthening of the Taliban.

The Chinese comrades, of course, have their own opinion and, by putting forward such a definition, they clearly show that they do not intend to join the American position. But at the same time, they do not condemn American policy in Afghanistan and demonstrate, as will be seen later, a pragmatic approach. The situation in Afghanistan to a certain extent affects Chinese border interests, especially those related to the XUAR, and Beijing is certainly interested in ending the war, for which China expresses its readiness to use its considerable capabilities.

China speaks for the SCO

Chinese experts, without a doubt, understand the wary attitude in the world towards Chinese foreign policy initiatives, and therefore propose a whole plan for a settlement in Afghanistan on behalf of a large regional organization - the SCO, that is, to a certain extent, on behalf of Russia.

The main features of the proposed settlement plan are as follows:

Participation in the policy of national reconciliation, which he recognizes as the main condition for the future of Afghanistan;
- SCO compliance with the principle of respect for the independence and sovereignty of Afghanistan, territorial integrity and recognition of the political system that it chooses itself, even if it is an undemocratic political system (Chinese experts believe that democratic values ​​do not meet the national interests of Afghanistan);
- involvement of the international community through bilateral relations (for example, Afghanistan - China, Afghanistan - Russia, etc.), through the UN and through the SCO;
- attracting Turkey and Iran as partners in resolving the situation in Afghanistan, as well as involving Pakistan as a partner, due to which China supports the admission of Pakistan to the SCO as an observer;
- China proposes to establish coordination between NATO and the SCO, but puts forward the requirement that NATO bases should not remain in the region, and the SCO countries should continue to support the Afghan National Army and police, while avoiding direct military intervention;
- maintaining stability in Pakistan is closely related to maintaining stability in Afghanistan;
- involvement of all political forces, representatives of nationalities and even representatives of influential tribes in the newly elected government of Afghanistan;
- as part of the settlement policy, there should be a lenient attitude towards the moderate Taliban, which should distance them from Al-Qaeda and narrow the political ground for terrorist organizations (according to Chinese experts, the majority of the Afghan Taliban are moderate);
- the policy of national reconciliation should rely on moderate “Afghanistan” Islam, and the SCO should influence the reconciliation process through its moderate Islamic figures;
- Russia plays a major role in the process of resolving the situation in Afghanistan.

Thus, China's position differs significantly from the modern approach to resolving the situation in Afghanistan. These differences boil down to the fact that China rejects the “constructive approach” to Afghan statehood, which was implemented at the Bonn Conference, and instead puts forward the priority of Afghan statehood and the political system in the form in which they will emerge during the internal political process. China rejects the priority of Western countries in Afghan policy and puts forward the priority of neighboring countries, both united in the SCO and those outside this organization. Thus, China adheres to the position that the Afghan settlement is a regional process.

Economics as a tool for settlement

The SCO should also provide greater economic support to Afghanistan, and Chinese experts consider the economy as an integral part of the settlement plan, based on their experience in the XUAR. The main features of economic assistance are as follows:

Supporting the new Afghan government in improving the lives of ordinary people through the export of consumer goods, which is important for eliminating the soil for terrorism, extremism and separatism;
- construction of facilities for the employment of Afghans (with the possible participation of Pakistan as a junior operating partner),
- providing economic support through the SCO, and the SCO must provide support without reservations (“The SCO must do everything possible to ensure that the world community truly fulfills its promise to Afghanistan and provides this country - Afghanistan - with the necessary support and assistance without any reservations”, - said one of the Chinese experts on Afghanistan);
- transfer to Afghanistan of Chinese experience in running small and medium-sized businesses as an alternative to drug production.

Although now the economic aspects are still poorly developed, this part of the program is still worth taking seriously, since China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, that is, the main trading partners, can take part in the economic development of Afghanistan. There are considerable opportunities for the implementation of economic programs through the SCO, the Customs Union, as well as through the highly influential regional economic organization CAREC, supported by ADB, the World Bank and UNDP, which in October 2012 adopted a large-scale plan for the development of transport communications in Central Asia.

The Chinese proposals are very interesting and deserve great attention, since they propose a long-term plan for resolving the situation through regional organizations, taking into account the interests of all parties, primarily Afghanistan (many versions of such plans had a serious drawback in that they actually excluded Afghanistan from the policy-making process), with the use of political and economic measures, rather than force, which have already shown very low effectiveness in Afghan conditions. This plan is attractive for its scale and thorough approach to resolving a complex political problem, and it is likely that the developments of Chinese experts can form the basis of a new policy for resolving the situation in Afghanistan.

27 years ago, in February 1989, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan ended. That same day, the head of the CIA station in Islamabad cabled the United States: “We have won.” For many years it was believed that for 10 years, Soviet soldiers fought exclusively with the Afghan Mujahideen, or at most with the popular resistance forces, poorly armed and scattered. In fact, Afghanistan has become another platform for confrontation between two world superpowers - the USA and the USSR, as before - Korea and Vietnam. During the Afghan campaign, the United States launched the secret Cyclone program, within the framework of which the “moderate Afghan opposition” received billions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of units of the latest weapons.

The birth of the "Cyclone"

On December 25, 1979, the political leadership of the USSR decided to launch a full-scale military invasion of Afghanistan - after repeated requests from the Afghan leadership. This decision entailed the largest (since the Cuban Missile Crisis) confrontation between the USSR and the West.

The United States responded immediately to the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. President Carter banned the export of grain and the sale of high-tech products to the Soviet Union, and blocked joint scientific, economic and cultural projects. The boycott of the 1980 Olympics became part of this sanctions policy. However, this was a significant, but only visible part of the response from the West. From 1979 until the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, Western countries and their allies supported Afghan militants financially and technically.

Despite the fact that the official start of the campaign in Afghanistan is dated December 25, the Soviet leadership found itself embroiled in an internal political crisis in this country back in the spring of 1979. The United States did not wait until the end of the year - already on July 3, 1979, President Carter signed a directive on secret assistance to opponents of the pro-Soviet regime. Adviser to the American President Zbigniew Brzezinski later explained the US strategy towards Afghanistan:

"We didn't push the Russians to intervene, but we deliberately increased the likelihood that they would... The covert operation was a great idea. It resulted in luring the Soviet Union into an Afghan trap."

The famous kiss between Brezhnev and Carter in Vienna after signing the SALT II treaty, June 1979 (the CIA is already sponsoring the Afghan opposition)

From that moment on, CIA funding was guaranteed to everyone who actively opposed the pro-Soviet regime of Hafizullah Amin and Nur Taraki. In early 1980, Carter declared that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was "the greatest threat to peace since World War II." There was an opportunity to act more openly. The first batch of weapons, consisting of rifles, arrived in Afghanistan on January 10, 1980. At the same time, an agreement was concluded with Saudi Arabia, which joined the anti-Soviet Washington-Islamabad axis.

The operation to finance and arm the Afghan Mujahideen was codenamed “Cyclone” and became one of the most secret and expensive CIA operations in the entire history of this secret service. By 1989, the Americans had spent at least $4 billion on the war with the Soviet Union by proxy.

Several senior American officials were directly responsible for financing the Mujahideen and supplying them with weapons as part of the operation. First of all, CIA Director William Casey, who led Reagan's election campaign and was not a career intelligence officer. But, like Reagan, he was known as a zealous anti-Soviet: he was sure that the USSR was behind the assassination attempt on Pope John Paul II, and he considered the war in Afghanistan to be the first step towards a march to the Indian Ocean. Casey made secret visits to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia every year, meeting with leaders of the anti-Soviet axis.

The second frontman was Congressman (and desperate rake) Charles Wilson. His activities formed the basis of the Hollywood film "Charlie Wilson's War", which was even nominated for an Oscar. Legend has it that Wilson decided to join the fight against the Union in Afghanistan after he was moved by seeing refugee camps in northern Pakistan. “Forty thousand more soldiers owe us advice,” Wilson allegedly said, comparing the losses suffered by the United States in Vietnam and the USSR in Afghanistan.

Congressman Charles Wilson poses with Afghan mujahideen

Pakistan factor

The peculiarity of “Cyclone” was that the United States acted not directly, but through a proxy country, which was played by Pakistan, which borders Afghanistan. Over 10 years, the war in Afghanistan claimed the lives of only three US citizens: the ambassadors to Pakistan and Afghanistan (both died in 1979) and one military adviser. Pakistan's interest in the war against the USSR in Afghanistan was understandable. In the event of a final victory of the pro-Soviet forces, its position became truly threatening - on the one hand stood India, which dreamed of solving the “Pakistan issue,” and on the other, Soviet-controlled Afghanistan.

There is a version that the final decision to provide assistance to the “Afghan opposition” from Pakistan was made thanks to General Akhtar Abdur Rahman Khan, head of the Pakistani intelligence service ISI. It was he who convinced Zia-ul-Haq to begin supporting the Mujahideen. The Pakistani dictator, having limited resources of his own, decided to play on the contradictions between the two superpowers. Zia understood how important he was for the United States and bargained with Carter regarding the volume of aid allocated: in early 1980, he rejected an offer for a tranche of $400 million over two years, demanding more.

And he waited. A more generous offer came from Reagan in 1981 - $3.2 billion over five years. The United States hoped that by receiving this money, Pakistan would stop its development of a nuclear bomb. President Zia-ul-Haq even gave “personal guarantees” to Vice President George W. Bush in 1984 that the country’s nuclear power would be used only for peaceful purposes. However, in 1998, the world learned that Pakistan had an atomic bomb.

President of Pakistan Zia-ul-Haq (1978-1988)

Funding mainly came through a network of NGOs, such as the Afghanistan Relief Committee (among the founders were former ambassadors and CIA officers) and the Free Afghanistan Committee (created on the personal initiative of Margaret Thatcher).

The United States allocated money as aid to Pakistan, and it, in turn, went into the hands of the ISI leadership, which distributed it among militant groups. Pakistani General Mohammed Yusuf spoke about help from overseas:

“The CIA’s tasks in Afghanistan were limited to the supply of weapons and military equipment, organizing the transportation of goods to Pakistan, providing funds for the purchase of weapons and their transportation ... training Pakistani instructors ... producing satellite photographs, as well as maps of operational planning and communications, consulting on technical issues ... "

Pakistan became the main stronghold of the Afghan Mujahideen. In the north-west of the country, the so-called. "tribal zone", a whole network of field camps developed, in which future militants were trained. The wounded were also treated here, the latest weapons from the United States arrived here, and American and Pakistani instructors taught them how to use them. Also, militant camps served as transit points from which caravans with weapons were sent to Afghanistan.

Pakistani troops also took part in the fight against Soviet troops. Often, Pakistani Air Force planes crossed the border into Afghanistan and attacked Soviet helicopters and bombers, after which they immediately retreated back to their territory. “I had to make sure that we did not provoke them too much. A war with the Soviets would mean the end of Pakistan and, possibly, a world war,” wrote General Yusuf.

Reagan Doctrine

In 1981, Ronald Reagan, known for his harsh anti-Soviet policies, came to power in the United States. He immediately described the Carter administration's response to the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan as too weak. From this moment on, the phase of active US presence in Afghan affairs begins. And this is being done more and more openly. For example, in 1983, Reagan personally received the leaders of Afghan militants at the White House (similar meetings were repeated at least twice more - in 1985 and 1987). Reagan then called his guests “the moral equivalent of the founding fathers of the United States.” Jalaluddin Haqqani, a field commander of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan, who was financially dependent not so much on the ISI and the CIA as on the government of Saudi Arabia, also took part in that meeting. Among his subordinates was the notorious Osama bin Laden.

The Americans used the opportunity to achieve destabilization in the USSR in connection with the Afghan war to the maximum. In October 1984, CIA Director William Casey, during a visit to Pakistan, suggested that the allies move the war to Soviet territory, using Afghanistan as a springboard. It was decided to act through Uzbekistan. According to the Washington Post, the CIA soon provided the Pakistanis with several thousand books for propaganda purposes among the residents of Uzbekistan - Korans and historical works dedicated to the “Uzbek national struggle” against the USSR.

President Reagan is surrounded by leaders of the Afghan Mujahideen. White House, 1983

Since 1985, the United States has been changing its tactics towards Soviet troops in Afghanistan. If previously the task was considered to be to inflict maximum damage on the Soviet side, then from that moment on the task was to force the USSR to leave Afghanistan defeated. This could only be achieved by increasing the supply of weapons. One of the American officials, Morton Abramowitz, who at that time headed the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the State Department, recalled:

“In 1985, we were really worried that the Mujahideen were losing, that their numbers were decreasing, that their units were disintegrating. The losses were high, and the damage they inflicted on Soviet troops was small.”

In March 1985, Reagan signed National Security Directive No. 166, which ordered that the Afghan problem be dealt with in the interests of the United States by "any means available." The new directive implied the supply of technologically new types of weapons to the rebels and a more active use of American intelligence.

​Afghan Mujahideen with Stinger

The Directive became a direct guide to action. Already in 1986, the Americans began supplying the Stinger anti-aircraft systems, which had just been put into service in the United States itself. The Stingers became a real headache for Soviet aviation. Since 1985, the volume of weapons supplied by the allies to Afghanistan has reached 85 thousand tons per year, which included long-range sniper rifles, rifle grenade launchers and much more. Some types of weapons, however, had to be purchased - from 1983 to 1987, Pakistan purchased 40 F-16 aircraft from the United States for $1.2 billion. Equally important for conducting combat operations against the USSR were satellite reconnaissance data from American space satellites and intelligence data on Soviet targets on the battlefield in Afghanistan.

Not the USA alone

Communist China also provided assistance to the militants by supplying copies of Soviet weapons. For example, the DShK heavy machine gun, the Mujahideen's favorite weapon against Soviet helicopters, was in most cases made in China, as were the old-style Kalashnikov assault rifles, 7.62 caliber. During the war, China invested about $400 million in the “alternative” Pakistan and sent about 300 of its military experts to train Afghans in Pakistani camps.

The option of involving the state of Israel in the campaign against the USSR in Afghanistan was even discussed. This decision was lobbied by Congressman Wilson, who, in his own words, was an “Israeli commando” in Congress. But Israel's accession to the coalition was blocked by Saudi Arabia.

A page of the British newspaper The Independent dedicated to the “anti-Soviet warrior” bin Laden

The Saudis have provided serious support to Islamist militants. The USSR was wedged deep into Asia and was very close to the most oil-rich Middle East, and this caused concern among the oil sheikhs. Arabian intelligence services helped find, recruit and pay volunteers for the war with the USSR. Osama bin Laden arrived in Afghanistan from Saudi Arabia, who had been in Pakistan since January 1980 and was mainly in charge of finances.

He managed to significantly improve the “quality” of the Mujahideen by attracting fanatical Muslim mercenaries who fought the Soviet troops more successfully than Afghan refugees from Pakistan. The same Congressman Wilson often flew to Riyadh when the Saudis were in no hurry to provide Pakistan with another tranche for military needs, after which sponsorship of the Afghan “opposition” through Islamabad was resumed.

By the end of the 80s, it became clear that American “friendship against a common enemy” with Islamic fundamentalists would not lead to anything good, as Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto prophetically said in a conversation with Reagan’s successor, Bush Sr.: “You have created Frankenstein.” ".

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It is generally accepted that the fatal war in Afghanistan of 1979-1989 was a local conflict between mujahideen revolutionaries and the official authorities of the country, which were openly supported by the Soviet leadership. However, judging by the number of parties involved in the showdown, this war may well be considered a world war. Various extremists, for example, Egyptian and Chinese, and entire states—about 55 countries in total—made their contribution to the fight in one way or another. A split within a split It would not be an exaggeration to say that during the war in Afghanistan the world split into two camps. But the reason for this was not even the fighting itself - initially few people paid attention to the internal squabbles that had been going on since 1973. The “red rag” was the entry of Soviet troops into the country. Moscow's decision divided the world community into those who considered it an invasion of a sovereign country, and those who appreciated the support of a friendly regime. Moreover, not everyone in the socialist camp reacted with understanding to such a struggle for ideology. The intentions of the Union were condemned in Yugoslavia and Romania, but the reaction of the Celestial Empire was harshest of all. In particular, China perceived the direct participation of the USSR in the Afghan War as aggression against an independent state. In response, one of Beijing's first steps was to boycott the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow. But the PRC, of ​​course, did not limit itself to this. Made in China Political statements were not enough for the Chinese to express their position. As a result, Beijing supported the Mujahideen not only verbally, but also militarily. According to media reports, more than 840 specialists from the Middle Kingdom were training Afghan rebels. Moreover, China began to supply the Mujahideen with weapons: first with licensed Kalashnikov assault rifles and grenades, then with 122-mm howitzers, rocket launchers and rockets for them. In total, according to various information, more than 100 thousand tons of weapons were supplied to the Mujahideen from the PRC. Moreover, if in 1981 the Chinese sent 10 tons, then by 1985 - about 70 tons. To please the situation Why China took such a step is easy to understand by looking at the foreign policy of the Celestial Empire at that time. Back in the 1950s, relations between Moscow and Beijing worsened. At first, the confrontation caused by de-Stalinization in the USSR and the course taken by Nikita Khrushchev towards “peaceful coexistence” with capitalist countries was ideological in nature. However, at its peak, the situation reached a military clash on Damansky Island in 1969. By the 1980s, tensions between the countries had subsided a little, but not so much that China missed the opportunity for confrontation. In addition, Beijing had an excellent opportunity, through the wrong hands, but with Chinese weapons, to strengthen its positions on the southern borders of the Soviet Union. The Chinese also had other factors that pushed them to participate in the Afghan conflict. By the beginning of the war, the PRC had already ceased to be a champion of the idea of ​​“Lenin’s sword.” Shortly before the entry of Soviet troops, Beijing began to move closer to Washington - at the end of 1978, a communique was signed between China and the United States on the establishment of diplomatic relations, after which the White House officially recognized the republic. Today, it is the States that are considered the main sponsor of the Mujahideen. However, at the first stage of the war in Afghanistan, Washington was by no means eager to advertise its assistance, trying to frame what was happening as an intraregional conflict. At the same time, the United States managed to put the burden of support on its allies: long-standing Saudi Arabia and new one China. The Saudis initially allocated 200-300 million dollars a year for the war, and almost all of this money went to pay for weapons purchased from the Chinese. So, on top of everything else, Beijing also managed to earn extra money from the war in Afghanistan. And fortunately for him, this had no consequences. Moreover, it was the end of the conflict that marked the beginning of the restoration of relations between the USSR and China. Even then, the role of the Middle Kingdom in the Afghan War began to be hushed up, and today, when the PRC is considered almost the most important strategic partner of Russia, almost no one remembers this at all.